BUDDHIST LOGIC

A Fresh Study
of
DHARAMKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

L. BAPAT

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(A FRESH STUDY OF DHARMAKĪRTI'S PHILOSOPHY)

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It is indeed true that accomplishment of any goal requires hard work, sincerity and dedication, but such an accomplishment of goal becomes possible and falls within one's reach if one proceeds with an appropriate method and with proper direction. These become available through proper guidance and supervision. Again, while accomplishing a difficult task varied and sometimes unexpected difficulties may arise which might make one to lose one's courage and slacken one's dedication. Under such a kind of circumstance a person not only giving guidance but also giving encouragement and moral support is required to be at hand. I am very grateful to my guide Prof. M.P. Marathe who not only guided me and supervised my work but also gave such a kind of requisite never-failing encouragement and moral support as well. It is his guidance and encouragement which made possible for me to accomplish my goal i.e. to complete my dissertation.

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LATA BAPAT

Contents

Introduction

The Purpose of the Present Study :

If one glances at the history of various thought-currents of the philosophy of Indian origin then one would notice that various concepts, problems, issues related and connected with human life in its varied aspects are discussed and considered at different levels by their respective adherents. Buddhism, one of the schools of Indian philosophy and its adherents are not an exception to this. Gautama, the Buddha and the founder of this trend of philosophical thought, attempted to discuss some of them. He tried to solve the issue of pain and suffering in human life by pointing out that *Tṛṣṇā* or excessive, uncontrolled and unregulated desire to retain, possess, acquire and amass anything and everything that one is tempted to, without rhyme or reason, is the root-cause of suffering coming to human lot. After his *Nirvāṇa* the councils were held to formulate and explicate what the Buddha has said. *Sutta Pītaka, Vinaya Pītaka* and *Abhidhamma Pītaka* are products of these councils. But what these councils presented are collections of what the Buddha is said to have said, especially in religious and ethical contexts. These collections were seen unable to bring out systematically the significance and relevance of Buddha's teching with reference to a given particular situation, context and the world. Hence, it was perhaps felt necessary to spell out the nature of that sort of world and life with

reference to which significance and relevance of Buddha's teaching could be hopefully brought out. If Buddha's teaching does not have any bearing on our life and if the world we live in is dissociated from it then interest in Buddha's thought is likely to be held to be of purely academic and historical nature. To bring out the significance and relevance of Buddha's philosophy, important doctrines, principles, concepts, issues and problems discussed by him should be considered in a systematic way. That is, his thoughts on various issues discussed by him should not merely be tabulated and enlisted. The interconnection between and among them should be so brought out that unity of his thought would not be missed. At the same time relevance of his thought should not remain confined only to particular sort of issues, contexts and situations.

At the hands of Buddhist philosophers of the systematic period of Buddhist philosophy this issue gathered considerable importance and they made an attempt to present Buddha's thought in a systematic and methodologically viable and respectable way. Nāgārjuna, Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, Diṅnāga, Dharmakīrti are some of the important Buddhist philosophers belonging to the systematic period of Buddhism. Each one of them seems to have made an attempt to bring out significance and relevance of Buddha's teching and yet each of them brought it forth in a different way. Naturally, these philosophers have an important role in the development of Buddhist philosophy. Hence, it is quite natural that a scholar interested in Buddhism and its development is attracted by these philosophers. Many scholars, ancient and modern, oriental and occidental have taken a keen intrest in studying and comprehending the philosophic thought of these philosophers. But at their hands some points of the thought of the Buddhist philosophers have come to be highlighted either in isolation from others or some major considerations have come unfortunately to be missed altogether. In attempts of this kind, however, certain features stand out in bolder relief. (1) It is very rarely, if at all, realised that the Buddhist philosophers belonging to systematic period were hardly interested in putting forth what could be held to be their own and novel philosophical position, no matter whether it had any connection with what the Buddha endeavoured to bring out notice or not. Their attempt needs rather to be understood as

directed at bringing to our notice such features of the thought of the Buddha which had hither to been missed, for whatever reason they so might have been. (2) Very often scholars have almost exclusively emphasised a certain doctrine, principle, issue or problem which in their view seems to have engaged attention of the given Buddhist philosophers of the systematic period. (3) Sometime else, a particular work by the given philosopher comes to be so heavily relied upon that it is that work alone is held to give us the essence of the philosophy of the concerned philosopher. (4) At some other time an inventory of the various problems and issues said to have been investigated into by the given philosopher comes to be presented in the vain hope of capturing the thought of the given philosopher or its unifying features. (5) Sometimes faulty and haphazard comparisons, misleading interpretations, confusing translations, sources removen from the original come so heavily to be relied upon that the amount of violence they introduce is hardly paid any serious attention to. (6) Lastly, the intellectual and cultural atmosphere in which the Buddha or the given Buddhist philospher endeavour to discuss a certain issue comes conveniently to be ignored, as if they have no philsophically significant role to play.

The philosophic enterprise on the part of number of Indian philosphers in general and that on the part of Buddhist philosophers of the systematic period in particular came, unfortunately, to be twisted and distorted, wittingly or unwittingly, at the hands of many interpreters and commentators of their thought. In consequence, such a bewildingly confusing mass of ideas and concepts, interpretotions and deductions have been given rise to that not only a novice but a sophomore as well is likely to come to his wit's end. In sueh a kind of circumstance and situation the ship of the hope of one's being able to discover, articulate unity of the thought of the given philosopher and its conceptual framework is bound to be wrecked on the sock of frustration, error and misunder standing.

On account ef these and similar reasons it becomes excedingly difficult to capature the philosophic thought and its unity of the given philosopher of Indian origin. This is true not only of philosophers belonging to non-Buddhistic trends of philosophic thought of Indian origin but those of Buddhist philosophy as well. Aśvaghoṣa, Nāgārjuna, Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, Diṅnāga, to name only some of

them have unfortunately fallen prey to this trend, and in consequence their philosophy has come to be distorted and misinterpreted. Dharmakīrti, one of the foremost Buddhist philosophers and logicians, too is not exception to this.

It is indeed true that Dharmakīrti has got a very important place in Indian philosophy in general and Buddhism in particular. But at the hands of number of scholars his philosophical thoughts are interpreted in such a way that it creates inconsistency in what he himself is said to have said. Further, its acceptibility remains questionable and its coherence with Buddhist approach and perspective remains indefensible.

In order not to arrive at auch an unpallatable consequence an attempt is made in the present work to articulate the conceptual fromwork of Dhamakīrti's philosophy to bring out unity of his philosophic thought. This is sought to be done not without investigating into his important thoughts, doctrines and concepts. But instead of stopping merely with an inventory into them an endeavour is made to bring them to bear upon one another in such a way that the conceptual framework of his philosophic thought and its unity would not escape from us, nor will they continue to elude our attention. Such a path not being an already trodden one, an altogether different attempt is made to understand some of the important contours of his philosophic thought and bring out their crucial and decisively significant implications. The effort has been considerably streneous, but not hopleessly unrewarding, we suppose. Along with articulating conceptual framework and unity of Dharmakīrti's philosophic thought we also attempt to bring out some of the key determiners of his philosophic enterprise.

In the present work an attempt has been made to point out that according to Dharmakīrti continued significance and relevance of Buddha's philosophy could be legitimately hoped to be brought out with reference to paradigmaticity of emprical world, the problem of pain and auffering coming to human lot and doctrine of *Anattā*. Without prjeudicing readers in any way and without anticipating or repeating our arguments later, we consider it necessary that we give an outline of the method of inquiry and investigation we have adopted in the present work. It is to this that we turn in the next section.

The Mothed of the Present Work :

As already pointed out, the aim of the present work is to bring out the conceptual framework of Dharmakīrti's philosophy in the light of which it should be possible for us to articulate unity of his philosophic thought and spell out its determining categories. None of these, however, is going to be presented before us just for asking. Nor is clue to any of them going to be provided from the extant writings on Dharmakīrti's philosophy. As pointed out earlier, a new pathway would have to be investigated and explored. To open this kind of possibility afresh instead of being guided by any extant interpretation of Dharmakīrti's philosophy, his works would have to be looked into with a view to investigating into some of the principal concepts, problems, issues, doctrines he has discussed in his various works in the context of different inquiries he has so patiently undertaken. For this any of his works, however, randomly selected, cannot be solely and exclusively relied upon. At the same time his prlncipal works such as *Pramāṇa-Vārtika, Nyāyabindu, Hetubindu* or subordinate works like *Vādanyāya, Saṁbandhaparīkṣā* or *Santānāntarasiddhi* cannot be hoped to be studied in isolation from the rest of them. Thoughts, concepts, problems, issues, doctrines, theories discussed in them would have to be brought to bear upon one another in such a way that the conceptual unity of his philosophic thought and the conceptual framework of it do not continue to elude our attention. With this end in view we shall hold his principal works like *Pramāṇa-Vārtika* and *Nyāyabindu* to be our major sources and seek to fortify and reinforce his considerations in them by those put forth in other major or mlnor works. An attempt of this kind is not directed at playing some of his works against others. This originates from the fact that some of his principal works like *Hetubindu,* or subordinate works like *Vādanyāya* ard explicitly given not to articulation of the general framework of his philosophy but rather to the detailed discussion of some selected family of problems, although their discussion is not sought to be isolated and segregated from the general framework spelt out so elaborately elsewhere by him. On the basis of this consideration our major emphasis would be upon his *Pramāṇavārtika* and *Nyāyabindu.* Our primary sources, however, are going to be the works of Dharmakīrti—major as well as minor, principal as well as subordinate—in the context of their being

brought to bear upon one another concurrently rather than hoped to be studied in isolation. The latter kind of exclusivist approach is sought to be given up primarily because it is academically unrewarding and its also being intellectually not only unpromising but positively harmful as well.

In addition, we also hope to profit, to the best of our ability from such other secondary sources as his own commentaries upon his works like *Svārthānumānapariccheda* of *Pramāṇavārtika*, or *Saṁbandhaparīkṣā*. Over and above this, to the extent to which it is necessary and helpful we wish also to draw upon such tierciary sources as commentaries of Dharmottara, Prajñākar Gupta, Manprathanandhi etc. upon the works of Dharmakīrti, as well as sub-commentaries upon them.

We do not wish to cast the net of our evidence wider than this compass, this being strong enough to be able to sustain the weight of conclusion we intend to arrive at. Within the framework of this sort of evidential net aided by our own comprehension and understanding of it we hope to discuss some of the salient features of of Dharmakīrti's philosophy, articulate his views on some of the major issues and spell out some of their erucial implications. Going about our business in the present work in this way we hope to present a sketch of the eonceptual framework of Dharmakīrti's philosophy, briefly discuss the determiners of it and bring out such a relationship between his engagement with ontological, epistemological, methodological and other issues.that in its light the principal concern of his philosophic enterprise would stand out in as bolder relief as it is normally capable of being presented and articulated. We hope to argue that in the light of such a concern it should no longer be havardous and risky to get to know what sort of philosophy he wishes to put forth before us in his various works and what their unifying tie would be. Likewise, we wish to point out that in its light the business of studying his major or minor works should no longer keep on posing the sort of difficulties this sort of attempt normally is seen to be giving rise to. In the present work we wish to operate with this end in view and within the framework of the above-mentioned evidential net. We earnestly hope that our methodological approach in our present study is not far too mistaken and does nor remain far from being satisfactory.

Brief Outline of the Work :

To be able to prepare the requisite kind of background for the sort of investigation into Dharmakīrti's philosophy that we wish to undertake in the following chapters we pay close attention in the first chapter to the principal ways in which his philosophy has variously come to be characterised and interpreted. We critically examine some prominent attempts to understand and make sense of his philosophic insights within the frameworks of such diverse philosophic positions as transcendental idealism, subjective idealism, critical realism, nominalism *Vijñānvāda* or even his being a *Sautrāntika*, articulate the reasons which might have led the respective scholars to consider his philosophy to be of any of these brands and argue that through these peepholes his philosophy cannot be properly comprehended in all its important contours and curvatures.

In the second chapter we being our fresh study of Dharmakīrti's philosophy with analysis of perceptual cognition as he presents it. There we argue that he has restricted his enquiry only to the veridical perception. We also attempt to bring out the role and significance of perception in epistemological enterprise according to Dharmakīrti and analyse the nature of the object of perception, viz. *Sva-lakṣaṇa*.

In the third chapter we proceed to consider Dharmakīrti's analysis of inferential cognition. We have tried to bring out, after Dharmakīrti, the distinction between significance of *Svārthānumāna* and *Parārthānumāna*. Again, we have brought out the distinction between *Trirūpa Liñga* and *Tridhātva* of *Liñga* and its key implications. In addition, we bring out Dharmakīrti's concept of *Vyāpti* as a rule rather than relation. We also discuss *Hetvābhāsa*. All these issues are discussed in the general context of controversy between *Nyāyāyikas* and Buddhists.

In the fourth chapter, we study further implications of Dharmakīrti's analysis of perception and inference with a view to comprehending lines of interconnection between them.

In the fifth chapter we take up the task of articulating the conceptual framework of Dharmakīrti's philosophy with a view to

bringing out unity of his thought. We argue that in this philosophic enterprise his principal concern seems to be to show that Buddha's philosophy is that of *Madhyamā-Pratipad* with reference to basis in the distinction between cognitive and justificatory epistemological problems, *Svalakṣaṇa* and *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*, and with reference to elaboration as to whether the Buddha accepted both change and continuity to be the structural features of the world etc.

In the sixth and the last chapter we take up the task of investigating into the determining categories of Dharmakīrt's philosophical enterprise and its conceptual framework. We argue that three principal considerations seem to have shaped Dharmakīrti's Philosophy : 1) Simplicity Principle, (2)Continued relevance of Buddha's philosophy in spite of passage of time and change in circumstano, and situations and (3) Not to miss and ignore insights of his predecessors. We also briefly outline some of the important oberrations which come to be given rise to and legitimise in the post-Dharmakīrti period of systematic Buddhism and give a brief sketch of some of their important implications and consequences, however unpallatable they might be held from the standpointof Dharmakīrti.

1

Some Characterisations of Dharmakīrti's Philosophy

Man's Curiosity and Inquisitiveness:

Man's curiosity and inquisitiveness are not of recent origin. They have kept man busy and restless, individually as well as collectively, ever since the dawn of human civilization. Things belonging to the external world, events, happenings and occurrences not only of the past and the present but also those which are likely to be in future, man's experiences, thoughts, actions, modes of organisation and fellowship, his comprehension and understanding, dreams, imaginations and aspirations —in short anything and everything that could be studied has fallen within their sweep. Thus, the campass and extent of them is so large that anything that could be considered to be conceivable and made an object of study, has hardly remained untouched and unaffected by them. It could be legitimately said that so long as man's quest and curiosity will continue to make him restless and inquisitive in this manner his search and enquiry cannot be stopped and so long as man's search of this kind continues there is every possibility of his being able to investigate newer and hence-to-forth

unknown ways and modes of comprehending and understanding things. Man's epistemological enterprise, in this way, has been as non-satiating and inconclusive as his strenuous attempts to be able to satiate his wants and desires. On the count of both of them, in his attempt to satisfy the present demand he comes to be confronted with another that springs up like a Jack in the box, often unexpectedly and surprisingly. As in the case of wants there is nothing like the last one, likewise in man's epistemological enterprise, there is nothing like the last question that he wishes to answer. The end of man's curiosity and inquisitiveness are as inconceivable as the last wave on sea.

Man's engaging himself in this kind of never satiating epistemological inquisitiveness has not, however, turned out to be aimless and fruitless. It has not remained merely to be a past-time for idlers and indolents. It has widened and deepened the horizon of the fund of knowledge and information at our disposal and yet it cannot be said with confidence that in this kind of enterprise man has never entered a blind allay or has not come to stumble upon an ice-berg of a formidable difficulty, if not of an impasse. But the hope of his being able to find a better and more efficient way of satiating his epistemological impulse has never taken a holiday, and inspite of intellectual pitfalls and errors, confusions and rigmaroles, bewitchments and roadblocks, man's quest and inquisitiveness have gone on, sometimes entering abysmally deep valleys of never-return once having entered and plunged in them, and, in turn, have brought in a mixed sense of light and darkness, fulfilment and misery, agony and ecstasy, promise and frustration. But with the hope that one day man would be able to sieze overall balance of light over darkness, enlightment over delusion, success over failure, man's inquisitiveness and curiosity have gone on unabated and unchecked. This not being an occasion and context to enquire whether man's epistemological enterprise of this kind has been or could be said to be more rewarding that frustrating and if so on what ground could this be justifiably held, we leave this stone presently to be unturned, especially because study of this king would be out of context so far as our present task is concerned.

Man's epistemological enterprise of this kind does not meet with its intended objective through his being endowed or gifted

with the kind of answers his queries and problems prompt him to elicit. He has very often than not to search and find them out and often this kind of seeking and finding does not run along smooth lines. Unexpected obstacles and difficulties make their headway. The information and comprehension that he seeks to gain does not come to him readymade. Nor do they come without toil and turmoil. There is no fixed peep-hole through which enlightenment alone is destined and guaranteed to come, come what may. This is so no matter whether man embarks upon his epistemological enterprise individually or collectively, competively or cooperatively, living in isolation and seclusion or whether being surrounded by fellowmen, no matter, again, whether he embarks upon this kind of enterprise as a layman or a philosopher, as a beginner or a sophomore.

It is not, again, the case that what man seeks and should seek to know is only the world around him, things, events and happenings of it—in short anything and everything that is apart from and external to him. Man has sought to know not only the world around him, his fellow-men and other creatures that cohabit the world with him but also his thoughts, actions and modes of fellowship. His inquisititiveness and enquiry have, thus, remained transitive, reflexive and even asymmetrical phenomena. He has sought to know not only any thing that is apart from him but also those things which are related with him-proximately or remotely, centrally or peripherally, directly or indirectly individually or collectively. There is, thus, nothing, no matter separable or distinguishable, past, present or future, inward or outward, that has not legitimately demanded and commanded attention of his epistemological enterprise and inquisitiveness and accordingly fallen within their purview.

Nonetheless, as remarked earlier this kind of epistemological enterprise on man's part does not come to be automatically gifted with favourable consequences. His understanding and comprehension of things and haPpenings around him do not come to be disclosed to him, without asking and without labour. Even his thoughts, actions, modes of fellowship do not spring from the oblivion of nothing. The task of understanding and comprehending

man's epistemological enterprise in general and that of a particular school of thought-philosophical or otherwise-or of a person—again, no matter whether of a thinker or a philosopher—remains a fairly complicated one. And yet, unless one understands the thought of a philosopher his success or failure in his epistemological as well as philosophical enterprise cannot be properly assessed. On this count merely enlisting the thoughts of a philosopher on various issues and problems, too, would not drive as anywhere. We would have to penetrate still deeper. As we shall soon point out, in our making sense of Dharmakīrti's philosophy, we come to be confronted with similar problems. This is not, however, something that is peculiar with his philosophy alone. The task of our being able to comprehend philosophy of any philosopher worth the name remains, in this way, to be a difficult one. It is nonetheless, no use to neglect or postpone the task. Nor would it be rewarding to accomplish it in whatever hap-hazard way one would be able to do so. For, this way of accomplishing it is more likely to turn out to be frustrating than rewarding.

Broad Relation Between the Thought and its Conceptual Framework:

Man, while living in society, has to face so many issues and problems. He comes in contact with different contexts and situations. He tries to solve of some these problems in order to get rid of them, i. e. in order solve, resolve or dissolve at least some of them. This kind of attempt of solving problems and issues facing him is reflected in his thoughts and actions. Concerning a given particular problem, he has his views and entertains certain concepts. He acts in the light of his comprehension and understanding which happen to be reflected in his thoughts, actions, and modes of fellowship which he adopts. His relation with himself, with nature and others influence him, while these, in turn, are influenced by his conception of himself, of others and of the world at large. The issues and problems he confronted with are, again, not restricted to a specific field alone. Rather, he happens to be confronted with various issues and problems relating to different fields. Accordingly, he has different thoughts and concepts regarding various issues and problems. Thus, a man, whether a layman or a philosopher, has various thoughts, concepts and views about issues and problems he comes to face.

Studying the scattered thoughts of somebody on various issues and problems, however, cannot be said to be a philosophically proper approach. What one needs to study is the thought of a given thinker or a philosopher in which his various thoughts concerning different problems come to bear upon and stand related with one another. The thought of a philosopher is not merely a pile or heap of his unrelated thoughts. Yet, thoughts do not come to be related with one another in the absence of an appropriate conceptual framework, in turn, does not emerge automatically. A conceptual framework of a given philosopher is relatedwith his understanding and comprehension on the one hand and with its determining categories on the other. His understanding and comprehension, the conceptual framework of his thought and its determining categories are soaked, in an important way in the intellectual, conceptual and cultural atmosphere of his time. They are affected by the thought of his predecessors and contemporaries and in turn affect the thought of his contemporaries and successors. A study in the thought of a philosopher is a very complicated task and it poses a number of problems. In what follows we are going to raise some of these problems with reference to Dharmakirti's philosophy with a view to properly understanding its framework, import and implications. Suffice it for the present, however, to note that what is important in case of a given philosopher is our studying his thought and unity of it and this task cannot be accomplished unless the conceptual framework, in which it was conceived, is understood and comprehended. While studying the conceptual framework of a philosopher it is necessary to pay attention to the different issues and problems discussed by him, the various concepts he has invoked, utilized and exploited as also possible lines of interconnection between them. Such a kind of enquiry is helpful in understanding the conceptual framework of the thought of a given philosopher. But neither the thought of a philosopher—uniting and unifying his various thought concerning different issues and problems—nor the conceptual framework of his thought could become available unless one pays a careful attention to his various thoughts, connected with different issues as also to the contexts and situations in which they were developed. The requisite and necessary information about his thoughts has very carefully to be collected and gathered. Different modes and channels of their

interconnction have to be discovered and what kind of unified thought they could be placing before us has to be investigated. This sort of information about the philosopher might be available either in works of other philosophers or may be available directly in the works of the philosopher himself. Such an information, further, may be scattered and often unconnected. But, as remarked earlier, such a kind of scattered information and unconnected concepts and views do not provide the conceptual framework of the thoughts of the given philosopher. It does not provide a principle which would unify these different and scattered thoughts and bits of information. Hence, under such circumstance it is not possible for anybody to understand the conceptual tframework of the the thoughts of the philosopher which is essential for the proper understanding of it and interconnection between them. If one enquires further and undertakes the painstaking investigations then one can find the general principles which might be said to unify these different thoughts in a fairly systematic and significant way. With the help of this sort of unification of different, scattered thoughts, one may have a clue regarding the framework of the thoughts of a given philosopher, But such a framework may not necessarily be the one the philosopher could be said to be desirous of adopting, for, by different principles of unification one may come to outline different unificatory avenues. This in turn, might pose a problem as to which of them was intended by the said philosopher and which of them, further, could be said to be helpful and beneficial for us in our task of understanding the thought of the philosopher. But more significantly, one has to see in what sort of conceptual and intellectual tradition was prevalent during the time in which his conceptual framework was reared and nurtured. One has also to inquire into its determining categories. The influence of his predecessors and contemporaries upon his thought has to be guaged. It is going through such a strenuous route that one can hope to discover and uncover the thought of a philosopher and its principal implications.

In understanding the thought of a philosopher the need and importance of its conceptual framework may be accepted. Likewise, it may be granted that such a conceptual framework comes to be

determined by its appropriate categories and determinants. The questions which crop up immediately are: First, where is one to find the conceptual framework of the thought of the philosopher? If it is not articulated by the concerned philosopher how is one to go about? What about its determining categories? Secondly, if such an information is not directly available from the philosopher concerned, how far can one rely on clues from other philosophers in this direction? Thirdly, if both these avenues are closed which mode should one adopt to get hold of the conceptual framework of the thought of a philosopher? In the absence of the philosoher himself or his contemporaries or even immediate successors supplying a clear clue to his thought and its conceptual framework the task of determining them becomes enormously complicated and difficult. Yet, taking into consideration the significance and importance of the thought of a philosopher, its conceptual framework and its determining categories, its study cannot be either neglected or ignored.

Difficulties In Articulating Dharmakīrti's Thought And Its Conceptual Framework :

In the case of Dharmakirti the kind of situation that has come to prevail is not far too different. Those who have attempted to fathom into the depth of his thought, have depended exclusively sometimes upon some of his works, not paying much attention as is necessary to be paid towards his other works. Very often than not his work called *Nyāya-bindu* has come to be exclusively relied upon. Such a trend is predominently noticeable in the study undertaken by Th. Stcherbatsky or Pt. Dalsukhdhaī Malvania. Other have relied upon some stray thoughts of Dharmakīrti gathered from with references to the writings of other philosophers, notably his adversaries from the *Nyāya* camp. Still others have sought to isolate his thought from the entire tradition of the Buddhist thought preceding him, while others have not paid much attention to the intellectual and cultural atmosphere prevalent during his time, the impact of his predecessors—from the camp of Buddism or otherwise—upon his thought, as also the impact of his thought upon his successors—to whichever school of the philosophical thought of Indian origin they owed their allegiance. Situation of this kind has come to prevail

mainly for the following reasons (a) Dharmakīrti is a voluminous writer and a number of philosophically important works are to his credit. (b) Very many of them of them were not easily available till recently, and although some were available scholars did not take enough labour to study them. (c) Even after his major works have now become available the sloth and indolence on the part of the concerned inquirers continues to hold its sway over their inclination. (d) Dharmakīrti belongs to a tradition which is antagonistic to the *Nyāya* tradition and after the discontinuation of the Buddhist tradition in the Indian subcontinent it is the latter tradition that has been holding its influence upon the philosophical and intellectual thought, and the scholars and inquirers are already considerably and even adversely influenced by it. (e) In the works of Dharmakīrti, he has hardly given a clear and direct clue to the conceptual framework of his thought. Nor has he explicitly articulated and outlined the categories determinative of it, This is not, however, to say that to a discerning inquirer they will never become available, whatever the varied and strenous way one strives and however sustained efforts one makes. But their easy non-availability has considerably deterred scholars from discovering them. This is not, of course, to say that if there are clear clues available in the writings of the concerned philosopher then people do not neglect them or distort them. We shall have an occasion later on to draw attention to at least two Important illustrations of this kind. (f) Even in the works of the contemporaries of Dharmakīrti or in those of his successors clear clues to the conceptual framework of his thought or its determining categories are not readily available. (h) At the hands of his adversaries his thought and conceptual framework have come to be so distorted and disfigured that through this peep-hole the accomplishment of the task of one's being able to guage Dharmakīrti's thought or determine its conceptual framework would be frought with frustration and disappointment.

A way out af Such a Situation:

In so far as this kind of situation come to prevail and given further that mere tabulation and documentation of the thoughts of a given philosopher on various issues and problems he tried to grapple with are not enough for one's being able to understand his

thought or determine its conceptual framework two principal options stand out. (i) Neglecting the works of the concerned philosopher and ignoring the task of articulating his thought or of determining its conceptual framework, or (ii) To utilize whatever clue that is readily available, and exploit it to the utmost possible extent with a view to one's getting hold of the thought of the philosopher concerned. Of these two options, concerning the former the less said the better. For, except the fact that interested people continue to be deprived of getting any clue to the thought of the given philosopher—not to talk of its conceptual framework being made available to them—no other consequence follows from it. On the count of the second option, however, it amounts to engineering an avenue of getting hold of the thought of the given philosopher at least indirectly and to exploiting its outcomes to the utmost extent, sometimes unmindful of the frightful consequences this mode of studying the thought of a given philosopher is dangerously prone to give rise to.

If one considers what such alternative avenues could be of one's coming to get hold of the thought of the given philosopher, then, as could be surmised four options stand out which have held their sway upon scholars and have exerted considerable influence upon their being able to guage the thought of the given philosopher or determine its conceptual framework. We shall have an occasion later on to point out that Dharmakīrti's philosophy has unfortunately come to be studied in this way and in turn has given rise to cosiderable difficulties. Without anticipating our later argument too much—especially with special reference to Dharmakīrti—suffice it for the present to note that there are four principal ways in which scholars attempt to get hold of the thought of a philosopher in the absence of a clear clue to this effect in the writings of the philosopher himself.

Four Avenues of Getting Hold of the Thought of A Philosopher :

These four significant alternative and yet luring considerations are :

1. Some of the scattered and unrelated thoughts of the philosopher or their engineered interrelation used as a peep-hole,

2. Comparison of some thoughts of the given philosopher with those of another's,

3. The throught of the philosopher attempted to be captured through what is believed to be his philosophic position; and,

4. The thought of the philosopher tried to be captured through the peep-hole of the impact of his predecessor/s upon him.

Let us briefly glance at some of the significant details about each of these considerations :

(1) The easiest way of studying the conceptual framework of the thought of a given philosopher is on the basis of clues available in his writings, which we can easily lay our hands upon. While studying the works of a given philosopher one may not only be concerned with the concepts invoked and the problems discussed but also whether the philosopher has at least indicated his philosophic position. Sometimes a philosopher clearly indicates what his philosophic position is. For example, Kant has indicated that his position is transcendental idealism.[1] But sometimes such a fact is not only not taken into account but is neglected or ignored. For instance, Nāgārjuna has stated that his position is middle path or *Madhymā Pratipad.*[2] But instead of taking this into account scholars interpret his philosophy differently. Sometines else, a philosopher may not indicate explicitly what his position is; but it may be reflected in various views that he advocates, issues he discusses and the concepts he invokes. Hence, they should be taken into account while formulating his philosophic position. For, they may be the consequences of the thought of the philosopher. Ignoring these consequences it is hardly appropriate to formulate the philosophic position of a given philosopher. Otherwise, the characterisation of the philosophic

1. Kant, *E. Critique of Pure Reason*; 7th edition, p. 439.

2. Nāgārjuna; *Mādhyamaka-śāstra*;

य: प्रतीत्यसमुत्पाद: शून्यतां ता प्रचक्ष्महे ।
सा प्रज्ञप्तिरुपादाय प्रतिपत्सैव मध्यमा ॥ ॥ 24.18 ॥

position that comes to be attempted is likely to remain to be a distorted picture. Hence, it is necessary to inquire whether the philosopher under consideration has indicated his own philosophic position in any of his writings or whether it is reflected in what he has said. It is also not unlikely that a philosopher might have held different positions at different stages of the development of his philosophic career. Under such circumstance it needs to be found out whether and to what extent they are consistent with one another, whether or to what extent they affect the general structure of the thought of the given philosopher. For, it may happen that in one of his texts, he holds a realistic position while in another he holds a nominalistic position. And holding nominalism and realism may not necessarily be inconsistent. It may, thus, happen that a philopher holds one position in one of his texts and another position in a different text without conflicting with the general structure of his thought.

While studying the conceptual framework of the philosopher, we should be more concerned with what he says or in fairness to him what he could be held to be saying. Very often, however, this kind of proximity to the thought of the philosopher is accomplished through the peep-hole of couple of unrelated concepts available in his writings and this sort of an effort fails to unfold the thought of a philosopher.

(2) It frequently happens that instead of the original writings of the philosopher, some secondary works, say *Bhāṣya or Vārtika* on that philosopher's writings are available to us. Likewise, sometimes a translation of his writings or an interpretation of his philosophy, in modern languages, are available to us. Such secondary sources are useful for two purposes :

(1) Sometimes, the original writings are available to us in the form of *Sūtras*. *Sūtras* being short and pithy they need further clarification and with the help of *Bhāṣya* and/or *Vārtika*, such a clarification may be available to us.

(2) Sometimes else, original writings that are available to us are not in the language familiar to us and under such circumstance reliance on translations and/or interpretations

that are available becomes and remains the only sources of our getting clue to the thought of the philosopher concerned. Often this sort of clue is used and exploited to characterise his philosophic position.

But such secondary writings, especially of the nature of translation and interpretations create some difficulties due to which proper understanding of the thought of the philosopher becomes extremely difficult, if not totally impossible. For, sometimes such characterisations of the philosophical position of a philosopher which comesto be put forth on the basis of such secondary sources or the sort of interconnections that come to be articulated among his views regarding number of problems originate from comparison of a thought of one philosopher with that of another. This tendency is predominently noticeable in the works at the hands of modern scholars. It is their general tendency to compare the philosophic position of one philosopher with that of others. Such comparisons are attempted especially when Indian philosophy is studied. Most of the classics of Indian philosophy are available in Sanskrit, Pālī, Tibetan or other languages. In order to introduce Indian philosophical thoughts to the Western people and to make such philosophy accessible to them, classical works by Indian philosophers are translated and their thoughts are interpreted. To make such thoughts comprehensible, scholars explain them in western philosophical concepts and frameworks. They compare thoughts of Indian philosophers with those of western philosophers. But, while doing this kind of study, some crucially important points are not taken into account. On the contrary, some superficial similarity is often relied upon. Thus, instead of making Indian philosophy interesting and respectable, scholars fail to present it without distortion. Hence, misleading kind of comparisons should be avoided. For, comparison, when it is made appropriately, is not useless and insignificant as it will help one to comprehend the thought of the philosopher concerned. But the way it is often embarked upon is misleading and improper. When one compares one philosopher's position with that of others, one should compare the framework and the thought of one philosopher with those of others. Instead of isolating disconnected thoughts or concepts for comparison it would be worthwhile to compare the thought of one philosopher with that of another, without segregating it from its conceptual

framework and delinking the conceptual framework from its determining categories. But very often these considerations do not count with scholars.

If one wants to compare one philosopher's position with that of others, it would be profitable to pay attention to the following points in addition to those mentioned in the previous paragraph :

1. The purpose or motif which might have led the philosopher to accept certain doctrine or principle.
2. The sort of rationale he gives for the sort of interconnection between the concepts he employs, problems he discusses and issues he grapples with.
3. The context within which certain concepts are employed and exploited, issues debated and controversies entered into. The general intellectual climate in which concepts, issues, problems etc. are utilized in a philosophical enterprise, has also a contribution to make.
4. The way in which the problem, view, doctrine or issue comes to be formulated also makes a difference in a philosophical context.

These points need to be taken into account, when one compares the thought of one philosopher with that of others.[3]

One would obviously expect that while comparing thought of a philosopher of Indian origin with that of a Western philosopher these points should be taken into account. The sort of comparisons that are made as a matter of fact, however, leave many things to be desired. Consequently, comparisons remain often partial, one-sided and hence misleading. It has been held that in comparison of Indian and Western philosophers at the hands of modern scholars there emerge three principal fallacies;

1) Tangible fallacy 2) Deceptive fallacy 3) Preliminary fallacy.[4]

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3. Conze, E.; *Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies*, p. 228
4. Ibid, p. 231.

Tangible fallacy arises when the form of an argument is, at least apparently, the same but motif or inspiration of advocating it is different. Deceptive fallacy arises when the form or content of an argument have similarity and on the basis of this kind of similarity one deals with the issue with reference to differential contexts. On closer scrutiny, however, one notices that there is nothing common in those arguments. Preliminary fallacy arises when the motif or the inspiration is the same but the ways of argumentation are different.

It is needless to discuss this issue here any further. What needs, however, to be understood is that whatever sort of comparison and in whichever way one feels like making it does not turn out to be either philosophically or intellectually rewarding.

3) Sometimes, the thought of the philosopher is sought to be captured through other dublous means. The different concepts he has employed, the various issues he has discussed and the different problems he has paid attention to are taken note of. Of them some concepts, problems, issues are picked up by whatever mode of selection that is found workable and then whatever sort of way they could be interconnected is considered to be the philosophic position of the said philosopher, no matter, however it might be at variance from the principal tenets of his philosophy. Sometimes some hap-hazard, contextually significant, partially accurate clues are taken to be the centrally important ones and formulating the philosphic position of the philospher concerned, in advance. On their basis the concepts, problems, issues he discusses are attempted to be interpreted in such a way that they would fit into the engineered philosophic position and through its spectrum the thought of the philosopher is sought to be captured. Going in this way a philosopher is often made to uphold that sort of a philosophical position that the scholars wish him to uphold, rather than explicating the one that he as a matter of fact upholds. It is not surprising that through such means number of philosophers come to be labelled as existentialists, idealists or pragmatists though they do not wish to champion and subscribe to any of such positions. The interconnections between concepts discussed by the philosopher that come to be worked out in this way neither unfold the conceptual

framework of the thought of the philosopher, nor do they spell out its determining categories. The thought of the philosopher that comes to be captured, connects with the arguments he employs and their form or content often superficially and misleadingly. It is not inquired whether the sort of philosophical position the philosopher is said to have held could be said to be rooted in the intellectual atmosphere prevalent at his time. Nor is it taken notice of whether the sort of thought he is said to have put forth could be said to be rooted in or making contact with the sort of cultural milieu that was available then. As a result of this the acceptability of such claims remains ridden with intuitive as well as methodological constraints. Hence, the philosophical position ascribed to the philosopher cannot be considered to be a legitimate way of capturing the thought of the philosopher.

4) Sometimes else, the thought of the philosopher is sought to be captured through the impact and influence of his predecessors upon him. It is quite natural that in discussing certain problems and issues he may be influenced by the then prevalent situation. He is influenced by thoughts of his predecessors. These predecessors may be of the school of which he himself is an adherent or may belong to a different school. His insight into the problem may be made available to him by the tradition to which he belongs. He may have adopted a certain methodology, in order to be consistent with his tradition on the one hand and to articulate his position with a view to defend it and to criticise that of opponents' on the other. When he is invoking certain concepts and explicating their interrelationship, they may be available to him via his predecessors. He either retains these concepts, modifies them or eliminates them. But he does not blindly accept or reject these concepts but accepts or rejects them on the basis of his reasoning. Hence, when we are going to study the thought of the given philosopher, it is necessary to know how far and to what extent he is influenced by his predecessors. It is also necessary to assess the impact of this kind of influence. Only when such an exercise is done that one can hope to connect it with his thought or his philosophic position. But very often the impact and influence of the predecessors are considered to be the sole and the decisive avenues of capturing his thought or articulating the conceptual frame work of it and thus the conch of

predecessors' impact is blown in such a way that is out of proportion. In this way the thought of the philosopher becomes more a matter of philosophical heredity rather than ingenuity of the concerned philosopher.

Various attempts have been made to study the philosophic positions of philosophers of Indian origin in general and of Buddhist philosophers in particular. Dharmakīrti, one of the Buddhist philosophers is not an exception to this. At the hands of modern scholars, his contemporaries and critics the thoughts of Dharmakīrti have been investigated into and discussed. These different efforts entertain different perspectives about his philosophy and doctrines. In the light of these perspectives, Dharmakīrti's philosophy is discussed, described and interpreted. These attempts have tried to characterise Dharmakīrti's philosophy in a particular way. His important doctrines are interpreted and presented in such a way that these doctrines and their interpretations could be fitted into that sort of characterization of his philosophy alone. Such a characterization is supposed to be the appropriate characterization of Dharmakīrti's philosophy. These scholars appear to decide the framework of Dharmakīrti's philosophy in advance and the important doctrines and concepts in his philosophy are articulated in such a way that the doctrines and their interpretations would appear to be inescapable implications of Dharmakīrti's philosophy. Scholars have tried to show that certain doctrines in Dharmakīrti's philosophical position and their interpretation are determined by some or the other characterization of his philosophical position, as if the philosophical position that he is said to be upholding is the fountain-head from which various concepts, doctrines, issues, problems that figure in his philosophy are inevitable consequences.

Classification of Perspectives About Dharmakīrti's Philosophy :

There are different characterisations that have come to be entertained, as a result of different endeavours of characterising Dharmakīrti's philosophical position. For the present purpose some representatives of them are selected. These characterisations are classified under five heads. Dharmakīrti's philosophic position is considered to be (a) transcendental idealism, (b) subjective idealism (c) critical realism, (d) nominalism, or else (e) he is held to be a ***Sautrāntika***.

In this chapter these perspectives are critically considered and in the light of this, it is pointed out that acceptance of these perspectives creates unsurmountable difficulties. Before critically examining these perspectives it will be proper and useful to consider on what ground different scholars put forth different characterisations of Dharmakīrti's philosophy. Of course, our aim is not to critically examine only the arguments advanced by the scholars in support of their position. In addition. we wish to show that such characterisations of his philosophy do not, unfortunately, enable one to get a proper insight into it. Hence, it is necessary to study Dharmakīrti's philosophy differently with a view to capturing his thought and articulating its conceptual framework.

Let us consider different perspectives about Dharmakīrti's philosophy in the same order in which they are mentioned above. Coming to the first interpretation of his philosophy.

(a) *Dharmakīrti'sPhilosophy is Transcendental Idealism* :

D.N. Shastri, Th. Stcherbatsky and C.L. Tripathi interpret Dharmakīrti's philosophy to be transcendental idealism. But before dealing with the issue, something about transcendental idealism. Formal, critical or transcendental idealisn is a view which on the one hand denies the possibility of gaining knowledge of the world by rational thought alone, and on the other hand denies the possibility of knowledge of the external world through mere sense experience. What it accepts is that unless our perception were organised within apriori intuitions of space and time in terms of rational principles such as the requirement that our perceptions refer to things in causal relation with one another, knowledge of objective world be impossible. Without intuitions of space and time and categories of understanding there would just be manifold of fluctuating sensations but no knowledge of the external world. Space and time and categories of understanding are conditions of the possibility of experience and not features of things as they are in themselves. We do not know whether things-in-themselves are in space and time and whether they form a causally interacting system. It is the transcendental self which synthesises spatio-temporal sensations and categories of understanding. About such a transcendenal self nothing else could be khown except that it is a condition of knowledge, for it is never an

object of knowledge. Empirical level selves and material things are equally real but only as appearances and knowledge we have at this level presupposes the synthesising activities of a transcendental self of which we can know nothing. It is called critical idealism because it seeks to refute problematic idealism of Descartes and dogmatic idealism of Berkeley.[5]

Arguments of D.N. Shastri, Th. Stcherbatsky and C.L. Tripathi seem to be going in the same direction. They argue that Dharmakīrti's philosophy is transcendental idealism. They advocate the following arguments :

(1) The theory of the universals is the heart of the philosophy of Buddhist schools. Buddhists hold that universals give form to our experience of the world but these universals are unreal. In so far as the empirical world comes to be experienced through the prisom of universals it becomes unreal. Nonetheless, empirical world has a core of an ultimate reality and hence is real. But this reality is not manifested in space and time and it is also without property. Diṅnāga school in general and particularly Dharmakīrti advocates such a view, Therefore, his philosophy could be called Transcendental idealism.[6]

Thus, it is argued that empirical world does not exist as it appears to us, because universals which give form to the objects of our experience are mental. Therefore, the theory of Diṅnāga school can be deservedly called to be transcendental idealism.

(2) Among the determinate perception (*savikalpa pratyakṣa*) and indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpa pratyakṣa*), universal is comprehended by determinate perception and particulars are comprehended by determinate perception. The determinate perception follows an indeterminate perception and hence has a basis of reality Nonetheless, a generalized form or the world of appearance is not real. It does not exist externally, as it is experienced, Hence,

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5. Edward, Paul; *The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*, Vol. 4, p. 113.

6. Shastri, D.N., *The Philosophy of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Its Conflict with Buddhist Diṅnāga School* pp. 369-70.

Diṅnāga's theory and along with it, Dharmakīrti's philosophic position, he being the follower of Diṅnāga, is designated as transcendental idealism.[7]

The characterisation of Dharmakīrit's philosophy as transcendental idealism is reinforced by making comparison between the philosophy of Kant and that of Dharmakīrti. On the basis of such a comparison, these scholars appear to be making their claim about Dharmakīrti's philosophy more strengthened. They compare following points of the thought of Kant and that of Dharmakīrti/School of Diṅnāga.

It is argued that Kant holds that the knower gives form to the external world i.e. thing-in-itself. Thing-in-itself provides sense-data. He accepts that form or world of appearance is mind-determined. Form and sense-data are essential factors of our knowledge. Kant called his philosophy transcendental idealism, because according to him, forms, with the help of which empirical objects are perceived, are subjective, and do not belong to thing-in-itself. Thing-in-itself alone is real, although they are not objects of knowledge.

Likewise, Diṅnāga also accepts that there are only two kinds of objects : *Sva-lakṣaṇa* and *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*. *Svalakṣaṇas* alone are real and *Sāmànya-lakṣaṇas* are thought constructions. Hence the philosophy of Diṅnāga, like that of Kant, can be called Transcendental idealism.[8] Continuing in the same vien, it is argued that Kant holds that external world is not in space and time, although space and time are the conditions of the possibility of our knowledge of it. External world is not experienced as it is in-itself. And what appears to us is the thought-construction which is constructed out of the material provided by experience of the world. Thus, Kant follows middle way between naive realists who hold that object is perceived as it is in-itself idealists who hold that external world is nothing but imposition of our mind. Like Kant, Diṅnāga accepts that external reality, i.e. *Sva-lakṣaṇas* is not in space and time, do not

7. *Ibid*, p. 309.

8. *Ibid*, pp. 43-44.

have any sharable property in order to be *Svalakṣaṇas* and hence are not spatio-temporal. They are comprehended by pure sensation and not by thought. The determinate perception follows pure sensation. It gives generalized form to the data provided by pure sensation. Thus, generalized form is not in the external world but is in the mind. Thus, Diṅnāga like Kant, follows middle way between the naive realists and idealists.[9]

(3) Th. Stcherbatsky does not directly claim that Dharmakīrti's philosophy is a transcendental idealism. Nonetheless, his intention is the same. For, according to him, although there may be only scant parallel lines between Dharmakīrti and Kant yet on the count of the general thrust of the whole argument there is a great similarity.[10] He argues that like Diṅnāga, Kant accepts that there are two means of knowledge and though there is a radical difference between the two, empirically they mix up. According to Kant, the thing-in-itself is not cognizable, because it is the limit of our cognition. Likewise, Buddhists accept that ultimate particular is not congnisable through determinate perception. Kant accepts that ultimate reality exists and is efficient. Likewise, Dharmakīrti accepts that ultimate particulars alone are ultimate reality because they alone have efficiency.

This is the argument advocated by Stcherbatsky. Of course, he has pointed out the difference between 'thing-in-itself' of Kant and 'own essence' of Dharmakīrti. But this difference, according to him, need not necessarily spoil the similarity of the whole conception.

4) Diṅnāga says that object of inference is ideal construction and the relation of *Sādhya* and *Hetu*, which is the basis of inference, is nothing but imposition of mind, having no reference to external world. Like Kant, Dharmakīrti holds that this relation is governed by identity and causality which are again impositions of mind. It is further claimed that from this it follows, without any doubt, that

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9. *Ibid*, pp. 2-4.

10. Stcherbatsky, Th.; *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. II, p. 202.

11. *Ibid*; pp. 200-201.

Buddhists hold the idealistic theory of inference which is nearer to the theory of Kant.[12]

On the basis of these and similar other arguments scholars mentioned above attempt to make their claim plausible and acceptable. The claim under consideration, which is meant to characterise Dharmakīrti's philosophic position, lebels it to be transcendental idealism. With respect to this characterisation the following three points are required to be taken into consideration :

1) Is this claim tenable and defensible ?
2) Is this position consistent with what Dharmakīrti has to say ?
3) Which difficulties will arise, if this position is accepted as the position of Dharmakīrti ?

We will discuss these points in the same sequential order.

It is already pointed out that these scholars have advanced different arguments on different grounds. These arguments tend to create certain impressions. These impressions are : 1) If a person accepts two worlds : real world and unreal world or ultimate world and world of appearance, he upholds transcendental idealism. 2) If a person accepts that ultimate reality is made up of non-spatio-temporal unique particulars and everything that we cognise is not of this nature, then he subscribes to transcendental idealism. 3) If he accepts that an object of inference could be a mental-construction and that the relation between *Sādhya* and *Hetu* could be determined by thought alone, his philosophic position is transcendental idealism.

But none of these points seem to provide the necessary and adequate ground of one's accepting or holding Dharmakīrti's position to be that of transcendental idealism. For, first, transcendental idealism is an epistemological position. One who inquires into perceptual and rational cognitions need not subscribe to two worlds ontologically. Though Dharmakīrti accepts the reality of the exter-

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12. Tripathi, C.L., *The Problem of Knowledge in Yogācāra Buddhism*, pp. 204-205.

nal world he denies that it is cognized always as it is in-itself. This does not, however, lead him to accepting ontological two worlds. Secondly, his philosophy need not necessarily discuss the issue whether every object of cognition is in space and time though it only asserts that an object of experience is in the external world and that it is not always cognized as it is in-itself. Hence, the consideration whether every object of cognition is in space and time is irrelevant. Thirdly, an object of perceptual cognition need not necessarily determine the structure of inference, nor is examination of the structure of inferential cognition sufficient to determine whether a given philosophic position is realistic or idealistic.

Another ground that they have advanced, in order to reinforce their claim about Dharmakīrti's philosophy is of comparing some tenets of his philosophy with those of someone else's. By comparing philosophic position of Dharmakīrti with that of Kant, they have tried to make their claim stronger. But this comparison does not seem to hold good. For, there is a fundamental difference between the philosophy of Kant and that of Dharmakīrti. The basic problem for Kant is, how does the sort of knowledge we have become possible ? He is dealing with the issue : what are the conditions of the possibility of knowledge ? This sort of inquiry might have given rise to his position, which is known as transcendental idealism. On the contrary, the position of Dharmakīrti emerges, as will be argued in the sequel, partly as a consequence of his commitment to some of the views of his predecessors and partly out of his commitment to make Buddha's teaching comprehensible as also as a consequence of his methodological interest.

Kant's phenomenal world and the neumenal world are consequences of his adoption of certain cognitive epistemological views and the possibility of knowledge on our part. On the contrary, Dharmakīrti's distinction between *Svalakṣaṇa* and *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* arises in the field of cognitive and justificatory epistemology on the one hand and on the basis of two-fold cognitions we come to have on the other.

Kant's intellect and understanding are faculties of mind, conditions of the possibility of knowledge, and not two means of knowledge. On the contrary, according to Dharmakīrti perception and

inference are two modes of knowledge with the help of which alone we come to know whatever we do. Likewise, Kant's thing-in-itself cannot be compared with Dharmakīrti's *Sva-lakṣaṇa* because Kant's thing-in-itself is not in space and time and is perceptually incognizable. On the contrary, Dharmakīrti's *Sva-lakṣaṇa* can be locatable in space and time and is cognized by perception alone. Thus, there is a fundamental difference between the philosophy of Kant and that of Dharamkrīti. Hence, their philosophies cannot be compared without violence to our understanding of both of them. This difference in their philosophy is not merely superficial. There is also a difference with regard to the context. The respective differential contexts have very significant role in shaping their philosophical positions.

Hence, the arguments that are advanced are not necessary and adequate for enabling one to hold that Dharmakīrti's philosophical position is transcendental idealism. Another aspect of these arguments that remains to be inquired into is whether these arguments could be said to be consistent with Dharmakīrti philosophy or with what Dharmakīrti has said. One's affirmative answer to the question is likely to bring in a balance of error and confusion over clarification with regard to one's understanding of Dharmakīrti's philosophy. Indeed, Dharmakīrti accepts *Sva-lakṣaṇa* and *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*. But they do not necessarily imply two different worlds, i.e. the real world and the unreal world or the world of appearance and the transcendental world. It is possible to show that perception and inference, according to Dharmakīrti bring forth what could be said to be necessarily non-sharable and sharable aspects of things respectively as necessary and sufficient conditions of the operativeness of them at all, and accordingly could be said to make two descriptions of the same world available to us through differential data that they furnish. Likewise, the world that Dharmakīrti accepts is not any kind of transcendental world. Rather, it is an empirical world in which we normally live. Accordingly, Dharmakīrti's *Sva-lakṣaṇa* is not a transcendental but is rather an empirical object. Likewise, identity, causality and the relation between *Sādhya* and *Hetu* are not, according to Dharmakīrti, impositions of our mind. We shall have, later on, an occasion to explain these points in their proper contexts.

If disregarding this it is accepted for the sake of an argument that Dharmakīrti's philosophy is transcendental idealism, the

following difficulties may arise. If Dharmakīrti is said to hold that of the two principal sort of knowables that he accepts, viz. *Sva-lakṣaṇa* and *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*, and if *Svalakṣaṇa* is not cognizable through perception as well, then since *Anumāna*, as he holds, can never enable us to cognize *Svalakṣaṇas* and *Svalakṣaṇas* would remain unknown and unknowable. This is something that is foreign to Dharmakīrti's contention. Further, at the hands of Dharmakīrti the epistemological enterprise is not an end in-itself. It is an instrument (*upāya*) of our being able to realise those aspirations and goals (*puruṣārtha*) the realisation of which is directly linked with our being human at all, although this is sought to be done within the framework of the teaching of the Buddha as we shall endeavour to argue in the fifth chapter. If on Dharmakīrti's philosophy *Sva-lakṣaṇa* remain non-cognisable then our cognition and comprehension of them can hardly be connected with our being able to realise such goals and aspirations, the realisation of which is determinative of our being human at all. And if there is no link between our epistemological enterprise and our being human then it can hardly be held that our epistemological enterprise is instrumental to the realisation of goals which would make us human. Further, it is extremely hard to make sense of this view of Dharmakīrti accepting that his philosophic position is transcendental idealism. Neglecting this view of his at the cost of holding his position to be transcendental idealism would amount to bringing in a formidable distortion into his philosophy.

Second difficulty is that, it will be impossible to explain the significance of experience, action and thought which Dharmakīrti labours hard to explain. What sort of philosophical position would it be that seeks to sever itself from the consideration of our experience, life and action? His detailed consideration of cognition, his severance of perceptual object from the linguistic and ratiocinative mode of communication that we generally adhere to, his insistence upon primacy of practice would all remain unintelligible if his philosophic position is formulated in such a way as to disconnect it from them. If, on the contrary, he is said to be considering significance of experience, action and thought in human life without paying attention to facts concerning them, his position could at most be Utopian. If Dharmakīrti's position is interpreted to be transcen-

dental or any other kind of idealism for that matter it is hard to make sense of his insistence upon primacy of practice and thereby his emphasis that our life and thought cannot be severed from the modes of action that we adopt in our life. Nor can paradigmaticity of empirical world, in his philosophy as we shall make out a case for it in the fifth chapter, be ignored in preference to the theory of two worlds to suit the accepted characterisation of transcendental idealism. Further, at the hands or Dharmakīrti the theoretical and practical aspects of our epistemological inquiry are not sought to be compartmantalized. Rather, they are sought to be brought to bear upon each other. This kind of approach would not perhaps be available provided his philosophy is understood to be transcendental idealism.

Thirdly, his indebtedness to some of his predecessors is understandable. His subscription to some of the dominant tenets of the Buddhist philosophic tradition too is sensible as far as it goes. But this can hardly be a ground to hold that therefore his philosophic position should be nothing else but a replica of that of his predecessors like Diṅnāga. Were it not so, he would not have differed so markedly as he does from Diṅnāga, no matter whether it is a case of perceptual or inferential cognition, or that of interrelationship between them. Lastly, as we shall have an occasion to argue later on, Dharmakīrti's upholding paradigmaticity of empirical world is very difficult to make satisfactory sense of, if his philosophic position is taken to be transcendental idealism.

Thus, if we accept, Dharmakīrti's philosophy as transcendental idealism, we will not be in a position to understand the implications of the goal of *Puruṣārtha Siddhi*, and Dharmakīrti accepts paradigmaticity of empirical world with reference to which Buddha's silence and message are sought to be shown to be significant. His distinction between *Sva-lakṣaṇa* and *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* too, would not remain intelligible with reference to empirical world. This distinction is not sought to be introduced in or with reference to the transcendental world. Given this, Dharmakīrti's philosophic position cannot be accepted to be transcendental idealism.

This is about the interpretation that Dharmakīrti's philosophy is transcendental idealism. Now coming to the second way of

characterising his philosophy. It is claimed that Dharmakīrti's philosophy is subjective idealism.

Dharmakīrti's Philosophy is Subjective Idealism:

A.K. Chatterjee, D.M. Dutta and S. Chatterjee, Balbir Singh, Pt. Sukhalaljee etc. interpret Dharmakīrti's philosophy to be subjective idealism. Before inquiring into their claims, we briefly deal with the issue : what is subjective idealism? Subjective idealism is a position which accepts that reality is in mind, especially in human mind.[13] It can also be said that it is a view which asserts that my mind alone is real and the external world is nothing else but creation of my mind. Hence external world does not exist independently of my mind. It could also be differentially formulated stating either that knowledge which I have alone is trustworthy and trustworthiness of any other knowledge could be established only on the proviso that it could be made sense of in terms of the former, or saying that language which I understand alone could be the legitimate language of communication and any other language can rise to this status only in so far as it is translatable without loss of meaning in the former.

Now coming to the different arguments that are advanced in support of the claim that Dharmakīrti's philosophy is subjective idealism. This view is upheld in two principal ways : some scholars characterise his philosophy in the light of what he is said to have accepted, while some others characterise his philosophy in the light of the philosophy of the school of which Dharmakīrti is said to be an adherent. A.K. Chatterjee, D.M. Dutta and S. Chatterjee characterise his position in the former way, while Pt. Sukhalaljee, Balbir Sing characterise it in the latter way.

Let us briefly outline some of the major points which are advanced from each side of the two principal ways in which the claim that Dharmakīrti is a subjective idealist is advanced and defended. First coming to those in whose opinion Dharmakīrti is a subjective idealist in so far as one or the other tenet of the philosophy of subjective idealism is discernible in his thought. They have put forth two main points :

13. Lacey, A.R.; *Dictionary of Philosophy*, p. 86.

(i) It is held that according to Dharmakīrti external world is nothing but ideas of (our) mind. Existence of external world cannot be proved, because the external world and (our) knowledge of the external world are identical in form. Dharmakīrti accepts that object and our knowledge of that object are identical in form. Therefore Dharmakīrti's philosophy is subjective idealism.[14]

(ii) Secondly, it is held that Diṅnāge and Dharmakīrti deny external world and accept reality of consciousness and this is evident from either Diṅnāga's *Ālaṁbana parīkṣā or* Dharmakīrti's section entitled *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* in his *Pramāṇavārtika*.[15] Anybody who accepts merely the reality of consciousness is a subjective idealist, and in so far as both Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti subscribe to this view their philosophical position is subjective idealism.

On behalf of those who proceed to characterise Dharmakīrti's philosophical position on the basis of the consideration that he is a follower of a particular school, the following points are made in support of their contention that his philosophical position is that of subjective idealism. The general form of their argument is as follows: Dharmakīrti belongs to *Yogācāra* school; the philosophic position of the *Yogācāra* school is subjective idealism, therefore Dharmakīrti also propounds subjective idealism. Two points are made from their side :

(i) *Yogācāra* holds that consciousness alone is real and Dharmakīrti has made an attempt to articulate and defend this position, therefore he holds such position.[16]

(ii) Dharmakīrti is a subjective idealist because he has continued the tradition of Asaṅga and (earlier) Vasubandhu.[17] Since this tradition is that of subjective idealism it is but natural that Dharmakīrti too subscribes to and upholds it.

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14. Dutta, D.M. and Chatterjee, S.; *Indian Philosophy*, pp. 147-148.
15. Chatterjee, A.K.; The *Yogācāra Idealism,* p. 54.
16. Sukhalaljee, Pt. *Indian Philosopy*, p. 76.

These are arguments advanced by scholars to claim that Dharmakīrti's philosophy is subjective idealism. However, the problem of the acceptability of this kind of characterisation of Dharmakīrti's position remains.

The arguments of these scholars bring forth certain points that need to be considered with a view to see whether they can be acceptable. Mainly these points are :

(1) If a person accepts that object and our knowledge of the object are identical in form, he holds subjective idealism.

(2) If a person denies the external world and accepts the reality of consciousness then he subscribes to subjective idealism.

(3) If a person belongs to certain school which propounds subjective idealistic position then as an adherent of that school, he also holds such a position.[18]

None of these points provide adequate ground for the acceptance of Dharmakīrti's position as subjective idealism. The first point of these is unacceptable. For first, subjective idealism need not necessarily accept that object and knowledge of the external object are identical; rather it accepts that my mind alone is real and external world is nothing but creation of my mind or is an experience of my mind. And once it is accepted that external world is a creation of my mind, it is held, it automatically follows that external world does not exist independently of my mind. But here one point needs to be noted carefully. One who is not a subjective idealist can also subscribe to the view that the form of an object and our knowledge of it is identical. Moreover, a subjective idealist, as pointed out above, may deny this kind of identity between the form of our knowledge and that of the object, especially because object, according to him, is nothing but externalisation of consciousness. Hence, mere acceptance of identity between object and knowledge of the object is not necessary as well as sufficient condition for the position being called subjective idealism. Moreover, we shall point out at a proper place that the contention of Dharmakīrti that in our cognition of an external object, the object of which it is a cognition and our cognition of it are no longer separable is hardly tantamount to saying that they are the same, although the form of

17. Singh B., *Conceptual Frame work of Indian Philosophy*, p. 33.
18. Hospers, J; *An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis*, P.506

an external object and that of our cognition of it is the same. Secondly, just on the basis of identity of form of an object and that of our knowledge of it, it is very difficult to characterise someboody's philosophic position to be subjective idealism. For, a person might accept reality of external objects, as it will be pointed later on that according to Dharmakīrti there are external objects, and yet he claims that in our cognition of them the object and our cognition of it are no longer separable in so far as both of them have the same form. This is not the same as saying that the external object that we cognise is nothing else but externalization of our cognition.

The second point in support of the view that Dharmakīrti's philosophic position is subjective idealism is equally questionable. First of all a subjective idealist need not deny the external world. He rather holds that it is an experience of my mind, and that it does not exist independently of my mind. Hence, mere denial of the axternal world does not suffice to say that anybody who subscribes to this view is a subjective idealist. Likewise, if a person accepts that on the count of certification of our knowledge claims the ultimate appeal is considered to be legitimate to our consciousness alone then it does not follow from this that upholder of this view is a subjective idealist, though he may be a methodological solipsist. And it can happen that a realist may subscribe to the position of methodological solipsism, though this may not necessarily be tantamount to subscribing to subjective idealism.

Tha third point is equally questionable. It is argued that Dharmakīrti belongs to a certain school which holds subjective idealism. This argument also is not acceptable. For, it is itself questionable whether Dharmakīrti belongs to *Yogācāra* school. As we shall argue later on that in the extant works of Dharmakīrti there is nowhere a reference to be found to the effect that he considers himself to be a *Yogācārin* or *Vijñānvādin*. Further, even if it is granted for the sake of an argument that he belongs to the *Yogācāra* school, it is not necessary that he should accept each and every tenet of that school. And if he does not accept those tenets of that school on the basis of which it is generally held to be subjective idealistic position, then the intended conclusion would not follow from the fact that he subscribes to some tenets acceptable to that

school and it thus cannot be held to be the necessary and sufficient ground for holding that he is a subjective idealist. Hence, though he may belong to the *Yogācāra* school and though the *Yogācāra* school may hold subjective idealism it does not follow that he also upholds subjective idealism.

If in spite of this it is accepted that Dharmakīrti's philosophic position is subjective idealism, following difficulties will arise. First, the world that subjective idealists accept is purely mental, i.e. creation of mind. If such a type of the world is accepted, we have different conceptions of the same world. For every individual has his own conception of the world. Accordingly, every one will claim that my mind and its creation alone are real and then the very problem of the possibility of communication will remain insoluble. But as it will be argued later on that the world that Dharmakīrti accepts as paradigmatic is empirical world. It will be pointed out later on that to show that Buddha's conceptual framework together with his silence and teaching are significant at least with reference to this paradigmatic world is one of the principal concerns of Dharmakīrti in his philosophic enterprise. This being the case, it can hardly be said that his position is subjective idealism.

Secondly, in our epistemological enterprise there are two problems, namely, problems pertaining to cognitive and justificatory epistemology. In cognitive epistemology, we deal with the issue: what do we know or cognize, while in justificatory epistemology we deal with the issue on what ground we shall be in a position to certify our knowledge claims? We certify our knowledge claims on the basis of our knowledge. My knowledge alone minimally needs to be considered to be reliable, so far as certification of my knowledge-claim/s is. concerned. Dharmakīrti holds that if we want to certify our knowledge claim, our knowledge alone is to be held to be reliable (*Vijñaptimātratā Siddhi*). And if what we have is our knowledge and not anything else, it is enough for our being able to justify our knowledge claims. Thus, when the problem of certification of knowledge-claim arises, Dharmakīrti has propounded the thesis of *Vijñaptimātratā Siddhi*. But this is not the same as claiming that world is nothing but my knowledge or that my knowledge and mind alone are real. No doubt such a kind of position is a kind of solipsism. But such a

kind of solipsism should be distinguished and demarcated from metaphysical solipsism which is the result of subjective idealism. If we accept that Dharmakīrti's position is a subjective idealism, we will not be in a position to bring out the significance of *Vijñaptimātratā Siddhi* together with acknowledgement of external world, and thereby, significance of justificatory epistemology in his philosophy.

Likewise, if we hold that Dharmakīrti is a subjective idealist, we will not be in position to interpret his theory of *Pratyakṣa* and also the significance of his effort to distinguish and demarcate *Abhrānta* and *Kalpanāaphodha*, *Pratyakṣa* from *Bhrānta Pratyakṣa*.

Lastly, even if it is granted that in certain respects there is a certain convergence between some tenets of the philosophic position of Dharmakīrti on the one hand and that of Asaṅga and earlier Vasubandhu, the author of *Vijñaptimātratā Siddhi* alone and not of *Abhidharmakosa* as well, on the other. Further even if it is granted, although it is questionable, that their philosophic position is that of Subjective idealism, it does not follow that Dharmakīrti too must be a subjective idealist. This is further so because to ape and echo predecessors, as will be pointed out later on in this as well as the last chapter, could not be said to be thc sole purpose behind his philosophic enterprise.

Hence, if it is accepted that Dharmakīrti is a subjective idealist, not only some unsurmountable difficulties arise but it is impossible to interpret and make a sense of some of the important concepts in his philosophy.

Dharmakīrti's Philosophy Is Critical Realism :

Somtimes, Dharmakīrti's philosophy is interpreted to be critical realism. S. Mookerjee claims that Dharmakīrti's philosophy is critical realism. To begin with, let us quickly consider what realism is. In the early history of philosophy realism was accepted to be a view which asserts that everything that is internal and external, is real. But in modern times realism is accepted to be a view which asserts that objects exist independently of knowing mind.[19] Though modern realists accept that objects exist independently of knowing mind,

19. Edward, Paul; *The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*, Vol. 7, p. 77.

there are divergent views regarding the issue: how is it perceived? According to some, object is directly perceived, while some others reject this.[20] Again, there are two divergent views advocated by those who hold that the object is indirectly perceived. These views are known as new and critical realism. As it does not pertain to our present task, not worring about the former, let us concentrate on the latter view i. e. critical realism. Critical realism is a view, which, onthe one hand, denies that object is directly perceived, and on the other hand, denies that object does not exist independently of knowing mind. Thus, it follows the middle way between naive realism and idealism. Critical realism holds that perception is the result of three factors, namely, physical object, psychical state and the datum.[21] What we perceive is not physical object but the datum. Physical object causes datum, datum causes psychical state. The datum is a mediator between the subject and object.

Arguments which are advanced for the characterisation of Dharmakīrti's philosophy to be critical realism go in the same direction. There is an objective reality which exists independently of knowing mind but this reality is momentary in character. Therefore, it cannot be directly perceived. But the likeness or similarity between percept i. e. idea in the mind to the extra-mental reality is to be regarded as the cause and warrant of its reliability and the cognition is the result of the same kind of likeness between our cognition and that of which it is cognition. (*Artha Sārupyaṃ asya Pramāṇam, tasmād arthapratītisiddheḥ*).[22] Thus, according to Dharmakīrti. it is held, object is not directly perceived but is perceived via likeness between image that is reflected in mind and reality. Therefore, Dharmakīrti's position is critical realism.

This is the argument presented to claim that Dharmakīrti's philosophy is critical realism. Here also there arises a problem as to whether this argument is acceptable and also whether it furnishes the necessary and sufficient ground to hold that Dharmakīrti is a critical realist.

20. *Ibid*, p. 79.
21. Dutta, D.M.; *Chief Currents of Contemporary Philosophy*, p.346.
22. Mookerjee, S.; *The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux*. pp. 339-340 including footnote.

Critical realists hold that for perception of the object three factors are necessary, namely, psysical object, phychical state and datum. But Dharmakīrti does not accept that these three factors are necessary for perception. According to him, for perception of an external object contact between senses and object is necessary, though it is not sufficient. Again, when Dharmakīrti is taking about perception, he does not deny that abject of perception could be a physical objcet. Likewise,when he is talking about perception he accepts that this perception is free from *Bhrānti* and *Kalpanā.* On the contrary, acceptance of three conditions does not provide a guarantee to critical realists that our perception is free from *Bhrānti* and *Kalpanā.* There being such fundamental divergence between the position of critical realism and that of Dharmakīrti, it is very difficult to hold that he subscribes to and upholds critical realism.

If, however, in divergence of this it is granted that Dharmakirti's position is critical realism, we are not in a position to explain as to how an object of perception could be a physical object. It is true that object of perception according to Dharmakīrti is *Svalakṣaṇa* but it is doubtful whether *Svalakṣaṇa* can be explained in terms of physical object alone especially in so far as we perceive, according to him, mental states as well. Similarly, there will be a difficulty in interpreting the terms *Abhrānta* and *Kalpanā-apoḍha.* Lastly, even if it is accepted that Dharmakīrti accepted that object of perception is momentary, it does not follow from this that, it should be indirectly perceived. For, it is possible that an object is momentary and yet it is directly perceived. Dharmakīrti while committing to momentary empiricism does not commit himself to critical realism. This point will be argued later on in the second and fourth chapters. Suffice it for the present to note that since according to him every sort of perception of ours is not mediated, hence his philosophic position cannot be taken to be critical realism.

(d) *Dharmakīrti's Philosophy is Nominalism* :

Raja Ram Dravid claims that Dharmakīrti's philosophy is nominalism. Let us briefly consider what nominalism is. Generally nominalism is a view which accepts reality of particulars and refuses to accept reality of universals.[23] There are different kinds of

23. Lacey, A.R., *Dictionary of Philosophy*. p. 228.

nominalism. Nominalism in its extreme form holds that, only particulars are real and universals are nothing else but names that we are giving to a class of things. Such naming is further held to be accidental.[24] Nominalism, is its moderate form holds that, particulars or individuals alone are real. Universals are signs and they do not exist. But universals are required for thought and language.[25]

The agruments in favour of the claim that, Dharmakīrti's philosophy is nominalism are as follows:

(1) The Buddhists deny the reality of universals. According to them, unique, causally efficient point-instants alone are real. These point-instants are without words and concepts. They are non-empirical in character. They hold that universal is a fiction, constructed to comprehend the reality. This position is that of nominalism and Dharmakīrti being a Buddhist subscribes to it.[28]

(2) Diṅnāga holds that concepts and words are related to each other. Everything that is conceptual is expressible in language and everything, that is expressible is conceptual. All concepts are intelligible in contrast with their opposites. Likewise, every word expresses its meaning only in contrast with its opposite denotation. Diṅnāga's nominalism was systematically developed by Dharmakīrti,[27] and so he is a nominalist.

(3) Dharmakīrti holds that the impact of words i.e. universals being negative in character, they are non-entities. Words signify neither external nor internal entities. They merely refer to the similarity with or difference from others, which is a thought construction. It has its source in mind. Thus, Dharmakīrti, in so far as he subscribes to this view, upholds a nominalistic position.[26]

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24. Hospers J., *An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis*, p. 361.
25. Edward, Paul; *The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*, Vol. 8, p. 203.
26. Dravid, R.R.; *The Problem of Universals in Indian Philosophy*, p. 264.
27. *Ibid* p. 265.
28. *Ibid*, pp. 266-267.

These are different arguments that are, advocated to characterise Dharmakīrti's philosophy as nominalism. However, the issue remains, how far this claim is acceptable. We will consider this problem with reference to three points :

(1) Are these arguments acceptable ?

(2) Is this position consistent with what Dharmakīrti has said ?

(3) Which difficulties will arise if it is held that Dharmakīrti's position is nominalism ?

Let us examine the points in detail.

R.R. Dravid's interpretation about Dharmakīrti's philosophy brings forth the following points :

(1) If a person accepts reality of particulars and refuses to accept reality of universals and/or if he accepts one to one correspondence between concepts and words then he holds nominalism.

(2) If he holds that universals are unreal, that they are non-entities and that words signify neither external nor internal world, then he holds nominalism.

These points do not seem to warrant holding Dharmakīrti to be a nominalist. Each of these points creates a particular sort of difficulty and taken together they seem to vitiate rather than strengthen and reinforce the claim that Dharmakīrti's position is nominalism. Consider for instance the first ground. This point is acceptable to two positions, namely, nominalism and conceptualism. For, both these positions accept reality of particulars primarily and refuse to accept the reality of universals. Hence, a problem arises : why does R.R. Dravid accept nominalism as the philosophical position of Dharmakīrti rather than conceptualism, though there are difficulties in holding Dharmakīrti to be a conceptualist as well. But this not being our present concern, we leave this stone unturned.

Now, coming to second point. It is true that, Dharmakīrti accepts *Sva-lakṣaṇa.* and among these two, *Svalakṣaṇa* alone is considered to be real, and *Sāmānya-lakṣaāna* could a mere construction. But Dharmakīrti does not accept *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* unexceptionally to be nothing else but merely a lingustic construction. On the contrary, he accepts that is may, however accidentally is might be, signify

actually shared properties, although it need not always stand for such features of things unexceptionally. This is how, as we shall argue in the third and fourth chapters, the possibility of convergence and interconnection between perceptual and inferential cognitions remains an open issue in his philosophy, although such actually shared features are never cognized perceptually. Likewise, he does not treat all universals to be mental constructions, or fictions of the mind, although concepts and language are enough for our coming to entertain univeısals. Thus, the position that R.R. Dravid entertains about Dharmakīrti's philosophy is not consistent with what Dharmakīrti has said. Dharmakīrti's distinction between *Svalakṣaṇa* and *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* has very important role to play in the discussion of epistemological issues. We will argue later on that this distincion is a result of his adoption of certain epistemological position.

If, however, it is accepted that Dharmakīrti's position is nominalism, a problem again remains: what kind of nominalism does Dharmakīrti adopt? Is it extreme nominalism or moderate nominalism? No requisite enlightenment from the concerned scholar is available. Nor are we given to understand how this sort of characterisation of his philosophy would enable us to articulate its conceptual framework or how, if at all, would it make possible for us to capture the unity of his thoughts on various issues and problems. Since, we happen to be left in the dark on these two principal issues this soıt of characterisation of Dharmakīrti's philosophy remains equally unacceptable.

Two Additional Characterisations of Dharmakīrti's Philosophy:

Having looked into some of the prominent characterisations of Dharmakīrti's philosophy and having shown unacceptability of each of them, on one count or the other, let us look briefly into two more modes of making sense of his philosophic enterprise through characterising it one way or the other. Both these modes stem from either one of the following two principal considerations: Given that the only way in which Dharmakīrti's philosophy could be appropriately characterised and interpreted is to take him to be a *Sautrāntika* or *Vijñānvādin* and given further that in saying that Dharmakīrti is a *Sautrāntika* alone exclusively or that he is a *Vijñānvādin* alone exclusively, we do not come to pigeon-hole all the threads of his philosophic enterprise, two alternatives seem to

stand out and beckon for their appropriate consideration as plausible alternatives. They are: (a) To hold that Dharmakīrti is neither a *Sautrāntika* nor a *Vijñānvādin.* That is, he is independent of the *Sautrāntika* as well as the *Vijñānvādin* tenets, or (b) to hold that he is partly a *Sautrāntika* and partly a *Vijñānvādin* simultaneously. The former of these alternatives seems to have been entertained by Prof. C. D. Sharma, while the latter by Pt. Dalsukhbhai Malvania. Let us briefly consider each of these alternatives and examine whether any of them offers a more promising alternative of interpreting Dharmakīrti's philosophy.

According to Prof. C. D. Sharma the philosophic position of Dharmakīrti can perhaps best be characterised to be *Svatāntrika Vijñānvāda.* It is held that a *Svatāntrika Vijñānvāda* is neither an ardent and faithful adherent of *Vijñānvāda* nor that of *Sautrāntrika* position. He could be said to be equidistant, as it were, from both these positions. Accordingly *Svatāntrika Vijñānvāda* is a position which on the one hand accepts reality of pure consciousness and on the other hand certifies the accepted metaphysical position-of accepting the empirical world to be real-with the help of theses accepted by a *Sautrantika.*[30] In other words, it could be said that *Svatrānrika Vijñānvāda* is a position which though not being fully and totally committed to *Sautrāntika* view or to the *Vijñānvādi* view alone, it is neither of them exclusively, although to some extent it accepts *Vijñānvāda* as well as *Sautrāntika* positions. This sort of feature of it, nonetheless, should be considered to be accidental rather than decisive. The following main point is made by advocates of this view: Diṅnāga is the founder of this school of Buddhist thought. Dharmakīrti has elaborated this position extensively and yet carefully. So far as ultimate reality is concerned they seem to follow the position of Vasubandhu with modifications.[31] It is this that makes them equidistant both from *Vijñānvāda* and the position of *Sautrāntika* and accordingly their position could be characterised as *Svātantrika Vijñānvāda.* From this nomenclature it would appear that their departure from *Vijñānvāda* alone is sought to be accentuated since (earlier) Vasubandhu was a *Vijñānvādin.* Yet mere

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30. Sharma, C.D; *A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy* P. 124.

31. *Ibid,* P. 125.

departure of this kind is not considered to be an effective way of characterising Dharmakīrti's philosophic position, as his departure from *Sautrāntika*, in the sense of his not being blindly committed to the *Sautrāntika* position alone, and yet leaning towards it as a platform standing on which he departs from *Vijñānvāda* pure and simple, needs, it is held, also concurrently to be taken into account. Thus, what it boils down to saying is not literally that Dharmakīrti is neither a *Sautrāntika* nor a *Vijñānvādin* pure and simple, but rather that he is partly a *Sautrāntika*, partly a *Vijñānvādin* simultaneously.

Pt. Dalsukhbhai Malvania makes a similar Point without calling Dharmakīrti to be a *Svātantrika Vijñānvādin.* He argues that it is beyond any doubt that Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti belong to the school of *Yogācāra Vijñānvāda.*[32] He is however, uncomfortable and constrained to notice one important'point which cannot be easily ignored and brushed aside. He states on the one hand, in the *Pramānvartika* "Dharmakīrti has defended the views of *Yogācāra*"[33] very strongly in certain context, while, on the ther hand, in the *Nyāyabindu* there is "the definition of *Svalakṣaṇa* and the like in such a manner that compels us to conclude that it is not a treatise from the viewpoint of *Yogācrāra.*"[34] From this it is clear that in the latter treatise he accepts the ideology of *Sautrāntika.*[35] He further argues that while *Paramāṇavārtika* is written basically to explicate the standpoint of *Paramārtha Satya, Nyāya-bindu* is written to put forth that of the *Samvṛtti Satya.*[36] Hence, "to this extent we can maintain that the *Nyāyabindu* represents the *Sautrāntika* system."[37]

Given the two treatises of Dharmakīrti, viz. *Nyāya-bindu* and *Pramāṇavārtika*, what position could he be held to be subscribing to and upholding? Pt. Malvaniaji tells us that among commentators of Dharmạkīrti there is a difference of opinion and they are divided

32. Miśra Durveka; *Dharmottarapradīpa* (ed.) Dalsukhbhai Malvania, Introduction, P. xxii.
33. *Idid*, P. xxii.
34. *Ibid*, P. xxii.
35. *Ibid*, P. xxii.
36. *Ibid*, P. xxii.
37. *Ibid*, P. xxii.

into two schools. One school holds that Dharmakīrti in general and his *Nyāyabindu* in particular 'represents a synthesis between the viewpoints of *Sautrāntika* and the *Yogācāra* schools, while the other school holds that he purely adopts the standpoint of the *Sautrāntika* only.[38] This means that at least from his commentators there seems to be no basis for the above mentioned view of Pt. Malvaniaji that "it is beyond any doubt that Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti belong to the school of *Yogācāra Viīnānvāda.*" We need not labour longer, however, on this point here.

Pt. Dalsukhabhai, however, has a unique way of getting out of the sort of difficulty that may surface, especially when the view of the former of the two above mentioned camps is accepted. He tells us that as Dharmakīrti is unhappy with the *Pramaṇa-prameya* treatment of other systems so too he is convinced that the *Sautrāntika* treatment of it is inadequate from the ultimate, i. e. *Parmārthika Sattā* points of view. He, therefore, refutes the *Sautrāntika* standpoint in his *Pramāṇavārtika* from the *Yogācāra* point of view. Hence, "he was essentially a follower of *Vijñānvāda* so far as his ultimate position was concerned."[39]

Let us not bother about Dharmakīrti being held to be *Vijñānvādin.* We have already shown that this alternative is indefensible. For the present let us merely deal with Dharmakīrti's being neither to be a *Sautrāntika* nor a *Vijñānvādin*, or his being partly at least to be both, no matter simultaneously or in succession. Whichever way we decide to go, there are unsurmountable difficulties: First, it seems unquestionably to be accepted that of characterising Dharmakīrti's philosophy appropriately there are only two viable alternatives: to take him to be a *Sautrāntika* alone or a *Vijñānvāda* alone. On each count of them there are too many difficulties. But apart from the difficulties each of these alternatives gives rise to, on what basis is one to defend that these are the only two alternatives? Leaving this aside, and granting that each of these exclusive alternatives is fraught with difficulties what do we do? Hence, secondly, why not try their combination? On the count of their combination there can be two alternatives: either he is a

38. *Ibid*, P. xxv.

39. *Ibid*, pp. xxii-xxiii.

Sautrāntika and a *Vijñānvādin* simultaneously or in succession. For to say that he is neither does not enable us to score any decisively significant point. If the former alternative is accepted he could be said to be equidistant from both camps. Prof. sharma toys with this alternative. If the latter, priority between *Nyāyabindu* and *Pramāṇavārtika* needs to be established, somehow in terms of which the alternative of Dharmakīrti adopting *Sautrāntika* and *Vijñānvāda* standpoints in succession could be attempted to be made sense of. This is the alternative which Pt. Dalsukhbhai opts for. Let us briefly examine this alternative.

First, if considering Dharmakīrti to be a *Sautrāntika* or *Vijñānvadin* alone is difficult to maintain and defend how can their combination—simultaneous or successive—to be a clue to our being able to characterise his philosophic position appropriately? Secondly, on the count of his being a *Sautrāntika* as well as a *Vijñānvādin* simultaneously is he to be considered to be both with regard to every issue he discusses or only with refrence to selected few? If the latter, how is one to make the concerned selection? If it is a question of his being equidistant from both the alternatives, then what is this kind of equidistance going to be determined by? Thirdly, if he is held to be a *Sautrāntika* and a *Vijñānvādin* successively as Pt. Dalsukhbhai holds, although in the last analysis Dharmakīrti is to be counted as a *Vijñānvādin* according to him, then three prominent and yet unsurmountable difficulties arise: (a) As we shall argue in the fifth chapter Dharmakīrti is said to have written *Nyāyabindu* after he wrote *Pramāṇavārtika* and not before as Pt. Dalsukhbhai seems to hold. (b) The *Parmārtha Sat* and *Samvṛtti Sat* are not to be held to be so in succession, but simultaneously although with regard to two distinct sort of cognitions. (c) As we shall argue later on *Parmārtha Sat* being objects of perceptual cognition alone according to Dharmakīrti how can he hold *Parmārtha Sat* alone to be real from the standpoint of *Yogācāra* as Pt. Dalsukhbhai maintains?

Moreover, whatever is taken to be the philosophical position of Dharmakrīti it cannot be through isolating some problems and issues he discusses and segregating their consideration from investigation into the conceptual framework of his philosophy as a whole and unity of his philosophic thought. But considering him to be a *Yogācārin* or a *Sautrāntika* this is precisely what one is forced to

do. To the extent to which a move of this kind gives rise to consequence of this kind, an attempt of this kind must be rejected, however *prima facie* attractive it may seem to be.

Consequences of These Characterisations

Dharmakīrti's position needs to be formulated on the basis of what he has explained and accepted, rather than on the basis of what he is supposed to have said. The sort of conceptual framework of his thought should be borne out by his thought and his philosophic position needs to be formulated in such a way that it bears upon his thought and its conceptual framework rather than formulating the philosophic position of the philosopher in advance and twisting and fitting his thought and its conceptual framework in it and doing violence to both of them. No doubt, these scholars have discussed Dharmakīrti's philosophy but no one seems to have discussed the issue as to why Dharmakīrti adopts the kind of position he is said to have adopted. Further, scholars do not seem to have shown how the philosophic position of Dharmakīrti emerges from his thought, is shaped by the conceptual framework of it and is determined by the categories determinative of the conceptual framework of his thought. His philosophic position will have to be shown to have bearing on all these considerations. In addition, the claim that philosophic position has such a bearing has preferably also to be certified with the help of whatever appropriate evidence one would be able to muster in its support. Unless an exercise of this kind is undertaken characterisation of Dharmakīrti's philosophy one or the other way would be misleading rather than illuminating.

Dharmakīrti is naturally influenced by some of his predecessors. He has adopted certain views, invoked certain concepts which his predecessors had discussed. Dharmakīrti does not, however, blindly accept them; he accepts them only when they are useful and significant for the articulation of his philosophy. The aim of Dharmakīrti is not, as it will be pointed out, to propound his own novel philosophical position but to elaborate what the Buddha in his view wanted people to teach. In the realisation of this aim he has utilized and exploited ideas, concepts propagated by his predecessors. His entire endeavour, however, as we shall point out later on, is neither ecclesiastic in character nor of elaboration of the view of any of his

predecessors alone. This aspect of his philosophy does not seem to have been discussed and its implications worked out. He is neither a *Sautrāntika* nor a *Vijñānvādin* pure and simple. Nor is he a hybrid of the two. Wherever the need arises and to whatever extent it is necessary he has no compunction to deviate from the central tenets of both these schools. Understanding the importance of some of these points appears profoundly to influence our comprehension of Dharmakīrti's philosophy.

The scholars often do not seem to pay as much attention to what Dharmakīrti has said, and the context in which he has said it, to the extent to which it would be necessary. No doubt some of them have tried to discuss his philosophy with reference to some or the other his works. Such discussions are likely to be misleading if the contexts and situations in which Dharmakīrti accepts certain doctrines, principles and holds certain position are not paid serious attention to. For instance, Dutta and Chatterjee refer to *Arthasārūpya* in *Nyāya-bindu* to fortify their claim that Dharmakīrti repudiates the external world. But the context in which Dharmakīrti discusses *Arthasārūpya* is not to repudiate the external world but rather to discover the truth of our knowledge of the external world. Similarly, an exclusive concentration on just one or the other work of Dharmakīrti cannot be substituted for a comprehensive study of his various works. Instead of depending upon what others have said about his philosophy it would be more advisable to rely on what he has said in his works. Very many times scholars have unfortunately come to be guided in their assessment and evaluation of Dharmakīrti's philosophy by what others have said about it or by his being successor or predecessor of somebody.

Lastly, not only those who consider Dharmakīrti to be a *Svātantrika Vijñānavādin* but also those who consider him to be a realist, an idealist or a nominalist seem to study his thought from the perspective of a philosophical position arrived at in advance. There may be and as we shall point out later on that there indeed are some features in his thought which could be present in the thought of a realist, nominalist, *Sautrāntika* or even a *Yogācārin*. But this can hardly be considered to be a necessary and sufficient ground to brand him to be a realist or an idealist etc. Nor, would it be proper to say that to discuss a particular issue or elaborate

the stance adopted by a particular school of Buddhism was the motivating force of his philosophy. Hence, when it is noticed that certain points acceptable to *Sautrāntika* or *Yogācāra* position figure in his philosophy it should more be treated to be a matter of accident, rather than its determinative force. Such points he accepts not so much because *Sautrāntikas* and *Yogācārins* accept it but rather because they are able to be reconciled with what the Buddha wanted to teach. We need not anticipate our later argument too much here. It is enough to note at the present juncture of our inquiry that in the investigation into his philosophy at the hands of number of scholars quite a number of considerations seem to be desirable.

Possibility of the Tenability of Combinations of these Views:

Here someone may ask that various characterisations of Dharmakīrti's philosophy considered so far seem to be misleading when discussed and considered separately. But if one considers them jointly through permutation and combination, then the sort of difficulties each of them individually gives rise to may perhaps be taken care of. If they cannot be defended separately they could at least be sustained jointly and in combination, where their individual shortcomings may cancel out and we may chance upon such an alternative that may be the best alternative that could be thought of.

It is already pointed out that when it is a question of studying the thought of a philosopher it is not a matter of considering his different thoughts, concepts and ideas. It is more a matter of discovering unifying thought, finding out its conceptual framework and articulating its determining categories. The various characterisations of Dharmakīrti's philosophy that we took notice of largely bring to our notice certain kind of his concepts, views and seek to highlight certain kind of connection of them with those of his predecessors. What is wanted, on the contrary, is such a kind of interrelation between his various thoughts, different issues and problems he grapples with etc. which would enable us to comprehend the conceptual framework of his thought. On what basis can one decide that out of permutation and combination of these characterisations of Dharmkīrti's philosophy there will emerge the desired sort of conceptual framework? How can one tell in advance

that this sort of inquiry will open to us an avenue of our being able to discern and discover the determining categories of the conceptual framework of his thought? This being the case, the alternative of permutation and combination of these characterisations of Dharmakīrti's philosophy cannot blindly be accepted to be the only available alternative course, however luring and attractive it may *prima facie* seem to be.

Secondly, on the count of considering the viability of these characterisations jointly a very serious kind of these difficulty is likely to arise. As already pointed out a number of characterisations are what others have considered to be appropriate with regard to Dharmakīrti's philosophy. Since what matters is not how others consider his philosophy but rather how Dharmakīrti wishes his philosophy should be considered. Not merely by combination or permutation of the views have been held about his philosophy we do not seem to be likely to come across a more viable and respectable approach concerning Dharmakīrti's philosophy. This being the case, it seems, that through considering some of these characterisations of Dharmakīrti's philosophy jointly one would either be able to fatham into the depth of the conceptual framework of his thought or that one would be able to outline the determining categories of it.

Thirdly, some of these scholars have characterised Dharmakīrti's philosophy on the basis of what others have held about it. They have also come to be guided by comparisons of his philosophy with that of others. Our attention has also sometimes come to be drawn to some of the important consequences of some or the other characterisations of his philosophy. But very often it has not come to be considered whether such characterisations and such consequences of them were intended by Dharmakīrti, as also whether they are consistent with the principal tenets of his philosophy. This being the case mere permutation or combination of such characterisations is not likely to bring forth such illumination which we otherwise would be missing.

Lastly, there seem to be a striking similarity among these different interpretations. They do not seem to bring out the determinants of the conceptual framework of Dharmakīrti's philosophy. Later on we hope to bring out the nature and importance of at least some determinants of the conceptual frame-

work of Dharmakīrti's philosophy. Their not being taken into account is likely to pose a serious impedement in our effort to comprehend Dharmakīrti's philosophy in a proper way and understand some of its implications. This being the case, regarding these interpretations of Dharmakīrti's philosophy their being accepted jointly can hardly be thought of improving the [situation.

These are some of the difficulties which are likely to arise, if we consider these interpretations about Dharmakīrti's philosophy separately or jointly. These difficulties create and reinforce the need of seeking clarification about Dharmakīrti's thought differently. It is in this direction that the present study hopes to proceed.

An Alternative Path

The foregoing investigation into some of the important extant characterisations and interpretations of Dharmakīrti's philosophy is meant to highlight two important points: (a) any single extant characterisation or interpretation of Dharmakīrti's philosophy or their combination is likely to create such difficulties in our understanding of his philosophy that so long as we continue to stick to such a characterisation of it there seems to be no way of our being able to resolve them. Nor can we have requisition the services of another characterisation for this purpose. And (b) there is a need of looking elsewhere to be able to understand Dharmakīrti's thought, its unity and conceptual framework. The extant interpretations and characterisations of his philosophy are not, however, for this reason to be dismissed summarily or wholesalely. They seem to serve two purposes: one, they are a pointer in our investigation in so far as they tell us which points need to be paid attention to in the inquiry into Dharmakīrti's thought. It would be unworthwhile if some of the important aspects of his thought are overlooked or ignored and yet we hope to outline the thought of Dharamakīrti or sketch out its conceptual framework. Secondly, they also seem to caution us rightly as to which sort of devices and tactics we should refrain from employing in our search for the conceptual framework of his thought. For, if here too we are going to rely on one or two of his thoughts then although we shall have investigated into certain segment of his thought, his thought and its unity may still continue to elude us. Likewise, if we are going to be guided either

by comparisons or by what others have said about Dharmakīrti's philosophy then by longer or shorter route we ourselves might come to embrace the same kind of difficulties that efforts to understand and interpret his philosophy at the hands of others seem to have given rise to. The need of going along a different path remains however, to be an irresistible one. If it is this course that we propose to take up, not sherely for the love of novelty and deviance but rather being prompted by what appears to be unsatisfactory of the extant characterisations and interpretations of Dharmakīrti's philosophy on the one hand and by the need and necessity of making an effort to try to understand it in an appropriate comprehensive and defensive way on the other.

A Leap Ahead:

A paragraph or two seem to be in order as to which different way do we wish to proceed in, given that there is a need and necessity of doing so. We have mentioned earlier, in course of our consideration of the views of others regarding Dharmakīrti's philosophy, that with a view to outlining the philosophic thought of Dharmakīrti we need to grasp modes of interconnections between his thoughts concerning various issues and problems. Further, we need to investigate into the conceptual framework of his thought and proceeding along the same line we need also to outline the categories determinative of the conceptual framework of his thought. A characterisation of his philosophy, if any, has to come only as a sequel to the sort of investigation mentioned earlier. Of these, investigation into determining categories and characterisation of his philosophy have to wait till the conceptual framework of his thought is outlined and the latter has to be held in abeyance until his philosophic thought comes to be grasped. But his philosophic thought cannot be hoped to stand before us waiting for being grasped no sooner we have wished to grasp and comprehend it. We shall have to strive to its being provided to us. One of the routes of our coming to provide ourselves with it, is to investigate into his thoughts figuring into his analysis of perception and inference. These are two principal and only modes through which, according to him, we can hope to either advance or vindicate any knowledge-claim and understand some of the important interconnections between them. Further when his analysis of perception and

that of inference are taken together and are brought to bear upon each other we shall have some of the crucial and key channels of interconnection between his thoughts. In this way we shall come to open a way of our being able to give a brief sketch of his philosophic thought. Once this is provided with, we can proceed to outline its conceptual framework in which contours of the connection of his thought with the Buddhist tradition in general and with the thoughts of his predecessors and contemporaries could be hoped to be given a sketch of. Given this, we can proceed to inquire into the rationale of these interconnections between his thought on the one hand and that of the Buddhist tradition in general or the thought of his predecessors or contemporaries on the other hand and hope to outline some of the important categories which could be legitimately considered to be determinative of the conceptual framework of his philosophic thought. Being armed with this data we can hope to present that sort of characterisation of his philosophy that has bearing on the determinative categories of conceptual framework of his philosophic thoughts, his philosophic thought and also upon those significant modes of interconnection between his thoughts which figure in his analysis of perception and inference.

This, then, is the brief sketch of the deviant and alternative route along with which we hope and wish to proceed. Given this, our taking this different route has to commence from taking into account those sort of thoughts that he places before us in his analysis of perception and inference respectively and grasping modes of interconnection between them—intradomain as well as interdomainwise. This is our primary task. That will occupy our attention in the next three chapters. With a view to accomplishing this task we turn in the next chapter to consider Dharmakīrti's analysis of perception.

2

Analysis of Perception

On the basis of a critical review of some of the prominant extant characterisations and interpretations of Dharmakīrti's philosophy it was pointed out in the previous chapter the need and necessity of studying it differently. It was also argued there that an initial step in that direction is to inquire into Dharmakīrti's analysis of perception. We take up this task in this Chapter.

Two Kinds of Knowledge

All knowledge-claims that man advances—whether individually or collectively—and all vindications of the knowledge-claims that he indulges into presuppose man's having knowledge and the latter obviously presupposes the possibility of man's having knowledge. For, if it is impossible for man to have knowledge, man cannot have knowledge and if he does not have knowledge, the question of his advancing any knowledge-claim or his vindicating any knowledge-claim already advanced simply does not arise. Granting then man has knowledge on the basis of which alone he can advance or vindicate his knowledge-claims, there arises a question : what are the principal kinds of knowledge man has or can hope to have ?

It may be held, following Russell, that knowledge we have whether about this world or about anything else, is mainly of two kinds namely, knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. Knowledge by acquaintance is the knowledge through direct cognition of an object. Here, by an object one need not necessarily mean a physical object. One may even plead that it is not necessary that it should exist. We need not bother about this claim here, it not being our present engagement. Thus, knowledge by acquaintance is that kind of knowledge where the object is directly given in our cognition. Knowledge by description, on the contrary, is that kind of knowledge, which we get from others through their coming to make it available to us communicatively. It is further clear that the object of which we have knowledge by description need not be present before us.

Though these two kinds of knowledge are quite distinct in nature, to some extent they are related. For, it is not impossible that the object of which we have knowledge by acquaintance, we have knowledge of it by description as well and the vice versa. Whether we have the same knowledge of the object through both these channels is an important question and we need not enter into the discussion of it, it not being our present issue. There is, however, a point when it is said that if these two kinds of knowledge were not related then there would be no point in saying that these kinds of knowledge deal with the same knowable. Secondly, we will have different kinds of information about the same knowable and there would be enormous problems of reconciling the two with each other. Hence, their being totally distinct from and unrelated with each other cannot be accepted.

There are, however,certain difficulties with which this classification of human knowledge is beset. First, there is no clear indication available as to how and where one should be able to demarcate knowledge from experience. Second, since every piece of knowledge by acquaintance could in principle also be available through knowledge by description, no knowledge by acquintance could ever be considered to be worth the name unless it is communicable as well. But, has experience to satisfy the requirement of communicability ? Thirdly, since all knowledge must in this way be communicable it is presupposed that even knowledge by

acquaintance must be interpersonal, sharable and communicable in its origin. Thus, origin of knowledge has to be considered to be essentially a social phenomena. But if it is possible to hold that even if there would have been a single human being in the entire world then he too would have had knowledge, though he might not have been able to communicate it with others, there seem to be a sufficient reason to believe that knowledge need not be social in its origination. Fourthly, the classes of knowledge that this classification brings forth cannot be said to be mutually exclusive, although collectively exhaustive they do remain. Accordingly, there arises a question : can there not be a classification of human knowledge that is both mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive ? Lastly, this classification does not tell us clearly as to what part does an object of knowledge—say of perceptual knowledge—play in our knowledge of it and what sort of determinants of our knowledge are operative from our side. This being the case one is required to look elsewhere to be able to discover such a classification of knowledge wherein the classes of knowledge are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive.

Dharmakīrti will obviously not be in favour of this classification of knowledge. Accordingly it will be futile to seek to understand the kind of classification of knowledge he gives in terms of the one sketched above. Intuitively, however, it is clear that whatever knowledge man has—individually or collectively—becomes available to him either through experience or through reason. Over and above these two avenues there is no other, through which knowledge could be said to be originally becoming available to him. Even the so-called knowledge by description becomes available to the describing person/s, ultimately through any one of these avenues. It is further clear that in order that we may experience, it is not necessary that we should have reasoned. Likewise, it is also not necessary that in order that we may reason, we should have had an experience. This does not, however, rule out apriorily that we may reason about what we experience, and, at least sometimes, it is not unlikely that we may experience that about which we might reason. But even if this is conceded one thing seems further to be obviously clear : it is not necessary that the same features must become available to us through both these avenues. In other words, it

need not be the case that unless those features which rationally become available to us are experientially given, we should not at all be able to experience anything. Likewise, it cannot also be said that unless experiential features themselves rationally become available to us we should not be able to reason at all. This being the case, experience and reason are the two mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive channels of any knowledge being made available to us at all. That experience and reason are the two mutually exclusive channels of information-flow bring forth an additional feature, viz. there is not only collective exhaustiveness of the total information that can flow through these channels but also mutual exclusiveness, and, in consequence, those features which would be available in so far as information under consideration has flown through one cannel would be fundamentally at variance from those which would be available in so far as the information under consideration has flown through another channel. For, Dharmakīrti whereas *Pratyakṣa* is a paradigm of experiential knowledge, inference is the paradigm of rational or rather ratiocinative knowledge. An important thing to remember, however, is that neither experience nor inference itself alone is knowledge, though each one of them is a channel of information-flow that may gain the status of knowledge. We shall have an occasion later on to inquire what conditions knowledge has to satisfy in order to gain the status of knowledge.

But it may be asked : why should we have these two distinct channels of information-flow ? That is, why should we have two *Pramāṇas* at all ? Dharmakīrti's answer is : because there are two distinct kinds of knowables.[1] If it is asked as to how do we know that there are two distinct kinds of knowables, the answer would be : it is intuitively clear that there are knowables which could be comprehended experientially and that there are others which could be comprehended rationally. Over and above these two principal kinds of knowables there are none. Hence, there are only two main kinds of knowables. Since, further, each one of these kinds of knowables would be comprehended only

1. धर्मकीर्ति; प्रमाणवार्त्तिक; मानं द्विविधं विषयद्वैविध्यात्; प्रत्यक्ष परिच्छेद, पृ० 98.

through its appropriate channel and since there are two distinct kinds of knowables, it is clear that there are only two channels of information-flows or *Pramāṇas*. Thus, distinctness of *Pramāṇas* is determined primarily on the basis of distinctness of knowables—*Prameyas* and since information of only one kind of *Prameya*. can flow through one channel, there have to be two distinct *Pramāṇas*. Dharmakīrti does not decide duality of *Prameyas* on the basis of duality of *Pramāṇas* but rather conversely. If he were to accept the former course then duality of *Prameyas* could have been considered to have been engineered. In accepting the later alternative, on the contrary, he merely draws our attention to the intuitively clear fact. Thus, here it is the intuitive constrain that shapes and guides the methodological consideration. We shall have later on an occasion to return to this point in the appropriate context.

If *Pramāṇa-vyavasthā* is an arrangement in accordance with which it comes to be stipulated as to how a given person/ knower can possibly know or not know a certain kind of knowable with the help of a certain *Pramāṇa*, then both Budhists as well as *Naiyāyikas* are champions of it. There is, however, a fundamental and crucially significant difference. Buddhists, inclusive of Dharmakīrti, hold that a person can comprehend one and only one kind of knowable through one and only one *Pramāṇa* and that it is not possible to know any *Prameya* with the help of any *Pramāṇa*. Nor is it possible to know one *Prameya* with the help of more than one *Pramāṇa*. What is meant by this is that it is neither desirable nor necessary to know one and the same *Prameya* with the help of more than one *Pramāṇa*. This is not only because different *Pramāṇas* are best suited to enable us to comprehend distinct *Prameyas* but distinct features as well. This view according to which no two *Pramāṇas* can ever give us the same information is know as *Pramāṇa-viplava*. As against this, *Naiyāyikas* hold that the same kind of information can be available to us through alternative channels and hence it should not make any difference as to through which *Pramāṇa* the information under consideration is gained. For, information gained through any *Pramāṇa* would

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2. वात्स्यायन; न्यायभाष्य—प्रमातुः प्रमातव्येऽर्थे प्रमाणानाम् सम्भवो ऽभिसम्प्लवः, असम्भवो व्यवस्थेति ।

decide the same features. This view is known as *Pramāṇa-saṁplava.* The crux of this view is that no *Pramāṇa* is isolated from others in the sense that it is not the case that it simply cannot disclose those features of a given knowable which are disclosed by another and their strength or weakness is that they stand or fall together. Though every *Pramāṇa* is generally useful to enable us to comprehend some particular feature or the other, yet that is not the only avenue through which it must be disclosed. Buddhists like Dharmakīrti opposes this view as it goes against the principal tenet of their contention. It, in this way, goes against the central tenet of his contention because, according to him, it is unnecessary for us to have more than one avenue for our being able to comprehend one kind of knowable, of whatever kind it is. The alternative avenues of the same information-flow are thus ruled out in Dharmakīrti's view not because such a device is inconceivable or because it is not useful, but rather because it is redundant and dispensable.

We pointed out earlier that according to Dharmakīrti, there are two principal kinds of knowables and they are related with their respective *Pramāṇas* through which alone they could be comprehended. The two kinds of knowable or *Prameyas,* he tells us, are : *Sva-lakṣaṇa* and *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* and they are known respectively through *Pratyakṣa* and *Anumāna.* It does not seem to be the case that these two main kinds of knowable are considered to be two distinct kinds of entities. If it were the case then it will have to be admitted that according to Dharmakīrti two main kinds of entities belong to the world. He does not seem to have stated this anywhere in any of his works. Understanding the expression '*lakṣaṇa*' that figures in the nomenclature of each of the kind of knowables in the sense of feature/s it appears that what according to him is epistemically at stake in our epistemological enterprise is not so much of our coming to know two different sorts of knowable entities but rather two different sorts of features that happen to be disclosed to us of the same entities.[3] In so far as we endeaour to comprehend them through one or the other channel through which information regarding them flows to us and accordingly different

3. धर्मोत्तर; न्यायबिन्दुटीका; वस्तुनः हि असाधारणं च तत्त्वमस्ति, सामान्यं च। प्रथम परिच्छेद, पृ० 15

features of them happen to be disclosed to us. Naturally, as a result of such disclosed features we come to have fundamentally differential comprehension of the entities belonging to the world. Thus understood, *svalakṣaṇas* as knowables are those features of things which in order for their being comprehended through *Pratyakṣa* need not be sharable,[4] while *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* as knowables are those features of things which in order for their being comprehended at all have to be sharable.[5] For, having non-sharable features is an indispensable aspect of a perceptible entity.[6] This has number of implications and we shall have an occasion later on to study at least some of them. Suffice it for the present to note that according to Dharmakīti it is intuitively clear that things have sharable and non-sharable features and that they can be comprehended only through A*numāna* and *Pratyakṣ*a respectively. Since things can have both these features, it is clear that for our being able to comprehend them we shall have to have two *Pramāṇas* at our disposal. Since things can have only these two sorts of features and since each *Pramāṇa* can disclose one sort of them alone, it is clear that the sort of comprehension that we can be able to have through the information made available by each *Pramāṇa* will be of a fundamentally different kind. Further, since we (can) have different sort of comprehension of different sort of features that things have and since things can at the most have only two sorts of features which are disclosed through distinct *Pramāṇas* alone, it is clear that there are only two [principal kinds of knowledge or comprhension made available to us through two *Pramāṇas*. Thus, things having in all only two sorts of features is the basis of accepting only two *Pramāṇas* and since the *Pramāṇas* as well as the features of things they disclose are of distinct-kinds, the knowledge being available to us through them must also be of distinct kinds. Mutual

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4. तत्रैव; स्वलक्षणम् । स्वं असाधारणं लक्षणम् तत्त्वम् स्वलक्षणम् । पृ० 15

5. तत्रैव; स्वलक्षणात् अन्यत् उच्यते । सामान्येन लक्षणं सामान्यलक्षणम् । साधारणं रूपं इत्यर्थः । समारोप्यमाणं हि रूप सकलवहिसाधारणम् । पृ० 17 से 18

6. तत्रैव; यत् असाधारणं तत् प्रत्यक्षग्राहयम् ।
प्रत्यक्ष परिच्छेद, पृ० 16

exclusiveness and collective exhaustiveness of features things can have ensured mutual exclusiveness and collective exhaustiveness of *Pramāṇas* and this in turn guarantees mutual exclusiveness and collective exhaustiveness of the sorts of comprehension, we can hope to have. Hence, according to Dharmakīrti any plea for additional *Pramāṇa* must be backed by appropriate proof of things having any feature other than sharable or non-sharable one. Given this alone, we can requisition the service of an additional *Pramāṇa* and plead on its basis that there is a third kind of knowledge we can hope to have at our disposal. Increasing the number of kinds of knowledge through augmentation of the number of *Pramāṇas* without telling for the disclosure of which sort of features of things have the additional *Pramāṇas*, under consideration been brought in is a move that is methodologically indefensible and philosophically unilluminative. Hence, according to Dharmakīrti, there are only two mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive kinds of knowledge—no less, no more—and they are made available through distinct *Pramāṇas*. Accordingly, when he presents his analysis of perception it is instrumental to his analysis of non-sharable features of things which perceptibly alone become comprehensible, while his analysis of inference or reason is instrumental to his analysis of sharable features of things. And through his analysis of perception and inference we can hope to get his analysis of human knowledge as a whole, an overwhelmingly comprehensive data, to be able to fathom into the depth of his thought and proceed to study its conceptual framework. Postponing the consideration of further issues that we wish to work upon later on to the succeding chapters, we turn to Dharmakīrti's analysis of perception—the task of the present chapter.

General Nature of Perceptual Knowledge :

Dharmakīrti's inquiry into perceptual and inferential knowledge should be considered to be directed at the consideration of the following points :

1. The sort of information perceptual or inferential congnition makes available to us and the sort of conditions that need to be fulfilled in order that perceptual or inferential cognition becomes available to us.

2. The sort of knowledge-claims we would be legitimately able to put forth on the basis of the particular sort of information that perceptual or inferential cognition discloses to us, and

3. The sort of knowledge-claim, we would be in a position to vindicate and justify on the basis of the information perceptually or inferentially furnished to us. Accordingly, his inquiry into the general nature of perceptual or inferential cognition should be understood to be directed at bringing to our notice the sort of information these modes of cognition can or cannot furnish and hence what sort of conditions are required to be fulfilled in order that that sort of unadultered information alone becomes available to us. His inquiry into kinds of perceptual or inferential cognition, on the contrary, should more be understood to be directed at finding out what sort of knowledge-claims could be legitimately advanced, given that such and such is the nature of the given sort of perceptual or inferential cognition we have at our disposal, and given further it can make only such and such a kind of information available to us. Given this sort of inquiry already having undertaken, according to him, we can raise and hope to answer the question: what sort of knowledge-claims would remain defensible, if we have such and such information at our disposal ? Likewise, if a certain knowledge-claim is not possible to be vindicated we should be in a position to point out that such is the case especially because the sort of information being available to us relying on which we should have been able to vindicate our knowledge-claim under consideration is not or cannot be available to us. Analysis of this sort has a number of far-reaching-consequences and we hope to return to the consideration of at least some of them later.

Coming to Dharmakīrti's analysis of perceptual cognition presently. Here he wishes, rightly, to mark off cognition made available by veridical perception for special consideration. This emphasis upon and isolation of veridical perception against the contention of Diṅnāga, who did not very much care to distinguish veridical perception on the one hand and illusory and hallucinatory perception on the other, is in order at the hands of Dharmakīrti for three main reasons :

(i) If the information furnished by perceptual cognition is to be the basis of our being able to advance any worthwhile

knowledge-claim and if we expect such claims to be defensible then it is necessary that the information furnished by the perceptual cognition under consideration is trustworthy and this criterion can be hoped to be satisfied only by the information furnished by veridical perception.

(ii) If the object of perception happens to be marked off from that of inferential cognition by its not necessarily having sharable features and if there can be no guarantee that object of hallucinatory or illusory perception will have nothing else but non-sharable features, then the objects of even illusory and hallucina tory perception need to be marked off from the objects of perception proper i.e. veridical perception. That is, veridical perception as furnisher of information about non-sharable features of things alone needs to be isolated from other modes of perceptual cognition which at least sometimes fail to guarantee this and thereby make object of perception non-distinguishable from the object of inferential cognition, in so far as objects of both these cognitions can have sharable features without having any non-sharable feature at all.

(iii) Not only concepts and linguistic modes of communication but also hallucinatory or illusory perceptual cognition can lead us to believe that things are what they are primarily because they have sharable features. Whereas, Dharmakīrti wants us to hold that primary determinant of things as they are is not so much that they have sharable but rather that they have non-sharable features. For if the former kind of features are considered to be primary and fundamental then we shall have no way to distinguish universals or *Sāmānya* from things. Dharmakīrti by no stretch of imagination, by no manoeuvre will ever be prepared to allow things belonging to the world and as they are to lapse into universals—objects of inferential cognition—and thereby efface the boundary-line of demarcation between objects of perceptual and inferential cognition. The move, therefore, on his part to consider that non-veridicality is a character which every case of trustworthy perceptual cognition must lack is very well-calculated and does not stem from a contingent desire to differ from his worthy predecessor, viz. Diṅnāga, who

does not consider absence of non-veridicality to be the fundamental characteristic of a trustworthy perceptual cognition—i.e. of veridical perception. Considering in this way veridicality to be the fundamental characteristic of reliable perceptual cognition and alienating it from every form of non-veridical one Dharmakīrti has drawn our attention to the general feature of reliable perceptual cognition which is of paramount significance.

Moreover, according to Dharmakīrti, reliable or trustworthy perceptual cognition must also exhibit another general characteristic for its being considered to be so. It is that it must be *Kalpanāpoḍha*. This is a general feature of reliable perceptual cognition that is recognized from Diṅnāga who used it as a defining feature of all perceptual cognition, no matter whether it is a case of veridical or non-veridical perceptual cognition. In this contention of Diṅnāga there is an implicit admission that the only source through which one comes to consider universals or sharable features to be the constitutive and structural features of things (of perceptual cognition) is through our coming to use concepts and words with reference to them. They have a peculiarity that, whether concepts or words, each of them can be profitably used to refer to and designate more than one object of a given kind at a time. That is, no concept or a word remains usable unless more than one thing of a particular kind happens to be given to us. Hence concepts and words of our language generate in us the cognition of sharable features and we begin to believe that they are structural or constitutive features of things and that things would not be what they are unless they have sharable features depicted by concepts and words. Thus, at the hands of Diṅnāga sharable feature is an exclusive and enviable outcome of concepts and words which can be used to refer to more than one object of a given kind.

Though Dharmakīrti does not disfavour and disapprove the view of Diṅnāga that any reliable perception must be *Kalpanāpoḍha*, he does repudiate his view in no uncertain terms that *Kalpanāpoḍhatva* alone guarantees veridicality and hence reliability of perceptual cognition. In spite of accepting, therefore, *Kalpanāpoḍhatva* to be a general feature of reliable perceptual cognition he holds that its reliability must also revolve around its *Abhrāntatva*,

which we considered earlier. Thus, *Kalpanāpodhatva* together with *Abhrāntatva*, according to him, guarantee veridicality and hence reliability of perceptual cogntion. That is mere *Kalpanāpodhatva* cannot, according to him, be considered to be both the necessary and sufficient condition of veridicality and reliability of perceptual cognition.

We mentioned earlier that according to Dharmakīrti trustworthy perceptual cognition has to satisfy two general conditions : that it should be *Abhrānta* and *Kalpanāpodha.*[7] Regarding *Abhrāntatva* we presented above one reason as to why this condition has to be satisfied by trustworthy perceptual cognition. It also has another significance. But we will return to it in the context of the discussion of viability and truth of the information furnished by perceptual cognition. Meanwhile let us pay a little closer attention to another general condition which perceptual cognition has to satisfy according to Dharmakīrti. It is that it must be *Kalpanāpodha.*[8] As pointed out previously, this condition has been acknowledged by Diṅnāga. It is not, therefore, in its acknowledgement and introduction of it that Dharmakīrti's originality lies, but in its elaborate stipulation and clarification. Along with Diṅnāga, he holds that *Pratyakṣa* should be absolutely free from the impact of (*Apodha*) *kalpanā*. This technical term has been explained by him in his two works, viz. *Nyāya-bindu* and *Pramāṇa-Vārtika* and we shall show shortly that these explanations boil down to the same. Manorathanandi in his *Vṛtti* on *Pramāṇa-vārtika* tells us that *Kalpanā* is a particular sort of (*Ākāra*) comprehension (*Pratīti*) that emerges due to the relation (*Saṁsarga*) (that we presuppose to be holding) between designatum (*Vācya*) and designation (*Vācaka*).[9] He further tells us that this kind of comprehension emerges primarily because we

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7. धर्मकीर्ति; न्यायबिन्दु; तत्र कल्पनापोढमभ्रान्तं प्रत्यक्षम् ।
प्रत्यक्ष परि. पृ. 1

8. धर्मकीर्ति; प्रमाणवार्त्तिक; प्रत्यक्षं कल्पनापोढं प्रत्यक्षेणैव सिध्दति ।। 123 ।।
प्रत्यक्ष परिच्छेद, पृ. 138.

9. मनोरथनन्दी; प्रमाणवार्त्तिकवृत्ति; वाच्यवाचकाकार संसर्गवती प्रतीतिः
कल्पना । प्रत्यक्ष परिच्छेद On 126 पृ. 139.

(are) never (accustomed to) use (linguistic) expressions generally without reference to what is actually furnished to us through sense- object contact perceptually, nor do we ever use them without convention.[10] Thus, *Pratyakṣa* must be free from any impact of *Kalpanā* because if the former is to preserve its true nature of bringing to our notice non-sharable features alone then in so far as linguistic expressions are used not referring to non-sharable but sharable features and since the conventions which are utilized and exploited to designate an object or its features with the help of expressions bring to our notice sharable features alone, it is obvious that *Pratyakṣa* has to be free from the impact of *Kalpanā*. There is also another consideration that needs to be understood of the contention that *Pratyakṣa* is *Kalpanāpoḍha*. It is this that if children, before language ability has developed in them, or deaf and dumb persons are able to have preceptual cognition then it is wrong to say that linguistic ability is a pre-requisite of it. So too it is incorrect to hold that perceptual cognition would be worth the name if and only if it is linguistically communicable. For the emergence of perceptual cognition by no token could it be said that it presupposes and requires facility or capability of linguistic communicability. In the case of even those who have such a capability, it is not their having it makes perceptual cognition to emerge and since all modes of linguistic communication and designation either rest upon or cannot be divested from the consideration of sharable features and since the primary requirement that perceptual cognition needs to fulfil being its bringing to our notice non-sharable features, there is every reason to hold that *Pratyakṣa* is *Kalpanāpoḍha*.

Let us look into the explanation of *Kalpanāpoḍha* given by Dharmakīrti elsewhere. In *Nyāya-bindu* he tells us that perceptual cognition is free from that sort of comprehension (*Pratīti*) which arises out of our belief (*Pratibhāṣa*) that designating expressions are capable of appropriately (*yogya*) capturing the features which

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10. मनोरथनन्दी; प्रमाणवार्त्तिकवृत्ति ; न चेन्द्रियविषयेऽनन्वयात संकेतासंभवाच्च शब्दयोजनास्ति
प्रत्यक्ष परि. । On 126 पृ. 139.

things have through (designatory) association with them.[11] Elaborating the point made by Dharmakīrti, Dharmottara tells us that this kind of designation takes place because we hold that there is a *Vācya-Vāchaka* (designator-designated) relation between linguistic expressions we use to designate objects and the objects that are designated by them. We, thus, come to believe that features of things happen to be comprehended by us in so far as we name them and the sort of features we thus come to comprehend are always sharable.[12] Thus, *Kalpanā* in one sense means those sort of sharable features which happen to be brought to our notice through designator-designated or name-named relationship believed to be holding between linguistic expressions and things they are supposed to name or designate. It is held that things or objects have the sharable features which words designating them bring forth and it is in so far as they possess such features that they are and should be considered to be perceptible. Since, significant expressions are in this way invariably connected with general or sharable features and since they are unable to capture non-sharable ones it is but natural to hold that perceptual cognition must be untouched by *Kalpanā* in this sense.

It is not, however, linguistic expressions alone by which perceptual cognition must remain uninfected. Concepts and conceptual comprehension too bring to our notice nothing else but common, general and sharable features. Here a concept is taken to indicate general, sharable properties and through it anything and everything to which such properties or features remain applicable. For instance, a child when it learns to talk, it names 'ball' to any round thing that it comes acorss or might name any elderly male person to be

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11. धर्मकीर्ति; न्यायबिन्दु; अभिलापसंसर्गयोग्य ········· तया रहितम् ।
प्रत्यक्ष परिच्छेद.

12. धर्मोत्तर : न्यायबिन्दुटीका : एकस्मिन् ज्ञाने अभिधेयाकारस्य अभिधानाकारेण सह ग्राहयाकारतया शीलनम् ।
प्रथम परिच्छेद. पृ. 10

a 'father'.[13] Thus, perceptual cognition must remain unaffected and uninfected by sharable features, no matter whether they are brought forth linguistically or conceptually. This sort of insistance upon keeping perceptual cognition totally free from sharable features being disclosed through it seems also to be backed by keeping *svalakṣaṇa* completely free from *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* so that they do not come to be mixed up with each other either inadvertently or through any fiat or manoeuvre of definition or illicit conception.

There is a third general feature of perceptual cognition according to Buddhist philosophers in general and Dharmakīrti in particular. This has something to do with acceptance of priority of what is known as *Nirvikalpa Pratyakṣa* over *Savikalpa Pratyakṣa*. Buddhist philosophers generally and Dharmakīrti particulârly upholds and defends priority of *Nırvikalpa Pratyakṣa*. This view of his is very intimately connected with the consideration that *Pratyakṣa* is both *Abhrānta* and *Kalpanāpodha*. We shall return to this point shortly.

To begin with, it may be held that there are two crucially important aspects of human knowledge in general, viz. the factual and formal aspect. It may further be contended that what holds regarding human knowledge in general must also hold regarding every kind of it. Of the two aspects, the argument may continue, the factual aspect has something to do with the information experientially furnished to us, while the formal aspect of human knowledge is concerned with conceptual and linguistic aspects. Given that

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13. धर्मोत्तर; न्यायबिन्दुटीका; तत् काचित् प्रतीतिरभिलापसंसृष्टाभासा भवति, यथा व्युत्पन्नसङ्केतस्य घटार्थकल्पना घटशब्दसंसृष्टार्थावभासा भवति।

काचित्त्वभिलापेनासंसृष्टापि अभिलापसंसर्गयोग्याभासा भवति, यथा बालकस्याव्युत्पन्नसङ्केतस्य कल्पना।

तत्र 'अभिलापसंसृष्टाभासा कल्पना' इत्युक्तावव्युत्पन्न सङ्केतस्य कल्पना न संगृह्येत। ······ तत् उभयोरपि योग्यग्रहणेन संग्रहः। प्रत्यक्ष परिच्छेद, पृ. 10.

human knowledge has these two aspects and given further that perceptual cognition is a kind of human knowledge, the two aspects of human knowledge—factual and formal—should also be discernible in it, and if they are so decernible then there is no reason why perceptual cognition should not be considered to be basically of two kinds, viz. that in which factual aspect of our knowledge is present and the one in which the formal aspect of it is present. Since, further, conceptual and linguistic aspects of human knowledge have to do with sharability, publicness and communicability, there is no reason why, in perceptual cognition itself non-sharable and sharable, private and public, non-communicable and communicable aspects of it should not be discernible. Accordingly, perceptual cognition or perceptual knowledge may be considered to be of two main kinds : that in which sharable, public, communicable, features do not come to be disclosed and that in which they do happen to be disclosed, i.e. *Savikalpa* and *Nirvikalpa*.

This argument would remain unacceptable to Dharmakīrti on number of counts. First, although it may be correct to hold that in human knowledge two aspects—factual and formal—are discernible, it would be fallacious to hold that in every kind of it they should likewise be discernible. Knowledge considered as a whole may enable us to discern two sort of features which happen to be disclosed to us. But this by no means enables us to say and uphold that even in perceptual cognition these two sorts of features must be likewise disclosed. Second, if the factual and formal aspects of knowledge are related with what is experientially disclosed and that which is conceptually and communicatively facilitating then although knowledge in general will have to have these two aspects, from this it does not follow that perceptual cognition also has to fulfil these two conditions. Thirdly, if the factual aspect is related with non-sharable features and if formal aspect of our knowledge is connected with conceptual, sharable and public features then in order that perceptual cognition discloses both of them it will have essentially to be taken to be concerned both with sharable as well as non-sharable features, and unless this is accepted there can be no way of holding that perceptual cognition is basically of two kinds—that in which not sharable features are disclosed and the one in which sharable features are given. Forthly,

Vikalpa is not the same as *Kalpanā*, though they might be and often are related. (Sometimes they are even understood, though inadvertently in the same way). Whereas *Kalpanā* revolves around *Vāchya-Vāchaka* relation,[14] *Vikalpa* is said to revolve around the consideration of *Viśeṣaṇa-Viśeṣya* relation. What one names may not necessarily be a *Viśeṣya*; it could be a *Viśeṣaṇa* as well. Moreover, just because and in so far as we name we need not be specifying any characteristics—especially such characteristics the possession of which make the given object what it is. But in the case of *Viśeṣya* it would be incorrect to hold that it is a particular sort of *Viśeṣya* although it does not possess those characteristics the possession of which would make it the sort of *Viśeṣya* it is. This is not, however, to hold that *Viśeṣya* should not be named at all. Without entering into the further finer nuences of the distinction between the respective relations around which the notions of *Kalpanā* and *Vikalpa* revolve, suffice it for our present purpose to note that characterising features in the *Viśeṣaṇa-Viśeṣya* relation are very often general, sharable and common features. That is, in the same situation they could also enable us to characterise another *Viśeṣya* with their help This being the case, if it is held that perceptual cognition is of two kinds, depending upon whether such general characterising features are disclosed in it or not, and if Dharmakīrti is made to accept such a classification of perceptual cognition then his position regarding perceptual cognition at least would not only be inconsistent but absurd as well. For, if according to him, perceptual cognition is essentially such that it does not disclose general, sharable or common features but only those which are specific,[15]

14. मनोरथनन्दी; प्रमाणवार्त्तिकवृत्ति; वाच्यवाचकयोजना हि विकल्पः सा च संकेतपूर्विका ...... । प्रत्यक्ष परिच्छेद 141 पृ. 143

15. (1) धर्मकीर्ति; प्रमाणवार्त्तिक; तस्माद् विशेषविषया सर्वेवेन्द्रियजा मतिः ।
न विशेषेषु शब्दानां प्रवृत्तावस्ति सम्भवः ।
प्रत्यक्ष परिच्छेद. 127 पृ. 139.

(2) मनोरथनन्दी; प्रमाणवार्त्तिकवृत्ति ; विशेषमात्राकारैव तु प्रत्यक्षबुध्दिः उपलभ्यते ।
प्रत्यक्ष परिच्छेद On 127 पृ. 139.

then how can he be made to accept classification of perceptual cognition into *Savikalpa* and *Nirvikalpa* ? This being the case it is incorrect to hold that the so-called classification of *Pratyakṣa* into *Savikalpa* and *Nirvikalpa* is made by taking into account what sort of features is disclosed in perceptual cognition -specific or general. On Dharmakīrti's view it has been held in no uncertain terms that perceptual cognition can disclose only specific features and that it is not meant to disclose non-specific and generic features. That is why he has not given or elaborated the so-called classification of perception into *Savikalpa* and *Nirvikalpa*.

But given his view that perceptual cognition by its very nature is *Kalpanāpoḍha* and given further that according to him *Pratyakṣa* is not meant to disclose generic, sharable, or common features at all, no matter whether they are said to flow via non-veridicality of perceptual cognition or conceptual or communicative nature of knowledge, to say that *Pratyakṣa* is *Nirvikalpa* is analytically connected with his definition of *Pratyākṣa*. In other words, for Dharmakīrti *Pratyakṣa* cannot be anything else but *Nirvikalpa* in the sense that it has to be totally free from *Kalpanā* and *Vikalpa*. In the case of *Nyāya* philosophers, on the contrary, this view obviously shall not be acceptable. For according to them, no piece of knowledge can ever lack generality or communicability. This being the case even perceptual cognition cannot lack this feature. In fact, according to them that any knowledge satisfies communicability, conceptuality, or sharability requirement is a necessary condition of its being considered to be knowledge worth the name at all. Hence, in their definition of *Pratyakṣa*, too, this element of generality happens to be emphasised. It is, therefore, quite natural for them to regard that *Savikalpa Pratyakṣa* is primary since no knowledge can ever lack, formal, sharable, conceptual aspect. The question as to whether it is *Savikalpa* or *Nirvikalpa* knowledge that is primary needs to be understood in a slightly different way than it is customary to do so. As pointed out earlier, it is one thing to hold that human knowledge in general will have to exhibit both the aspects—factual as well as formal—and quite another to hold either that every piece of knowledge has to exhibit both these aspects or even

that every piece of knowledge has to be at least formal. If the first of these views is accepted, as Buddhist in general and Dharmakīrti in particular do, then whether it is *Nirvikalpa* or *Savikalpa* knowledge that is primary is and remains an unaskable question. If on the contrary, a particular kind of knowledge—say either exhibiting particularity or generality—that is taken into account then, as Dharmakīrti holds, the question would have to be answered saying that whereas in the case of that knowledge that is exclusively meant to exhibit particularity i.e. perceptual cognition, that it is *Nirvikalpa* which will have to be considered as its necessary condition, while in the case of that kind of knowledge that is exclusively meant to exhibit generality i.e. inferential or reciocinative knowledge, that it is *Savikalpa* which will have to be considered to be its necessary condition. If the second view is accepted then every piece of knowledge will exhibit both the features and hence whether it is *Nirvikalpa* or *Savikalpa* that is primary just cannot be decided, both particularity as well as generality being essential conditions of knowledge. If the third view is accepted then it is *Savikalpa* that turns out to be primary. But then we happen to be faced with a consequence that would remain unpallatable, viz. it is not only necessary that our knowledge is formally alright but it is enough as well for it to be so. If this rider, too, is added then our philosophic or epistemological enterprise can soar high without being constrained by intuitive or experiential considerations. We need not enter into the details of the debate here, it being needless for us to do so in the present context of our inquiry. It is necessary, however, to note that Dharmakīrti's considering *Nirvikalpakatva* of perceptual cognition to be primary is intimately connected with his view about human knowledge in general and about perceptual cognition in particular and unless both these views are shown to be untenable it is no use in holding that even emergence or occurrence perceptual cognition cannot help being *Savikalpa.*

It may be argued that even though perceptual cognition can perhaps occur without involving *Savikalpakatva* yet when it comes to interpretation or communication of it, it would be futile to hold that these exercises too do not involve *Vācya-Vacaka* or *Viśeṣya-Viśeṣaṇa* relation and in so far as this is the case it would be

incorrect to hold that perceptual cognition is bereft of *Vikalpa* or *Kalpanā*. This argument, too, misses an important point. Even if it is accepted that interpretation or communication of information involves *Savikalpakatva* it does not follow from this either that perceptual experience itself cannot occur unless *Savikalpakatva* facet is already involved in it or that the *Vācya-Vācka* or *Viseṣya-Viśeṣaṇa* relation that may figure in interpretation oı communication of perceptual experience must be contributed by it and by nothing else. Likewise, in the case of those in whose view all our knowledge as it occurs is *Savikalpa* to say that from such a a knowledge its *Nirvikalpa* counterpart becomes available by abstraction does not score any philosophically illuminating point. For, in that case it would be futile to strive to gain *Nirvikalpa* counterpart of the given *Savikalpa* knowledge. In the case of those, on the contrary, who hold that perceptual experience in its occcuırence is *Nirvikalpa* and that it becomes *Savikalpa* through construction, a philosophically interesting point emerges, viz. in our interpretation or communication of our perceptual experience we come to add such features to what is disclosed through perceptual experience which bear no relation with it and could at the most be distortive rather than illuminative of it. We had mentioned earlier that there is a point about *Abhrāntatva* that will be considered after we have paid attention to *Kalpanāpoḍhatva*. Both *Abhrāntatva* and *Kalpanāpoḍhatva* are very intimately connected with each other. Whereas the latter ensures that perceptual experience remains unaffected in its occurrence by concepts and language giving rise to generality to which perceptual experience is allergic in its occurrence, *Abhrāntatva* not only ensures demarcation of veridicality from non-veridicality but also ensures perceptual experience from being infected by generality due to defective organs, movement of object of perception or of ourselves or acute emotional distrubance etc.[16] Thus, both of them insalute perceptual experience from being infected by generality that is foreign to and unrelated with those features disclosed in and

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16. धर्मकीर्ति; न्यायबिन्दु; तिमिराशुभ्रमणनौयान संक्षोभाघनाहितविभ्रमं ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षम्।
प्रथम परिच्छेद. पृ. 1

through it. *Kalpanāpoḍhatva* and *Abhrātatva* severally and jointly ensure to keep perceptual experience unadulterated by generality that is alien to the features disclosed in it. They reinforce each other to keep perceptual experience *Nirvikalpa* and in this way they are very intimately related with each other,[17] although they by no means are the same.

Thus, according to Dharmakīrti perceptual cognition has to fulfill three general and yet essential conditions : one, it must be *Abhrānta*, two, it must be *Kalpanāpoḍha* and three, it must be *Nirvikalpa in* its occurrence. The third of these general features is inextricably connected with the first two as also with his view about knowledge in general, viz. in it two principal kinds of features should be available—one disclosing specificity and another disclosing generality.

Kinds of Perception

Though every kind of perceptual cognition is expected to satisfy the above mentioned three general conditions, yet that does not mean that Dharmakīrti does not acknowledge kinds of it. According to him, perceptual cognition is of four main kinds.[18] Let us proceed further to consider briefly the decisive and differentiating features of each of them. The first of them is called *Indriyajñānam* or *Indriya Pratyakṣam.*[19] It is that kind of perception which arises through sense-organs. We perceive that individuals or features are discrete, given in succession or in conjunction.[20] We may call it sensation for the sake of convenience. *Mānas pratyakṣa* or *Manovijñānam* is that kind of perceptual cognition which arises at the same time at which *Indriya Pratyakṣa*

17. धर्मोत्तर; न्यायबिन्दुटीका; कल्पनापोढत्व अभ्रान्तत्वे परस्परसापेक्ष ······
दर्शितमिति ।
प्रत्यक्ष परिच्छेद. पृ. 11
18. धर्मकीर्ति; न्याय बिन्दु; तत् चतुर्विधम् । प्रत्यक्ष परिच्छेद. पृ. 2
19. (1) तत्रैव; इन्द्रिय ज्ञानम् । प्रत्यक्ष परिछेद. पृ. 2
(2) धर्मकीर्ति; प्रमाणवार्त्तिक ; इन्द्रिय प्रत्यक्षम् । प्रत्यक्ष परिच्छेद
पृ. 158
20. धर्मकीर्ति; प्रमाणवार्त्तिक ; अथैकायतनत्वेऽपि नानेकं दृश्यते सकृत् ।
सकृदग्रहावभास: किं वियुक्तेषु तिलादिषु ।। प्रयुक्तं
लाघवञ्चात्त तेष्वेव क्रमपातिषु । किं नाक्रमग्रहस्तुल्य-
काला: सर्वाश्चबुध्दर्थ : ।। प्रत्यक्ष परिछेद 197, 198
पृ. 160.

or sensation arises, with the difference that whereas *Indriya Pratyakṣa* arises from the object.[21] (*Ālambana Pratyaya*), the former arises from *Samānāntar Pratyaya.*[22] We may call it impression for convenience. It is this which makes memory possible even though object of sensation (*Indriya Pratyakṣa*) might have ceased to exist. The difference between the two is : whereas in *Indriya Pratyakṣa* the object is directly cognized, in *Mānasa Pratyakṣa* it is indirectly cognized, although the object of sensation and that of impression is the same. Both *Indriya Pratyakṣa* and *Mānasa Pratyakṣa* are equally viable although the former with regard to sensation, whil the latter with regard to memory, provided, of course, that both are *Ābhranta* and *Kalpanāpoḍha.* It is not possible to hold that while object of *Indriya Pratyakṣa* is acceptable, that of *Mānasa Pratyakṣa* is not. For, first, the object of both of them is the same. Secondly, impression arises at the same time at which sensation arises. Thus both sensation and impression are equally acceptable or none is acceptable. Accepting sensation but rejecting impression, or accepting impression but rejecting sensation is not acceptable.

By *Mānasa Pratyakṣa,* we have merely memory of the object. It does not, however, create any feeling of pain or pleasure. Such feelings are generated by our being affected in a certain way. We may come in this way to be affected by objects or by states into which we come to find ourselves. *Svasaṁvedana* or *Ātmavedana* is the perceptual cognition of our various feelings, emotions,

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21. धर्मकीर्ति; न्याय बिन्दु; स्वविषयान्तरविषय सहकारिणेन्द्रिय ज्ञानेन समन्तर
प्रत्ययेन जनितं मनोविज्ञानम् ।
प्रत्यक्ष परिच्छेद पृ. 2

22. According to Buddhists in all four determiners figure in perceptual cognition. The object that we perceive is known as *Ālambana Pratyaya,* the sense-organ/s with the help of which we perceive is known as *Adhipati Pratyaya,* the auxilitory conditions like light etc. as *Sahakāri Pratyaya* and the fourth-what may be called power of *Manas* is known as *Samānāntara Pratyaya,* for it creates impression corresponding to sensation and at the same time we have sensation, although sensation itself does generate impression.

sensation etc. when we are affected by something.[23] It is considered to be non-sensational in character in so far as it does not arise with the help of any sense-organ. It is also non-linguistic for no convention plays any role in it.[24]

Svasaṁvedana differs from memory. In case of *Mānasa Pratyakṣa* what we come to have is an impression. But we do not come to be affected. Impressions themselves do not generate any feeling in us. Feelings arise only in so far as we come to be affected by them. Hence, for the emergence of feelings we must come to be affected in one or the other way.

Yogi-jñāna is that fourth kind of perceptual cognition in which *yogis* come to instantaneously clearly comprehend a *Sadbhūta artha* (a thing that has genuinely emerged or that is genuinely there) upto the farthest limit of its initial state in future.[25]

There is a fundamental difference between *Svasaṁvedanā* and *yagi-jñāna.* In the case of the former it is the perceptual cognition of our present feelings in so far as we are affected. In *yagi-jñāna* there is a comprehension of the thing by which we are affected till the farthest limit of our being in this way affected is likely to continue. That is why whereas in *Svasaṁvedanā* and *yogi-jñāna* our being affected is significant, in the former it remains limited only to the present, while in the case of the latter it extends to the future as well.

Each of these perceptual congnitions is free from *Kalpanā* which is that sort of comprehension which emerges in so far as words having particular sense are used and the comprehension is a consequence of the sense of word so used.[26] Further, each of them is clear and

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23. धर्मकीर्ति; न्यायबिन्दु; सर्वचित्तचैत्तानाम् आत्मसंवेदनम् । प्रत्यक्ष परिच्छेद. पृ. 2

24. मनोरथनन्दी : प्रमाणवार्त्तिकवृत्ति ; ...... संकेत अविषयत्वात् ...... प्रत्यक्ष परिछेद On 249-50 पृ. 175-176.

25. (1) धर्मकीर्ति; न्यायबिन्दु; भूतार्थ भावनाप्रकर्षपर्यन्तज' योगिज्ञानं चेति । प्रत्यक्ष परिच्छेद. पृ. 3·

(2) धर्मोत्तर; न्यायबिन्दुटीका ; भावनाया: प्रकर्षो ...... आरम्भावस्था भावना प्रकर्ष: । प्रत्यक्ष परिछेद. पृ. 15.

26. धर्मकीर्ति : प्रमाणवार्त्तिक : शब्दार्थग्राहि यद यत्र तज्ज्ञानं अत्र कल्पना स्वरूप' च न शब्दार्थस्तत्राध्यक्षमतो खिलम 285 प्रत्यक्ष परिच्छेद. पृ. 185.

distinct, does not involve generality or shareability in it and hence is true to the essence of perceptual cognition which is supposed to disclose one or the other particularity alone.

We saw above, before we considered the kinds of perceptual cognition accepted by Dharamakīrti, that Dharamakīrti does not accept classification of perceptual knowledge into *Savikalpa* and *Nirvikalpa.* It would be instructive to inquire whether the so-called classification of *Pratyakṣa into Laukika* and *Alaukika* would at least be acceptable to him. From what has already been considered, it is clear that in the case of every kind of *Pratyakṣa* that has been considered by Dharmakīrti, perceptual cognition in no case extends beyond the present object. In no kind of perceptual cognition can perceptual cognition extend beyond it. Now, as it is generally understood, in case of *Laukika Pratyakṣa* our perceptual cognition remains limited only to what is presently given to us and never extends beyond it, no matter what is the object of perceptual cognition—whether it is a thing, feeling, state or even a cluster of properties. Further, there is nothing built into the very mechanism and framework of any perceptual cognition that with the help of it or through it, it can bring out extension of our perceptual cognition beyond the object of its present campass. In the case of *Alaukika Pratyakṣa*, its essence is considered to be the fact that it enables us to accomplish this kind of extension of our perceptual cognition either extensionally—in the sense that we not only perceive what is given or the thing that is present but also all possible things similar to it—, or intentionally in the sense that we perceptually not only cognize those features of a thing that are perceptually, presently given but even those which are not so given, their being already given to us previously and their being available to us in the form of memory traces of them. Thus, it is thought that through or with the help of the very mechanism built into the very structure of *Alaukīka Pratyakṣa* extension of our perceptual cognition could be effected either merely extensionally or intentionally alone or in both the ways.

Naiyāyikas, for example, hold that perceptual cognition that is basically of two main kinds. According to them, perception is of two kinds, namely, *Laukika* and *Alaukika.* In this view, our perceptual cognition may either furnish information about that

object or its features alone, which is perceptually presented to us, in which case, it would be *Laukika Pratyakṣa*, or it may furnish information about not only the object that is presented perceptually but also about similar other objects that could have been so presented, or may furnish information not only about that feature of (a) given thing/s that is actually presented but also about those which were presented earlier or which could be said to be capable of being perceptually presented. Under such circumstances it would be a case of *Alaukika Pratyakṣa.* In accepting the classification of *Pratyakṣa* into *Laukika* and *Alaukika* the *Nyāya* philosophers seem to accept that knowledge not only can arise perceptually, but through the perceptual mechanism itself it may happen to go beyond what is perceptually presented—both extensionally and/or intentionally. They further held that in the case of *Laukika Pratyakṣa* our perceptual cognition remains limited only to what is perceptually presented, because there is a direct relation (*Saṁbandha* or *Sannikarṣa*) between particular sense-organ and the thing or feature perceptually presented. In the case of *Alaukika Pratyakṣa*, the extension and augmentation of perceptually made available information happens to be effected through a particular or special relation called *Pratyāsatti*. Thus, on the *Nyāya* view, the classification of perceptual cognition into *Laukika* and *Alaukika* is quite legitimate and needs to be respected as well as accepted.

Such a kind of distinction or even the very problem of *Alaukika Pratyakṣa* cannot be raised in Dharmakīrti's philosophy. For, as it is already pointed out perceptual cognition remains limited, according to him, to what is presently perceptually available and there is no mechanism built into it whereby it could happen to be extended beyond what is perceptually presented. What is denied is not possibility of empirical knowledge going beyond the limit of what is empirically furnished, but rather that there is a mechanism built into empirical experience itself due to the sole force of which perceptual cognition cannot help going beyond the limit of what is empirically presented. Nyāya philosophers, on the contrary, seem to be holding that since knowledge originating empirically is seen to transgress the boundary of what is empirically presented, there must be some mechanism built into empirical experience itself on the basis of which this kind of transgression

must be happening to be effected. Buddhists like Dharmakīrti, seem rightly to hold, on the contrary, that there is no empirically available evidence relying on which it could be held that knowledge originating empirically goes beyond empirical experience through the mechanism of empirical experience itself. This being the case, Dharmakīrti holds, analysis of perceptual cognition cannot be said to furnish any evidence relying on which we could be forced to admit phenomenon of *Alaukika Pratyakṣa* and accept classification of *Pratyakṣa* into *Laukika* and *Alaukika.*

Object of Perceptual Cognition

Having considered the general conditions which perceptual cognition worth the name has to satisfy and having dealt with the kinds of it that Dharmakīrti accepts, there arises a problem: what could be said to the object of perceptual cognition ? A very general answer to this question was pointed out earlier when it was stated that only two sorts of features figured in human knowledge : the particular or non-sharable, and the general or sharable. It was also pointed out that, according to Dharmakīrti, these two features of human knowledge happen to be disclosed by perception and inference respectively. In other words, perceptual cognition is a paradigmatic mode of our cognition through which particularity available in our knowledge happens to be furnished, while inference is paradigmatic mode of our cognition through which generality or shareability which figures in our knowledge happens to be made available. Thus, through empirical experience we chance upon particularity, while through reason we expose ourselves to generality and shareability. A question, however, remains : what could be said to be the object of perceptual cognition ? While answering this question we should not forget one thing, however. It is this that both particularity and generality are the features of the same things and there are no things which have nothing else but non-sharable features and others which have sharable features alone. Holding this view would amount to dichotomise the world into two mutually exclusive compartments which do not have any point of contact except perhaps the fact that both of them are objects of our knowledge. Such a view would obviously not be acceptable to Dharmakīrti.

According to Dharmakīrti, object of any perceptual cognition is *Svalākṣaṇa.*[27] But what kind of object deserves to be considered to be *Svalakṣaṇa* ? If one says that an object of perceptual cognition is *Svalakṣaṇa* and *Svalakṣaṇa* is that which figures as object of perceptual cognition, then this would obviously involve circularity. Hence, the question is required to be answered differently. Etymologically, *Svalakṣaṇa* is that which is definable in terms of or is symptomatic of nothing else but of itself. That is, it is something which has a unique character. It has no sharable feature/s. Thus, understood, *Svalakṣaṇa* is a unique particular in the sense that substitution of it by something else would not be possible. Elaborating this Dharmottara tells us that any object of perceptual cognition has such features which it does not share or have in common with anything else.[28] What is meant is that anything, in order to be an object of perceptual cognition, is not necessarily required to have any sharable features, nor could its having any sharable features be said to be making it amenable to perceptual cognition. To be able to understand what exactly is meant by *Sva-lakṣaṇa* this much, however, is not enough. Some more pointers need to be made available, using which one may be able to decide what sort of object *Sva-lakṣaṇa* could be. Dharmakīrti provides three crucial pointers to decide what sort of object could be considered and adjudged to be *Svalakṣaṇa.* They are : First, *Svalakṣaṇa* is that sort of object in our perceptual comprehension or cognition of which there arises a difference according as it is proximate to or distant from us.[29] Explaining Dharmakīrti's contention Dharmottar points out that the difference in our perceptual cognition under consideration is to be understood in terms of clarity or unclarity of it.[30] What is meant by this does not seem to be

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27. धर्मकीर्ति; न्यायबिन्दु; तस्य विषय: स्वलक्षणम् । प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 3.
28. धर्मोत्तर; न्यायबिन्दुटीका; यत् असाधारणम् तत् प्रत्यक्षग्राह्यम् । प्रत्यक्ष परिच्छेद. पृ० 16.
29. धर्मकीर्ति; न्यायबिन्दु; यस्यार्थस्य सन्निधानासन्निधानाभ्यां ज्ञानप्रतिभा सभेदस्तत् स्वलक्षणम् । प्रत्यक्ष परिच्छेद. पृ० 3.
30. धर्मोत्तर : न्यायबिन्दुटीका : अर्थशब्द: विषय पर्याय ।······तस्मात् सन्निधानात् असन्निधानात् च ज्ञान प्रतिभा सस्य ग्राह्याकारस्य भेद: स्फुटत्वस्फुटत्वात् । प्रत्यक्ष परिच्छेद. पृ० 16.

enlargement or shrinkage of the object of perceptual cognition itself due to its proximity or distance, but rather clarity or unclarity attendant upon our cognition of it. Now, since object of perceptual cognition could be an external object, its impression, our feelings and emotions or even the present state of a thing, it would be incorrect to hold that according to Dharmakīrti objects of perceptual cognition or *Sva-lakṣaṇa* must be nothing else but physical objects. Physical external objects could certainly be perceptually cognized according to him, if they fulfil conditions of their perceptual cognizability. But from this it cannot follow that physical objects alone must be considered to be *Sva-lakṣaṇas*. Otherwise we would be forced to hold feelings and impressions also to be physical and external objects which is not only unacceptable but is absurd as well. This is again the reason that Dharmakīrti's *Sva-lakṣaṇas* cannot be compared with Kant's thing-in-itself for the very simple reason that Kant never considers impressions or feelings to be things-in-themselves. This seems often to be ignored or forgotten and a misunderstanding about Dharmakīrti's philosophical thought happens to be given rise to through its being compared with that of Kant.

Secondly, Dharmakīrti tells us that any *Sva-lakṣaṇa* feature must be considered to be genuinely real in the true sense of the term, because anything that is so, must be capable of being given to us unartificially and unadulteratedly. Any *Svalakṣaṇa* is *parmārthasat*.[31] Hence, anything that is artificial and adulterated cannot figure as *Sva-lakṣaṇa* and hence cannot be an object of perceptual cognition.

Thirdly, if it is asked why should such an object be considered to be genuinely real then the answer would be : because such an object alone could be considered to be endowed with capability of inducing an appropriate response with reference to it on our part.[32] Such an appropriate response, Dharmotcara tells us, essentially

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31. धर्मकीर्ति; न्यायबिन्दु; तदेव परमार्थसत प्रत्यक्ष परिच्छेद. पृ० 3.
धर्मोत्तर; न्यायबिन्दुटीका; परमार्थ : अकृत्रिमं अनारोपितं स्वयम् । तेन अस्तीति परमार्थसत् । प्रत्यक्ष परिच्छेद. पृ० 17.

32. धर्मकीर्ति; न्यायबिन्दु; अर्थक्रियासामर्थ्यलक्षणत्वात्वस्तुनः । प्रत्यक्ष परिच्छेद. पृ० 3.

consists in our accepting or rejecting it.[33] We shall have, later on, an occasion to explore in greater details Dharmakīrti's notion of *Arthakriyāsāmārthya*.

Given these clearly stated pointers or symptoms of *Svalakṣaṇas* there should hardly be any doubt whether Dharmakīrti's *Svalakṣaṇas* could be considered to be external objects alone or physical, material objects only and also whether they could be taken to be comparable with Kant's things in themselves. As pointed out little earlier that what Dharmakīrti calls *Svalakṣaṇas* can at all be physical objects. What we wish to deny, however, is that according to him physical and nothing else but physical objects are and must be considered to be *Svalakṣaṇas*. Further in so far as *Svalakṣaṇas* can be external as well as physical objects it is untenable to hold that his philosophic position is subjective idealism.

A counter argument, however, against this view may be advanced along the following lines. It may be held that sensation is obviously caused by external object. An impression, though neither caused by sensation nor by object of sensation, cannot, however, be had unless there are both of them. For, even if impression is not caused by *Ālambana*, *Sahakāri* or even *Adhipati Pratyaya*, it is nonetheless caused parallelly when *Adhipati Pratyaya* causes sensation. Now if there is no sensation itself, what could impression be parallel to ? Likewise, although *Ātmasaṁvedana* is of our feelings and emotions, yet it would not be there if both sensations and impressions are absent. On the same line *Yogijñāna* would not be there if there is no *Sadbhuta Artha*. Thus every form of perceptual cognition, according to Dharmakīrti, is related with an external object directly or indirectly. Hence, what Dharmakīrti, calls *Svalakṣaṇas* need to be understood as nothing else but physical objects.

The counter argument sketched above is fallacious, however on more than one counts : First, Dharmakīrti nowhere defines *Svalakṣaṇa* to be that object alone with which every mode of perceptual cognition is directly or indirectly connected. He tells us that object of every kind of perceptual cognition is *Svalakṣaṇa*,

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33. धर्मोत्तर : न्यायबिन्दुटीका : अर्थ्यंत इत्यर्थः। ······तत् अर्थक्रियासामर्थ्य लक्षणम्। तस्य भावः। प्रत्यक्ष परिच्छेद. पृ० 17.

independently of whether object of another perceptual cognition is *Sva-lakṣaṇa* or not. That is, we are not told that object of *mano-vijñāna* is *Svalakṣaṇa* only because and in so far as object of *Indri-yajñāna* is *Svalakṣaṇa* and so on and so forth.

Secondly, objects of all kinds of perceptual cognitions-which are not physical objects—are considered to be *Svalakṣaṇas*, on par with one another and they are not rated or graded in their being considered to be *Sva-lakṣaṇas*. That is, there is no hierarchy among them in so far as they are said to be related with external physical objects, directly or indirectly.

Thirdly, it is not again necessary that when every kind of perceptual cognition occurs there must be a physical object present before us when that sort of cognition arises. For instance, we come to be affected by our impressions and we may have perceptual cognition of them even though the object of which we have an impression has ceased to exist. Under such circumstances what sort of external physical object would it be with which we can legitimately hope to relate our perceptual cognition of our feelings ? Hence, it would be incorrect to hold that what Dharmakīrti calls *Svalaṣkaṇa* are nothing else but physical objects. It can not even be held that although every physical object is a *Svalakṣaṇa*, every *Svalakṣaṇa* is not a physical object, For, what guarantees something being considered, according to Dharmakīrti, to be a perceptual object is not that it is a physical object but rather that it fulfils conditions of perceptibility. Hence, if there are to be physical objects not fulfilling conditions of perceptibility, i.e. physicability of an object not being co-extensive with its perceptibility, then just because an object is physical it cannot be considered to be perceptible. These considerations are often lost sight of, quite often inadvertantly and it is held that Dharmakīrti's *Svalakṣaṇas* are physical objects. This view, however, would not be acceptable to him, however, dear it might be to us.

The General Criterion Of Viability Of Perceptual Cognition :

With clarification regarding object of perceptual cognition at hand let us proceed to consider what, according to Dharmakīrti, should be considered to be the general conditions of the viability or acceptibility of perceptual cognition. He tells us that all knowledge, irrespective of whether it is perceptual or otherwise, has to fulfil

one condition : any acceptable (*Pramāṇa*) knowledge must be non-inconsistent.[34] Explaining this, Manorathanandi tells us that it must be non-discordant or that it must be non-deceitful[35]. Since this is a general condition of knowledge in general, it has to be fulfilled by perceptual cognition as well. But this cannot, however, be held to be the general condition of the viability or acceptibility of perceptual cognition alone. Hence, there arises a question : what could be said to be the general condition of the viability or acceptibility of perceptual cognition ? Such a condition would be differentia of perceptual cognition in general, though it would remain applicable to every kind of viable perceptual cognition. Dharmakīrti answers this question saying : any viable (*Pramāṇa*) perceptual cognition (*Pratyakṣa jñāna*) would be that which leads to the cognition of the concerned perceptual object, of whatever particular kind it is.[36] That is, its viability should consist in culminating in our being able to cognize it. Explaning this Dharmottara tells us that it must never turn out to be the case that we have a viable kind of perceptual cognition and yet we fail to cognize any perceptual object.[37] Thus, the general condition that viability of perceptual cognition needs to fulfil is that through it or with the help of it we should succeed in cognizing the object in our epistemic enterprise. Otherwise, invain would be the perceptual cognition under consideration.

But there would arise yet another question : that we have succeeded in cognizing a perceptual object is after all our knowledge claim. In our epistemological enterprise it is not enought that we have advanced a knowledge claim. We must also succeed in certifying the knowledge claim under consideration to the best of our ability and on the basis of reliable information at our disposal. What sort of information could that be on the basis of which we can

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34. धर्मकीर्ति ; प्रमाणवार्त्तिक; प्रमाणं अविसंवादि ज्ञानम् । प्रमाण परि० पृ०. 3
35. मनोरथनन्दी ; प्रमाणवार्त्तिकवृत्ति; विसंवादनं विसंवाद: वञ्चनम् । तद्योगात विसंवादि । न तथा अविसंवादि । प्रमाण परि०. पृ० 3.
36. धर्मकीर्ति ; न्यायविन्दु ; तदेव च प्रत्यक्षं ज्ञानं प्रमाणफलमर्थप्रतीतिरूपत्वात् । प्रत्यक्ष परिच्छेद. पृ० 3.
37. धर्मोत्तर ; न्यायविन्दुटीका : प्रापकं ज्ञानं प्रमाणम् । प्रापणशक्तिश्च न केवलात् अर्थं अविनाभावित्वात् भवति । प्रत्यक्ष परिच्छेद. पृ० 18.

justify our knowledge claim that we have at our disposal a viable perceptual cognition ? In other words, on what basis can we hope to dispel suspicion about viability of perceptual cognition ? It is this question that Dharmakīrti proposes to answer saying that we must have succeded in cognizing an appropriate object of which our particular perceptual cognition could be said to be a mirror image.[38] Explaining this Dharmottara tells us that what is meant by this is that there should be such a correspondence between our perceptual cognition and the object of it that they are similar to each other i.e. provided our perceptual cognition could (objectively) be said to be cognition of the object it is said to be on the basis of such a kind of correspondence between them.[39] It is on account of such a kind of correspondence that the perceptual cognition under consideration enables us to cognize its object.[40]

Thus, any perceptual cognition worth the name must culminate in our being able to cognize a particular sort of perceptual object and this kind of cognition could be certified on the basis of correspondence between our perceptual cognition and that of which it is a perceptual cognition.

It was pointed out above that according to Dharmakīrti anything that is an object of perceptual cognition is *Svalakṣaṇa* and that any *Svalakṣaṇa* is genuinely real object. This, however, too, is a very crucial knowledge claim and unless it is vindicated on the basis of reliable evidence it would not be acceptable. Further, it was also stated earlier that if we have viable perceptual cognition we must not fail to cognize object of it. But this seems to be insufficient. For, although given a sprout (*Aṅkura*) we should not fail to relate it to its seeds but given seed we may not be able to relate it to its sprout, for it might have given rise to no sprout at all. Likewise, if we have cognized a perceptual object it must be through perceptual cognition, but given perceptual congnition

38. धर्मकीर्ति; न्यायबिन्दु; अर्थसारुप्यं अस्य प्रमाणम् । प्रत्यक्षपरि० पृ० 3.

39 धर्मोत्तर; न्यायबिन्दुटीका; अर्थेन सह यत्सारुप्यं सादृश्यम् अस्य ज्ञानस्य तत् प्रमाणम् । इह यस्मात् विषयात् विज्ञानं उदेति तद्विषयसदृशं भवति । प्रत्यक्ष परिच्छेद. पृ० 18.

40. धर्मकीर्ति; न्यायबिन्दु; तदवशात् अर्थप्रतीति सिद्धेः । प्रत्यक्ष परिच्छेद, पृ० 3 .

how can we claim that we must succeed in cognising a perceptual object with the help of it, unless it fulfils an additional condition ?[41] And this being the case, it needs to be considered what condition needs to be fulfilled as a result of which we would be in a position to say that through our perceptual cognition we have succeeded in cognizing a genuinely real object. We would be in a position to cognize and obtain the object under consideration provided our action or effort of obtaining it culminates in obtaining it to there. That is, the perceptual object that we are supposed to succeed in cognizing and obtaining it to be real must meaningfully be capable of being correlated with our action of seeking and finding.[42] But this would *not* be the case unless our action of obtaining and finding is in some way capable of being related with that the object that we succeed in finding. How is this kind of relation to be established from the side of the object that we are able to succeed in finding with our effort and action of seeking and finding and on what basis are we able to certify that such and such is the relation between them ? This is the formidable question, concerning perceptual cognition and its role, significance and importance, which Dharmakīrti seeks to answer in terms of the criterion of *Arthakriyāsāmarthya.*[43] It is to the consideration of it that we now turn.

The Criterion of Arthakriyāsāmarthya :

We have seen that according to Dharmakīrti the object of any perceptual cognition is *Svalakṣaṇa.* One of the important features of *Śvalakṣaṇa* is that it must be a genuinely real object and we must be able to find it out with the help of some or the other perceptual cognition. Such a perceptual cognition must obviously be a case

41. धर्मोत्तर : न्यायबिन्दुटीका : प्रापकं ज्ञानं प्रमाण ।। प्रापण शक्तिश्च न केवनात् अर्थ अविनाभावित्वात् भवति । बीजादि अविनाभाविनोपि अंकुरादे : अप्रापकत्वात् । प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 18

42. धर्मोत्तर; न्यायबिन्दुटीका; तस्मात् अर्थात् उत्पत्तो अपि अस्य ज्ञानस्य अस्ति कश्चित् अवश्यंकर्तव्य: प्रापक व्यापार: येन कृतेन अर्थ: प्रापित: भवति । प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 18.

43. धर्मकीर्ति; न्यायबिन्दु; अर्थक्रियासामर्थ्यलक्षणत्वाद वस्तुन: । प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 3.

of veridical perception, because an object of veridical perception alone could be *Svalakṣaṇa*. But *Svalakṣaṇas* alone, we are told, are genuinely real objects. But on what ground is one to vindicate this view ? If it is held that they are real because they are capable of being discovered through one or the other sort of veridical perceptual cognition then it would be circular, for they become objects of such a kind of cognition only in so far as they are genuinely real. How are we to establish that what we have discovered through perceptual cognition is nothing else but genuinely real. In so far as we have discovered it through perceptual cognition under consideration our discovering it from our side is and happens to be related with what we succeed in discovering. But how does our seeking itself originate ? Dharmakīrti tells us that our seeking objects of perceptual cognition originates from their having *Kriyāsāmarthya* and hence their being *Arthakriyāsāmartha*. What is meant by this is not that objects of veridical perception are considered to be genuinely real because and in so far as they themselves act but rather that they are endowed with disposition to induce an action of seeking them in us. Thus, from the side of *Svalakṣaṇas* our action of seeking them is related with them in so far as it is induced by them on account of their disposition to induce an action in us through manifestation of their nature on their own. Our seeking them is in this way a response from our side to the inducement of our seeking them which is generated by them on account of their disposition to manifest themselves. Once such an inducement of seeking happens to be generated that itself goads and impels us to find them out in our perceptual cognition. Thus, our finding them out is a response from our side that connects ourselves with them in our being able to find them out in which our act of finding is supposed to culminate. It is thus not the case that we somehow and quite accidently begin seeking on our own and whatever object we thus succeed in finding on the basis of perceptual cognition we deem it to be genuinely real. *Svalakṣaṇas* endowed with disposition to induce our seeking them are there, no matter whether we have perceived them or not. Likewise, we do not succeed in discovering them simply being impelled by desire to seek them in us we begin discovering them and quite accidently and arbitrarily succeed in finding them, consider them to be real only because we have found them, due to whatever reason and in what-

ever way we might have found them out. As the disposition of inducing an action of seeking them in us of *Svalakṣaṇas* is independent of us, likewise our disposition of being induced is independent of *Svalakṣaṇa*. If *Svalakṣaṇas* are not there then no organism especially human beings—could be induced to seek and find them out; if there are no organisms,—especially human beings—in spite of the disposition of *Svalakṣaṇas* to induce an action in organisms to seek and find them, they would not be saught and discovered at all.

But what exactly should this finding out—the end-point of the entire process triggered by *Arthakriyāsāmarthya* of *Svalakṣaṇas*—culminate into ? That is what is, the criterion of our being able to vindicate our claim that we have found out a particular *Svalakṣaṇa* or a genuinely real thing ? Dharmottar tells us that *Artha* is that which we seek to find out or capture. After we have found it out or succeeded in capturing it we may be able to do either one of the following things : reject it (*tyājya*) or retain it (*grāhya*). Thus what we succeed in finding out as a consequence of our seeking may be rejectable or retainable, naturally depending upon its not being or being capable of meaningfully connected with our life-individual or social. Thus, *Arthakriyāsāmarthya Vastus* or *Svalakṣaṇas* must, on the one hand, be connected with our seeking them which happens to be induced in us in so far as they are endowed with this disposition and once sought and found out they must be capable of being either retained or rejccted. It is only in so far as they exhibit this feature, they could be considered to be real.[44] The significance of *Arthakriyasāmarthya* is that on the basis of it, in addition to our knowing that *Svalakṣaṇas* are empirical objects, we also learn that they are not merely of academic interest. They are capable of being related with our life and it is in so far as this is the case that they should concern us at all.

Thus, *Arthakriyāsāmarthya* of *Svalakṣaṇas* does not mean

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44. धर्मोत्तर : न्यायबिन्दुटीका : अर्थ्यत इत्यर्थः । हेय उपादेयश्च । हेयो हि हातुमिष्यते, उपादेयश्चोपादातुम् । अर्थस्य प्रयोजनस्य क्रिया निष्पत्तिः । तस्यां सामर्थ्यं शक्तिः तदेव लक्षणं रूपं यस्य वस्तुनः, तद अर्थक्रिया सामर्थ्यलक्षणम् तस्य भावः तस्मात् । वस्तुशब्दः परमार्थपर्यायः। प्रत्यक्ष परिच्छेद. पृ० 6.

capacity to perform an action with special purpose in view,[45] but a disposition to induce an action on the part of an individual of seeking and finding the thing out that is *Arthakriyāsāmartha* in such a way that it could be either retained or rejected.

Minimal Duration of Svalakṣaṇa

With regard to the object of perceptual cognition, according to Dharmakīrti, viz. *Svalakṣaṇa* we considered above those important features of them as they emerge from his analysis of perceptual cognition in so far as they are objects of perception. There may, however, be an argument that may be marshalled to put forth the view that although we learn from the above analysis that *Slavakṣaṇa* are objets of perceptual cognition, that they are endowed with disposition to induce us to seek them and that when we have found them out through our seeking them in our perceptual cognition, they should be capable of retained or rejected, yet it does not tell us how long should such a genuinely real object last in order that it may be either experienced or it may induce us to seek it, or even in order that we may succeed in finding it out, or after we have found it out we may be in a position to retain or reject it. Dharmakīrti's analysis of peception cannot be said to be complete, the argument continues, unless he throws some light on this issue.

The issue is certainly very important and Dharmakīrti's answer to it, one way or the other, is bound to have number of implications, which we wish to study in latter chapters in their proper context. Presently let us concentrate upon the answer that he gives to the above question. It is, however, important to remember in this connection that the answer he gives presupposes that we are considering the minimal duration of any *Svalakṣaṇa* with special reference to our being able to perceptually experience it or its being able to induce seeking on our past, or our being able to find it out etc. independently of each other. That is, his answer to the above question considers for example, such questions as how long minimally should a *Svalakṣaṇa* last in order that we may come to experience

45. Esho Mikogami—"Some Remarks on the Concept of *Arthakriyāsāmarthya*." Journal of Indan Philosophy, Vol. No. 1, Mar. 1979, pp. 79-92.

it to be an isolated one. He is not, therefore, answering the question : how long should minimally a *Svalakṣaṇa* last in order that it has all these features, could be found out and certified. This is very often not taken into account. Consequently, it gives rise to a number of confusions and misunderstandings about his philosophy, as we shall attempt to point out it later.

Coming back to the questions : how long should a *Svalakṣaṇa* at least last in order that it is perceptually experienced ? Or how long should it minimally last in order that it may induce an action of seeking it in us ? These and such other questions, in so far as they are unrelated with each other, that is in so far as each of them is raised separately, are answered by Dharmakīrti saying that it is enough for a *Svalakṣaṇa* to be there just for a moment.[46] As we shall point out later, this sort of contention need to be understood not in the sense that every real thing lasts just for a moment and no more but rather in the sense that it is directed at impressing upon us non-eternality or non-constancy or changeability of real things[47] Detailed consideration of this point and its significance in Dharmakīrti's philosophy has, however, to wait till later chapters.

Resume

We considered above some of the crucially important points which emerge in Dharmkīrti's analysis of perception. These are not, however, the only points that are of significance that one has come to across in his analysis of perception. We hope to touch upon some more points in the context of our coming to outline his intergrated

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46. मनोरथनन्दी : प्रमाणवार्त्तिकवृत्ति : वस्तु एक क्षण स्थितिधर्मकं अस्मात् सिद्धम् ।
प्रत्यक्ष परिच्छेदे, 40 पृ० 113.
धर्मोत्तर : न्यायाबिन्दुटीका : प्रत्यक्षस्य ह्रि क्षण एको ग्राह्यः । प्रत्यक्ष परिच्छेद, पृ० 16.

47. (1) धर्मकीर्ति; प्रमाणवार्त्तिक; वस्तुमात्रानुबन्धित्वाद् विनाशक्य चनित्यता ।
असम्बन्धश्च जातीनामकार्यत्वादरूपता ॥44॥ प्रत्यक्ष परिच्छेद. पृ० 144.
मनोरथनन्दी; प्रमाणवार्त्तिकवृत्ति; वस्तुमात्र अनुबन्धित्वात् नाशस्य वस्तुनो न नित्यता स्यात् प्रत्यक्ष। परिच्छेद 44 पृ० 144-145.

(2) धर्मकोर्ति; प्रमाणवार्त्तिक; नित्यं प्रमाणं नैवास्ति प्रामाण्यात्तु वस्तुसदगतेः।
ज्ञेयानित्यतया तस्या अध्रौव्यात् : क्रमजन्मनाम् ॥ 10 ॥ प्रमाण परिच्छेद. पृ० 10

philosophic thought and give a sketch of its conceptual framework. The points that figure in his analysis of perception are concerned with the consideration of particularity which is an important aspect of human knowledge. But another aspect of it that needs to be taken into account is that of generality or shareability and Dharmakīrti presents his analysis of generality aspect of human knowledge through his analysis of inference. Unless we have taken into account both these aspects and their analysis at his hands we shall not be in a position to outline his philosophic thought and unless that is done it would be futile to proceed to inquire into the conceptual framework of it. Therefore, with a view to acquainting ourselves with Dharmakīrti's analysis of generality we proceed, in the next chapter to consider his analysis of inference.

3

Analysis of Inference

TWO KNOWABLES

In the previous chapter we saw that according to Dharmakirti there are two kinds of knowables : *Sva-lakṣaṇa* and *Sāmānya-l akṣaṇa.* They could be understood in two different ways: 1) either that there are not only two different and totally distinct kinds of knowables but also correspondingly two different kinds of things such that neither the knowables or things nor our knowledge of them respectively have anything in common nor do they have any bearing upon and connection with each other. This would lead to compartmentalization not only of the world but of our knowledge of it as well and such a view would obviously not be favoured by Dharmakīrti, as it is hoped to be made clear in the next chapter. Or 2) that there are two different kinds of knowables is nothing else but two distinct sort of features: we might come to know are the features that things may have in all.[1] This does not mean that there must be as many kinds of things as many sort of features we

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1. प्रज्ञाकर गुप्त; वार्त्तिकालंकार;···विषयस्य चैकस्यैव द्वैविध्यं प्रतिपत्तिप्रकारस्य द्वैविध्यात प्रतिप्रतिभेदस्य प्रमाणभेदः। सः च एव विषयभेदः।···यदा साक्षाज्ज्ञानजननं प्रति शक्तत्वेन। प्रतीयते तदासौ स्वेनरूपेण लक्ष्यमाणत्वात् स्वलक्षणं, यदा तु पारम्पर्येण शक्तत्वात् तस्यैव प्रतीयते तदा सामान्यरूपेण लक्षणमिति सामान्यलक्षणम्। प्रत्यक्ष परिच्छेदे, पृ॰ 169.

might come to know of them, although through our one kind of knowing of them we may come to know only one kind of features of them. If the knowables under consideration are understood as objects, then *Sva-lakṣaṇas* and *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇas,* understood by Dharmakīrti could be taken to be two distinct sort of objects we seek to know in our epistemological enterprise, but which have no bearing upon each other in whatever way. If, on the contrary, the knowables are understood as two different sorts of features we discover things or objects to be having, then they may be taken to non-shareable and shareable features of things respectively. Uunderstanding in either of these ways has a number of implications and we hope to probe into at least some of the prominent of them in the next chapter wherein we, wish to study interrelationship between Dharmakīrti's analysis of perceptual and inferential cognitions with a view to discovering contours and determiners of the unity of his philosophical thought in order to enable us to formulate and put forth the conceptual framework of his philosophy in the fifth chapter.

We are told by Dharmakīrti that given that there are only two sorts of knowables and given further that no means of knowledge would enable us to comprehend both of them we need to have two distinct sorts of means of knowledge at our disposal.

This point especially as contrasted with that of *Nyāya,* has immensely and decisively important implications, some of which we hope to take into account in the next chapter. Suffice it for the present to note that according to Dharmakīrti there are fundamentally two different kinds of knowables, viz. *Sva-lakṣaṇa* and *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇas* and that it is the business of perceptual cognition to enable us to cognize and comprehend the former of them, while it is the job of inferential cognition to enable us to understand and comprehened the latter kind of knowable. In the previous chapter,

2. (a) धर्मकीर्ति : प्रमाणवार्त्तिक : मानं द्विविधं विषयद्वैविध्यात्; शक्त्यशक्तितः। अर्थक्रियायाम्; केशादिर्नार्थोऽनर्थाधिमोक्षतः ॥ 1 ॥ प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 99.

(b) तत्रैव : न प्रत्यक्ष परोक्षाभ्यां मेयस्यान्यस्य सम्भवः। तस्मात् प्रमेयद्वित्वेन प्रमाणद्वित्वमिष्यते ॥ 63 ॥ प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 120.

(c) धर्मकीर्ति : न्यायबिन्दु : तस्य (प्रत्यक्षस्य) विषयः स्वलक्षणम्। अन्यत् सामान्यलक्षणम्। सोऽनुमानस्य विषयः। प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 15, 18.

in the light of the analysis of perceptual cognition which Dharmakīrti presents, we argued that in order that a perceptual object comes to be cognized at all it is *enough* that it happens to be presented to us *at least for a moment*, i.e. for a short while, and that the being and perceptibility or still better our sensibility of a perceptual object is determined not necessarily by its having shareable and common features but rather by its having non-shareable features, although its having shareable features is not a feature of it such that unless it ceases to have it, it could not be perceptible or rather sensible at all. Thus understood, any perceptible object has to have at least some non-shareable features. As we saw there, its not having shareable features is its differentiating and distinguishing mark and symptom. It is the non-shareability of things that could be said to be the minimal foundation and basis of our comprehension of plurality and distinctness, rather than things' having shareable and common features. This feature of the objects of perceptual cognition too has some of the decisively significant consequences. We hope to examine at least some of them in the next chapter in so far as at least sometimes our perceptual and inferential cognitions may converge upon the same object, although this kind of convergence may not necessarily be determined by our comprehension of the same features of a given object of cognition.

Phe Problem

As objects of perceptual cognition have certain features which mark them off from those of other kind of cognition, likewise analysis of perceptual and inferential cognitions brings forth certain distinctive and peculiar epistemological issues. In the previous chapter we analysed, after Dharmakīrti, the nature of *Sva-lakṣaṇas*, the object of perceptual cognition, and brought to surface some epistemologically important issues that analysis of perceptual cognition as presented by him brings to our notice. But objects of perceptual cognition are not the only knowables and epistemolo gically significant issues do not arise just with reference to them. The objects of inferential cognition, viz. *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇas*, too, are equally important. In order to understand their nature and significance it is necessary to outline Dharmakīrti's analysis of them. In addition, it is also necessary to take note of the various kinds of epistemologically relevant issues that their analysis presents. If,

further, we come to cognize and comprehend the nature of the objects of inferential cognition with the help of infrrence, it becomes inevitable to pay attention to Dharmakīrti's analysis of inferential cognition in order to understand the nature and significance of the various epistemological problems he raises and discusses in its connection. It is the twin task of analysis of *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇas*. Firstly, the objects of inferential cognition, and second is that of inferential cognition, according to Dharmakīrti, that the present chapter is addressed. For, without paying attention to Dharmakīrti's analysis of *Sva-lakṣaṇas* and *Samanya-lakṣaṇas*, on account of his analysis of knowables cannot be complete, and without taking into account his analysis of perceptual and inferential cognitions adequate and necessary basis for our being able to understand his epistemology and philosophy could not be complete. And unless both these exercises are undertaken satisfactorily the question as to what could legitimately be considered to be the determiners of the unity of his philosophic thought and the way they bring to bear upon each other, and again not only *Sva-lakṣaṇas* and *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇas* but also aspects of our perceptual and inferential cognitions cannot be discussed and without paying attention to these and similar other issues the question as to what is the conceptual framework of Dharmakīrti's philosophy and what sort of unity of his philosophic thought becomes available within that kind of conceptual framework is a question which can neither be raised nor discussed. These issues we intend to discuss in the following chapters. For our being able to raise and discuss them in an appropriate way and on legitimate basis the requisite kind of preliminary inquiry into Dharmakīrti's epistemology and philosophy needs to be completed. With this complex end in view we proceed in this chapter to present and analyse Dharmakīrti's views concerning *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇas*, the objects of inferential cognition, and those regarding inferential cognition in order to comprehend the sort of epistemological and philosophical issues he raises with reference to them. Of these two principal issues, again, we consider the nature significance and general framework of inferential cognition with priority and later on turn to the discussion of Dharmakīrti's analysis of *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇas*. In going this way we wish to argue that not only in the case of our perceptual but in the case of inferential

cognition as well Dharmakīrti's analysis of them proceeds through paying attention to intuitive and methodological constraints on it and not through disregarding their relevance and significance. Without unduly anticipating our argument later on we proceed to discuss not only Dharmakīrti's analysis of inferential cognition and that of inferential process but also that of objects of inferential cognition, viz. *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇas.* Of them, again, as pointed out above, we first take up the issue of paying attention to Dharmakīrt's analysis of inferential process and inferential cognition and after we have discussed this issue in its important aspects we hope to take up the problem of the nature of object of inferential cognition. Going this way we wish to bring to the fore certain methodologically important aspects of Dharmakīrti's philosophy. First, therefore, turning to Dharmakīrti's analysis of inference and inferential cognition.

General Nature of Inference

In the context of the discussion of the nature of inference two questions are very often confused:

(1) Consideration of the nature of inferential psychological process where the various psychological aspects of reasoning or thinking process come to be analysed in great detail, and

(2) the discussion of the conditions which our ratiocinative thinking or reasoning, or our inferences or arguments need to satisfy in order that they may be considered to be valid or invalid, sound or unsound, acceptable or unacceptable, tenable or untenable. Question of the first kind might be important in our coming to understand the nature and significance of the various kinds of psychological acts and processes we pass through when we reason. But however, profound insight we gain on this count it could hardly be said to be useful in our being able to tackle the second kind of questions on its basis. Even if the first kind of consideration might be said to be enabling us to comprehend the way inferential cognition originates in us, this in itself can hardly be said to enlighten us regarding the second kind of issues. Moreover, the first kind of consideration does not seem to be raising any significant methodological issue nor can it enable us to stipulate the sort of conditions our arguments have to satisfy if they are satisfactorily

to figure or any of the above mentioned counts, like validity, soundness etc. Dharmakīrti seems to have seen this very clearly in so far as in none of his treatises does he ever discuss any aspect of the psychological process of reasoning or inferring. Obviously, therefore, in his analysis of inference, of inferential cognition as also of the nature of the objects of inferential cognition he neither raises any issue concerning any aspect of the psychological process of reasoning nor does he ever discuss any feature of the origin of inferential cognition. For, he seems to be convinced that as discussion of the first sort of aspects would not enable us to deal with the second sort of issues, so too raising and discussing the issue of the origin of inferential cognition would not likewise prepare any basis for our being able to discuss the second sort of issues. His discussion and analysis of the second kind of issues exclusively thus seems to be strengthened and reinforced by this twin sort of comprehension on his part.

It is obvious, that the mode of inferential cognition would be required to be employed either where an object, although otherwise perceptible, is not given in the given perceptual situation or where it is not perceptible at all. Contrarily, inference would be requisite provided we wish to comprehend such a feature of an object as it cannot be given to us perceptually. In the case, where an object is perceptibly given it would be needless to employ inference or argument and where there is no imperceptible knowable too an argument just need not be employed. Restricting in this way to the legitimate contexts of the employment of arguments it is clear that inferential cognition would make us aware of the knowable indirectly and imperceptibly. Thus, understood *Pratyakṣa* and *Anumāna* turn out to be two important modes of knowing, available with us to be able to know any knowable either directly or indirectly, perceptibly or imperceptibly and since whatever we come to know, we know it directly or indirectly we would not require any additional mode of knowing, *Pratyakṣa* and *Anumāna* being jointly exhaustive modes of knowing. This way of putting the matter furnishes yet another clue to Dharmakīrti's classification of knowables as those known perceptibly and inferentially. Whereas, knowable being given directly is the minimum condition of perceptual cognition, its being indirectly given is that of inferential cognition. This does not

preclude, however, objects of perceptual cognition being those of inferential cognition as well in so far as they are not directly given and also in so far as they have some shareable features/s, although the converse of this consideration would not hold unconditionally and mechanically. This has enormously important implications some of which we hope to inquire into in the next chapter wherein, we wish to study contours of interrelationship between Dharmakīrti'y analysis of the objects of perceptual and inferential cognitions.

Restricting for the present to inference and argument, there is yet another aspect that needs carefully to be taken into account. With regard to any knowledge-claim there are two epistemologically important aspects of it :

(1) formulating or putting forth of the knowledge-claim and,

(2) certification or vindication of it. These considerations would apply to inferentially or argumentatively put forth knowledge-claim as well. But over and above this, regarding an argument as such there arises yet another consideration. Regarding an argument or inference three principal considerations stand out :

(1) what conditions need to be satisfied in order that we come to fashion and formulate an argument at all ? This is, under the fulfilment of which conditions, if any, would our arguments stand at all as being formulated or fashioned ?

(2) what additional conditions would have to be satisfied in order that we may come to communicate our already formulated argument to others ? These two issues, although related with each other, are quite distinct. When we formulate an argument our concern is restricted minimally only to our being able to fashion and formulate an argument. Here we are concerned with fulfilment of those conditions which are necessary and sufficient for our formulating an argument at all. It is not necessary that when we formulate an argument we must entered into a debate or controversy. Independently of this an argument can be formulated. It can be formulated in a soliloque or in a situation where the given person is all alone. That is, social context or situation is not a necessary condition for formulation of an argument, although social context or situation is not a bar on an argument being formulated. When we intend to communicate our already fashioned and formulated argument, on the contrary, we not only require language through

which we can communicate with others, but also a social context or a situation, although our having entered into a debate or controversy is not such an exclusive social context. Further, when we communicate our argument we need not be either defending our position or criticising that of our adversary. When we enter into a debate or controversy we certainly enter into communication, although the converse of this is not true. Moreover, when we communicate an argument it must be already fashioned and formulated, although wherever we communicate we do not necessarily communicate arguments already fashioned, since there can be merely descriptive or narrative communication. Additionally (3) there is also an issue as to what conditions need to be satisfied in order that an argument we have fashioned and formulated comes to be considered to be valid, sound, tenable, acceptable etc. Of these three issues concerning arguments we wish first to consider the first two issues with priority, for the third issue can arise only with regard to an already fashioned and formulated argument, no matter whether it is communicated or not. If it is communicated then others also can raise third kind of issues in its connection. But more about this kind of consideration later.

Svārthānumāna and Parārthānumāna

The issues of fashioning and formulating an argument on the one hand and that of communicating an already fashioned and formulated argument on the other, however, are quite distinct from each other. Formulation of an argument can be possible, as already pointed out, independently of social context but communication of an argument is not and cannot be possible independently of it. In short, it could be said that for formulation of an argument a single individual is sufficient, but for its communication more than one individual is required. But when we communicate our knowledge-claim, we communicate it in a formulated form. Without formulation, the argument cannot be communicated though converse of this does not follow in the sense that an argument we have communicated need not have been fashioned and formulated by ourselves. Formulation of an argument is a pre-requisite for its communication. Thus, these two issues are related. But, just on this count one should not mix them up. Hence, it is necessary to draw a line of demarcation between them.

The sort of distinction we are considering remains significant only in the context of *Anumāna* or an argument. In the case of *Pratyakṣa* the question of our making the distinction between formulation or fashioning and communication of it just does not arise. We perceive the object directly. We do not fashion and formulate perception. We perceive and if the need be we communicate what we have perceived. That is why whereas in the case of *Pratyakṣa* the classification of it into *Svārtha Pratykṣa* and *Parārtha Pratyakṣa* is not in order, its classification into *Nirvikalpa* and *Savikalpa Pratyakṣa* is qute appropriate. In the case of *Anumāna*, on the contrary, while its classification into *Svārtha* and *Parārtha* is quite legitimate, its classification into *Śavikalpa* and *Nirvikalpa* should be considered to be untenable. This is a significant point and we shall have an occasion to look into it in greater details in the next chapter. Dharmakīrti's distinction between *Svārthānumāna* and *Parārthānumana* is significant in more than one respect. First, it bears upon the distinction between fashioning and formulating an argument on the one hand and that of its communication on the other. Secondly, while it tells us that even a non-social context is enough for our coming to fashion and formulate an argument, a social context is essential for its being communicated. Thirdly, since an argument that comes to be communicated is already fashioned and formulated, unless, an argument is fashioned formulated, the question of its communication just does not arise. Fourthly, since fashioning and formulating an argument is prior to its communication and since the conditions of forms assure and guarantee its being able to be considered an argument at all, mere communicability of it could neither be considered to be prior to its being fashioned and formulated nor could it be said to guarantee its argumentativity. This is especially the case, since plain and simple narration is communicative enough although does it not become argumentative just on that count. That is why Dharmakīrti begins considering *Svārthānumāna* first, while consideration of *Parārthānumāna* is taken up later on in hand. Fifthly, the distinction between *Svārthānumāna* and *Prārthānumāna* cannot be understood as that between an argument for oneself and that for other/s as it normally erroneously done. In fact, there is nothing like argument for oneself and that for others. Even when arguments are employed either for self-pursuation or in order to persuade others arguments

that come to be employed need not differ from one another. Likewise, it is also erroneous just to mention the distinction between *Svārthānumāna* and *Prārthānumāna* in passing and leave the matter to rest there as many *Nyāya* logicians are often prone to. It needs to be explicated as to why the distinction under consideration is significant, otherwise the distinction under consideration would remain merely to be ornamental and decorative. Over and above this, as earlier pointed out, problems of validity and soundness of an argument also arise. An argument that is formulated may be valid or invalid. Since formulation of an argument in itself does not automatically guarantee validity or invalidity of an argument. Hence it is necessary to find out that on what ground we decide validity and invalidity of an argument. Likewise, formulation of an argument need not concern itself with the soundness of it, as soundness of an argument is not a precondition of its validity or also of its being formulated at all. A formulated argument may not be sound, though it may not cease to be valid. Again, it may happen that an argument is valid and yet has no reference to any reality, as it may also happen that an argument may be sound and yet may not be valid. Hence, it is necessary to find out conditions determinative of soundness of an argument. Of course, these conditions do not decide the validity or invalidity or an argument automatically. Thus, formulation, communication, validity and soundness of an argument are quite distinct from one another and so these issues should be kept apart from one another.

Thus, it needs to be granted that considerations regarding formulation, 'validity and soundness of an argument should not be mixed up with one another on the one hand, and those relating to formulation and communication of an argument on the other. Dharmakīrti seems to understand the importance and significance of making the distinction between these issues. While we hope to show in the sequel that by making the distinction between *Trairūpya linga* and *Tridhātva linga* he makes the distinction between the conditions determinative of validity and those of truth of the conclusion of an argument, by classifying *Anumāna* into *Svārthanumāna* and *Parārthānumāna*, we have shown above, he segregates the issues regarding formulation of an argument and those pertaining to its communication to be distinct. Accordingly, we turn

in the next two sections to the consideration of the conditions determinative of entertainability and validity of a valid argument respectively. First of them, turn to the former in the next section.

Entertainability of an Argument

Regarding an argument it is generally held in the classical Indian intellectual milieu that there are three important pillars of it viz., *Pakṣa* or what Dharmakīrti and many other Buddhist logicians prefer to call sometimes *Anumeya* or Dharmī,[3] *Sādhya* and *Hetu*. With the help of *Vyāpti*, which is a rule,[4] according to Dharmakīrti, as we wish to elaborately state later on and consider its important implications, we infer *Sādhya* in relation with *Pakṣa*. Inference is a mode of inferring *Sādhya* on the basis of *Hetu*. In inferential cognition *Sādhya* is never given to us directly, in which case inference would be redundant. In the absence of *Vyāpti* or *Hetu* or both, on the contrary, inference would just be impossible. In inference the *Sādhya* is rather cognized in its generality, although such a cognition is no proof of such an object being *Parokṣa*,[5] the

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3. (a) धर्मकीर्ति; न्यायबिन्दु; अनुमेयोऽत्र जिज्ञासितविशेषो धर्मी । स्वार्थानुमान परि० पृ० 4.

(b) मनोरथनन्दी; प्रमाणवार्तिकवृत्ति; पक्ष: धर्मिधर्मसमुदाय : अनुमेय: । तदेकत्वादुपचारेण धर्मी पक्ष: उक्त: । स्वार्थानुमान परि० पृ० 257.

(c) धर्मकीर्ति; प्रमाणवार्तिकान्तर्गतस्वार्थानुमान परिच्छेद-स्वोपज्ञवृत्ति; पक्षो धर्मी, अवयवे समुदायोपचारात् । पृ० 1.

See also in न्यायबिन्दु & हेतुबिन्दु ।

4. धर्मकीर्ति; प्रमाणवार्त्तिक; कार्यकारणभावाद् वा स्वभावाद् वा नियामकात् । अविनाभावनियमोऽदर्शनान्न न दर्शनात् ।। 31 ।।

अवश्यंभावनियम: क: परस्यान्यथा परै: । अर्थान्तरनिमित्ते वा धर्मे वाससि रागवत् ।। 32 ।। स्वार्थानुमान परि० पृ० 269.

5. (a) धर्मकीर्ति; प्रमाणवार्तिक; या च सम्बन्धिनो धर्माद् भूतिर्धर्मिणि ज्ञायते । सानुमानं परीक्षाणामेकान्तेनैव साधनम् ।। 62 ।।

न प्रत्यक्ष परोक्षाभ्यां मेयस्यान्यस्य सम्भव: ।

तस्मात् प्रमेयद्वित्वेन प्रमाणद्वित्वमिष्यते ।। 63 ।।

प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 120.

(b) धर्मोत्तर; न्यायबिन्दुटीका; ततश्च यत्किंचिदर्थसाक्षात्कारि ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षमुच्यते ।···लिंगग्रहणसंबंधस्मरणस्य पश्चान्मानुमानम् ।

प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 8.

(c) प्रज्ञाकरगुप्त; वार्तिकालंकार; न हि अनुमानेन परोक्षता साध्यते··· ततोनुमानप्रवर्तनं व्याघातः। 2-2.45 पृ० 174.

implications of which we hope to examiner later. What we have, according to Dharmakīrti, in *Anumāna* are :

(1) *Dharmi* for *Pakṣa*, with which *Hetu* is related as its *Dharma*, as a result of which the *Hetu* is saíd to have *Pakṣadharmatā*,

(2) *Hetu* related with *Pakṣa* on the one hand through *Pakṣadharmatā*, and with *Sādhya*, on the other hand, through a *Niyama* called *Vyāpti* and (3) *Vyāpti* as *Avinābhāva Niyama* through which *Hetu* and *Sādhya* are related with each other. Thus, given *Hetu Pakṣa* and *Sādhya* are enough for one's coming to entertain an argument, no matter whether such an argument is entertained to defend one's own knowledge-claim or to criticize the one held by other/s.

On the level of coming to entertain an argument it cannot be held that one would legitimately come to entertain an argument one comes to entertain is valid or sound, or even that its conclusion is true. These considerations, are important and significant with regard to arguments yet for one or the other reason, they cannot be said to be determinative of the possibility of our coming to entertain an argument at all. That is why the conditions determinative of entertainability of an argument and those of its validity, Soundness or even those of the truth need carefully to be distinguished and demarcated from each other. Otherwise, there is a possibility of these different kinds of conditions being mixed up and confused with each other without any warrantable basis for doing so.

In the case of one's coming to entertain an argument, further, one more point needs very carefully to be noted and borne in mind. It is indeed true that we come to entertain argument/s in various kinds of situation. We not only entertain arguments while arguing with ourselves or while considering prons and cons of any situation or issue but also while arguing with others, Again, we might entertain arguments while persuading ourselves or persuading someone else. Further still, we might entertain arguments while repudiating views or opinions we ourselves held once, or might do so while trying to critically examine and if possible overthrow arguments, views and opinions put forth by someone else. There

are varied and numerous kinds of situations in which we entertain arguments. But entertainability of an argument cannot be held to be determined by those conditions that need to be satisfied in order that we might come to entertain an argument in that given kind of situation. The conditions required to be satisfied cannot be said to be those which could be shared by all kinds of such situations in common in which we come to entertain an argument at all either. Instead of going about in any of these ways the question that need to be asked is What minimum conditions need to be satisfied or what conditions are enough to be satisfied in order that one may come to entertain an argument ? Going about in this way would leave the possibility of our coming to entertain arguments in various situations open rather than its being closed arbitrarily and haphazardly. The *Nyāya* view, therefore, that either we entertain arguments having entered into a debate, dialogue or controversy or that in order to entertain an argument we should have entered into a debate with someone else is misleading and wrong. It is misleading because it ignores the possibility or one's coming to entertain an argument even in a condition of solilque. But it is wrong because making fetish of one kind of situation in which one generally employs arguments it seeks to equate an argumentative situation thereby elevating one kind of situation to its unwarranted generality seeks to consider the conditions which need to be satisfied in it in order that we may come to entertain an argument at all to be the minimum conditions which entertainability of an argument in any situation has to satisfy. As we hope to point out later on, *Nyāya* philosophers and logicians seem also to confuse between conditions determinative of validity and those determinative of entertainability of an argument. We shall have an occasion to return to this point later in this chapter. For the present it is enough to note what, according to Buddhist logicians, like Dharmakīrti, the conditions which are supposed to be fulfilled in order to formulate an argument are quite distinct from those conditions which are supposed to be fulfilled in order to participate in debates and controversies. For Dharmakīrti, our having entered into a debate with somebody cannot be considered to be the minimum condition of our coming to entertain an argument at all. To hold this would be tantamount to laying down too stringent a condition of entertainability of an argument. In his view methodo-

logical considerations need strictly to be kept within methodological bounds and they should not be either diluted or dissolved in face of practical considerations or common modes of practice, however weighty these considerations might be. This is not of course to sacrifice and repudiate intuitive constraints. For, intuitively we know and do entertain arguments even while we are all alone and openly have not entered into a debate with anyone.

Given, thus *Pakṣa. Sādhya* and *Hetu*, the three pillars of an argument we can entertain an argument in principle at any situation yet in a given particular situation certain additional considerations also come to influence our coming to entertain an argument in that kind of situation. It is, however, hopeless and too stringent to hold that unless those peculiar conditions are fulfilled entertainability of an argument is even methodologically inconceivable or is bound to be doomed to failure. *Pakṣa Sādhya* and *Hetu* in this way are enough for an argument being entertained, fashioned or formulated.

But, since an argument being fashioned, formulated or entertained not being a guarantee of its being valid, sound or even of its conclusion being true, there arises a question: what conditions could be said to be determinative of validity of an argument, irrespective of whether the argument under consideration is sound or not. It is to this issue that we turn in the next section.

Conditions Determinative of Validity of An Argument

In an inference, two of its components are especially important viz. *Hetu* and *Sādhya*. For, as it will be pointed out below that with reference to *Pakṣa* both *Hetu* and *Sādhya* and *Dharmas* and it is in consequence of this that *Pakṣa* is also called *Dharmī*. Of the two components of *Anumāna*, *Hetu* is an indicator of *Sādhya* and *Sādhya* is that which is indicated by it. In other words, it could be said that with the help of *Hetu*, *Sādhya* is inferred while *Sādhya* is that which is being inferred. *Hetu* is also called *Sādhana* or *Liṅga*. *Hetu* is indicator of *Sādhya* but from whatever *Hetu* that is available, the requisite and the legitimate *Sādhyā* cannot be inferred. A *Hetu* remains a proper indicator of the legitimate *Sādhya* provided there be a certain relation between *Hetu* and *Sādhya*. This relation holds that if *Hetu* is obtainable, *Sādhya* cannot fail to be obtainable. Conversely, if *Sādhya* fails to be obtainable then *Hetu* must fail to

be obtainable as well. This relation is determined and regulated by *Avinābhāva Niyama*.[6]

The relation between *Hetu* and *Sādhya* is known as *Vyāpti* relation. *Vyāpti* is a relation between *Vyāpya* and *Vyāpaka*. Hetu is *Vyapya* and *Sādhya* is *Vyāpaka*. *Vyāpya* depends on *Vyāpaka*,[7] Sometimes, *Hetu* and *Sādhya* are, extensionally speaking, equinumerous. But *Hetu* is never more *Vyāpaka* than *Sādhya*. Hence it could be said that *Hetu* is either less than or equal to *Sādhya* in extension but never greater than *Sādhya*.

We mentioned earlier that two relations in the context of *Anumāna*, according to Dharmakīrti, play a decisive role, viz., the relation between *Hetu* and *Sādhya* and that between *Hetu* and *Pakṣa*. We also pointed out that while the former of them is called *Vyāpti* which is an *Avinābhāva Niyama*, the latter is called *Pakśadharmatā*. Of them, further, *Vyāpti* brings to our notice a never-failing, non-contingent, necessary and exceptionless relation between *Hetu* and *Sādhya*, while *Pakṣadharmatā*, although a contingent feature of *Hetu*, yet is contextually decisively significant relation between *Hetu* and *Pakṣa*. There, however, arises a question with regard to both of them: what role have they to play in an *Anumāna* ? It is to the consideration of this issue that we now turn.

We saw earlier that for our coming to entertain, fashion or formulate an argument it is enough to have *Pakṣa*, *Sādhya* and *Hetu*. But we also were careful to note that any argument that we might entertain, fashion or formulate does not turn out to be either valid or sound, just because and in so far as we have fashioned it. Further, an argument that is valid, needs to be distinguished from the one that is in valid. In the same way, a sound argument needs to be distinguished from an unsound one. This is especially because (1) validity of an argument is no guarantee of its soundness, (2) nor is

6. धर्मोत्तर; न्यायबिन्दुटीका; तदयं परमार्थः—न हेतुः प्रदीपवद् योग्यतया गमकोऽपि तु नान्तरीयकतया विनिश्चितः। साध्याविनाभावित्वनिश्चयनम् एव हि हेतोः साध्यप्रतिपादनव्यापारो नान्यः कश्चित्। परार्थानुमान परि० पृ० 52.

7. तत्रैव; साधनस्य च साध्येऽर्थे नियतत्वकथनं व्याप्तिकथनम्। यथोक्तम्—"व्याप्ति र्व्यापकस्य तत्र भाव एव, व्याप्यस्य वा तत्रैव भावः" इति परार्थानुमान परि० पृ० 48.

soundness of an argument a barometer of deciding an argument to be valid. Further, there may be an argument the conclusion of which is true and yet this in itself is no proof of its being valid. Restricting for the present to the consideration of validity or invalidity of an argument it may be asked: what conditions could be said to be determinative of validity of an argument ? In answer to this question, it cannot be held that we need to entertain, fashion or formulate an argument. For, in spite of an argument being formulated it may not cease to be valid. Hence, over and above an argument being entertained, fashioned or formulated some additional conditions would have to be fulfilled in order that it may be considered to be valid. An argument having *Pakṣa*, *Sādhya* and *Hetu*, too, cannot be held to be validity determining conditions, as even an invalid argument—not lo talk of unsound argument as well—may have all of them and accordingly may cease to be valid An argument being sound or having a true conclusion, likewise, cannot be held to be validity determinative, for an argument, in spite of its being sound, may not cease to be valid. For, there is no decisive bar on an unsound argument being valid or even a sound argument being invalid. This being the case, validity determining conditions of an argument need to be investigated in all seriousness without recking up an issue of soundness or unsoundness of it.

Coming then to the conditions determinative of validity of a valid argument. On this level of consideration of *Anumāna* two aspects of it need to be taken into account:

(1) Since, according to Dharmakīrti *Svārthānumāna* is the very basis and framework of *Anumāna* and since the essence of *Svārthanumāna* is knowledge,[8] any significant issue concerning *Anumāna* and its proper consideration is bound to bring in an epistemologically important component. Following W.E.Johnson, it may be called an epistemic condition[9] of *Anumāna*. No matter, whether we are examining an already formulated argument on the count of validity soundness, or truth of its conclusion this epistemic component of *Anumāna* cannot totally be left out of consideration. We shall soon point out that *Vyāpti* as a relation between *Hetu* and *Sādhya* on the

8. धर्मोत्तर; न्यायबिन्दुटीका; परार्थानुमानं शब्दात्मकं स्वर्थानुमानं तु ज्ञानात्मकम् । स्वार्थानुमान परि० पृ० 21.

9. Johnson, W.E.; Logic; Part II, Chapter I, pp. 8-10.

one hand and *Pakṣadharmatā* as a relation between *Pakṣa* and *Hetu* on the other are the two regulative epistemic conditions of *Anumāna* which ought to figure in our consideration of it, no matter whether we wish to examine it on the count of validity, soundness or anything else.

(2) Secondly, there should also be certain conditions which need to be satisfied if an argument is to be valid at all and that non-satisfaction of any one of them would automatically render an argument under consideration to be invalid. Conditions of this kind determinative of the validity of an argument may be called, following W.E. Johnson, constitutive conditions of validity of an argument. We shall see in the sequel that violation of any one of them is also constitutively determinative of the resultant kind of invalidity. The discussion of the conditions determinative of the validity of an argument is a two-pronged or double layered affair. These two kinds of conditions jointly considered turn out to be the necessary and sufficient conditions of the validity of an argument. We turn to these considerations in the same order in which we have mentioned them above.

Vyāpti and Pakṣadharmatā

First coming, therefore, to *Vyāpti* and *Pakṣadharmatā*. As pointed out above, both of them constitute epistemic conditions of *Anumāna*. Given that *Svārthānumāna* is the basis of *Pārāthānumāna*[10] and given further that the essence of the former is knowledge or comprehension, the kind of comprehension that emerges due to *Svārthānumāna* should be said to be determined by the satisfaction of the fulfilment of these epistemic conditions primarily. More importantly, however, any argument that may be considered to be valid, sound or having a true conclusion comes to be considered to be so on the fulfilment of certain appropriate additional conditions and not in spite of the fact that the epistemic conditions are left or accepted to be unfulfilled. Thus, understood *Vyāpti* and *Pakṣadharmatā* appears to be such kind of epistemic conditions in the

10 मनोरथनन्दी; प्रमाणवार्तिकवृत्ति; तच्च (अनुमानं) द्विविधम्—स्वार्थं, परार्थं च। तत्र स्वार्थं इदानीं वक्तव्यम्, एतत्पूर्वकत्वात् परार्थस्य। स्वार्थानुमान परि० पृ० 257.

non-fulfilment of which an argument would remain fundamentally to be abortive. Our being given *Pakṣa Sādhya* and *Hetu* is enough for our proceeding to fashion an argument. But an argument would not come to be fashioned and formulated unless epistemic conditions of both *Vyāpti* and *Pakṣadharmatā* are satisfied. Their being fulfilled, however, is in no way a guarantee of its being valid, sound etc., validity or soundness of an argument being uniquely determined by the appropriate differential conditions. Yet merely the latter kind of conditions of being fulfilled without the epistemic conditions of *Vyāpti* and *Pakṣadharmatā* being satisfied would leave arguments to be equally abortive and pointless. It would be tantamount to saying that there are two conditions, viz. epistemic and constitutive which are to be satisfied by inference Further it is not enough that they fulfil either of these two sorts of conditions. As this would be untenable so too it would be indefensible to hold that *Vyāpti* and *Pakṣadharmatā* are the necessary and sufficient or epistemic and constitutive conditions of *Anumāna,* no matter whether we wish to consider viability and acceptibility of an argument along with validity or soundness. That is why over and above the satisfaction of the epistemic conditions of *Vyāpti* and *Pakṣadharmatā* additional conditions are required to be satisfied taking which into consideration the given argument could be adjudged to be valid, sound etc. We shall consider such conditions according to Dharmakīrti in the sequel. But prior to it we wish to inquire what role and status was accorded to *Vyāpti* and *Pakṣadharmatā* in the *Nyāya* traditional prior and posterior to Dharmakīrti to enable us to understand Dharmakīrti's insight in a bolder relief.

Prācīna-Nyāya Tradition on Vyāpti And Pakṣadharmatā

In the *Nyāya Sūtras* or in the *Bhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana on it there is not even a mention of *Vyāpti* and *Pakṣadharmatā.* In the *Nyāyavārttīka* of Udyotakara too, their consideration is conspicuously absent, though he attempts to explain *Liṅga-Liṅgī Saṁbhandha* through *Lingaparāmarṣa.* Thus in the *Nyāya* tradition prior to Dharmakīrti *Anumāna* is explained along the consideration of it as *Linga-Lingī Saṁbhandha darśanam* as Vātsyāyana came to stipulate it in the *Nyāya-bhāśya.* Udyotakara to generally continued

11. वात्स्यायन; न्यायभाष्य; 1-1-5 न्यायचतुर्ग्रन्थिका : पृ० 291.

to explain *Anumāna* in the same vein, although he tried to reunderstand Diṅnāga's expression *'Nāntarīyakatva'* in the sense of *Sāmānādhikaraṇya.*[12] In spite of quoting Dharmakīrti's view explaining *Vyāpti* within the framework of *Avinābhāva*, being critical of it, Vācaspati Miśra, following Udyotakara, continues to explain *Anumāna* on the basis of *Liṅga Parāmarśa* and *Bhūyo Darśana.* Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, though continues the same tradition, brings in *Niyatasāhacarya* between *Hetu* and *Sādhya* to be the basis of *Anumāna,*[14] although it becomes available, according to him, through *Bhūyo Darśana.* It is Bhāsarvajna who is the first *Naiyāyika* who explicitly understands *Vyāpti* as natural (*Svābhāvika*) Avinābhāva of *Sādhya* with *Sādhana* or of *Sādhya* with *Hetu.*[15] He further understands such a *Vyāptı* to be of two principal kinds: (a) *Anvayi* and (b) *Vyātireki*[16] and thus converts what was earlier considered to be a classification of *Anumāna*[17] starting from Udyotakara into that of *Vyāpti.* Jayanta Bhāṭṭa, on the contrary, perhaps under the influence of Hemachandra, a Jain scholar, talks of the classification of *Vyāpti* into *Antarvyāpti* and *Bahirvyāpti.*[18] Varadarāja understands *Anumāna* to be an instrument of cognition (*Pramiteḥ*) relative to the comprehension of *Vyāpti,*[19] and defines *Vyāpti* as an unconditional (*nirupādhikāḥ*) relation (*Saṁbandhaḥ*).[20]

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12. उद्योतकर; न्यायवार्तिक; 1-1-5 न्यायचतुर्ग्रन्थिका, पृ० 300.

13. वाचस्पति मिश्र; न्यायवार्तिकतात्पर्यटीका; 1-1-5 न्यायतुर्ग्रन्थिका; पृ० 310-312.

14. (a) जयन्त भट्ट; न्यायमञ्जरी; पृ० 107 आणि पृ० 111.
    (b) तत्रैव : सामानाधिकरण्यम्······तत्पूर्वकम् अनुमानमिति प्रत्यक्ष-फलेन लिङ्गदर्शनेन परोक्षार्थप्रतिपत्ति । प्रमाण प्रकरण पृ० 115.

15 भासर्वज्ञ; न्यायसार; अनुमितिपरिच्छेद, पृ० 226.

17. भासर्वज्ञ; न्यायभूषण; पृ० 228.

18. उद्योतकर; न्यायवार्तिक; त्रिविधं (अनुमानं) इति अन्वयव्यतिरेकी, अन्वयी व्यतिरेकी च । न्यायतुर्ग्रन्थि, पृ० 294.

18. जयंत भट्ट; न्यायमञ्जरी; प्रमाप्रकरण, पृ० 102.

19. वरदराज; तार्किकरक्षा; व्याप्तिग्रहण तापेक्षं प्रमितेः साधनं विदुः ।

20. तत्रैव; व्याप्ति संबंधो निरुपाधिकः । पृ० 65.

Explaining his contention his commentator Mallinātha, not posterior to Udyanācārya, argues that *Vyāpti* is a *Svābhāvika Sambhandha.*[21] Explaining this further, his commentator Jñānapurṇa, who is posterior to Udayanācārya, argucs that *Vyāpti* is to be understood ontologically and not epistemologically and that is how Varadarāja's definition is to be understood as faultless.[22] Udayanācārya too explains *Vyāpti* to be a *Svābhāvika Sambandha* and clarifies its nature within *Sāmānādhikarṇya* of *Hetu* and *Sādhya* on *Pākṣa.*[22] Although he mentions the distinction between *Svārthānumāna* and *Parārthānumāna* none the less he contends that the latter alone is the only genuine kind of *Anumāna* since it arises through *Tṛtiyaliṅgaparāmarṣa,*[24] for *Pakṣadharmatā* together with *Vyāpti* alone is conducive to *Anumāna.*[25] It can be surmised that this contention of Udayanācārya might have been the consequence of the Buddhist inference, since *Vyapti* and *Pakṣadharmatā* are not earlier ever mentioned in the pre-Dharmakīrti *Prācina-Nyāya* tradition to be the conditions of *Anumāna,* epistemic or otherwise Thus at least up to Udayanācārya *Vyāpti* was not perhaps understood as epistemic condition of *Anumāna* in the tradition of *Prācina-Nyāya.* The tradition pioneered by it of understanding *Vyāpti* within the framework of *Sāmānidhikarṇya* of *Hetu* and *Sādhya* persisted even within the *Navya-Nyāya* tradition. But progressively it stopped perhaps to bc considered as a *Svābhāvika Sambandha.* Its regulative aspect, however, was scarcely acknowledged. Although *Prācina-Nyāya* logicians considered the nature of *Paramarṣa or Tṛtiyaliṅgaparāmarśa* as they preferred to call it, following perhaps Vācaspati Miśra, yet by the time *Nyāya* logicians began explicitly considering the nature and importance of *Pakṣadharmatā* much

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21. : मल्लिनाथ; निष्कंटका; स्वाभाविको संबधो व्याप्तिरिति। पृ० 65.

22. ज्ञानपूर्ण; लघुदीपिका; व्याप्तेः : प्रयोग सन्तैवोपेक्षिता न तु तज्ज्ञानमिति अदोषः। उदयनाचार्यैरपीदमेव लक्षणं भङ्ग्यन्तरमुक्तम् · ···।

पृ० 68

23. उदयनाचार्य; न्यायवार्तिकतात्पर्यटीकापरिशुद्धि : 1.1.5 अतः न वार्तिके हेतुसामानाधिकरण्य विरोधः। न्यायचतुर्ग्रन्थि, पृ० 339.

24. तत्रैव, पृ० 338.

25. तत्रैव; पक्षधर्मता हि व्याप्त्यासह······अनुमानोपयोगिनी। पृ० 338.

water had to be flown under the bridge. We had to wait till the time of Raghunāthaśiromanī to get the required assurance that *Vyāpti* and *Pakṣadharmatā* together as they were acknowledged by Buddhists are the necessary and sufficient epistemic conditions of *Anumāna*[26], commenting on which Gadādharabhaṭṭa reiterates the Buddhist point that the so-called constituents like Udāharaṅa are never considered to be genuine in the Buddhist tradition.[27] This entire discussion will have to be critically considered in the light of Dharmakīrti's another celebrated work *Hetubindu* and Arcata's commentary on it. But this not being our present task we leave this side of his thought unconsidered in our present study.

Prācīna-Naiyāyikas did consider constitutive conditions of the validity of an argument. But this consideration at their hands too is ridden with unsurmountable difficulties, as we hope to point out in the sequel, chiefly due to the confusion between validity determining constitutive conditions properly so-called and those which are not so. We shall return to this point in due course. Prior to it, it is necessary to look into Dharmakīrti's treatment of *Vyāpti* and *Pakṣadharmatā*, the two important epistemic conditions of *Anumāna*. It is to this consideration that we turn immediately.

The foregoing brief digression into the *Prācīna Nyāya*-tradition is meant to bring to the notice of the interested readers the sort of questions concerning *Anumāna* were raised in that tradition preceeding and following Dharmakīrti with a view to pointing a picture of his analysis of *Anumāna* in a little bolder relief.

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26. रघुनाथ शिरोमणी; आत्मतत्त्वविवेकदीधिति; अनुमितिकारण व्याप्तिपक्षधर्मताज्ञानजनक ··· द्विअवयवादी बौध्द:······पृ० 21.

27. (a) गदाधर भट्ट; बौध्दाधिकारवृत्ति; (उदाहरणादि) इतर अवयवानां अनुमितिजनक ज्ञान अजनकतया न्यायाङ्गत्वम् अनुचितं इति सूचनाय उदाहरण-उपनययो: अनुभितिजनकं ज्ञानाजनकत्त्व अभिधानम्।

(b) तत्रैव; पृ० 21.

28. (a) धर्मकीर्ति; न्यायबिन्दु; स च प्रतिबन्ध: साध्येऽर्थे (लिङ्गस्य)······। स्वार्थानुमान परि०, पृ० 30.

(b) धर्मोत्तर; न्यायबिन्दुटीका; लिग परायत्तत्वात् प्रतिबध्दम् ·····गम्यम्। स्वार्थानुमान परि० पृ० 30.

Dharmakirti on Vyāpti

In the consideration of *Vyāpti* at the hands of Dharmakīrti two important questions gather great significance. They are: (a) how does *Vyāpti* relate *Hetu* with *Sādhya* ? and (b) what is *Vyāpti* Of them the first is relatively simpler and we take that for consideration with priority.

We observed earlier that one of the important aspects of *Vyapti* is that it relates *Hetu* with *Sādhya*. We also saw that *Hetu* is a *Linga* (indicator) of *Sādhya* which is a *Lingī* (indicated). Now, something could indicate something else quite accidentally. Moreover, the relation between *Hetu* and *Sādhya* may just be operative from one side, say from *Hetu* to *Sādhya* alone but not conversely. Still further, the relation under consideration may not be regulated through a rule of any kind at all. Under such circumstance the relation between *Hetu* and *Sādhyā* would remain merely to be accidental, arbitrary, decorative and ornamental. In order not to allow something of this kind to happen Dharmakīrti holds that (a) there must be a tie or relation (*Pratibandha*) between *Hetu* and *Sādhya* such that *Hetu or Linga* or *Gamaka* is *Pratibāddha* while *Sādhya* or *Liñgī* or *Gamya* is the *Pratibandhaka*.[28] (b) The relation under consideration between *Hetu* and *Sādhya* should be such that the former of them is *Vyāpya* while the latter should be *Vyāpaka*. It is this that makes either *Anvaya* or *Vyatireka* kind of monodirectional relation between them available[29] This kind of accessibility of *Sādhya* through *Hetu* via *Anvaya* or *Vyatireka* is made available respectively through *Sādharmyā* or *Vaidharmyā* although in both the cases the same kind of indicator-indicated relationship that is made object of study. As a result it is erroneous to hold either that *Anvaya* and *Vyatireka* give us a classification of *Vyapti* as *Nyāya* logicians hold...in fact we shall argue below that *Vyapti* as a *Niyama* is similarly operative and regulative in both the cases and accordingly is not amenable to any classification as such or that this dual mode of expressing the relationship between *Hetu* and *Sādhya* is indicative of two kinds of things sought to be studied or

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29. धर्मकीर्ति : प्रमाणवार्तिक, स्वार्थानुमानपरिच्छेद, स्वोपज्ञवृत्ति, व्याप्ति-व्यापकस्य तत्र भाव एव व्याप्यस्य वा तत्रैव भावः। एतेन अन्वयव्यतिरेकौ यथा-स्वंप्रमाणेन निश्चितौ, पक्षधर्मश्च। पृ० 2.

even that it seeks to bring to our notice a fundamental difference between them.[30] In fact *Anvaya* and *Vyatrieka* are so related with each other that they mutually and reciprocally exclude each other and in consequence should be considered to be interdefinable,[31] especially in so far as *Anvaya* and *Vyatireka* are captured through *bhāva* and *abhāva* respectively. Now, since any thing cannot slmultaneously be captured through both *Anvayī* as well as *Vyatirekī* way, accordingly, *Anvayavyatirekī* as a combined mode of comprehending anything in both *Anvayī* as well as *Vyatirekī* way is both redundant and meaningless,[32] (c) The relation between *Hetu and Sādhya* under consideration should be *Nāntarīyaka*,[33] which is explained by Dharmakīrti saying that the relation between them should be incapable of being done away with, altered or modified.

These features of relationship between *Hetu and Sādhya* are important but they are not in themselves sufficient to explicate how precisely *Vyapti* relates *Hetu* and *Sādhya*. To be able to see this we shall have to probe into what is *Vyapti*. It is to this consideration that we now turn. To begin with, *Vyapti* cannot be contingent and accidental. In its exhibitting certain features non-accidentally and non-arbitrarily it would function and operate in a certain way enabling us to infer an appropriate and legitimate conclusion. Therefore, according to Dharmakīrti *Vyapti* is not a *Sāmānādikaraṇya* kind of relation between *Hetu* and *Sādhya* which is anchored in our comprehending things in a certain way, or our using expres-

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30 तत्रैव; तदनेन द्विविधस्यापि साधप्रयोगस्य······प्रयोगभेदात् । पृ० 64.

31. धर्मोत्तर; न्यायबिन्दुटीका; अन्वयव्यतिरेकयोरन्योन्यव्यवच्छेदस्वपत्वादिति····· भावाभावौ परस्परव्यवच्छेदरूपौ । पृ० 84.

32. धर्मकीर्ति; प्रमाणवार्तिक; असिद्धायामसत्तायां सन्दिग्धा व्यतिरेकता । अन्वयो व्यतिरेको वा सत्त्वंवा साध्यधर्मिणि ॥ 29 ॥ स्वार्थानुमान परि०

33. (a) उद्योतकर; न्यायवार्तिक; अपरे तु ब्रुवते नान्तरीयकार्थदर्शनं तद्वित्वे अनुमानं ।

Here he is mentioning the view of Diṅnāga.
न्यायचतुर्ग्रन्थि पृ० 300.

(b) धर्मकीर्ति; प्रमाणवार्तिक; नान्तरीयकता साध्ये सम्बन्धः हेतोः ॥ 64 ॥ परार्था परि०, पृ०

sion in a certain sense.[34] To hold that there should be a relation between *Hetu* and *Sādhya*, say of *Vyapya-Vyapaka*, is one thing while to construe this relation itself to be *Vyapti* is quite another as *Nyāya* logicians are accustomed to.[35] Dharmakīrti, instead, considers to be a rule (*niyama*).[36] It is in its being a *Niyama* that it is regulative. A *Sambandha* is not regulative by nature, while a *Niyama* is, whatever kind of *Niyama* it might be. But it is not merely in its being a *Niyama* that the heart and essence of *Vyapti* lies. Although *Vyapti* does not generate *Vyapya-Vyapaka* relation between *Hetu* and *Sādhya*, given that it is there, it is regulative of it. Likewise, accessibility of *Sādhya* to *Hetu* in an *Anvyayī* way or that of *Hetvabhāva* to *Sādhyābhāva* in *Vyatireki* way, is not generated by *Vyapti*, although it is regulated by it. *Vyapti*, thus, according to Dharmakīrti, is a *Niyama* and through its *Niyāmakatva* it regulates the relation between *Hetu* and *Sādhya*, the two important pillars of *Anumāna*.[37] In addition *Vyapti* as a *Niyama* exhibits two more characteristics. First, is an exceptionless (*Avinābhava*),

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34. धर्मकीर्ति; प्रमाणवार्तिक; यदान्यत् ; तेन स व्याप्त एकत्वेन च भासते ।
समानाधिकरणं स्यात् तदा बुध्दयनुरोधत: ।। 132 ।।

वस्तुधर्मस्य संस्पर्शो विच्छेदकरणे ध्वने: ।
स्यात् सत्यं स हि तत्रेति नैकवस्त्वभिधायिनि ।।133 ।।

बुध्दावभासमानस्य दृश्यस्याभावनिश्चयात् ।
तेनान्यापोहविषय: प्रोक्ता: सामान्यगोचरा: ।। 134 ।।
स्वार्थानुमान परि०

35, धर्मकीर्ति; प्रमाणवार्तिक;- स्वार्थानुमानपरिच्छेद स्वोपज्ञवृत्ति; सोऽयं सवर्थिसर्वाकारप्रतीति प्रसंगोऽ सामान्यधिकरण्यादयश्च मन्यमाना: प्रणेता न्यायशास्त्रस्य ……। पृ० 42.

36. धर्मकीर्ति; प्रमाणवार्तिक; कार्यकारणभावाद् वा स्वभावाद् वा नियामकात् । अविनाभावनियमोऽदर्शनान्न न दर्शनात ।। 31 ।।

अवश्यंभावनियम: क: परस्यान्यथा परै: ।
अर्थान्तरनिमित्ते वा धर्मो वाससि रागवत् ।। 32 ।।
स्वार्थानुमान परि०

37. धर्मकीर्ति : प्रमाणवार्तिक : पक्षधर्मस्तदंशेन व्याप्तो हेतु:, तत्रिरूपत्वम् त्रिधैव स: ।। 1 ।। आणि ।। 39 ।। स्वार्थानुमान परि०

context-free, universal rule[38] such that it points to a *Hetu* which is never-failingly associated with *Sādhya* (*Sādhyāvyabhicāritvaniyamaḥ*)[39] through non-obtainability (association) of *Hetu* at (with) *Vipakṣa* and not through obtainability at (association with) *Sapakṣa*.[40] We shall have an occasion to return to this point a little later. For the present it is sufficient to note that *Avinābhāvitva* of *Vyāpti* is determined by exceptionless non-association of *Hetu* with *Siyakṣa*. Secondly, *Vyapti* as a *Niyama* is a necessary rule[41] through which *Sādhya* is context-freely associated with *Hetu* in the absence of which there just cannot be any never-failing association between them. Mere accidentality of their being found together (*Sāhacarya*) through repeated observation of such instances (*Bhūyo Darṣana*) cannot bring forth necessity as *Nyāya* logicians hold, that should be inherent in *Vyapti*. That is why Dharmakīrti in particular and Buddhist logicians in general never speak of *Bhūyo Darṣana* as a basis of our coming to comprehend *Vyapti*. Its being occasioned by observation of such an instances is one thing; its being capable of being justified or certified on its basis is quite another. Dharmakīrti seems to be aware of the fact that no amount of inductive support can ever give rise to certainty, and if certainty is a feature built into *Vyapti* as its inherent nature then we no longer need any inductive support. That is, such a support would be a dispensable and redundant feature of it. Seeing such a necessary rule being instantiated in some cases is one thing, while to hold that inductive support made available through such instances is what is generative or determinative of necessity is quite another. It

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38. तत्रैव; कार्यकारणभावाद् वा स्वभावाद् वा नियामकात्।
अविनाभावनियमो ऽदर्शनान्न न दर्शनात् ।। 31 ।।
स्वार्थानुमान परि० पृ० 269.

39. मनोरथनन्दी; प्रमाणवार्तिकवृत्ति : अविनाभावनियम: साध्याव्यभिचारित्व नियम: साधनस्य । on 31
स्वार्थानुमान परि० पृ० 269.

40 तत्रैव; विपक्षे हेतोरदर्शनाद न सपक्षे दर्शनात् । पृ० 269.

41. धर्मकीर्ति; प्रमाणवार्तिक; अवश्यंभावनियम: क: परस्यान्यथा परै: ।
अर्थान्तरनिमित्ते वा धर्मो वाससि रागवत ।। 32 ।।
स्वार्थानुमान परि० पृ० 269.

is the latter thesis that Dharmakīrti seems never to take seriously infected as it is with number of unsurmountable difficulties. Now, *Avinābhāva* together with *Avaṣyaṁbhāvitva* make it amply clear as to why that kind of relation between *Hetu* and *Sādhya* which falls within the jurisdiction of *Vyapti* cannot be done away with, altered or modified. Thus understood, the traits of the relation between *Hetu* and *Sādhya* on the one hand and those of *Vyapti* as a *Niyama* on the other, where the latter regulates the former, enable us to discover that sort of relation or association between *Hetu* and *Sādhya* through which we would be in a position to infer the legitimate *Sādhya* in the context of a given argument. Of course, the necessity and never-failingness in such a relation due to which it becomes capable of being done away with or altered becomes available through a certain feature which the items so related exhibit. We shall have an occasion to return to this point later. For the present, suffice it to note that *Vyapti* together with relation between *Hetu* and *Sādhya* constitutes one important determiner of the legitimate, proper *Anumiti*, the other such constitutent being that of *Pakṣadharmatā*. It is to this consideration of it that we now turn.

Dharmakīrti On Pakṣadharmatā

Pakṣadharmatā or *Pakṣadharmatva* as Buddhist logicians prefer to call it[42] is another determiner of proper *Anumiti*. As pointed out earlier, it establishes relation between *Pakṣa* and *Hetu*. *Pakṣa*, according to Dharmakīrti, in relation with *Hetu*, is a *Dharmī*, although *Hetu* is not the only *Dharma* of *Pakṣa*, especially because *Sādhya* also is a *Dharma* of it. *Pakṣa* in fact has been understood by him to be that inferable *Dharmī* which is a cluster of *Dharmas*.[43] *Hetu* being one of the *Dharmas* of *Pakṣa* it is derivatively called *Dharmī* with reference to *Hetu*.[44] Since, *Hetu* is a *Dharma* of *Pakṣa*, *Pakṣadharmatva* is that feature of *Pakṣa* whereby *Hetu* stands associated or related with it.[45] Although *Pakṣa* may have

42. मनोरथनन्दी; प्रमाणवार्तिकवृत्ति; अनेन पक्षधर्मत्वम् उक्तम् । स्वार्था. परि० 258.

43. तत्रैव; पक्ष: धर्मिधर्मसमुदायोऽनुमेय: । पृ० 257.

44. तत्रैव; तदेकदेशवशात् उपचारेण धर्मी पक्ष: उक्त । पृ० 257.

45. तत्रैव: तस्यधर्म:, अनेन पक्षधर्मत्वमुक्तम् । पृ० 257.

many *Dharmas* yet by *Pakṣadharma* it means that *Dharma* i.e. *Hetu* is to be taken into account which is *Vyāpta* by that *Dharma* of *Pakṣa* which is legitimately intended to be inferred.[46] Further, in spite of *Hetu* being *Dharma* of *Pakṣa* it is not an exclusive *Dharma* of it alone, although it is its distinguishing feature, for otherwise *Sapakṣa* itself would fail to be available.[47]

Thus understood, *Pakṣadharmatva* not only establishes a link or tie between *Pakṣa* and *Hetu* but since the *Hetu* is required to be *Vyāpta* by the *Sādhya* that is intended to be inferred as a *Dharma* of *Pakṣa*, it also operates as another important determiner of *Anumāna*. H*etu* through *Pakṣadharmatva* is related with *Pakṣa*, while through *Vyāpti* it is related with *Sādhya* and these two determiners together with three pillars of *Anumāna*, viz. *Pakṣa*, *Hetu* and *Sādhya* guarantee *prima facie* viability of it. While the pillars of *Anumāna* bring out principal supports on which it stands, *Vyāpti* and *Pakṣadharmatā* together establish such a relation between them that through their being related with each other, other things remaining the same, intended *Sādhya* alone remains to be legitimately inferable. Thus, *Vyāpti* and *Pakṣadharmatā* jointly determine minimum viability of an argument in such a way that it may come to be fashioned and formulated at all.

But neither *Vyāpti* nor *Pakṣadharmatā* can jointly or severally assure validity or soundness of an argument. This is especially because in an invalid or unsound argument too these two important determiners of the very formulation and form of an argument would figure. Accordingly, if over and above an argument being formulated it is sought to be considered whether such an argument is valid then certain validity determining features will have to be brought into picture. Such features should be such that they alone independently of *Vyāpti* and *Pakṣadharmatā*, should

46. तत्रैव; धर्मिधर्मो हेतुरिति अनुमाने······व्याप्तो हेतुः बोद्धव्यः । पृ० 257.

47. (a) धर्मकीर्तिः प्रमाणवार्तिकः अयोगं योगमपरैरत्यन्तायोगमेव च । व्यवच्छिनत्ति धर्मस्य निपातो व्यतिरेकचक: ॥ 190 ॥

परार्था० परि०, पृ० 426.

(b) मनोरथनन्दी; प्रमाणवार्तिकवृत्ति; यदि पक्षस्य·····अत्यन्तायोगं व्यवच्छिनत्ति । पृ० 426.

primarily enable an argument to be determined to be valid, while non-fulfilment of any of them should automatically render it to be invalid, whatever be the status of *Vyāpti* and/or *Pakṣadharmatā* in such an argument.

From the foregoing it is amply clear, it is hoped, that *Vyāpti* together with *Pakṣadharmatā* determine the general form of an argument. But they in themselves are insufficient to determine validity or soundness of an argument. Even an invalid or unsound argument too has a form, as valid or sound argument has one, though the form of the former kind of argument would be an invalid or unsound argument-form, as that of the latter would correspondingly be a valid or sound argument-form. Since, any kind of an argument has a form and since it is determined by *Vyāpti* and *Pakṣadharmatā*, although there are no kinds of the latter, the so-called kinds of the former cannot be said to be determinative of the kinds of arguments. Dharmakīrti, of course, is careful to point out, as observed earlier, that the so-called *Anvayī* and *Vyatirekī Vyāpti* boil down to the same thing, they being two interdefinable modes of expressing the same regulative *Niyama* called *Vyāpti*. This being the case validity determinative conditions should be sought to be discussed neither via *Vyāpti* nor via *Pakṣadharmatā*. This view of Dharmakīrti is markedly different from that of *Nyāya* logicians according to whom that which determines kinds of *Vyāpti* is also correspondingly determinative of kinds of *Anumāna*, as if *Anumāna* means the same as *Vyāpti*. We hope to return to this point later in a slightly changed context. Both *Nyāya* and Buddhist logicians, especially Nāgārjuna, Diṅnāga, Dharmakīrti and others, seem to be in agreement in holding that validity determining conditions must be sought elsewhere. There is of course, a fundamental difference between them and it would be clear from the sequel. For the present suffice it, however, to note that according to both *Nyāya* and Buddhist logicians validity determining conditions of an argument originate from the kind of features, the *Hetu* involved in a given argument exhibits or should exhibit, failing which an argument cannot help being invalid.

Trairūpya Of Hetu

Dharmakīrti holds that there are three conditions that every

Hetu has to satisfy in order that an argument in which it occurs remains valid. These three conditions are the essential validity determining characteristics of a *Hetu*. They are: *Pakṣa Sattva*, *Sapakṣa Sattva*, *Asapakṣa* (*Vipakṣa*) *Asattva*.[48] Before dealing with the issue further, it will be profitable to clarify the significance of the terms, *Pakṣa*, *Sapakṣa* and *Asapakṣa* (*Vipakṣa*).

Pakṣa is that whose *Dharma* i.e. *Sādhya* is going to be inferred. Or it could be said, *Pakṣa* is that with reference to which we are going to infer *Sādhya*.[49]

Sapakṣa is that which is similar to *Pakṣa* in the sense that there also it should always be possible to cognize the *Dharma* that is going to be inferred. Regarding the possible association of *Sādhya* with it, there is a similarity between *Pakṣa* and *Sapakṣa*.[50]

Asapakṣu (*Vipakṣa*) is that which is dissimilar with *Sapakṣa*. And since, as already observed, *Sapakṣa* is similar to *Pakṣa*, it is obvious that *Vipakṣa* is dissimilar with *Pakṣa* as well. *Asapakṣa* could be dissimilar with *Sapakṣa* in any of the following three respects: 1) in being other than *Sapakṣa* 2) being opposite of *Sapakṣa* 3) Or *Sapakṣa* being absent.[51]

For example, where there is a smoke, there is a fire as in a kitchen ; therefore, there is a fire on the younder mountain. Here the yonder mountain is *Pakṣa*, kitchen is *Sapakṣa* and lake is *Asapakṣa*.

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48. धर्मकीर्ति; न्यायबिन्दु : त्रैरुप्यं पुनर्लिङ्गस्यानुमेये सत्त्वम् एव, सपक्ष एव सत्त्वम्, असपक्षे चासत्त्वम् एंव निश्चितम् । स्वार्थानुमान परि० पृ० 22-23.

49. तत्रैव; अनुमेयोऽत्र जिज्ञासितविशेषो धर्मी । स्वार्था परि० पृ० 24.

50. (a) धर्मकीर्ति; न्यायबिन्दुः साध्यधर्मसामान्येन समानोऽर्थः सपक्षः ।
स्वार्था परि० 24.

(b) धर्मोत्तर; न्यायबिन्दुटीका; समानः अर्थ सपक्षः ।·····साध्यधर्मश्चासौ सामान्यं चेति साध्यधर्मसामान्येन समानः पक्षेण सपक्षः इत्यर्थः ।
स्वार्था परि० पृ० 24.

51. धर्मकीर्ति; न्यायबिन्दु; न सपक्षोऽसपक्षः ।
ततोऽन्यस्तद्विरुद्धस्तभावश्चेति । स्वार्था परि० पृ० 25.

Now coming to the condition of *Pakṣa Sattva* i.e. *Hetu* must either be related with or obtainable on *Pakṣa*. This means, it is necessary for a *Hetu* to be obtainable on the place where we are going to infer *Sādhya*.[52] This is one of the important features of *Hetu*.

Sapakṣa Sattva means *Hetu* should be related with or be obtainable on *Sapakṣa*. That is, *Hetu* can exist on those places which are similar to *Pakṣa*[53]

Asapakṣa Asattva means *Hetu* must not be obtainable on or be related with *Asapakṣa*. That is, *Hetu* should not be obtainable on those places which are dissimilar with *Sapakṣa*.[54]

In technical terms, it could be said that *Pakṣa Sattva* is that feature of *Hetu* where impossibility of non-obtainability of *Hetu* on *Pakṣa* must be ruled out. *Sapakṣa Sattva* is that where the possibility of obtainability of *Hetu* at a place other than *Pakṣa* but similar to *Pakṣa* is not ruled out, *Asapakṣa Asattva* is that where possibility of obtainability of *Hetu* on *Asapakṣu* must be ruled out.

Thus, *Sapakṣa Sattva* and *Pakṣa Sattva* together exhaust the possibility of obtainability of *Hetu* and *Asapakṣa Asattva* is a counter set of them in the sense that it signifies a set of places where obtainability of *Hetu* is permanently ruled out. The relation between *Pakṣa Sattva* and *Sapakṣa Sattva* of *Hetu* together with *Pakṣa Sattva* of *Sādhy* a given us valid affirmative argument, while that between *Pakṣa Asattva* and *Sapakṣa Asattva* of *Sādhya* together with *Pakṣa Asattva* of *Hetu* gives us a valid negative argument. We shall return to this point later.

These three essential features of *Hetu*, in Dharmakīrti's view, are jointly and severally validity determinative conditions of a valid

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52. धर्मोत्तर; न्यायबिन्दुटीका; अनुमेय वक्ष्यमाण लक्षणम् । तस्मिन् लिङ्गस्य सत्त्वम् एवं निश्चितम् रूपम् । स्वार्था परि०, पृ० 22.

53. धर्मोत्तर; न्यायबिन्दुटीका; सपक्षो वक्ष्यमाणलक्षण: । स्वार्था परि० पृ० 23.

54. तत्रैव; असपक्षो वक्ष्यमाण लक्षण: । तस्मिन् असत्वम् एव निश्चितम् । पृ० 23.

argument. If a *Hetu* satisfies these three conditions or has these three characteristics then alone it is possible to validly infer the intended *Sādha* or that the conclusion of an argument follows from they premises. i.e. the argument is valid. If one of these conditions is not fulfilled then we are not in a position to deduce certain conclusion from the given premises i.e. the argument will be invalid. If one of the conditions is not fulfilled then *Hetu* cannot unexceptionally relate itself with *Sādhya* in a way which is regulated by *Avinābhāva Niyama*. Hence, we are not in a position to say that *Sādhya* logically follows from premises or that *Sādhya* is legitimately and validly inferred.

If *Hetu* does not fulfil certain conditions then *Avinābhāva Niyama* does not determine and regulate the relation between *Hetu* and *Sādhya*. For, what *Avinābhāva Niyama* suggests is that if and where *Hetu* obtains *Sādhya* cannot fail to obtain and if and where *Sādhya* cannot obtain, *Hetu* must fail to obtain.[55] Now, if *Hetu* is obtaiainable where *Sādhya* is obtainable and also where *Sādhya* is not obtainable, then it will be against the rule of *Avinābhāva*. Thus, *Hetu* has to satisfy these conditions in order to be validly related with *Sādhya* by *Avinābhāva Niyama*. Otherwise we will not be in a position to decide whether *Sādhya* is validly inferred with the help of *Avinābhāva Niyama*. Of course, it is needless to discuss the conditions due to which we are not in a position to deduce the conclusion from given premises. In other words, it could be said that all these characteristics cojointly make the argument valid and even if one of these characteristics is not fulfilled then we will not be in a position to have a valid argument. Here it may be asked: why there are only three conditions of deciding the validity of an argument? The answer is that these three conditions are necessary as well as sufficient in order to decide the validity of an argument, according to Dharmakīrti. For, according to him, while we are discussing conditions determinative of validity of an

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55. मनोरथनन्दी; प्रमाणवार्तिकवृत्ति; द्विविधा चेयं व्याप्तिः व्यापकव्याप्य-धर्मतया। तत्र व्याप्ये सति व्यापकस्यावश्यम्भावस्तस्य व्याप्तिः। व्याप्यस्य च व्यापक एव सति भावो नाम तस्य व्याप्तिः। आभ्यां यथाक्रममन्यव्यतिरेकावुक्तौ। व्याप्य-सद्भावे व्यापकस्य सत्त्वनियमस्यान्वयरूपत्वात्, व्यापकाभावे व्याप्याभावस्य च व्यतिरेकरूपत्वात्। स्वार्थानुमान परि०, 257.

argument, we should confine ourselves only to these considerations. We should not mix up such conditions with those which determine whether an argument consists of true premises. We should not likewise, mix up such conditions with those which determine whether the *Sādhya* is obtainable or not. This is further so because the conditions which determine the truth of the premisses need not necessarily be determinative of validity of an argument. For, it is quite possible that an argument is valid and yet does not contain true premisses. Hence, general discussion of the necessary and sufficient conditions determinative of validity of an argument must be kept free from the determinative conditions which determine whether the argument is about something that is obtainable or not. And this seems to be sound insight on the part of Dharmakīrti.

These three characteristic validity determinative features of a *Hetu* which figure in a valid argument is called *Trairūpya* of *Hetu*, by Dharmakīrti. It would be interesting to contrast this view of Dharmakīrti that these three features alone are validity determinative conditions of an *Anumāna* with that of *Nyāya* logicians, especially to be able to grasp fuller implications of Dharmakīrti's view. It is to this consideration that we now turn.

Prācīna-Nyāya Tradition On Validity Determining Conditions :

In the Pre-Dharmakīrti *Prācīna-Nyāya* tradition, i.e. up to *Nyāyavartika* of Udyotakara, the explication of the nature of *Hetu* does not seem to progress beyond pointing out that it is instrumental to the inference of *Sādhya* through its similarity with *Udāharaṇa*.[56] The situation did not come to be altered at the hands of Vācaspati Miśra[57] and Udayanācārya[58] except disapproval of the views of Vasubandhu, Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti concerning *Trairūpyatva* of *Hetu*, although Bhāsarvajña tells us while explaining *Hetvābhāsas* that they are *Hetus* improperly so-called due to their being bereft of (some or the other) features of *Hetu* and yet

56. गौतम; न्यायसूत्र; उदाहरणसाधर्म्यात् साध्यसाधनं हेतुः । 1.1. 34. See also Vātsyāyana's *Nyāya-Bhāṣya* and Udyotakar's *Nyāya-Vārtika* on it.

57. वाचस्पति मिश्र; न्यायवार्तिकतात्पर्यटीका; 1.1. 34.

58. उदयनाचार्य; न्यायवार्किकतात्पर्यटीका परिशुद्धि; 1.1.34.

which seemingly appear to be *Hetus* (proper).[59] This line of treating *Hetvābhāsas* to be devoid of features of proper *Hetu* originates from Vātsyāyana,[60]* although what precisely those features a legitimately and validly proper *Hetu* should have come to be explicated in the Post-Dharmakīrti period only. Regarding the difference of opinion between Dharmakīrti and *Nyāya* logicians concerning *Hetvābhāsas* we shall have later on something interesting to say. Restricting for the present to the validity determining conditions through the features a *Hetu* that figures in a valid argument should have, five such features come to be stipulated in the later *Nyāya* tradition. They are, *Pakṣa Sattva, Sapakṣa Sāttva, Vipakṣa Asattva, Abādhita Viśayatva* and *Asatpratipakṣatva.*[61]** But when one considers the last two conditions, in the light of Dharmakīrti's discussion of *Trairūpya* to be the only necessary and sufficient conditions a *Hetu* of any valid argument needs to satisfy it is clear that these two conditions cannot be said to be determinative of validity of an argument. For, merely the fact that my argument has not come to contradict itself or that it has not turned out to be beneficial to my adversary does not guarantee its validity. Additionally, my argument may remain invalid even if I have not come to contradict myself, or even though it has not come to be beneficial to my adversary. Further, an adversary may be there provided we have come to engage ourselves in a debate or a controversy. These conditions do not decide the validity of an argument. They are extraneous to it. One can defend one's own argument though it is invalid and criticise other's though it is valid. Hence, these two additional conditions need not necessarily determine validity of an argument. Of course, it is needless to probe into these kinds of issues here. They are, however, brought in with a view to getting a deeper insight into Dharmakīrti's

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59. भासर्वज्ञ; न्यायसार, न्यायभूषणं च, एतेन हेत्वाभासानाम् अहितुत्वमुक्तं भवति । हेतुलक्षण रहिता हेतुवदाभासमाना हेत्वाभासा: । पृ० 308.

60. वात्स्यायन; न्यायभाष्य; हेतुलक्षणाभावादहेतवो हेतुसामान्यादहेतुवदाभासमाना: । 1.2.4.

61. जयन्तभट्ट; न्यायमञ्जरी; पक्षोऽर्थो लिङ्ग्यते······पक्षधर्मत्व, सपक्षधर्मत्वं, विपक्षदव्यावृत्ति:; अबाधित विषयत्वम्, असत्प्रतिपक्षत्वं चेति । एतै: पंचभैर्लक्षणैरुपसंपन्नं लिग अनुमप्पके भवति। पृ० 101.

discussion of the *Trairūpya* of a *Hetu* that should occur in a valid argument.

Kinds Of Valid Argument: Tridhātva of Hetu

Thus, with the help of the three conditions discussed above, namely, *Pakṣa Sattva, Sapakṣa Sattva* and *Asapakṣa Asattva,* we are in a position to decide whether the conclusion of an argument follows from its premises validly. These characteristics of *Hetu* enable us to decide whether an argument, is valid or invalid. Over and above this, however, there remains an important issue to be discussed: What are the principal kinds of valid argument? For, merely considering what conditions are determinative of validity of valid argument is not enough to answer the former question. It is to the discussion of it that we now turn.

We have already seen that *Vyāpti* regulates relation between *Hetu* and *Sādhya.* This relation between *Hetu* and *Sādhya* that comes to be regulated though *Vyāpti* may, in all, come to be regulated in two principal ways: (a) given *Vyāpya, Vyāpaka* would neverfailingly and unexceptionally be there, or (b) given *Vyāpkābhāva Vyāpyābhāva* cannot fail to be there. These *Anvayī* and *Vyatirekī* modes of regulating relation between *Hetu* and *Vyāpti* are important determiners of form of a valid argument, although formwise they bolil down to the same [61] Though, in this way, the form of valid argument does not come to be altered, the mode of determining validity of valid argument comes to be changed. Since *Anvaya* and *Vyatireka* correspond respectively with *Bhāva* and *Abhāva,* they are mutually exclusive of each other,[62] and yet being negative of each other they are mutually interdefinable,[63] We saw that according to Dharmakīrti the tie between *Hetu* and *Sādhya* is called *Pratibhandha.* But since this kind of tie as it may figure in

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60. मनोरथनन्दी; प्रमाणवार्तिकवृत्ति; द्विविधा चेयं व्याप्ति······व्यतिरेक रूपत्वात् । पृ० 257.

62. धर्मोत्तर; न्यायबिन्दुटीका; अन्वयव्यतिरेकयोः अन्योन्यव्यवच्छेदरुपत्वात् इति ।······अन्वय व्यतिरेको भावाभावौ भावाभावो च परस्परव्यवच्छेदरूपो। पृ० 84.

63. तत्रैव; तथा च सति अन्वयाभावो व्यतिरेको व्यतिरेकाभावश्चान्वयः । पृ० 84.

an argument could be principally of two kinds, although the mode of its being regulated through *Vyāpti* remains the same, *Bhāva* or *Abhāva*, *Anvayī* or *Vyatirekī*, two important kinds of *Hetu* would be determinative of it. While in the case of *Vyatirekī Hetu* figuring in *Vyatirekī* tie it is *Vyatirekī Vyāpti* which is regulative of it, in the case of *Anvayī Hetu* figuring in *Anvayī* tie it is *Anvayī Vyāpti* that could be said to be regulative of it. Although the relation of the *Hetu* as it is related with its corresponding *Sādhya* in the case of *Vyatirekī* tie remains of the same kind in various of its possible instances, in the case of *Anvayī* tie, on the contrary, the situation becomes different. Of course, the shaft around which *Anavayī Vyāpti* and *Anavayī* tie between *Hetu* and *Sādhya* revolve is, as pointed out earlier, that given *Vyāpya* (*Hetu*) *Vyāpaka* (*Sāahya*) unexceptionally cannot fail to be there. But this kind of *Bhāva* or *Anvaya* between *Hetu* and *Sādhya* cannot be accidental and has to come to be regulated by *Anvayī Vyāpti*. Since *Vyāpti* does not generate the tie between *Hetu* and *Sādhya*, no matter *Anvayī* or *Vyatirekī*, *Anvayī Vyāpti* by which *Anvayī* tie between *Hetu* and *Sādhya* comes to be regulated cannot be held to be generative of it. But under what circumstance would *Anvayī Vyāpti* come to regulate the *Anvayī* tie between *Hetu* and *Sādhya*? Its being merely a tie would not do, for even *Vyatirekī Vyāpti* regulates a tie between *Hetu* and *Sādhya*. Nor would mere accident of *Hetu* and *Sādhya* being together can make such a tie between them accessible and amenable to being regulated by *Anvayī Vyāpti*. In the case of the tie between *Hetu* and *Sādhya* that could be accessible to and regulated by *Anvayī Vyāpti* is called by Dharmakīrti to be *Svabhāva Pratibandha*.[64] Explaining this we are told that the tie between *Hetu* and *Sādhya* which is natural is to be understood as *Svabhāva Pratibandha*[65] and is principally of two kinds: the tie between *Hetu* and *Sādhya* being determined by either (a) *Sādhya-svabhāvatva* of *Hetu*, or (b) by *Hetu* being *Kārya* of *Sādhya*.[66] For,

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64. धर्मकीर्ति; न्यायबिन्दु; स्वभावप्रतिबन्धे हि सति अर्थोऽर्थं गमयेत् । पृ० 29.

65. धर्मोत्तर; न्यायबिन्दुटीका; स्वभावेन प्रतिबन्धः स्वभावप्रतिबन्धः । पृ० 29.

66. तत्रैव; कारणे स्वभावे च साध्ये स्वभावेन प्रतिबन्धः कार्यस्वभावयोरविशिष्ट इत्येकेन समासेन द्वयोरपि संग्रह । पृ० 29.

unless *Sādhya* and *Hetu* are so tied with each other there can neither be *Gamya-Gamaka-bhāva*[67] between them nor can the tie between them be any longer accessible to and regulated by *Avyabhicāraniyama* or *Avinābhāva Niyama* called *Vyāpti.*[68] For, something that is not naturally connected with something else cannot be not-foresaking it and accordingly an *Avyabhicāraniyama* or *Avinābhāva Niyama* cannot be said to be regulative of it. It is through *Avyabhicāraniyama* that there could be *Gamya-Gamakabhāva* between *Hetu* and *Sādhya*, not otherwise.[69] Thus, two kinds of *Hetus* fall within the purview of *Anvayī Vyāpti*, while only one kind of *Hetu* falls within the of *Vyatirekī Vyapti.* There is neither third mode of *Vyapti* nor is there any kind of *Hetu* falling within the jurisdiction of any *Vyāpti* that could be said to be determinative of the validity of an argument. In all, in this way, there are only three kinds of *Hetu* viz. *Svabhāva, Kārya* and *Anupalabdhi*[70] which are determinative of the kinds of valid argument, and accordingly there are only three kinds of valid arguments, viz. *Svabhāvānumāna, Kāryanumāna* and *Anupalabdhyānumāna.*[71] While the former of these is known as *Tridhātva* or *Triprākāratva* of *Hetu,* the latter is called *Tridhātva* or *Triprākāratva Anumāna,* where the former is determinative of the latter. Any *Anumāna,* according to Dharmakīrti, can be either *Svārthānumāna* or *Parārthānumāna*[72]

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67. तत्रैव; कस्मात्पुनः स्वभावप्रतिबन्ध एव सति गम्यगमकभावः न अन्यथा इति आह । पृ० 29.

68. धर्मकीर्ति; न्यायबिन्दु; तदप्रतिबद्धस्य तदव्यभिचारनियमाभावात् । पृ० 29.

69. धर्मोत्तर; न्यायबिन्दुटीका; नहि यो यत्र स्वभावेन न प्रतिबद्धः·········अव्यभिचारनियमाच्च गम्यगमकभावः । पृ० 30.

70. धर्मकीर्ति; प्रमाणवार्तिक;······त्रिधैव सः ॥ 1 ॥ स्वार्थ परि० मनोरथनन्दी; प्रमाणवार्तिकवृत्ति; त्रिधैव त्रिप्रकार एव कार्य-स्वभाव अनुपलम्भभेदेन सः हेतुः । पृ० 257.

71. धर्मकीर्ति; वादन्याय, त्रिविधमेव हि लिङ्गमप्रत्यक्षस्य सिद्धेरङ्गम्-स्वभावः कार्यम अनुपलम्भश्च । पृ० 6-7.

72. धर्मकीर्ति; न्यायबिन्दु अनुमानं द्विधा । स्वार्थं परार्थं च । स्वार्थानुमान पृ० 21.

and of whatever kind it is, it may be of any of the above mentioned three kinds. But since *Svārthānumāna* itself is presupposed by *Parārthānumāna* and since the former itself is considered to be valid provided it is determined by *Trirūpa* or *Trairūpya Liṅga*[73] and since the kind of *Hetu* that figures in it is determinative of what kind of valid argument it is, all these considerations would *mutatis mutandis* hold with regard to *Parārthānumāna* as well. Thus, according to Dharmakīrti, while *Vyapti* and *Pakṣadharmatā* together are enough to determine form and viability of a valid argument. *Trirūpatva* of *Hetu* stipulates validity determining conditions, whereas *Tridhātva* of *Hetu* is determinative of the kind of valid argument. With a view to determining any significant feature of a valid argument no additional consideration is required to be requisitioned. That is why he not only repudiates *Pratijñā, Upanaya* and *Nigamana*[74] to be legitimate components of *Anumāna* as acknowledged and insisted upon by *Nyāya* logicians right from Gautama, but he also repudiates *Udāharaṇa* accepted to be an important constituent of *Anumāna* both by *Nyāya* logicians as also by Diṅnāga.[75] Likewise, he seeks to do away with the two classifications of *Anumāna* accepted by *Nyāya* logicians: (a) *Anvayī, Vyatirekī* and *Anvaya-Vyatirekī* and (b) *Pūrvavat, Śesavat* and *Sāmānyatodrsta*, the latter of which has come

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73. तत्रैव; तत्र स्वार्थं त्रिरूपालिङ्गधदनुमेये ज्ञानं तदनुमानम् । पृ० 21.

74 धर्मकीर्ति; प्रमाणवार्त्तिक; पूर्वविधारणे तेन प्रतिज्ञालक्षणाभिधा ।
व्यर्था व्याप्तिफला सोक्तिः सामर्थ्याद् गम्यते ततः ।। 172.।।

विरूद्धतेष्टासम्बन्धोऽनुपकारसहास्थिती ।
एवं सर्वाङ्गदोषाणां प्रतिज्ञादोषता भवेत् ।। 173. ।।

पक्षदोषः परापक्षो नेति च प्रतिपादितम् ।
इष्टासम्भव्यसिद्धश्च स एव स्यान्निराकृतः ।। 174 ।।

अनित्यत्वसहेतुत्वे शब्द एवं प्रकीर्त्तयेत् ।
दृष्टान्ताख्यानतोऽन्यत् किमस्त्यत्रार्थानुदर्शनम् ।। 175 ।।

परार्थां परि०, पृ० 418-20.
See also in हेतुबिन्दु and वादन्याय.

75. दिग्नाग; न्यायप्रवेश; तत्र पक्षादिवचनानि साधनम् ।
पक्षहेतुदृष्टान्तवचनैर्हि प्राश्निकानामप्रतीतोऽर्थः प्रतिवादत इति । पृ० 1.

down from Gautama, while the former is introduced by Udyotakara[76]. He questions these considerations on the ground that none of them could be said to be either validity determining nor can any of them be said to be determinative of the kind of valid argument. All these issues would gather considerable significance if one wants to critically study Dharmakīrti's treatment of *Anumāna* alone basically with reference to his celebrated work *Hetubindu*. This not being our present exclusive concern we leave this stone unturned.

Within the framework of valid argument, in this way, the only kind of questions that should gather significance, according to Dharmakīrti, are those which we had an occasion to discuss above briefly. The only significant consideration around which valid arguments are to revolve are those of *Anupalabdhi* and *Svabhāva* in such a way that in the case of *Anupalabdhyānumāna* non-obtainability of a given thing, otherwise obtainable in a given context, becomes *Sādhya* while in the case of *Svabhāvānumāna* or *Kāryānumāna* a *Sādhya* related with *Hetu* as of the same kind as the latter or as the *Kāraṇa* of it becomes the object of our inference. In the case of valid arguments possibility—conceptual or factual—of obtainability or non-obtainability is enough to warrant validity of an argument. That is why given that the given tree is *Śiṃśapā* and given further that *Śiṃśapā* and *Vṛkṣa* are related with each other through *Tādātmya* it is legitimate to infer the given *Śiṃśapā* to be a *Vṛkṣa*. Likewise, given that fire is *Kāraṇa* of smoke and given smoke, it is legitimate to infer fire. In the same vein, given that if there were a *Ghaṭa* it should have been perceptible, other things remaining the same, and given that *Ghaṭa* is not perceptible in a given context, it is legitimate to infer absence of *Ghaṭa*. Thus, valid arguments are determined and governed by formal considerations alone and no other consideration needs to be dragged in.

But when we talk about truth or soundness of an argument or whether an argument is about something that is obtainable as a matter of fact the above mentioned considerations may not suffice. For, these considerations enable us to know and determine the validity of an argument alone. They do not inform us whether the

76. उद्योतकर; न्यायवार्त्तिक; 1.1.5.

argument is about something which is obtainable or not. By non-obtainability we do not mean that it has no reference to reality. By it we need not mean an empty world. Rather it means absence of a thing. For example, This man is a pig. There is no pot on this table. Both these sentences are about something that are non-obtainable. But there is a difference between the two. With respect to the first, it is about something that is in an empty world, while the second indicates absence of a pot at present. When, Dharmakīrti talks about non-obtainability he means minimally absence of a thing at present or in a given context,[77] which is otherwise obtainable. Non-obtainability of a thing independently of the consideration of time, space or *Svabhāva* being generative only of doubt.[78] Here a problem arises: on what basis do we decide whether an argument is about something that is obtainable—*Upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāpta*—or not-obtainable—*Anupalabdhilakṣaṇaprāpta* ? In order to be able to answer th,s question we proceed to inquire into the question: what are the conditions with the help of which we would be able to decide whether the argument is about something which is obtainable or nor. This discussion has something to do with truth of an argument.

Conditions/Determiners of The Truth of an Argument :

It is already pointed out that *Hetu* is *Gamaka* of *Sādhya*. *Sādhya* is *Pradhāna*, and *Hetu* being instrumental to infer *Sādhya*, it has an essential role to play. *Sādhya* that we intend to infer may have reference to reality or it may not have. That is, it may be either *Bhāvātmaka* or *Vidhirūpa*, or *Abhāvātmaka* or *Pratiṣedharūpa*. It could be said, it refers to obtainability or non-obtainability of the object. On the basis of this *Hetus* are classified. Kinds of *Hetu* are decided on the basis of *Sādhya* in the sense that the kind of *Sādhya* that we are going to infer becomes possible, provided it is inferred only on the basis of a particular kind of *Hetu*. Generally, *Sādhya* may be either the one that obtains or the one that does not. On the basis of this, *Hetu* is classified as *Vidhi Hetu* and *Pratiṣedha*

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77. धर्मकीर्ति; न्यायबिन्दु; सर्वत्र···ते वामुपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तानामेव उपलब्धिरनुपलब्धिश्च वेदितव्या । पृ० 43.

78. तत्रैव; विप्रकृष्टविषयानुपलब्धिः प्रत्यक्षानुमान निवृत्तिलक्षणा । पृ० 43.

Hetu.[79] *Vidhi Hetu* informs that argument is about something that is btainable and *Pratiṣedha Hetu* informs that argument is about something that is non-obtainable.

When we are talking about obtainability or non-obtainability of something, we need to consider some features of the world. The things or properties should be so related to each other that if one of the properties is absent another property will also be invariably absent. Or we may say that *Sādhya* is determined by *Hetu*. But *Hetu* would determine *Sādhya* provided certain relationship between them holds. For example, *Śimśapātva* cannot be independently of *Vṛkṣatva*. Such a kind of feature is called *Svabhāva*. *Svabhāva* is explained to be that feature, conditions of the perceptibility of which being fulfilled it necessarily is perceived.[80] There are also some properties which are related to each other in such a way that the relation between the two is *Kārya-Kāraṇa*. For example, Smoke is a *Kārya* of fire.

These are the only two features of the world, namely, *Svabhāva* and *Kārya* given which alone one thing could be said to be unexceptionally related with another in such a way that *Hetu* indicates a thing that cannot fail to be obtainable. That is why, *Vidhi Hetu* is further classified as *Svabhāva Hetu* and *Kārya Hetu*. For, it is only with reference to them that we are in a position to decide whether the argument is about something that is obtainable or not.[81]

Anupalabdhi or *Pratiṣedhu Hetu*, on the contrary, informs us that an argument is about something that fails to obtain. Thus, *Svabhāva Hetu* and *Kārya Hetu* inform us that the argument is about something that is obtainable, while *Anupalabdhi Hetu* informs

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79. धर्मोत्तर; न्यायबिन्दुटीका ; तद् अयम् अर्थः···साध्यश्च कश्चिद् विधिः कश्चिद् प्रतिषेधः। विधिप्रतिषेधयोश्च परस्परपरिहारेणावस्थानात् तयोर्हेतु भिन्नो। पृ० 29.

80. धर्मकीर्ति; न्यायबिन्दु; यः स्वभावः सत्सु अन्येषु उपलम्भप्रत्ययेषु यत्प्रत्यक्ष एव भवति स स्वभावः। पृ० 27.

81. तत्रैव; न्यायबिन्दु; सः च प्रतिबन्धः साध्येऽर्थे लिङ्गस्य वस्तुतःतादात्म्तात्साध्यार्था-दुत्पत्तेश्च। पृ० 30.

that the conclusion of an argument is about something that is non-obtainable.[82]

In Dharmakīrti's view, in this way, three characteristics of *Hetu*, what he calls *Trairūpya Liṅgatva* determine validity or invalidity of an argument. Only the consideration of Hetu under *Svabhāva, Kārya* or *Anupalabdhi*, what he calls *Tridhātva* or *Triprakāratva* of *Liṅga* is determinative of whether an argument is about something that is obtainable or otherwise. It is under the consideration of the latter kind of issue that the problem whether an argument has existential import or not arises.[83]

Mere, *Trairūpya Liṅga* in itself does not and cannot tell us whether an argument is about something that is obtainable or not. Just *Triprakāra* or *Tridhātva* of *Liṅga* in itself, on the contrary, cannot tell us whether an argument is valid.

In this way, we might be said to have two principal kinds of valid arguments: those which are about something that fails to obtain in a given situation at least, and those about something that could be obtainable. At the same time given that an argument is valid in itself does not and cannot tell us whether it is about something that is obtainable or not. Conversely, an argument may be about something that obtains, but this in itself cannot make it valid. Hence, consideration about validity of an argument and its being about something that obtains or fails to obtain have to be segregated.

Now, given the context of *Svabhāva* or *Kārya Hetu* alone the consideration of a *Sādhya* which is an obtainable (*Bhāvātmaka*) object arises. There, however emerges a questions: How *Svabhāva* or *Kārya Hetu* are to be determined ? For, merely if we are given two things, we cannot say that one of them is *Svabhāva Hetu* of another. Nor can we say that one of them is *Kārya Hetu* of

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82. धर्मकीर्ति; न्यायबिन्दु; अत्र द्वौ वस्तुसाधनौ ।
एकः प्रतिषेधः हेतुः । पृ० 12.

83. By existential import we mean the object of the conclusion is obtainable, while by non-existential import we mean non-obtainability of the object of conclusion. Non-existential import does not necessarily mean an empty world.

another. The conditions, according to Dharmakīrti, determinatives of *Svabhāva* and *Kārya Hetu* are *Tādātmya* and *Tadutpatti* relations respectively[84]. *Tādātmya* and *Tadutpatti* relations between things inform us, not only that they are related with each other but rather that they are related in an inalienable way. It is on this basis, that we can say that where one obtains, the other cannot fail to obtain, or that where one obtains the other must necessarily obtain too.

Thus, whereas *Svabhāva*, *Kārya* and *Anupalabdhi Hetus* give us two broad classes of them, namely, those within the framework of which alone an argument could be about an obtainable (*Bāvātmaka*) object and the one within the framework of which it cannot be so, *Tādātmya* and *Tadutpatti* relations specify the conditions which being fulfilled alone enable an argument to be about an obtainable object. In this context, it is necessary, however, to note that, according to Dharmakīrti, *Anupalabdhi* of something may come to be variously determined. Nonetheless, it is very difficult to specify axhaustively various conditions determinative of non-obtainability of an object. Such is not, however, the case with reference to an obtainable object, especially if they are so related with each other that given one of them, the other cannot fail to obtain.

Thus, with the help of *Trūirapya Liṅga*, validity of an argument is decided, while with the help of *Triprakāra* or *Tridhatva Liṅga* we decide whether an argument is about something that is obtainable or not. By making the distinction between *Trairūpya Liṅga* and *Tridhatva Liṅga* Dharmakīrti attempts to demarcate the conditions which determine validity of an argument on the one hand and those which determine obtainability or non-obtainability of the object of the conclusion of an argument on the other.

Now, it is clear that issues of validity of an argument and those of obtainability and/or non-obtainability of the object of the conclusion of an argument are quite distinct. Prior to Dharmakīrti nobody seems to have made a distinction between these two issues. Dharmakīrti seems to be the first to have understood the importance

84. धर्मकीर्ति; न्यायबिन्दु; ते च तादात्म्यतदुत्पत्ती स्वभावकार्ययोरेवेति ताभ्याम एव वस्तुसिद्धिः । पृ० 31.

of this distinction. According to him, a distinction needs also to be made between the conditions of formulating an argument and those which are essential when we participate in a debate. It is pointed out above that *Naiyāyikas* accept five conditions of determining the validity of an argument. But, when *Naiyāyikas* are talking about arguments, they seem exclusively to concentrate upon them as they are employed in debates and controversies. But in order to entertain, fashion and formulate an argument one need not have entered into a debate and controversy. Fashioning and formulating an argument can occur even when the person concerned have not entered into a debate or controversy. One's having entered into a debate cannot be said to be the necessary condition of one's coming to entertain and formulate an argument at all. A failure to see this, perhaps, led *Prācīna-Naiyāyikas* not to make a distinction between *Svārthānumāna* and *Parārthānumāna.* Apart from this, Dharmakīrti holds that it is possible that one can formulate and articulate an argument independently of one's having engaged oneself in a debate.

Dharmakīrti is interested in formulating the conditions determinative of validity of an argument independently of the context in which we resort to arguments. Likewise, he is interested in the problem of the conditions determinative of whether an argument is about an obtainable or non-obtainable object. Discussion of none of them brings in consideration of a debate or a controversy.

Though, apparently both *Naiyāyikas* and Dharmakīrti seem to consider and determine the conditions of validity of a valid argument, so that an argument would be methodologically viable and acceptable, yet *Naiyāyikas* seem to hold that those very conditions which determine the formulation of an argument, in a situation of a debate are the conditions which determine the validity of a valid argument. As mentioned earlier, *Naiyāyikas* accept five conditions of *Sadhetu.* From these five conditions the last two conditions are not the conditions determinative of validity. Nor are they methodologically necessitated. They, however, bring them in because, as it was customary then, people employed arguments when engaged in debates they were led to hold that outside the context of a debate it is not worth to entertain arguments. This consideration, however, is methodologically irrelevant. The conditions of *Asat-*

pratipakṣatva and *Abāḍhita Viṣayatva* are not methodologically speaking validity determinative. That is, such conditions cannot be said to be determinative of validity of an argument.

On the other hand, the conditions that Dharmakīrti accepts are the ones which are determinative of formulating an argument, no matter whether one entertains an argument in a soliloque or a debate. They are methodologically necessary and sufficient.

Thus, he not only distinguishes between *Trairūpya Liṅga* and *Tridhātva* of *Liṅga* but also brings to our notice that the circumstance in which we formulate an argument has nothing to do with its validity or otherwise.

Kinds Of Inference: Svārthānumāna and Parārthānumāna: Once Again

It is pointed out earlier that fashioning and formulating of an argument and its articulation and communication are two distinct issues. Though, they are distinct from each other to some extent they are related. Articulation and communication of an argument necessarily presuppose an argument being already entertained, fashioned and formulated, but not conversely. Likewise, conditions determinative of entertainability and communicability of an argument are differential. It is not without falling into error and confusion that one may come to mix them up. Dharmakīrti understands the importance of making the distinction between these issues. Hence, he classifies *Anumāna* under two heads, namely, *Svārthānumāna* and *Parārthānumāna*.[85] In this section we wish to discuss this classification in a little depth.

In *Svārthānumāna*, on the basis of *Trairūpya Liṅga Parokṣa* object in inferred, or, it could be said that with the help of *Trairūpya Liṅga*[86] inferential cognition is gained in such a way that *Parokṣa* object is inferred. In *Parārthānumāna*, on the contrary, this already formulated argument is communicated.[87] But many times, importance of making the necessary distinction between them is not

85. धर्मकीर्ति; न्यायबिन्दु; स्वार्थं परार्थं च। पृ० 21.

86. तत्रैव; तत्र स्वार्थं त्रिरूपाल्लिङाद् यदनुमेये ज्ञानं तद् अनुमानम्। पृ० 21.

87. धर्मकीर्ति; न्यायबिन्दु; त्रिरूपलिङाख्यानं परार्थानुमानम्। पृ० 46.

taken into account seriously. At the hands of *Prācīna-Naiyāyikas* at least up to Vācaspati Miśra such a kind of distinction is neither made nor acknowledged. Bhāsarvajna seems to accept the distinction but the ground of making the distinction that he stipulates is unsatisfactory. According to him an *Anumāna* is *Svārtha* provided it is not employed to counsel or persuade somebody, while the one that is employed for such a purpose is *Parārtha* and is composed of five components[88]—naturally those which are traditionally acknowledged in the *Nyāya* tradition right from Gautama. In this context it is important to understand that classification of *Anumāna* into *Svārtha* and *Parārtha* originates from the Buddhist tradition and it came to be observed and incorporated into the *Nyāya* tradition quite late, first attempts of this kind being made by Bhāsarvajna. Upto Jayanta Bhaaṭṭ's *Nyāya-manjari* the *Nyāya* tradition seems to be totally silent about it. But even after it came to be incorporated in the *Nyāya* tradition and even though this classification continues to be there in the *Navya-Nyāya* tradition as well, the basis of making the classification is lost sight of and as a result the classification remains merely to be a decorative piece without serving any purpose. The only difference between *Svārthānumāna* and *Parārthānumāna* in the *Nyāya* tradition is that in the case of *Parārthānumāna* alone *Pañcāvayava* is required and that it alone is required in case we want to counsel and advise others. This happens because at the hands of *Naiyāyikas* the issues of formulation of an argument and its communication are mixed up. Further, communicative context is considered to be determinative of the formulation of an argument as well. Hence, for them, conditions determinative of formulation of an argument and its communication are one and the same. But Dharmakīrti's and his followers' view is quite different. For, according to him, these two issue are quite distinct. He understands the importance and significance of these issues. That is why he makes a distinction between *Svārthānumāna* and *Parārthānumāna*. In the former cognising a *Parokṣa* object on the basis of *Trairūpya Liṅga*[89] is what is at stake. In *Parārthānumāna*, on the contrary,

88. भासर्वज्ञ; न्यायसार न्यायभूषणं च; तत् (अनुमानं) पुनर्द्विविधम्-स्वार्थं परार्थं चेति। परोपदेशादेशं परार्थम्। परोपदेशस्तु पंचावयववाक्यम्। पृ० 272.

89. धर्मकीर्ति : प्रमाणवार्त्तिक : स्वदृष्टग्रहणफलम्। स्वार्थानुमान परि० पृ० 363.

one explains or communicates what one has cognised (oneself).[90] Explaining the point made by Dharmakīrti, Dharmottara writes: *Svārthānumāna* is that through which one comes to comprehend (a *Pakṣa*, object) oneself, whereas that by which some one else comes to be informed is *Parārthānumāna*.[91] Elaborating this further it is brought out that one coming to know oneself is the objective of *Svārthānumāna*. That *Anumāna* by which one comes to a *Parokṣa* object oneself is known as *Svārtha*.[92] *Parārthānumāna*, on the contrary, is that *Anumāna* through the statement or communication of which someone else happens to be informed about an already indirectly cognized object.[93] The distinction between *Svārthānumāna* and *Parārthānumāna* is neither sought to be made on the basis of the respective purposes they serve, nor on the basis that while one of them is *Trirūpaliṅga*, the other is not. This basis of the distinction between them is erroneous and misleading.

The basis of the distinction between them has to be sought elsewhere. In *Svārthānumāna*, the person who infers, knows the inferred object himself, while in *Parārthānumāna* he communicates the knowledge of the inferred object to others. Hence, it could be said that *Svārthānumāna* can be independent of social context. Dharmottara also interprets this classification of *Anumāna* by saying that there are two distinct characteristics of these kinds of *Anumāna* as each of these kinds has a unique and distinctive role to play. *Svārthānumāna* is *Jñānātmaka* while *Parārthānumāna* is *Śabdāt-*

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90. मनोरथनन्दी; प्रमाणवार्तिकवृत्ति; तत्र परार्थानुमानं स्वदृष्टार्थप्रकाशनम् । स्वेन दृष्टः स्वदृष्टः, स्वदृष्टश्चासावर्थश्चेति त्रिरूपो हेतुः । तस्य प्रकाशनं वचनं अनुमानहेतुत्वादित्यर्थः । पृ० 363.

91. धर्मोत्तर; न्यायबिन्दुटीका; येन स्वयं प्रतिपद्यते तत् स्वार्थम्।··· येन पर प्रतिपादयति तत् परार्थम् । पृ० 21.

92. दुर्वेक मिश्र; धर्मोत्तरप्रदीप; यस्य चात्मप्रतिपत्तिः प्रयोजनम् । ···येनानुमानेन-करणभूतेन अनुमाता स्वयं प्रतिपद्यते परोक्षमर्थम् इति:···। पृ० 88.

93. तत्रैव; येन वाक्येन करणेन परं प्रति वाच्यं प्रतिपादयति परोक्षमर्थं बोधयति तत् त्रिरूपलिंग व्याख्यानम् । परार्थानुमानम् पृ० 89.

maka.[94] *Svārthānumāna* is *Jñānātmaka* because in *Svārthānumāna.*, *Parokṣa* object is cognized. *Parārthānumāna* is *Śabdātmaka* because the information which is available to us through *Svārthānumāna* is articulated and communicated. Thus, *Parārthānumāna* is both *Jñānātmaka* and *Śabdātmaka* because it involves two aspects cognition of *Parokṣa* object and articulation and communication of that cognition, while *Svārthānumāna* involves merely the knowledge aspect. That is why the distinguishing marks of *Svārthānumāna* and *Parārthānumāna* are knowledge on the part of *inferring* person and communication of it respectively. But, whether *Anumāna* figures as instrument of cognition or that of communication it involves the same kind of components, and determiners of its validity or soundness remain exactly the same. Further, since no knowledge could be communicated unless one has it already and since the instrument of cognition of *Parokṣa* object and communication of it is the same, it is a small wonder that *Parārthānumāna* bodily and formally involves *Svārthānumāna* and since the latter is a fulfledged *Anumāna* it is not a matter of surprise that it is determined by *Trairūpya Liṅga* and it is *Tridhā* as well, its *Tridhātva* being determined by *Tridhātva* or *Triprakāratva* of *Hetu.* It, therefore, makes no sense either to say that *Parārthānumāna* alone is *Anumāna* in the true sense of the term or even that the basis of making distinction between them is the differential purpose they serve.

Thus, in *Svārthānumāna, Parokṣa* object is inferred on the basis of *Trairūpya Liṅga* or an argument is formulated in such a way that *Parokṣa* object is inferred through it. In *Parārthānumāna* such an argument is communicated. Argument is not communicated unless it is formulated though converse does not necessarily follow. For, I can communicate an already communicated argument. Hence, formulation of an argument is a necessary condition for its initial or later communication. This is how, *Svārthānumāna* is presupposed by *Parārthānumāna.* That is why, between them priority is of *Svārthānumāna.*

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94. धर्मोत्तर; न्यायबिन्दुटीका; परार्थानुमानं शब्दात्मकम् स्वार्थानुमानं तु ज्ञानात्मकम् । तयोरत्यन्तभेदात् नैक लक्षणमस्ति ।···प्रकारभेदो हि व्यक्तिभेदः । पृ० 21.

Here, an issue may be raised ; what are the necessary and sufficient conditions of an argument being formulated ? Over and above, *Hetu Sādhya* and *Vyāpti* between them together with *Pakṣa-dharmatā, Hetu* has to satisfy three conditions. These three conditions are necessary as well as sufficient. Because, when we formulate an argument we do not necessarily formulate it only when we participate in a debate and a controversy. Rather the consideration of a debate and controversy need not be raised when we formulate an argument. That is why, Dharmakīrti accepts that there are three conditions that every *Hetu*, has to satisfy. On the contrary, *Naiyāyikas* do not accept this. According to them one can formulate an argument only when one enters into a debate and controversy. Naturally in the case of a debate and controversy the aim is either to defend our own position or criticise the position held by others. Hence, they accept five characteristics of *Hetu.*[95] But, methodologically speaking, consideration of a debate and a controversy need not be raised in the consideration of formulation of an argument. Hence, these two considerations should be segregated.

It is pointed out earlier that in *Parārthānumāna* we articulate and communicate the knowledge available to us through *Svārthānumāna.* When we communicate this knowledge, it is possible for us to communicate it in two ways : *Sādharmya* (similarity) or *Vaidharmya* *Sādharmya* intended here is of course *Sādharmya* of *Sadhyadharmī.* with *Dṛṣṭāntadharmī*. Likewise, such a knowledge gained through *Svārthānumāna* may be communicated through bringing to one's notice *Vaidharmya* between *Sādhyadharmī* and *Dṛṣṭāntadharmī*. Since communication of the knowledge of *Sādhyadharmī* gained through *Svārthānumāna* may be possible in either of these ways, and since a communicated argument is *Parārthānumāna Parārthānumāna* may be said to be of two kinds expressively.[96] Accordingly *Parārthānumāna* is classified as *Sādharmyavat* and *Vaidharmyavat Parārthānumāna.* In the former of them similarity between *Sādhyadharmī* and *Dṛṣṭānta-*

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95. जयन्त भट्ट : न्यायमञ्जरी : परोक्षोऽर्थो लिङ्ग्यते गम्यतेऽनेनेति लिङ्गम् तच्च पञ्चलक्षणम् । कानि पुनः प चलक्षणानि । पक्षधर्मत्वम्, सपक्षधर्मत्वं, विपक्षाद्व्यावृत्तिः, अबाधित विषयत्वम्, असत् प्रतिपक्षत्वं चेति ।···एतै : पंचाभिर्लक्षणैरूपपान लिङ्ग अनुमापकम् भवति । भाग I, पृ० 101.

96. धर्मकीर्ति; न्यायबिन्दु; तद्द्विविधं प्रयोगभेदात् । परार्था परि० पृ० 47.

dharmī is the basis of communication, while in the latter dissimilarity between them.[97] Though taking into consideration the mode of communication involved there is a difference between these kinds of *Parārthānumāna*, yet the object of both of them is the same, viz, to communicate *Trairūpya Liṅga.*[98]

Since the difference between them is merely expressive or communicative what is communicated via *Sādharmya* may lead to a cognition of a thing through *Vaidharmya*, such as if *Sādhya* is not there then there cannot be *Anvaya* of *Hetu* with it. Likewise, communication of *Anumāna* via *Vaidharmya* may lead to cognition of a thing through *Sādharmya* such as if *Sādhyābhāva* does obtain then *Hetvābhāva* too cannot fail to obtain.[99] Moreover, since except in the case of those things which are naturally tied with each other through *Tādātmya* or *Tadutpatti* we cannot infer invariably (*niyamena*) absence of one thing from that of another,[100] those things which are *Svabhāvapratibaddha*, it would hardly make a difference whether one of them is inferred from the other through *Anvaya* or *Vyatireka*, *Sādharmya* or *Vaidharmya* and hence in the case of

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97. धर्मोत्तर; न्यायबिन्दुटीका; ···समानो धर्मोऽस्य सोऽयं सधर्मा । तस्य भाव: साधर्म्यम् । विसदृशो धर्मोऽस्य विधर्मा । विधर्मणो भावो वैधर्म्यम् । दृष्टान्त-धर्मिणा सह साध्यधर्मिण: सादृश्यं हेतुकृतं साधर्म्यम् उच्यते । असादृश्यं च हेतुकृतं वैधर्म्यम् उच्यते। तत्र यस्य साधनवाक्यस्य साधर्म्यम् अभिधेयं तत् साधर्म्यवत्।

···यस्य तु वैधर्म्यम् अभिधेयं तद् वैधर्म्यवत् । परार्था० परि० पृ. 47.

98. धर्मकीर्ति; न्यायबिन्दु; नानयोरर्थत: कश्चिद् भेद: । अन्यत्र प्रयोगभेदात् । परार्था परि० पृ० 47.

99 धर्मकीर्ति; न्यायबिन्दु; साधर्म्येणापि हि प्रयोगेऽर्थाद्वैधर्म्यं गतिरिति । असति तस्मिन्साध्येय हेतोन्वयाभावात् । तथा वैधर्म्येणोप्यन्वयगति: । असति तस्मिन् साध्याभावे हेत्वभावस्यासिद्धे: । परार्थानुमान पृ० 56.

100. तत्रैव : न हि स्वभावप्रतिबन्धे सति एकस्य निवृतो अपरस्य नियमेन निवृत्ति: । स च द्विप्रकार: । सर्वस्य तादात्म्यलक्षणस्तदुत्पत्ति लक्षणश्चेत्युक्तम् । परार्था परि० पृ० 56.

Svabhāvapratibaddha things, it is redundant to employ both these modes of communicating an already formulated argument.[101]

It is pointed out earlier that there are three kinds of *Hetu* and that they are determinative of three kinds of *Anumāna.* These three kinds of *Hetu* alone are *Hetus* properly so called because they have *Trirūpata.* Now, when we communicate knowledge available to us with the help of *Trairūpya Liṅga,* we can do so with the help of any *Anumāna* of its different kinds. But since communicatively we might communicate on the basis of *Sādharmya* or *Vaidharmya,* as pointed out above, expressively *Parārthanumānas* may be of six kinds as follows :

Parārthānumāna

Sādharmyavat	Viadharmyavata
1. Svabhāvānumāna	4. Svabhāvānumāna
2. Kāryānumāna	5. Kāryānumāna
3, Anupalabdhi Anumāna	6. Anupalabdhi Anumāna

The classification of *Parārthānumāna* into *Sādharmyavat* and *Vaidharmyavat* is according to the method through which we communicate. It is on the basis of similarity or dissimilarity between *Sādhyadharmī* and *Dṛṣṭantadharmi* that we are going to communicate. This classification of *Anumāna* is on the basis of expressive form it may assume and not on the basis of differential *Avinābhāva Niyama* involved. In fact, *Avinābhāva* is a *Niyama* and a *Niyama* cannot be classified as it is determiner in any case in the same way.

On the contrary, when *Naiyāyikas classify Anumāna as Anvayī, Vyatireki and Anvaya-Vyatireki* they seem to do so on the basis of the basis of the classification of *Vyāpti.* This is so, for, accor-

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101. तत्रैव : तेन हि निवृत्तिं कथयता प्रतिबन्धो दर्शनीयः ।
तस्मात् निवृत्तिवचनम् अक्षिप्तप्रतिबन्धोपदर्शनम् एव भवति । यच्च प्रतिबन्धोप-दर्शनं तदेवान्वयवचनम् इत्येकेनापि वाक्येनान्वयमुखेन व्यतिरेकमुखेन वा प्रयुक्तेन सपक्षासपक्षयोर्लिङ्गस्य सदसत्वख्यापनं कृतं भवतीति नावश्यं वाक्यद्वय प्रयोगः ।
परार्थानुमान परि० पृ० 57-58.

ding to them *Vyāpti* is a relation which is classifiable, as also because they count expressive kinds to be genuine. Both on the basis of differential relation as well as expressive mode, it classified *Anumāna* into *Anvayayī*, *Vyatirekī* and *Anvaya Vyatirekī*.

Thus, *Anumāna* considered from the point of view of cognition which it generates, it is *Svārthānumāna* only. When considered expressively or communicatively it is *Parārthānumāna.* Since any communicated argument has to be formulated already and since any formulated argument may be *Svabhāvānumāna*, *Kāryānumāna* or *Anupalabdhi Anumāna* determined respectively by *Tadātmya-prakāraka*, *Tadutpatti-prakāraka* or *Anupalabdhi-prakāraka Hetu,* there are only three principal kinds of arguments, although expressively they may become of six kinds and even when they do so become, they boil down to the three principal kinds only. We also saw that *Trairūpya* of *Hetu* is a threefold validity-determining feature of it, such that non-fulfilment of any of those validity determining conditions would render an argument to be invalid. We further saw briefily that of the five constituents of *Anumāna* accepted by *Nyāya* logicians Dharmakīrti seeks to do away with *Pratijña*, *Udāharana*, *Upanaya* and *Nigamana*. We need not probe deeper into these nuences. Instead, let us look into Dharmakīrti's treatment of *Hetvābhāsas*-kinds of argument's invalidating determiners, for without their consideration our study of Dharnakīrti's analysis of inference would remain inadequate and incomplete. It is to this that we turn next.

We saw previously that with the help of *Trairūpya Liṅga* we are in a position to decide validity of an argument. These there conditions conjointly and severally determine the validity of an argument, and that these three conditions are both necessary and sufficient to determine validity of an argument. Now, if at least one of these conditions it not fulfilled, we are not in a position to have a valid argument. Hence, it could be said that in order to decide invalidity of an argument non-fulfilment of at least one validity-determining condition of *Hetu* is sufficient. Due to invalidating characteristics of a *Hetu* an argument becomes invalid. Such *Hetus* are improperly so-called. They masquerade as genuine *Hetus,* although they are not so. Hence they are called *Hetvābhāsas*.

Nature and Kinds of Hetvābhāsas:

Hetvābhāsa or *Sādhanābhāsa* means a situation in which at least one of the features of a *Hetu* properly so-called which is determinative of validity is not mentioned, or that even if it is mentioned it remains unproved, or at least one of them is doubtful.[102]

According to Dharmakīrti there are only three kinds of *Hetvābhāsa*, namely, *Asiddha*, *Viruddha*, and *Anaikāntika*.

Asiddha Hetvābhāsa arises when one or the other feature or candition of a legitimate *Hetu* fails to be fulfilled with reference to *pakṣa* or is at least doubtful or when the *Pakṣa* itself is unproved or is at least doubtful.[103]

Viruddha Hetvābhāsa arises when *Hetu* fails to fulfil the condition of *Sapakṣasattva* and/or that of *Asapakṣāsattva*. Thus, this *Hetvābhāsa* arises when *Hetu* is non-obtainable on *Sapakṣa* but obtainable on *Vipakṣa*.[104]

Anaikāntika Hetvābhāsa is that kind of *Hetvābhāsa* when one of the characteristics of *Hetu* namely, *Asapakṣa Asattva* is ruled out. It arises when *Hetu* is obtainable also on *Asapakṣa* or its absence on *Asapakṣa* is doubtful.[105]

Dharmakīrti accepts only these three *Hetvābhāsas*. According

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102. (a) धर्मकीर्ति; न्यायबिन्दु; त्रिरूपलिङाख्यानं परार्थानुमानम् इत्युक्तम् । तत्र त्रयाणां रूपाणाम् एकस्यापि रूपस्यानुक्तौ साधनाभासः ।
परार्थानुमान परि० पृ० 67.

(b) तत्रैव; उक्तावप्यसिद्धौ सन्देहे वा प्रतिपाद्य प्रतिपादकयोः । पृ० 67.

10·. (a) धर्मकीर्ति; न्यायबिन्दु, एकस्य रूपस्य धर्मिसम्बन्धस्यासिद्धौ सन्देहेऽसिद्धौ हेत्वाभासः ।
परार्थ परि० पृ० 67.

(b) तत्रैव; तथा स्वयं तदाश्रयणस्य वा सन्देहेऽसिद्धा । पृ० 69.

104. तत्रैव; द्वयो रूपयोर्विपर्ययासिद्धौ विरुद्धः । कयोर्द्वयोः 1 सपक्षे सत्त्वस्य, असपक्षे चासत्त्वस्य । परार्थ परि० पृ. 78.

105. तत्रैव; तथैकस्य रूपस्य असपक्षे असत्वस्यासिद्धौ अनैकान्तिको हेत्वाभासः ।
पृ० 71.

to *Naiyāyikas*, on the contrary, there are five *Hetvābhāsas* namely, *Asiddha*, *Viruddha*, *Anaikāntika*, *Bādhita* and *Satpratipakṣatva.*[106] when the argument is inconcistent within the system *Bādhita Hetvābhāsa* arises and due to *Satpratipakṣatva* the argument becomes beneficial to an adversary.

Now, it is an interesting issue as to why does Dharmakīrti accept only three kinds of *Hetvābhāsa* and why do *Naiyāyikas* accept five *Hetvābhāsas* ? Is it arbitrary and methodologically indefensible ? It is to this consideration that we now turn.

Dharmakīrti accepts three characteristics of *Hetu* while *Naiyāyikas* accept five characteristics of *Hetu* to by validity determinative. Since violation of the fulfilment of any one of validity-determinative conditions or characteristics of *Hetu* is enough to give rise to a *Hetvābhāsa* it is obvious that according to Dharmakīrti there would in all be only three *Hetvābhāsas*, while according to *Nyayāyikas* there would be five. But this answer is very superficial in the sense that again a problem remains: on what ground are the characteristics of *Hetu* accepted to be validity determinative ? Let us deal with the issue in a little detail.

It is pointed out earlier that when an argument is fashioned and formulated it is not necessary to be formulated in the context of a debate or controversy. That is, for the formulation of an argument context of dialogue, debate or controversy is redundant and dispensable and not indispensable as *Nyāya* logicians are generally prone to hold. Dharmakīrti holds this view. On the contrary, according to *Naïyayikas*, an argument is not only communicated but is formulated as well only in the context of a debate or controversy. Hence, according to them the context of formulation and communication of an argument are essentially the same. Thus, there are divergent positions so far as the situation in which an argument is and need to be formulated. Likewise, according to Dharmakīrti, an argument can be communicated or expressed in language not necessa-

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106. जयन्त भट्ट : न्यायमञ्जरी : एतेषां एव लक्षणानाम् एकैकापायात् पंच हेत्वाभासा: वक्ष्यन्ते ।···

असिद्ध:, विरुद्ध:, अनैकान्तिक:, कालात्ययाप्रदिष्ट: (बाध:), प्रकरणसम: (यस्य निष्प्रतिपक्षता नास्ति ।) प्रथम भाग पृ० 101.

rily in a context where more then one persons is physically present, as it happens in a soliloque. On the contrary, *Naiyāyikas* hold that an argument is and should be communicated only in a situation of debate or controversy where at least two persons are present. Both, Dharmakīrti and *Naiyāyikas* are interested in deciding validity of valid argument. But they stipulate different methodological conditions determinative of it.

Naiyāyikas hold that we formulate and communicate an argument only when we enter into a debate or controversy. And that is why, as it seems, *Prācīna-Naiyāyikas* do not seem to make an appropriate distinction between *Svārthānumāna* and *Parārthānumāna.* Apart from this, Dharmakīrti holds that it is possible that one can formulate and articulate an argument independently of the situation of debate or controversy.

Now, both *Nyāya* and Buddhist logicians like Dharmakīrti stipulate the conditions of validity of an aigument so that argument would be methodologically respectable and acceptable. They differ, nonetheless, from each other, as we shall argue below, in stipulating minimally necessary and sufficient validity determinative conditions of an argument.

Naiyāyikas hold that those very conditions which determine the situation of dialogue, discussion debate or controversy to be those not only of formulating an argument but also to those determinative of the validity and communication of an argument as well. That is, intuitive conditions of there being a debate itself are considered to be methodologically necessary and sufficient conditions of determining the validity of an argument as well. It is pointed out earlier that according to *Naiyāyikas* there are five conditions determinative of validity of an argument. Among these five conditions, the last two conditions viz. *Abādhita Viṣayatva* and *Asatpratipakṣatva* are not accepted on methodological but rather on intuitive ground, because it is methodologically irrelevant whether you defend your own position or *criticize* the position held by others. But do they methodologically determine validity of an argument at least ? That is, could they be counted amongst necessary and sufficient validity deteminative conditions of an argument ? It is to this consideration that we now turn. The conditions of *Abādhita Viṣayatva* and *Asatpratipakṣatva* are

intuitively determined. Hence, *Naiyāyikas'* additional two conditions are not methodologically speaking conditions determinative of validity of an argument. Methodologically speaking those three conditions which Dharmakīrti, accepts to be necessary and sufficient validity determinative conditions, namely, *Pakṣa Sattva, Sapakṣa Sattva* and *Asapakṣa Asattva* alone need to be counted. Once validity of an argument is determined, it is irrelevant whether we participate in a debate etc. being armed with such an argument. Thus methodologically speaking, a *Hetu* needs to satisfy only three conditions in order that an argument comes to be formulated and that such a formulated argument remains valid. The additional conditions which *Nyāya* logicians lay down viz. those of *Abādhitaviṣayatva* and *Asatpratipakṣatva* are such that their fulfilment would guarantee our not having come to contradict ourselves and our having entered into a debate and our employing certain arguments not turning out to be disadvantageous to us respectively. But none of these could be considered methodologically to be determinative of formulation or validity of an argument.

Thus, at the hands of *Naiyāyikas*, conditions determinative of validity of an argument, conditions which determine the formulation of an argument in the situation of a debate etc. in a way advantageous to us are mixed up. These conditions are supposed to be the same. Hence, it is held that if one of these conditions is not fulfilled we do not have valid argument. That is why, they accept five *Hetvābhāsas*. But this is both erroneous and untenable.

According to Dharmakīrti on the contrary, conditions determinative of validity of an argument are three. For he understands that the consideration of validity or formulation of an argument is not determined either by a debate situation in which an argumentation may be and often is resorted to. Hence, he accepts three conditions to be determinative of validity of an argument. If and in so far as at least one of them is not satisfied, an argument would be invalid.

Methodologically speaking the *Hetvābhāsas* that Dharmakīrti accepts should be the only *Hetvābhāsas*. Apart from these three, there is no need to acknowledge any additional *Hetvābhāsas* and where it is done so it must be on a methodologically indefensible ground. *Satpratipakṣa* and *Bādha* are not and cannot be methodo-

logically speaking counted as *Hetvābhāsas* as their absence is not necessarily validity determinative. Further, consideration of some or the other extramethodological advantage makes one count them among *Hetvābhāsas*. For even when we have not contradicted ourselves our arguments could be fallacious and invalid. Moreover, contradiction could be taken care of by *Avinābhāva*, as *Avinābhāva* and *Bādha* are mutually exclusive of each other.[107] Likewise, that our argument has not turned out to be advantageous to our adversary in a debate or that it has not turned out to be disadvantageneous to us in a controversy cannot be held to be a guarantee of our argument being valid. Hence, the consideration that *Satpratipakṣa* and *Bādhita* are to be counted as additional *Hetvābhās* should be rejected, and likewise, the absence of those features of *Hetu* due to which they result should not be counted to be validity determinative conditions of an argument.[108]

Thus far we considered some of the important issues concerning nature and structure of arguments and Dharmakīrti's analysis of them. Equally important is the problem as to what is the object of inference and what are some of the important features of such an object. In the next section we propose to discuss this view.

Nature of Sāmānya-Lakṣaṇa

According to Dharmakīrti, object of inference is *Sāmānya-Lakṣana*.[109] It is distinct and different from *Svalakṣaṇa*, the object of perception. It is exhaustively presented through *Vikalpa* or *Vijnāṇa* or both and whether it is proximate or remote this makes no difference in its nature. Nor does any change occur in it presentatively on the count of haziness or clarity. That is why, it is said to

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107. धर्मकीर्ति; हेतुबिन्दु : तत्र अबाधित विषयत्वं तावत् पृथक् लक्षणं न भवति बाधा अविनाभावयो: विरोधात् । अविनाभावो हि सत्येन साध्यधर्मे भावो हेतु: । पृ० 68.

108. धर्मकीर्ति : हेतुबिन्दु : तस्मात न हेतु षड् पंचलक्षणो वा । पृ० 72.

109. धर्मकीर्ति; न्यायबिन्दु; अन्यत् सामान्यलक्षणम्, सोऽनुमानस्य विषय: । प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 17-18.

be distinct and different from *Svalakṣaṇa.*[110] It is a comprehension of an object through generality (*Sāmānya*) or shareable features (*Sādhāraṇam rūpam*).[111] Since there are only two kinds of knowables and since both of them cannot be known through *Pratyakṣa,* as on the basis of it only *Svalakṣaṇa* can be known, another *Pramāna* viz. *Anumāna* is required to know *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa,* since it can be known only through *Anumāna.* This is further so because one and the same knowable cannot be general as well as distinguishing, as they being opposite of each other they cannot be the same.[112]

Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa does not have any potentiality or disposition to cause any action on our part. It is anchored in similarity and is indicated only by words and expressions. It is an object of intellect, is of the nature of what is called *Samvṛtti Sat* and remains epistemologically operative through imagination.[113] *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* is indicative of what is shareable, what is common to individuals of a certain kind.[114] It is capable of being articulated, expressed or communicated, and the expression/s which communicates it on the one hand and *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* on the other are not related with each other through any rule but rather by convention.[115]

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110. धर्मोत्तर; न्यायबिन्दुटीका; एतस्मात् स्वलक्षणात् अन्यत् स्वलक्षणं यो न भवति ज्ञानविषय: तत् सामान्य लक्षणम् । विकल्पविज्ञानेन अवसीयमान: सन्निधानासन्निधानाभ्यां ज्ञानप्रतिभासं न भिनत्ति···स्फुटत्वेनास्फुटत्वेन वा। प्रथम परि० पृ० 17.

111. धर्मोत्तर; लघुदीपिका; ···सामान्येन लक्षणं सामान्यलक्षणम् । साधारणं रूपम इत्यर्थ: । समारोप्यमाणं हि रूपं सकलवह्निसाधारणम् । तत: त त् सामान्य लक्षणम् । प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 17-18.

112. मनोरथनन्दी; प्रमाणवार्तिकवृत्ति; विषयश्च स्वसामान्य लक्षणात् अतिरिक्तोनास्ति । तत: तद्विषये प्रत्यक्षानुमानतैव । नापि सामान्य विशेषात्मक एकोऽस्ति विषय:, परस्पर विरुद्धयोरैकात्म्यायोगात् । प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 98.

113. तत्रैव; अत: अन्यत् अशक्तं सदृशं शब्द विषय:, अन्यनिमित्तभावे बुद्धेर्विषयश्च तत् संवृत्तिसत् प्रोक्तम्, कल्पनामात्रव्यवहार्यत्वात् । पृ० 100.

114. तत्रैव : सदृशं सामान्यम्, सर्वव्यक्तिसाधारणत्वात् । पृ० 99.

115. धर्मोत्तर; न्यायबिन्दुटीका; (वाचक शब्देन) अभिलापेनसंसर्गयोग्य···व्युत्पन्नसंकेतस्य···अनियतप्रतिभासमानत्वात् । प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 10.

Likewise, *Sāmānyalakṣaṇa* comes to be comprehended independently of being backed or determined in any way by a proximity of a thing.[116] It is always determined by the relation between expressions and what they express.[117] *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* is incapable of causing or generating any action on our part.[118] Such a *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* is always cognized indirectly and never directly,[119] as it is cognized through *Anumāna*. It is the product of *Vikalpabuddhi* which culminates in *Sāmānya*.[120] That comprehension which arises independently of a thing is of the nature of generality and it is *Sāmānya*,[121] Thus, *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* stands for such general, shareable, common features which happen to be comprehended through the expressible-expressed (*Vācya-Vācaka*) relation. This kind of relation, further is governed by the accepted conventions and there is no necessary relation of any kind between them. *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* being expressible and communicable is never of the nature of a thing as it is. It is rather comprehended through and because of expressions.[122] Thus, *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* is so called because of its being indicative of shareable, common feature/s.[123]

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116. तत्रैव; अर्थसन्निधिनिरपेक्षत्वात् । पृ० 11.

117. तत्रैव; वाच्यवाचकभावापन्न···। पृ० 11.

118. (a) मनोरथनन्दी; प्रमाणवार्त्तिकवृत्ति:···अनर्थक्रियाकारिसामान्यम् । प्रत्यक्ष पदि० पृ० 99.

    (b) धर्मकीर्ति; प्रमाणवार्त्तिक, (सामान्यस्य) अर्थक्रियां अशक्तिन: । प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 99.

119. धर्मकीर्ति; हेतुबिन्दु, परोक्षार्थप्रतिपत्ते; अनुमानाश्रयत्वात् । पृ० 52.

120. मनोरथनन्दी; प्रमाणवार्त्तिकवृत्ति, घट इत्यादि विकल्पबुद्धिस्तु सामान्यावसानात् तद्विषया । प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 102.

121. तत्रैव; यत्रं विषयं व्यतिरिक्तनिमित्तसदभावे भवति बुद्धि: तत् सामान्यम् । पृ० 69.

122. मनोरथनन्दी; प्रमाणवार्त्तिकवृत्ति; तत् सामान्यं न वस्तुरूपादिस्वभावम्, अभिधेयत्वात् । शब्दधर्मवत् सामान्यं शब्दज्ञानगोचरम् । न च शब्दविषयो वस्तु । प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 104.

123. तत्रैव; साधारणरूपत्वात् अर्थत्वेन सामान्यमुच्यते । पृ० 104.

Implications of the Nature of Sāmānya-Lakṣaṇa

This kind of commonness is one of the knowable features of a thing, although made available through our communication with regard to them. As knowable there are only two features: unique or non-shareable (*Svalakṣaṇātmaka*) and common or shareable (*Sāmānya-lakṣaṇātmaka*).[124] In the preceeding chapter we discussed the nature of non-shareable features or *Sva-lakṣaṇa*. We also considered above, however, briefly, the general nature of *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*. Now we propose to discuss some important implications of it.

A thing can have at the most in all two kinds of features: shareable and non-shareable. But it may happen that a knowable either has only shareable properties or only non-shareable properties. In these cases, however, some or the other way difficulties will arise. If the first alternative is accepted, then we would not be in a position to have an experience of them especially because on Dharmakīrti's view shareable features are never perceptually comprehended. If the second alternative is accepted, then we would not be in a position to talk about such particularity. On this alternative, although we would differentiate one thing from another yet we would not be able to capture any generality or shareability. Secondly, knowledge of shareable and non-shareable features would not be connected with each other. For both the properties as well as our comprehension of them may be considered on this view to be mutually distinct from each other. There would be no way to connect them. Hence, there would not be any convergence of these two kinds of knowledge. Therefore, it is necessary to search for another alternative. This alternative is that a thing could have shareable as well as non-shareable features. Dharmakīrti seems to accept this position. There are various implications of this view having bearing upon the relation between knowledge, language and the world. We hope to discuss this issue in the next chapter.

Now, even if it is accepted that sharability is one of the features of a knowable, there still remains a question as to how this

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124. (a) धर्मोत्तर; न्यायबिन्दुटीका; वस्तुनो असाधारणं च तत्त्वमस्ति सामान्यं च। प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 15.

(b) धर्मकीर्ति; प्रमाणवार्त्तिक; अर्थक्रियासमर्थं यत् तदत्र परमार्थसत् । अन्यत् संवृत्तिसत् प्रोक्तम्; ते स्वसामान्य लक्षणे। प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 100.

kind of feature could be distinguished from non-shareable feature—another important kind of feature of a knowable? There are five determiners on the basis of which shareable features could be distinguished from non-shareable feature of an object. They are:

(1) *Arthakriyāsāmarthya*: non-shareable features or *Sva-lakṣaṇtāmaka* objects alone have *Arthakriyāsāmarthya*, while shareable features do not have.[125] Whereas things which have *Arthakriyāsāmarthya* alone create a vague or vivid impression about them according as they are proximate or distant, *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* does not create such an impression.[126] If the thesis that shareable features also have *Artnakriyāsāmarthya* is accepted then we have to accept *Kṣaṇikatva* of *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*. The things which have *Arthakriyāsāmarthya* have to be impermanent in character. For, a permanent thing endowed with *Arthakriyāsāmarthya* would perpetually continue generating action on our part. We will argue later on that *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* is necessary for communication and conceptual comprehension and not for *Arthakriya*. Hence, it could be said that, *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* being primarily linguistic in character, we can neither speak of change in it—micro and macro—nor can be consider it to be a

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125. (1) धर्मकीर्ति; प्रमाणवार्त्तिक; मानं द्विविधं विषय द्वैविध्यात् शक्त्यशक्तितः।
अर्थक्रियायां केशादिर्नार्थोऽनर्थाधिमोक्षतः ॥1॥
प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 99.

(2) मनोरथनन्दी : प्रमाणवार्त्तिकवृत्ति : सार्थक्रिया सर्वत्र स्वलणे सामान्येऽत्यस्ति चेत् ?
न सामान्यलक्षणे···पृ० 102.

126. धर्मोत्तर : न्यायबिन्दुटीका : ···यस्माद् अर्थक्रियासमर्थं परमार्थसद् उच्यते, सन्निधानासन्निधानाभ्यां च ज्ञानप्रतिभासस्य भेदकोऽर्थोऽर्थक्रियासमर्थः, तस्मात् स एव परमार्थसत्। तत एव हि प्रत्यक्षविषयाद् अर्थक्रिया प्राप्यते न विकल्पविषयात्। अत एव यद्यपि विकल्पविषयो दृश्य इवावसीयते तथापि न विकल्प-विषयात्। अत एव यद्यपि विकल्पविषयो दृश्य इवावसीयते तथापि न स दृश्य एव ततोऽर्थक्रियाया अभावात्, दृश्याच्च भावात्।
प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 17.

thing. It however, captures all the objects of the same kind in its generality.[127]

(2) *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* is not and cannot be an object of perception.[128] It is pointed out in the previous chapter that perception captures only non-shareable features and those too directly. Shareable feature is an object of inference and non-shareable feature is object of perception.[129] The two sorts of features that things could have are comprehended and cognized through two distinct modes of cognition.

(3) Non-shareable features cannot be depicted in language because language is based on generality. Every word in our language, in one or the other way, indicates generality. Hence, language is incapable of depicting uniqueness and non-shareability of an object, the very basis of its perceptuality. Secondly, language is governed by convention. *Sva-lakṣaṇa* is not determined by convention.[130] Thus, *Sva-lakṣaṇa* is not an object of language, while *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* is.[131]

(4) *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* is object of inference. In inference what we infer is *Parokṣa* to us. If the object of inference would also be

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127. धर्मकीर्ति; प्रमाणवार्त्तिक; अर्थरूपत्वेन; समानता सर्वत्र समरूपत्वात् तदृष्या-
वृत्तिसमाश्रयात् ॥10॥
प्रत्यक्ष परि० 104.

128. तत्रैव; न तद् वस्त्वभिधेयत्वात्, साफल्यादक्षसंहते: । नामादिवचने वक्तृश्रोतृ-
वाच्य अनुबन्धिनि ॥11॥
प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 104.

129. धर्मकीर्ति; न्यायबिन्दु; तस्य विषय: स्वलक्षणम् ।
सोऽनुमानस्य विषय : । प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 15 ते 18.

130. धर्मकीर्ति; प्रमाणवार्तिक; शब्दा: संकेतितं प्राहुर्व्यवहाराय संस्मृता: तदा स्व-
लक्षणं नास्ति संकेतस्तेन तत्र न ॥92॥
स्वार्थ परि० पृ० 288.

131. मनोरथनन्दी; प्रमाणवार्त्तिकवृत्ति; शब्दस्य विषय: सामान्यम्, अविषय: स्व-
लक्षणम् । प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 99.

Aparokṣa to us in the context in which we infer it, then inference would become redundant and dispensable. Inference or argument is not an alternative mode of gaining the same cognition which has already been or could be gained through perception. when we infer fire what we infer is not *Aparokṣa* fire but a *Parokṣa* fire through common, shareable property. Inference always captures shareable properties. The shareable features that inference captures may be either those which things have or those which they are said to be having in so far as we use a language with reference to them, of which *Vācya-Vācaka* relation conventionally determined is a built in feature. The shareability which things have is not thrust upon them through language and concepts and it could be captured through *Tādātmya* and *Tadutpatti* relations and on their basis it is possible for us to infer these features of the object.

(5) *Sva-lakṣaṇa* is a unique particular or unique feature of an object, while *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* is similarity, shareability or generality of it.[132]

In brief we can say that, *Sva-lakṣaṇa* has *Arthakriyāsāmarthya*, *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* does not have. *Sva-lakṣaṇa* is unique particular, *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* is general. *Sva-lakṣaṇa* is not of the nature of language but *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* is.[133] Likewise, while *Svalakṣaṇa* is object and could be object of perception alone, *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* can never be perceived. This view of Dharmakīrti marks itself off form the view of *Nyāya* philosophers according to which if an object is perceptible then *Sāmānya* of it too is perceptible by the same sense-organ by which the object under consideration is perceived.

we saw that things could and often do have shareable features. But the shareable features a thing is said to be having is not always determined by its own nature (*Svabhāva*). If that were the case every sort of generality ascribed to things would have been required to be taken to have been determined by and anchored in

1 2. तत्रैव : सदृशं सामान्यम्; सर्वव्यक्तिसाधारणत्वात् । असदृशं स्वलक्षणम्; सर्वतो व्यावृत्तत्वात् । प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 99.

133. धर्मकीर्ति; प्रमाणवार्त्तिक; शक्त्यशक्तितः । अर्थक्रियायाम्; केशादिर्नार्थोऽनर्थाधिमोक्षतः ॥1॥ प्रत्यक्ष परि० 99.

सदृशासदृशत्वाच्च विषयाविषयत्वः शब्दस्यान्यनिमित्तानां भावे धी सदसत्त्वतः ॥2॥ प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 99.

the very nature of things itself. Such, unfortunately, is not the case. The shareability and generality ascribed to things is not always determined by the nature of things-in-themselves. Many times, shareability enters into things through concepts and language we use with reference to them. That kind of shareability which things have through their *Svabhāva*, captured within the framework of *Anumāna* through *Tādātmya* or *Tadutpatti*, enables us to determine, although indirectly the nature of things on the basis of features that things have by their very nature. But, we also invoke concepts and use generality depicting expressions through which similarity and shareability enters into objects or things, On the basis of which we say that things have such and such features in common or that they share among themselves. Generality and shareability of the latter kind is something that is ascribed to or thrust upon things and it cannot be said to be determined by the nature of things. One importanc aspect of this kind of shareability and generality is that it is brought in by our using language and concepts with reference to things, and *Vācya-Vācaka* relation between linguistic expressions and what they express or signify is governed by convention rather than by necessity. Hence, shareability of this kind is more a matter of conceptual or linguistic construction rather that its being determined by the nature of things. We do not necessarily mean by it that it is foggy or empty, though often it is of thin kind. This is especially because and in so far as such a kind of shareability is of ten the basis of our ordinary modes of thought, action and fellowship. Inspite of shareability of this kind being ordinarily useful it cannot be said to be determined by the nature of things as they are.

Here a very important issue arises : it may be true, it may be held, that shareability and generality invoked through concepts and expressions in language *may* not have an ultimate base in the nature of things, while shareability and generality of the other kind has. But, of ten all, both these kinds of shareable features could be held to be general and common to things of the same kind. Under such

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134. धर्मकीर्ति : प्रमाणवार्त्तिक; केशादयो न सामान्यमनर्थाभिनिवेशतः।
ज्ञेयत्वेन ग्रहाद् दोषा नाभावेषु प्रसज्यते ॥7॥
प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 103.

circumstance, how is one to demarcate one kind of generality from the other ? The answer is: while first kind of shareability of them has reference to reality, the second kind of sharability does not have such a reference.[134] The point that needs to be cleared here is that when it is said that generality has reference to reality, what is meant is not that it has its own status as realists are prone to accept. Rather what is meant is that it is determined by and anchored in the very nature of things. It, thus, has an objective base. There is a difference in saying that generality has objective base and that generality itself is substantive in nature. First position could be acceptable to those who accept moderately nominalistic position, while the second alternative is accepted by realists. This issue is not intended to be discussed here although we shall have an occasion to consider it in the next chapter.

It may, nonetheless, be asked : what is meant by saying that shareability is conceptual or that it is a linguistic construction ? We propose to briefly discuss this issue in the next section.

Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa is a Conceptual Construction :

It is pointed out earlier that things may have some shareable and non-shareable features by their very nature. It is this that determines their uniqueness and generality respectively, but over and above this we use concepts and linguistic expressions with reference to things in order that we might imaginatively and intellectually conceive and clarify their nature, talk about them and link our ordinary modes of thought, action and fellowship with them. In doing this we invoke concepts and expressions and what they indicate and signify is not something that is necessarily determined by nature of things with reference to which they are invoked. They are governed by conventions. But unless we bring in such concepts and linguistic expressions it would not be possible for us to communicate with reference to things or interpret our cognition of them. But both concepts and linguistic expressions by their very nature bring in generality and shareability which happens to be mirrored in things with reference to which they are used although such generality is not determined by things. In this way, we impose certain characteristics or features on things without considering whether such general and shareable features are determined by things, looking merely to the fact that with-

out such a kind of generality our communication with reference to them and the sort of understanding of them as we ordinarily have would not be possible. Looked at in this way what such generality could be said to be determinative of is communicability and our ordinary sort of understanding of things. These common characteristics that we impose on things are not built into them by their very nature. They are not objectively determined. That is to say, these general features are not part of the very nature of things. For example, *tableness* is common to many things which are supposed to be called table. But corresponding to this tableness there is nothing in the external world. For, tableness is not such a general characteristic of tables that is built into them. Rather it is constructed out of the given, on the basis of similarity and dissmilarity that objects have in order to facilitate communication. Due to this kind of conceptual construction it is possible for us to comprehend the object the way we normally do.

Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa of this kind is a construction in the sense that we impose certain general properties on things inspite of the fact that things do not have them, nor are they determined by their nature. The generality, however, that is naturally built into things or that which is imposed on them by way of construction have two features in common: one, each of them is cognized only indirectly, and secondly, both do not create a vague or vivid impression according to their proximity or distance.[135] With the help of generality of any kind what is comprehended is that the object is such and such. Suppose, there are various objects of the same type, for example, tables. We may notice thing-based similarity that they are made of the same kind of wood, or the basis of an imposed generality we might hold that tableness is a feature which is common to all of them, although tableness is not something that is part of the nature of tables. It is generality of such a kind that is considered to be of the nature of construction, its not being determined by the nature of things.

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135. धर्मोत्तर; न्यायबिन्दुटीका; ···विकल्पज्ञानेनावसीयमानो अर्थः···सन्निधानासन्निधानाभ्यां ज्ञानप्रतिभासं न भिनत्ति ।···तस्य समारोपितस्य सन्निधानाद् असन्निधानाच्च ज्ञानप्रतिभासस्य न भेदः स्फुटत्वेनास्फुटत्वेन वा । प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 17.

Whatever we comprehend conceptually is of the nature of generality. This generality is depicted in language. Even the nature of our language is such that it always talks about generality. Every word in our language is a general word. Hence, there is no way of properly and genuinely depicting non-shareable features of things in language. If, however, in spite of this they are sought to be depicted linguistically and conceptually then it is not unlikely that it would distort the nature of things as also of their non-shareable features. Such distartions would obviously have to be counted as construction on things.

Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa is of the nature of linguistic construction where it is governed solely by a relation between *Vacāya* and *Vācaka*.[136] This relation is determined by convention. This convention is for the sake of communication. This relation is determined by convention and such a convention, too, is not determined by things. Generality of this kind is imposed and thrust upon things. Hence, Dharmakīrti says that from the fact that thing is named one or the other way, it does not follow that the generality names are determined by things.[137]

Thus one finds similarity between or among things one or the other way and in the light of such similarity the thing is named. But on the basis of generality depicted by names and imposed by expressions governed by convention, how can one naturally decide

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136. धर्मकीर्ति; (a) प्रमाणवार्त्तिक, एतेन समयाभोगाद्यन्तरङ्गानरोधत: । घटोत्क्षेपण सामान्य संख्यादिषु धियो गता: ॥6॥ प्रत्यक्ष परि पृ० 102.

(b) मनोरथनन्दी ; प्रमाणवार्त्तिकवृत्ति; : ·····विकल्पबुद्धिवस्तु कल्पिका सा च संकेत संस्कार प्रबोधन मात्रभाविनी, नार्थाधीनेति न तेषां सामर्थ्यं समर्थयति । प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 102.

(c) धर्मकीर्ति; प्रमाणवार्त्तिक; विशेषणं विशेष्यञ्च सम्बन्धं लौकिकी स्थितम् । गृहित्वा सङ्कल्य्यैतत् तथा प्रत्येति नान्यथा ॥145॥ प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 144.

137. मनोरथनन्दी ; प्रमाणवार्त्तिकवृत्ति; सामान्यं न वस्तुरूपादिस्वभावम् अभिधेयत्वात् । शब्दधर्मवत् सामान्यं शब्दज्ञान गोचर: । न च शब्दविषयो वस्तु । ···प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 104.

that the thing named and depicted by such and such an expression is rightly and legitimately a table and not a chair ? Or how do we come to know that this word indicates this object ? The answer is that through the meaning of the word. But the relation between words and their meaning is established by convention and not by taking the nature of things into account. This convention suggests that certain word indicates certain things. That is, words do not name things naturally. They rather name them conventionally.

Dharmakirti makes a distinction between *Mukhya Artha* and *Gauṇa Artha,* although both are determined by convention. Traditionally it is accepted that such and such a word means such and such an object. This is the *Mukhya Artha.* Once it is in this way determined, we use mechanically the same word for different similar object. This is *Gauṇa Artha.*[138]

Convention has very significant role in determining meanings of the words. Otherwise, any object can be called by any word and anything could be meant by any word. Due to convention cow is distinguished from horse and so on.[139] But the fact that in this way we are in a position to distinguish one convention from another in the light of the distinction between *Mukhya Artha* and *Gauṇa Artha* does not mean that such conventions are determined by the nature of things. In consequence, they do not cease to be constructions, however useful they might be in our ordinary modes of thought, expression and communication. That is why generality and similarity brought forth in this way has carefully to be distinguished from that which is determined by the nature of things.

Making a careful and methodologically tenable distinction between shareability and generality of these two kinds, Dharmakīrti

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138. धर्मकीर्ति; प्रमाणवार्त्तिक; यो यथा रुढितः सिद्धस्तत्साम्याद् यथोच्यते। मुख्यो गौणश्च भावेष्वभावस्योपचारतः ॥159॥ प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 149.

139. तत्रैव : भेदान्तरप्रतिक्षेपाप्रतिक्षेपौ तयर्द्वयोः ।
पदं संकेतभेदस्य ज्ञातृवाञ्छानुरोधिनः ॥62॥
स्वार्थ परि० पृ० 279.

intends to repudiate any generality which is other than thing-based. It is an exercise of this kind that makes markedly different in his approach from that of *Nyāya* logicians. It is on this basis, again, that he attacks the *Nyāya* theory of *Sāmānya* or *Jāti* which, in his view, reduplicates the world and makes the issue of understanding the world as it is given to us as a matter of fact highly complex and complicated. Making a legitimate and defensible use of the thing-based generality, on the contrary, he opens the possibility of not only holding *Svalakṣaṇas* and *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇas* at least accidentally to be two different sorts of features of the same thing but also that of convergence of and interconnection between perceptual and inferential cognitions within a certain conceptual framework. We hope to investigate into some of these implications of his philosophy in the sequel.

Argument to Follow:

These are some of the important points which emerge in Dharmakīrti's analysis of inference and object of inferential cognition. Likewise, the points that figure in his analysis of generality or shareability, an important aspect of human knowledge, too, are significant. So far in the second and third chapters we looked into Dharmakīrti's analysis of perception and inference respectively. But since objects of perceptual and inferential cognitions are distinct and are cognised differentially Dharmakīrti's analysis of perception and inference may give an impression that perceptual and inferential cognitions cannot, in his view, come to bear upon each other, nor can perhaps both these kinds of cognition be of one and the same thing. Under such circumstance it would be very difficult to spell out unity of his philosophic thought and sketch out its conceptual framework—the task of the fifth chapter. Before that, however, modes of interconnection between Dharmakīrti's analysis of perception and inference on the one hand and those between perceptual and inferential cognitions on the other have to be discovered and analysed and their implications drawn. In the next chapter we consider the implications of Dharmakīrti's analysis of perception and inference in order to comprehend the interconnection between them, so that we will be in a position to outline the conceptual and epistemological framework of his philosophy and its unity in the

fifth chapter. With this end in view, therefore, we proceed in the next chapter to study modes of interconnection between Dharmakīrti's analysis of perceptual and inferential cognitions. This is sought to be done in so far as an exercise of this kind is instrumental to the exploration into conceptual framework and unity of his philosophic thought.

4

Interconnections Between Perceptual and Inferential Cognitions

NEED TO STUDY INTERCONNECTIONS

In the first chapter we discussed and examined attempts of different scholars to characterise and capture the heart of Dharmakīrti's philosophy variously. There it was pointed out that these attempts seem not to be successful in bringing out the conceptual framework and appropriate characterisation of Dharmakrīti's philosophy. Nor do they seem successfully to encapsulate the unity of his philosophic enterprise. It was noticed there that there is a need to reunderstand and reinterpret his philosophy in such a way that these features of it would not only not come to be ignored but they would stand in a bolder relief as well.

In the two chapters following the first we endeavoured to outline Dharmakīrti's analysis of perception and perceptual cognition on the one hand and inference and inferential cognition on the other. We thus brought into focus some of the decisive and salient features of each of them. But in those chapters we also saw that according to Dharmakīrti objects of perceptual and inferential cognitions *Svalakṣaṇa* and *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* respectively—are two

distinct sort of knowables. Likewise, the two *Pramānas—Pratyakṣa* and *Anumāna* respectively—are such that with the help of any one of them both the sort of knowables can never be known. Accordingly, at least apparently and superficially considered neither the objects of these two respective cognitions nor analysis of them would seem to be opening any avenue of establishing any contact and interconnection between them. Under such circumstance our perceptual and inferential cognitions would seem to be such segregated and schizophrenic aspects of our epistemological enterprise that the task of searching and discovering unity in such a kind of epistemological enterprise would seem impossible to be accomplished. Were it to be so it would have been totally futile to study Dharmakīrti's philosophy and hope for any worthwhile illumination being gained. But in his philosophy these two aspects of our cognitive enterprise are not merely tossed together with a faint hope that their being just tossed together in the basket of our cognition would automatically generate unity in it, and that such a unity of our cognition is the backbone of our epistemological enterprise. Thoughts or aspects of epistemic endeavour do not generate unity through their accidentally being tossed together.

The unity in the thought of any thinker or philosopher, Dharamakīrti being no exception to it, cannot be hoped to be discovered and studied by separately studying his thoughts on various issues and their being tossed together. No doubt a study into the thought of a given philosopher has to begin with studying his thoughts on various issues. But by no means can the study end there. Should it end there, accomplishment of the task of discovering unity of his thought would remain far removed and unaccomplished, however hard one probes into separate and discrete thoughts. The unity under consideration is not, again, to be engineered and hoped to be discovered by a fiat. It must be systematically probed into and the task of its discovery is intricate and delicate. Superficial thinking and indiscreminate aggressiveness have very scrupulously to be avoided in such a task so that the very beginning of the enterprise does not mark its end.

But how is one to be able to discover unity and thought of a given philosopher ? The thought and the unity of the philosophy of a given philosopher do not come to stand before us just for asking or via our muddling through the jungle of his divergent

thoughts. One way of discovering unity in the philosophy of a given philosopher is to comprehend conceptual framework of his philosophy. Even the conceptual framework of the philosophy of a given philosopher does not come to be discovered merely by tossing together his thoughts and insights into various issues and problems indiscriminately and haphazardly. To be able to accomplish the task of discovering conceptual framework of the philosophy of a given philosopher with a view to discovering unity of his philosophic thought it is necessary to study the modes of interconnection between his various thoughts, insights, through incisive investigation into various issues and problems. Discovery of such interconnections would enable us to bring to bear his thoughts and insights upon one another in such a way that tracing through such modes of interconnection and mutual bearing contours of the conceptual framework of his philosophy would start progressively to be surfacing, with the help of which discovery of the unity of his philosophic thought would be facilitated. The network of the conceptual frame-work arises through complex and intricate modes of interconnections and the way the various thoughts and insights of the philosopher come to bear upon one another spells out the general direction and the intellectual atmosphere within which the conceptual framework is sought to be worked out and present a background on which the figure of the unity of his philosophic thought would stand out in bolder relief.

The route of discovery of the unity of the philosophic thought of Dharmakīrti also would have to traverse through such a complicated terrain and landscape. Various problems connected with such a discovery cannot be hoped to be recked up simultaneously and concurrently. This way of going about would turn the very possibility of realizing the dream into hopeless nightmare and would open a path of never return. Avoiding this alternative, therefore, Dharmakīrti's analysis of perceptual and inferential cognitions would have to be carefully looked into, to begin with, with a view to discovering possible, feasible and defensible modes of interconnection between them in such a way that not only connections between perceptual and inferential cognitions would come to be established but they could also be shown to be concurrrent knowledges or cognitions of the same thing in such a way that such a concurrence of them is sanctioned intuitively and methodologically on the one hand and

is capable of possibly being determined by the nature of things themselves on the other. All these points need to be established not speculatively but on the basis of what Dharmakīrti is so much at pains to say and draw our attention to. To establish reasonably well that some decisive and key modes of interconnection between perceptual and inferential cognitions are discernible in Dharmakīrti's analysis of them and to show that such an interconnection between them is not only intuitively and methodologically feasible and defensible but is also determined by nature of things is the task of the present chapter. With a view to accomplishing this limited and yet complicated task we begin with the study of the general nature of the reliability of cognition, irrespective of whether it is perceptual or inferential, at the hands of Dharmakīrti.

Two Criteria of Reliability of Cognition

We have seen in the foregoing discussion that according to Dharmakīrti whatever cognition or knowledge we come to have at our disposal becomes available to us either through perception or inference. They furnish either direct or indirect knowledge. Now, knowledge to be worth its name must be knowledge properly so called. Being properly so-called and appropriate cannot be considered to be built in features of knowledge, even when we restrict our consideration to knowledge propely so-called. For, if being properly so-called were the very nature of knowledge, irrespective of whatever kind it is, then since nature and built in feature of any kind have a disposition to manifestation on itself,[1] being appropriate to be the nature of it should have become manifest in any knowledge and none of our knowledge (-claim) should ever have come to be falsified. Likewise, there would have been no way to distinguish between reliable and unreliable knowledge Such not being the case being properly so-called and appropriate cannot be said to be the very nature of knowledge.[2] Accordingly, being properly so-called and appropriateness of knowledge must be sought to be determined along the route of reliability of it. Reliability in turn, further, has to be considered to be an emergent feature of knowledge on the fulfilment of appropriate reliability conditions,

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1. धर्मकीर्ति; प्रमाणवार्त्तिक; स्वरूपस्य स्वतो गतिः ॥6॥ प्रमाणसिद्धि परि० पृ० 6.

2. प्रज्ञाकरगुप्त : वार्त्तिकालकार, न हि ज्ञानस्वरूप एव प्रामाण्यं···।
प्रमाणसिद्धि परि० पृ० 25.

instead of reliability being taken to be a built-in-feature of knowledge. This is one reason as to why Buddhist philosophers like Dharmakīrti reject *Mīmāṁsā* view of *Svataḥ Prāmaṇya* of knowledge[3] and accept *Parataḥ Prāmāṇya* view in its place. Dharmakīrti lays down in all two reliability conditions of knowledge for its being considered to be properly so-called and we shall soon show that while one of them stipulates methodological constraint on reliability, the other seeks to bring to our notice what may be called to be an intuitive constraint on reliability of knowledge. It is these reliability conditions laid down by Dharmakīrti, of knowledge properly so-called that we propose to discuss in this section and hope to bring out one thread of establishing interconnection between perceptual and inferential cognitions, since these reliability conditions are expected to be uniformly applicable to both these kinds of cognition. These two conditions are :

(1) *Avisaṁvāditva*[4] : Knowledge properly so-called, according to Dharmakīrti, must remain free from its being deceitful.[5] It is through its being deceitful that knowledge forfeits its right to its being considered to be appropriate. properly so-called and reliable. Hence, knowledge that is free from being deceitful alone can be considered to be reliable.[6] As every knowledge is *Pramāṇa-tantra* and is instrumental to proper cognition[7] it cannot be so unless it ceases to be deceitful. Any *Pramāṇa* is the best instrument of enabling us to have that kind of cognition neverfailingly and non-accidentally which it is naturally prone to give rise to.[8] This it can do provided it gives rise

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3. धर्मकीर्ति; प्रमाणवार्त्तिक;······स्वरूपस्य स्वतो गतिः ।।6।। ······स्वरूपाधिगतेः परम् ।।7।। प्रमाणसिद्धि परि० पृ० 6 से 8.

4. तत्रैव : प्रमाणमविसंवादि ज्ञानम्;····· ।।1।। प्रमाणसिद्धि परि० पृ० 3.

5. मनोरथनन्दी; प्रमाणवार्त्तिकवृत्ति; विसंवादनं विसंवादः=वञ्चनम् । पृ० 3.

6. तत्रैव : अविसंवादनमुक्तम् । पृ० 3.

7. प्रज्ञाकरगुप्त : वार्त्तिकालंकार; ज्ञानं प्रमाणतंत्रं सति प्रमितिसिद्धेः । प्रमाणसिद्धि परि० पृ० 1.

8. मनोरथनन्दी : प्रमाणवार्त्तिकवृत्ति; साधकतमञ्च प्रमाणम् । तस्याव्यवहितव्यापारत्वात् । प्रमाणसिद्धि परि० पृ० 5.

to a non-deceitful cognition, and since the knowledge that we so gain is distinguishable acccording to the form it assumes corresponding to its object, the *Pramāṇas* can be demarcated and distinguished in as much as and in exactly the same way as knowables can be.[9]

But reliability and appropriateness of knowledge is not sought to be established merely by looking to the nature of the sort of cognition each *Pramāṇa* generates.[10] The reliability of knowledge must also enable us to connect our knowledge with the world on the one hand and with actions the things beloging to it are prone to generate in us in a non-deceptive way[11] on the other. That is if knowledge is to enable us to connect ourselves with things and actions then this kind of non-deceitful and regular connection of our knowledge with them could be used as a criterion of the establishment of its reliability.[12] This kind of constant and non-deceitful connection of our knowledge with things and actions[13] understood generally is the essence of *Avisaṁvādakatva.*[14] This consideration of *Avisaṁvādakatva* is to be made applicable with equal force to inferential cognition as well,[15] for whereas perceptual cognition is directly and naturally capable of being connected with things and actions inferential cognition too, is so capable of being connected in terms of inten-

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9. प्रज्ञाकरगुप्त : वार्त्तिकालंकार : विषयाकारभेदाधिगमस्य प्रमाणफलस्य भेद: । प्रमाणसिद्धि परि० पृ० 22.

10. तत्रैव; न खलु ज्ञानस्वरूपमात्रावगताविदं (ज्ञानं) प्रमाणं भवति । पृ० 4.

11. तत्रैव; किं तर्हि ? अर्थस्य दाहपाकादे: क्रियानिष्पत्ति: तस्या: स्थिरमविचलं अविसंवादनं व्यवस्था च । पृ० 4.

12. तत्रैव; यद्यर्थक्रियाधिगमपूर्वकं प्रमाणं सोप्यर्थक्रियाधिगम: प्रमाणमप्रमाणं वा । पृ० 4.

13. धर्मकीर्ति; प्रमाणवार्तिक; अर्थक्रियास्थिति: अविसंवादनम् । प्रमाण सिद्धि प्र० पृ० 3.

14. प्रज्ञाकरगुप्त; वार्त्तिकालंकार; अर्थक्रियास्थितिरविसंवादनमिति सामान्येनाभिधानात् । प्रमाणसिद्धि परि० पृ० 4.

15. धर्मकीर्ति; प्रमाणवार्त्तिक; शाब्देऽप्यभिप्राय निवेदनात् ॥3॥
वक्तृव्यापारविषयो योऽर्थो बुद्धौ प्रकाशते प्रामाण्यं तत्र शब्दस्य नार्थतत्त्वनिबन्धनम् ॥4॥ प्रमाणसिद्धि परि० पृ० 4 से 5.

ded things and actions, although indirectly.[16] Of course, while the reliability of perceptual cognition is to be understood with reference to its connection with things as they are i.e. *Parmārtha Sat*, that of inferential cognition is to be understood with regard to *Saṁvṛtti Sat*,[17] the connection between which we hope to spell out in the sequal. Thus, understood what Dharmakīrti understands by criterion of *Avisaṁvādakatva* is not what Mimāṁsakas understand by *Abādhitva*.[18] For, although the latter too is taken to be a criterion of reliability of knowledge and although coherence as a criterial account of the reliability of knowledge is perhaps common to both of them, while *Abādhitatva* spells out and seeks to stipulate a guaranteeing criterion of the reliability of knowledge, *Avisaṁvādakatva* seeks perhaps to lay down an authorising criterion of it.[19] The latter authorises us to consider given knowledge to be reliable provided it fulfils the condition of *Avisaṁvādakatva*, where *Avisaṁvādakatva* is not sought to be understood solely on the ground of pereeptual and inferential cognitions not clashing with each other but also on the ground that our cognition of whatever kind is capable of being connected with our life in a significant and coherent way. Whereas guaranteeing or authorising or both the criteria stipulate the condition that reliability of knowledge has to satisfy in order that it may come to be considered to be trustworthy and properly so-called, it is in so far as *Avisaṁvādakatva* is authorising criterion

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16. मनोरथनन्दी; प्रमाणवार्त्तिकवृत्ति; अर्थक्रियानिर्भासनं प्रत्यक्ष स्वत एवार्थक्रियानुभवात्मकम् । शाब्दे शब्दजनिते (अनुमिति) ज्ञानेऽपि अभिप्रायस्याभिप्रेतार्थक्रियाया निवेदनात् प्रतिपादनात् प्रामाण्यम् । अर्थक्रिया हि क्वचित् स्वरूपप्रतिपत्तिरेव, क्वचित् ततोऽन्यो यथासम्भव व्यवहारविषय: ।
प्रमाणसिद्धि परि० पृ० 4.

17. धर्मकीर्ति; प्रमाणवार्त्तिक; वक्तृव्यापारविषयो योऽर्थो बुद्धौ प्रकाशते । प्रमाण्यं
तत्र शब्दस्य नार्थतत्त्वनिबन्धनम् ॥4॥
गृहीतग्रहणान्नेष्टं सांवृत्तम्, धीप्रमाणता ।
प्रवृत्तेस्तत्प्रधानत्वात् हेयोपादेयवस्तुनि ॥5॥
प्रमाणसिद्धि परि० पृ० 4, 5.

18. मनोरथनन्दी; प्रमाणवार्तिकवृत्ति;⋯⋯नाबाधित्वं नाम प्रामाण्यम्, नाप्यस्य स्वत: सिद्धि: । प्रमाणसिद्धि परि० पृ० 6.

19. Rescher, N. ; *Coherence Theory of Truth*, p. 4.

of reliability of knowledge that it can hope to connect knowledge with things on the one hand and with actions generated and determined by them on the other. On *Abādhitatva*, on the contrary, fulfilment of formal condition of not having given rise to contradiction is enough to guarantee reliability of knowledge, no matter whether it is connectcd with things and actions or not. Further, while *Avisaṁvādakatva* applies to perceptual interential cognitions with equal force and enables us to adjudicate their reliability, *Abādhitva* is designed primarily to be applicable to expressions from Vedic lore and their interpretation.

(2) *Ajñātārthaprakāśakatva*:

Secondly, knowledge that is reliable is alternatively required to be illuminative of hitherto unknown thing or unfamiliar feature of it.[20] This kind of illumination of additional feature holds good not only with regard to perceptual cognition of *Svalakṣaṇas* but also with regard to inferential cognition of *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*,[21] in so far as objects of inferential cognition also are changing *Svalakṣaṇas*. Primarily, however, cognition of *Svalakṣaṇa* is to be concidered to be knowledge properly so-called and reliable, for that alone has *Arthakriyasādhanatva*.[22] This criterion of reliability of knowledge, too, is held to be applicable to perceptual as well as inferential cognition, although primarily to the former, and derivatively to the latter. It may, however, be asked: why should this alternative and yet additional criterion be stipulated ? Why cannot

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20. धर्मकीर्ति; प्रमाणवात्तक; अज्ञातार्थप्रकाशो वा स्वरूपाधिगते: ॥7॥
प्राप्तं सामान्यविज्ञानम् अविज्ञाते स्वलक्षणे ।
यज्ज्ञानमिति अभिप्रायात् स्वलक्षणविचारत: ॥8॥
प्रमाणसिद्धि परि० पृ० ८-9.

21. मनोरथनन्दी : प्रमाणवार्त्तिकवृत्ति: अज्ञात स्वलक्षणविषयं यज्ज्ञानं तत्प्रमाणम् ...एव तर्हि अनुमानमपि सामान्यलक्षणत्वात् प्रमाणं न स्यात ? नैतदस्ति, तदापि स्वलक्षणमेवानित्यादिरूपतया विषयी करोति । प्रमाणसिद्धि परि० पृ० 8.

22. तत्रैव : स्वलक्षणविचारत: अर्थक्रियार्थिभि: स्वलक्षणमेव प्रमाणेनान्विष्यते, तस्यैवार्थक्रियासाधनत्वात् । पृ० 6.

Avisaṁvādakatva alone suffice to be the only criterion of reliability of knowledge ? Ordinarily we not only demand that our knowledge should be reliable but also that it should make room for novelty and additivity in so far as they are instrumental to growth of knowledge. We do not wish that our knowledge should remain stagnant, however, otherwise reliable it may be. Satisfaction of this criterion is an intuitive requirement that knowledge is expected to satisfy, as contrasted with the methodological requirement stipulated in terms of the criterion of *Avisaṁvādakatva.* Fulfilment and satisfaction of this intuitive demand on knowledge is also determinative of its reliability in the sense that it keeps the possibility of growth and development of knowledge permanently open in so far as reliable knowledge is required to satisfy this condition.

It may, however, be further asked: why cannot we consider *Ajñātārthaprakāśakatva* as a criterion of reliability of knowledge to be subsumable under and derivative from the criterion of *Avisaṁvādakatva* ? There are two difficulties in accepting the view under consideration. First, these two criteria are of different sorts and subsumption of the former under the latter would be tantamount to nullifying the distinction between methodological and intuitive criterion of the acceptability and reliability of knowledge. These two criteria do not stipulate the satisfaction of the same condition of reliability alternatively either. Secondly, the criterion under consideration are not those of the possibility of knowledge but rather those of reliability of knowledge,[23] and they respectively spell out methodological and intuitive demand, knowledge has to fulfil in order that it may be considered to be reliable.

Given these two criteria of the reliability of knowledge, it may be further asked: it is a nature of a thing alone that can be said to be cognized on its own, but not reliability of knowledge and under such circumstance in what sort of way is reliability of knowledge comprehended ? In answer to this question it is held that such a reliability of knowledge comes to be comprehended through its truth and applicability i.e. through our knowledge and actions being

23. मनोरथनन्दी; प्रमाणवार्त्तिकवृत्ति; ननु अविसंवादात् एव अज्ञातार्थप्रकाशको ज्ञातव्यः···स्यादेतद् यदि सम्भवित्वमात्रे लक्षणं स्यात्, किं नूदिष्टत्वेन ? प्रमाणसिद्धि परि० पृ० ४.

capable of correlated with things, the nature of which becomes manifest on their own.[24] Further, since reliability of our knowledge is to be understood in terms of knowledge of things and actions promoted by them being correlated with things, and since things being impermanent and since such a correlation can be established only with impermanent things, there is nothing like constant reliability of any knowledge claim, it being always contextual and impermanent.[25]

Thus, understood, reliable knowledge would be that which leads to the acquisition of that by which we happen to be non-deceitfully impelled (to act-overtly or covertly).[26] This consideration uniformly holds both with regard to perceptual and inferential cognitions. Of them, in the case of perceptual cognition the thing that we cognize perceptually impells us directly, while in the case of inferential cognition our being impelled arises out of reliable indicator-indicated relation.[27] Further, while perceptual cognition invariably makes us to cognize the presented thing, inferential cognition makes us to cognize invariably that which is related with *Liṅga*.[28] In both the cases our cognition turns out to be reliable through our succeeding in gaining the thing we intend to acquire.

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24. (1) धर्मकीर्ति; प्रमाणवार्त्तिक स्वरूपस्य स्वतो गतिण्यं:, प्रामा व्यवहारेण । प्रमाणसिद्धि परि० पृ० 6.

    (2) मनोरथनन्दी; प्रमाणवार्त्तिकवृत्ति; यदि स्वरूपमात्रं स्वतो गम्यते, न प्रामाण्यम, कथं तर्हि तदवगम्यम् ? इत्याह प्रामाण्यं व्यवहारेण अर्थक्रिया-ज्ञानेन । प्रमाणसिद्धि परि० पृ० 6.

25. मनोरथनन्दी; प्रमाणवार्त्तिकवृत्ति; कस्मात् पुनः नित्यं प्रमाणं नैवास्ति ? आह, वस्तुनः अर्थक्रियाकारिणः सतो गतेः…तज्ज्ञान्याया अध्रौव्यत्वात् अनित्यत्वात् । प्रमाणसिद्धि परि० पृ० 9-10.

26. दुर्वेक मिश्र; धर्मोत्तरप्रदीप; अविसंवादकं प्रवृत्तिविषयकवस्तुप्रापकं सम्यग्ज्ञान-मिति । प्रथम परि० पृ० 27.

27. तत्रैव; तत्रयोर्थो दृष्टत्वेन ज्ञातः स प्रत्यक्षेण प्रवृत्तिविषयिकृतः ।…अनुमानं तु लिंगदर्शनानिश्चिन्वत् प्रवृत्तिविषयं दर्शयति । पृ० 20.

28. तत्रैव; प्रत्यक्षं प्रतिभसन नियतं अर्थं दर्शयति । अनुमानं च लिंगसंबद्धं नियतमर्थं दर्शयति । पृ० 21.

From the point of view of reliability and trustworthiness of our knowledge—both perceptual and inferential—same criteria need to be satisfied and the simultaneous satisfiability of perceptual and inferential cognitions, although indicative and depictive of differential features, through the satisfaction of the same criteria brings in one important thread of interconnection between them. This sort of interconnection between them does not arise through the same features being cognized through both of them, but rather through the same reliability criteria being applicable to them, in spite of the fact that both the avenues of cognition—perceptual and inferential do not enable us to cognize the same features of things.

It may, however, be held that this kind of criterial interconnection between perceptual and inferential knowledge at our disposal may be a fact due either to the nature of the thing cognized or because the self that comes to have cognition through both these avenues is the same. We shall argue later on in this as well as in the next chapter that Dharmakīrti accepts the first alternative and rejects the other in so far as he upholds *Anātmadarśana* to be paradigmatic issue. Yet, the argument continues, it may be held that cognition, is just one aspect of our epistemological enterprise, the other being that of certification or justification. Thus considered, if there is interconnection between perceptual and inferential cognitions merely cognitively but not certificatorily, then this kind of interconnection alone would not enable us to hold that in Dharmakīrti's philosophy perceptual and inferential cognitions have interconnection in each of the important aspect of our epistemological enterprise—cognitive and certificatory—and accordingly at least certificatorily they would stand unrelated. Hence, this kind of situation should be considered to be an important road-block in our way of searching unity in his philosophic thought and of hoping to outline such a conceptual framework of it as is conducive to the search for the intended unity is bound to remain unaccomplished. To show that such is not the case and that in both the aspects of our epistemological enterprise interconnection between perceptual and inferential cognitions remains available in Dharmakīrti's philosophy is our next task. To be able to accomplish it we shall argue that while certificatory convergence or interconnection between perceptual and inferential cognition is accomplished via criterial regulation of

our knowledge, cognitive interconnection stands authorised and determined by the nature of things which are cognized. Of them, in the next section to follow we show that certificatory interconnection between perceptual and inferential cognitions is guaranteed by the criteria of reliable knowledge within the framework of which we can hope to be able to certify our knowledge-claims.

Certificatory Epistemology and Interconnection between perceptual and inferential cognitions

In our epistemological enterprise, there are two important issues, namely, what do we know ? and on what ground shall we be in a position to certify and/or justify that we have such and such knowledge ? These two kinds of issues pertain to cognitive and justificatory epistemology respectively. Cognitive epistemology deals with two issues: what do we know ? and how do we know ? In it our concern is with the nature and structure of the object on the basis of our knowledge of it along with nature and structure of our knowledge of the object/s of cognition on the one hand and the way we know them on the other. Here, we deal with cognition and the way it arises. On the basis of cognition gained we proceed to formulate and put forth our knowledge-claims. In cognitive epistemology, therefore, it is an important issue as to what sort of cognition we have and what sort of knowledge-claims do we come to put forth on its basis. But regarding knowledge-claims there is another aspect of them, viz. their certification and/or justification. For, it is generally held that unjustified knowledge-claims do not rise to the status of knowledge properly so-called or reliable knowledge. Justificatory epistemology, on the contrary, deals with justification of knowledge claim/s that we advance. These two aspects of our epistemological enterprise, viz. cognitive and certificatory jointly exhaust the domain of epistemologieal enterprise. Cognitive and certificatory epistemology as branches of epistemology deal respectively with these two aspects of our epistemological enterprise. Both these branches of epistemology as also aspects of knowledge with which they deal are equally important. Without cognitive aspect mere certificatory aspect of our knowledge would be empty, while without certificatory aspect cognitive aspect alone is blind. Likewise, without cognitive epistemology, justificatory epistemology will be empty and without justificatory epistemology,

cognitive epistemology will be blind. For, if we do not cognize anything we have no basis to put forth any knowledge-claim and the question of justifying baselessly put forth knowledge claim/s simply does not arise. Likewise, if we cognize something and put forth a knowledge-claim on its basis, but if that remains unjustified then it is tantamount to our not having put forth a worthwhile knowledge-claim. Further, if whatever cognition we have does not enable us to put forth a worthwhile knowledge-claim then there is no point in having such a cognition.

In our epistemological enterprise and its proper analysis, making the distinction between these issues is very important and essential. For, while cognitive epistemological issues have to do with what do we cognize and the way we cognize it, certificatory epistemological issues have to do with certification of knowledge-claims and the basis relying on which we can do so. The former has some thing to do with our knowledge being determined by what we cognize,while the latter with our determining the nature of what we cognize on the basis of the sort of cognition we have. Certificatory enterprise would require criterion or criteria using which appropriately and legitimately we can hope to determine the nature of what we cognize on the basis of our cognition of it. Otherwise, the knowledge-claims on the basis of which we may seek to do this may misfire. Mixing between these two aspects of our epistemological enterprise is highly misleading and erroneous. Many of the shortcomings and confusions in the analysis of epistemological enterprise spring from ignoring, blurring, or avoiding to take into consideration the role and significance of the distinction between these two aspects. while trying to articulate the conceptual framework of Dharmakīrti's philosophy with a view to discovering unity of his philosophic thought, too, an adequate note of the way he analyses these two aspects of our epistemological enterprise has to be taken and the way there by another avenue of establishing inter connection between perceptual and inferential cognitions is hoped to be made available needs to be properly comprehended in order that we do not come to do violence to the conceptual framework of his philosophic thought and its unity.

We have seen that Dharmakīrti accepts two *Pramāṇas* viz. *Pratyakṣa* and *Anumāna*. Both of them have a role to play with regards to both cognition as well as certification, and with regards

to the interconnection between perceptual and inferential cognitions both cognitively and certificatorily. It is available in a way conducive to determine conceptual framework of his philosophy and its bearing on the unity of his philosophic thought needs to be shown. Of them, in this section we hope to show that within the field of certificatory epistemology interconnection between perceptual and inferential cognitions in Dharmakīrti's philosophy is available.

When we consider our knowledge (of the world) it is intuitively clear that it becomes available to us either directly or indirectly. According the Dharmakīrti it becomes available respectively through *Pratyakṣa* and *Anumāna*.[29] But whether directly or indirectly made available knowledge is made the basis of certifying a knowledge-claim already advanced, similar kind of problem is likely to crop up. The knowledge-claim under consideration that is attempted to be certified may be about a thing that belongs to the world, about our knowledge of it or about anything else. But as knowledge-claims may come to be advanced on the basis of perceptual or inferential cognition, so also a knowledge- claim may be certified on the basis of any of these knowledges. This does not, however, mean that perceptual and inferential cognitions are just alternative modes of knowing the same knowable, as their respective objects are distinct and different kinds of knowables. Though both perceptual and inferential cognitions are important both cognitively as well as certificatorily yet none of them is inferior to another,[30] although this needs to be under stood with regard to their respective knowables. Now, we mentioned earlier that so far as certification of knowledge-claims about anything is concerned we try to certify our claim to the effect that something is/is not such and such on the basis of what ever sort of knowledge we have at our disposal about it. Perceptual

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29. (1) धर्मकीर्ति; हेतुबिन्दु; परोक्षार्थप्रतिपत्तेः अनुमानाश्रयत्वात्····· । पृ० 52.

(2) धर्मोत्तर; न्यायबिन्दुटीका; यद् किंचित् अर्थस्य साक्षात्कारि ज्ञानं तत्प्रत्यक्षमुच्यते । प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 8.

(3) प्रज्ञाकरगुप्त; वार्तिकालंकार; स्वरूप साक्षात्करणे हि प्रत्यक्षतैव भवेत् । प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 215.

30. धर्मोत्तर; न्यायबिन्दुटीका; प्रत्यक्षानुमानस्य तुल्यबलत्वं समुच्चिनोति । प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 7.

knowledge is obviously about perceptual thing. But inferential knowledge too could be and often is about a thing. There is, however, a difference — a very fundamental difference for that. Whereas *Pratyakṣa* or perceptual cognition remains reliable in so far as it enables us to capture and comprehend a thing as it is in the presence of it, *Anumāna* or inferential reliable knowledge enables us to comprehend a hidden thing in spite of the fact that it is not directly presented to us.[31] In both cases, however, in the context of certifying knowledge-claim (concerning a thing), thing about which a knowledge-claim may have been advanced may not be present before us. Accordingly, we might try to reach a thing on the basis of our knowledge of it and this kind of an attempt of reaching out to a thing on the basis of our knowledge of it — direct or indirect — needs to be regulated. Such regulation again should be twofold : methodological and intuitive, methodological guaranteeing that we do not reach out to a thing erratically and accidentally, while intuitive assuring that we do not close the door to novelty and growth of knowledge i. e. we do not fail to reach out to an hitherto unknown thing. We saw earlier that knowledge-reliability criteria-though authorising criteria they are-serve precisely this very end. Thus, within the regulative framework of their being invariably non-deceptive and not ignoring or avoiding novelty our knowledge-claims should come to be certified. Since both these regulatory aspects govern and apply to perceptual as well as inferential cognitions alike,[32] not only on the count of reliability but also on the count of certification of knowledge-claims, this is yet another avenue of interconnection between perceptual and inferential cognitions.

Cognitive Epistemology and Interconnection Between Perceptual and Inferential Cognitions

But merely this much would not suffice. For, authorising criterial regulation on the level as reliability of knowledge in general as also

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31 तत्रैव; यथार्थविनाभावित्वादर्थविदाभावित्वादर्थं प्रापयत् प्रत्यक्षं प्रमाणम्। तद्वत् अर्थविनाभावित्वादनुमानमपि परिच्छिन्नमर्थं प्रापयत्प्रमाणमिति। पृ० 8.

32. मनोरथनन्दी; प्रमाणवार्तिकवृत्ति; प्रमाणं तत् अविसंवादात्। प्रत्यक्षमपि ह्रिसंवादकत्वाप् प्रमाणत्। तच्च अनुमानस्य अपि समानम्। प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 122.

on the level certification of knowledge-claims—no matter formulated and put forth on the basis of perceptual or infrential cognitions.... would be unimportant in itself as they together would constitute, what may be called the formal aspects of reliability and certification respectively. While we cognize the features of a thing, which in all, are of two main kinds—particularety and generality, separately and with the help of two distinct *Pramāṇas*, since they cannot be cognized with the help of just one of them, it should be borne in mind that from this it does not follow that there should be two compartments of a thing of which they are the features. As corresponding to two kinds of knowables, viz. *Svalakṣaṇa* and *Sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, particularity and generality, there are not two kinds of things such that the world could be said to be made up of two distinct compartments, so too there connot be two campartments of a thing housing the two different aspects or features of it which we cognize. This kind of compartmentalization either of the world or of each thing belonging to it is an idea that it totally foreign to Dharmakīrti's philosophic thought and approach.

In fact Dharmakīrti asserts that in the strict sense of the term there is only one kind of thing, viz. *Svalakṣaṇa* to be known.[33] In the larger context of *Arthakriyāsiddhi*— a thing being obtainable or not, or in the context of a thing being known as it is or otherwise,[34] i.e. as it is known derectly or indirectly,[35] perceptually or inferentially,[36] and these two aspects of it may be known not with the help

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33. (1) धर्मकीर्ति! प्रमाणवार्तिक; मेयं त्वेकं स्वलक्षणम् ।। 53 ।।
प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 117.
(2) प्रज्ञाकरगुप्त; वार्तिकालंकार; स्वलक्षणमेवात्र सर्वज्ञ ज्ञाने प्रतीयते । प्रमाणसिद्धि परि० पृ० 31.

34. धर्मकीर्ति; प्रमाणवार्तिक; तस्मादर्थक्रियासिद्धेः सदसत्ताविचारणात् । तस्य स्वपररूपाभ्यां गतेर्मेद्वयं मतम् ।। 54 ।। प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 117.

35. मनोरथनन्दी; प्रमाणवार्तिकवृत्ति; विषयस्य स्वरूप सामान्यलक्षणतया द्वैविध्यम् । ......स्वलक्षणं कदाचित् परोक्षम्, अन्यदा परोक्षम् । प्रमाणसिद्धि परि० पृ० 98-99.

36. (1) तत्रैव; तस्य स्वलक्षणस्य प्रत्यक्षतः स्वरूपेण, अनुमानतः पररुपेण सामान्याकारेण गतेर्मेयद्वयम् । प्रत्यक्षपरि० पृ० 118.
(2) प्रज्ञाकरगुप्त; वार्तिकालंकार; अपि प्रत्यक्ष अनुमानाभ्यां स्वलक्षणे विषयीकर्तव्यम् । तस्मात् प्रमेयद्वैविध्यात् एव (प्रमाणानां) द्वैविध्यम् । प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 213.

of one *Pramāṇa* but only with the help of two distinct *Pramāṇas* that is why two *Pramāṇas* have been accepted. Since, the world and things belonging to it as we experience them are infected with particularity and/or generality [37] it is these two aspects of them that become knowables. Given this and further that perceptually we cognize particularity while inferentially we cognize generality, or that perceptually we cognize a thing directly while inferentially it is cognized only indirectly, regarding the information so made available through our cognitions on the basis of two independent *Pramāṇas* two alternatives stand before us. They are :

(1) Information available to us through these two avenues is the same.

(2) Information available to us by these two avenues is not the same but these are two distinct kinds of information, although may be about the same thing, to avoid trap of compartmentalization of the world or that of a thing.

If the first alternative is accepted then in that case we will have the same information about the same world or thing alternatively. Hence, one of them i.e. perception or inference has to be rejected or eliminated because it would be redundant. If this is not done then on this alternative Dharmakīrti remains amenable to the change of accepting *Pramāṇa-Saṁplava*, a theory according to which the same kind of information could be said to be available with us via alternative avenues. Since Dharmakīrti emphatically and uncompromisingly rejects this doctrine and subscribes instead to the doctrine of *Pramāṇu Viplava*, according to which distinct kinds of information flow available to us via different avenues alone, the former alternative would obviously have to be rejected.

If the second alternative, on the contrary, is accepted then we will have different information about the same world or thing. This is quite clearly accepted by Dharmakīrti, saying that duality of *Pramāṇas* is accepted in so far as the modes of our cognition as

37. मनोरथनन्दी; प्रमाणवार्तिकवृत्ति; वयमपि साधारणासाधारण चेतनालक्षकनिर्मितं जगत् विचित्रं इच्छामः। प्रमाणसिद्धि परि० पृ० 11.

also the features that we cognize differ markedly from each other.[38] But then, on this alteınative, certain questions stare at us and unless we satisfactorily resolve them it would be pointless to hold that Dharmakīrti accepts this alternative. First, if through different *Pramāṇas* variant kind of cognitions emerges then from the side of our knowledge how do these two cognitions come to be interconnection ? For, if they do not come to be interconnected then two difficulties would arise: (a) there would be no way perhaps to say that both these cognitions are of the same thing, and (b) we would be said to be suffering from perceptual-inferential or epistemic schizophrania. Both these difficulties are significant and yet interconnected in the sense in the resolution of first of them resolution of the second would be automatically accomplished. It has been held, in reply to the first difficulty, that even in the case of inferential cognition *Svalakṣaṇatva* itself is sought to be captured and thus both in perceptual as well as inferential cognitions it is the thing that is sought to be cognized.[39] Thus, from the side of our knowledge there is or would be an interconnection between perceptual and inferential cognitions, as the nature of things is sought to be understood through both on the basis of our knowledge of it.[40] Nonetheless, another difficulty stated above would continue to loom large before us. Secondly, it may be held that unless the features of things we cognize are in some way determined by nature of things themselves our trying to determine the nature of things on the basis

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38. प्रज्ञाकरगुप्त; वार्तिकालंकार; किमर्थं तर्हि प्रत्यक्षानुमानभेदः बाह्यविज्ञान भेदश्च निर्दिष्टः? प्रमाणसिद्धि परि० पृ० 31.
तत्रैव; विषयस्य च एकस्य एव द्वैविध्यम् प्रतिपत्तिप्रकारस्य द्वैविध्यात्। प्रतिपत्तश्च प्रमाणभेदः। तदसौ अर्थः स्वेन रूपेण लक्ष्यमाणत्वात् स्वलक्षणं, यदातु पारंपर्येण शक्तत्वात् तस्यैव प्रतीयेण तदा सामान्यरूपेण लक्षणम् इति सामान्यलक्षणम।
परि० पृ० 169.

39. तत्रैव; ज्ञानरुपतया स्वलक्षणता परिस्फुटाकारता च सामान्यस्य विद्यत एव। ······अर्थनिरूपणेन समानता। बाह्यस्य अर्थस्य रूपेण समानता। प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 191.

40. मनोरथनन्दी; प्रमाणवार्तिकवकृत्ति; प्रतीतिनिबन्धनत्वात् वस्तुव्यवस्थायाः। प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 240.

of our cognition of them is futile. For it may not be unlikely that we might come to ascribe such features to them which they just do not possess. Something of this kind is more proned and likely to happen in the case of inferential cognition which is determined by language soaked in *Vācya-Vācaka* kind of relation between expressions and what they signify, and governed as it is by convention. Going this way we might come to cognize and attribute to things such features which they just do not possess. In this way we might come to understand nature of things in a way different from what as a matter of fact it is. What is sought to be denied is not, however, that something of this kind may even occasionally not happen. For, since *Sāmānyalakṣaṇa* stands for generality and since generality may be available even in an empty world,[41] and since *Sāmānya* by its very nature is not prone to reveal the nature of things as they are, it being basically linguistic in character,[42] it is not unlikely that on the basis of inferential cognition we might ascribe such features to a thing which it lacks.

Conditions of Cognisability

This difficulty should be understood and sought to be resolved with a pinch of salt. For, although *Sāmānyalakṣaṇa* could be obtainable in any empty world, it need not be understood always in this way. It could, instead, be understood in a non-empty world.[43] Understood in this way, if perceptual cognition and inferential cognitions make us cognize particularity and generality respectively and if *Sāmānyalakṣaṇa* could also be understood in a non-empty world, then both particularity as well as generality will have to be construed as thing-based and thing determined and in that case, i.e. where by nature things have particularity as well as generality, generality cognized through *Anumāna* would not make

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41. प्रज्ञाकरगुप्त; वार्तिकालंकार; व्यक्तिशून्ये अपि प्रदेशे सामान्यमुपलभ्यते। प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 198.

42. मनोरथनन्दी; प्रमाणवार्तिकवृत्ति; तत् सामान्यं न वस्तुरूपादिस्वभावम्, अभिधेयत्वात्। प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 104.

43. तत्रैव; केवलस्य व्यक्तिशून्यस्य सामान्यस्य अग्रहणात्। पृ० 107.

room for *Samvṛtti Sat* as it often does,[44] bur rather to *Paramārtha Sat* as it can sometimes at least do.[45] Although, it is of course true that perceptual and inferential cognitions make us invariably cognize particularity and generality only respectively, yet from this it does not follow that the generality that inferential cognition makes us cognize must always be fictitious, distortive of the nature of things and hence always required to be banished at the first possible opportunity. Were it so then inferential cognition should never have given us reliable knowledge (*Samyak jñāna*) at all which is said to be instrumental to *Puruṣārthasiddhi*[46] and this prerogative should have been reserved exclusively to perceptual cognition. Such is never done. If, therefore, inferential cognition too iś to lead us to things, although indirectly, then at least somethings would have to be taken to be possessive of both particularity as well as generality. Things related with each other through the relation of *Tādātmya* and *Tadutpatti* have such both the kind of features and it is because of this that *Svabhāvānumāna* and *Kāryānumāna* are said to enable us to indicate one thing on the basis of another, although inferentially and hence indirectly. Such things have generality, but it is never cognized perceptually even when they are perceptually presented, as perceptual cognition is incapable of accomplishing this feat. Their general features are comprehended inferentially, although just because they are comprehended inferentially they are not to be construed as fictitious. Likewise, even though such things have particularity, it can never be comprehended inferentially, as inferential cognition by its very nature is unable to accomplish this task. Thus, the dual features of particularity and generality that things have come to be comprehended through two

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44. तत्रैव; एवं यदसदृशं शब्दाविषयोऽन्यनिमित्तभावे ज्ञानाभावश्च, तत् परमार्थसत्। अतोऽन्यदशक्तं सदृशं शब्दविषयः······बुद्धेर्विषयश्च तत् संवृतिसत् प्रोक्तम्, कल्पनामात्र व्यवहार्यत्वात्। ते परमार्थ संवृती स्वसामान्य लक्षणे······। पृ० 100.

45. प्रज्ञाकरगुप्त; वार्तिकालंकार; अथ प्रत्यक्षेण विद्यमानेन सामान्यं गृह्यतेतत् परमार्थो भविष्यति। प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 203.

46. धर्मकीर्ति : न्यायबिन्दु : सम्यकज्ञानपूर्विका सर्वपुरुषार्थसिद्धिरिति तद् व्युत्पाद्यते द्विविधं सम्यकज्ञानम्।
प्रत्यक्षमनमानं च प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 1-8.

distinct *Pramāṇas*, and yet through both of them we can come to comprehend the same thing in so far as both these features it naturally has. Understood in this way, both from the side of our knowledge of things as also from the side of the nature of things there opens yet another mode of interconnection between perceptual and inferential cognitions in Dharmakīrti's philosophy.

Criteria of reliability of knowledge need, however to be distinguished from those of its cognisability. For, although every reliable cognition has to satisfy conditions of cognizability yet mere satisfaction of the conditions of cognizability does not automatically turn our cognition into a reliable one. What we cognize are features, knowables (*Prameyas*) and duality of *Pramāṇas* has been accepted by Dharmakīrti, on the ground of duality of *Prameyas*. Duality of *Pramāṇas* is also accepted, further, on the ground, as pointed out earlier that, no *Pramāṇa—Pratyakṣa or Anumāna* alone can ever enable us to cognize both the kinds of features. It is also clear that through perceptual cognition we can cognize particularity alone, while through inferential cognition we can cognize generality only, Given this, on Dharmakīrti's view nothing could be cognizable unless it is of the nature of particularity or that of generality. That is, in order that we come to cognize any feature at all it must be either particular, unique and non-shareable or general and shareable. Since the features which are cognizable are only of these two types, over and above them nothing remains cognizable. This does not, however, mean that we must cognize both these features simultaneously. Nor does it follow from it that unless a thing has both these kinds of features it would just not remain cognizable at all. What determines cognizability is, however, either particularity or generality or both, and accordingly they could be considered to be cognizability determiners.

It is further a noteworthy feature of them that they are independent of each other in the sense that fulfilment of the cognizability condition of particularity does not invariably demand fulfilment of the second condition and vice-versa. That is why perceptual cognition can arise independently of inferential cognition[47] and

47. प्रज्ञाकरगुप्त; वार्तिकालंकार; प्रत्यक्षं अन्तरेण अनुमानं प्रवर्तते, अनुमानं तु विनाऽपि प्रत्यक्षमिति विशेषात् अनुमान प्रत्यक्षेण असमानम् । प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 219.

vice versa. That is why, unlike *Naiyāyikas* Dharmakīrti does not subscribe to the view that perceptual cognition is a necessary prerequisite of inferential cognition. Nor does he subscribe to the view accepted by *Nyāya* logicians, viz. that of *Pramāṇasaṁplava,* for no cognizable feature is, according to him, alternatively cognizable via perceptual and inferential cognitions.

An investigation into the necessary and sufficient conditions of cognizability of any feature in Dharmakīrti's philosophy opens, however, yet another avenue of understanding interconnection between perceptual and inferential cognitions. We observed above that cognizability of any feature does not demand that it should be both particular as well as general. In fact no feature can simultaneously be of both these kinds. But this does not preclude the possibility of a thing that we cognize having both these kinds of features. This means a thing or an object having just one of the kinds of features, viz. particularity and/or generality, is as much cognizable as much as a thing having both these kinds of features. Thus, a thing can have both these kinds of features, but not out of necessity but rather through contingency and accidentality. This view of Dharmakrīti seems to differ markedly from the well known view according to which everything that we cognize has to have both the kinds of features, viz. particularity and generality. On this view both these kinds of features become built in features of anything whatever and hence they turn out to be thing-determinative. On Dharmakīrti's view, on the contrary, being-of-a-thing determinative features and its cognizability determinative conditions need to be distinguished and in so far as thing-determinative necessary and sufficient conditions and those determinative of cognizability of a thing are different, the latter cannot be equated with the former. In some cases, however, they may converge. But this feature of them needs more to be considered to be a matter of accident than that of a rule, Thus, on Dharmakīrti's view perceptual and inferential cognitions of the same thing, in some cases, is perfectly legitimate but not of the same features under any cricumstance. What cognizibility *minimally* demands is either particularity or generality, although in some cases co-presence or together presence of both these features cannot and need not be ruled out. But it is these cases that bring in and open yet another route of inter-connection between perceptual and inferential cognitions, especially when

the inferential cognition under consideration emerges through *Svabhāvānumāna* and *Kāryānumāna.* Under no circumstance can, however, it be held that every legitimate inferential cognition must be of either of these kinds. In the case of *Anupalabdhi Anumāna* the question of interconnection between perceptual and inferential cognitions does not arise, as also in the case of *Anumāna* in an empty universe as we shall soon point out. But it does not arise in yet two kinds of other cases as well. First, where a given thing has only non-shareable features alone and secondly, where every feature that is cognized is shareable only. What needs, at this juncture of our inquiry, to be understood clearly, however, is that through distinguishing between cognizability 'satisfying conditions and thing determinative conditions Dharmakīrti seems to hint at one more avenue of bringing in interconnection or convergence between perceptual and inferential cognitions, however contingent it might be. This kind of contingency of the convergence does not, nevertheless, decide its dispensability or redundance as otherwise it might be considered to be.

Conditions of Prameyatva and Vastutva Distinguished :

It may be asked, however, that although conditions of cognizability and thing-determinative conditions may not have one-one correspondence between them and hence a plea could be advanced to distinguish between them, yet on what basis could conditions of *Vastutva* and those of *Prameyatva* be distingushed ? If and in so far as there could be one to one correspondence between them the whole exercise of distingushing between cognizability aetermining and thing-determining conditions is bound to be shipwrecked. The *prima-facie* basis for this contention seems to be that every thing (*Vastu*) is knowable (*Prameya*). This is true as far as it goes. But its converse, viz. everything that we know is a thing (of one or the other kind), does not hold. To begin with if what we know are features then features certainly are not things, even when the features are held to be of things. Where things are nothing else but clusters of features, no features could be equated with cluster of them. Moreover, on this view, although everything would be a cluster of features, every imaginable cluster of features cannot be held to be a thing. We shall see later on that according to

Dharmakïrti any cluster of features as could be given or instantiated in the kind of world we actually live in, i.e. empirical world, could alone be considered to be a thing. This is one way of understanding paradigmaticity of empirical world at the hands Dharmakīrti, the inquiry into the ramifications and implications of which is going to occupy our considerable attention in the next chapter in our attempt to capture conceptual framework and unity of Dharmakīrti's philosophic thought. For the present restricting to *Prameyatva* let us inquire which conditions need to be satisfied in order that it may be considered to be an object (*Viṣaya*) of knowledge. To say that it should be knowable is both too vague as well as circular. Generally, taking into consideration cognizability determinative conditions it would be held that anything that is capable of being conceived in terms of particularity or generality or both could in principle be considered to be knowable. If what we know are features alone then in so far as anything is conceivable through the features of particularity or generality or both it needs to be considered to be knowable. This could very well be. But just on this count it cannot be considered to be a thing. For instance, something like *Vandhyāputra* or *Śasaśṛṅga* is perfectly conceivable in an empty world but it by no means is a thing. Or again, the significant words we generally use in our communication are certainly indicative of generality through convention (*Saṅketa*),[48] but since words never indicate non-conventionally,[49] they can never be said to be referring to *Svalakṣaṇas* or things (*Vastu*) as they are. Words are not naturally disposed to indicate thing as they are,[50] and since there is no rule by which generality indicaed through *Vācya-Vācaka* relation is governed,[51] they cannot invariably be said to be referring to things. As corresponding to what we intellectually conceive there may not be anything in the external

48. धर्मकीर्ति; स्वार्थानुमाम स्वोपज्ञवृत्ति; शब्दप्रतिपत्तिभेदस्तु संकेतभेदात्। पृ० 21.

49. तत्रैव; नहि शब्दाः असंकेतितं अर्थं प्रकाशयन्ति······तस्नान्न स्वलक्षणे समयः। पृ० 29.

50. तत्रैव; न वै शब्दानां काचिद्विषयस्वभावयत्ता वृत्तिः।······पृ० 21.

51. तत्रैव; विकल्पानां अर्थप्रतिबन्ध नियमाभावात्, नहि विकल्पाः यथार्थमेव जायन्ते। पृ० 33.

or outer world it may very well non-indicative of anything and have empty.[52] This does not, however, mean that the kind of generality that things naturally have, which is capable of being captured in terms *Svabhāvānumāna* or *Kāryānumāna* is never expressible through words indicative of generality. But it would be a folly to hold that every sort of generality that is indicated by words is what things naturally and actually have. This being the case, words indicative of generality cannot invariably be said to be capturing things as they are or *Svalakṣaṇas*. But just on this very count we need to distinguish between *Prameyatva* and *Vastutva* and we cannot consider the former to be the criterion of the latter as *Nyāya* philosophers are prone to hold. On the same ground, again, one cannot accept one-one correspondence between *Prameya* and *Vastu*. This does not rule out *Vastu* being *Prameya* in which case *Prameyatva* and *Vastutva* converge. But this should be held more to be a matter of accident rather than that of a rule. Accordingly, criteria that need to be satisfied in order that something may be considered to be a *Prameya* on the one hand and something being held to be a *Vastu* need to be distinguished. We shall point out in the next chapter that in the context of paradigmaticity of empirical world the criteria of *Vastutva* and *Prameyatva* turn out to be interconnected and convergent.

From the side of *Vastus* it could be held that they may either be such that the features of which they are clusters are such that none of them is shareable, or some of them are shareable, there being no thing of which every feature is shareable. It is not in the former case but rather in the latter case that perceptual and inferential cognitions turn out to be interconnected and convergent, although in both the cases *Prameyatva* and *Vastutva* remain interconnected and convergent. Thus, understood convergence of *Prameyatva* and *Vastutva* in itself cannot be used as a criterion of interconnection between perceptual and inferential cognitions, although where the latter turns out to be the case, the former invariably remains the case.

Thus far we analysed various routes through which interconnection between perceptual and inferential cognitions could be

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52. मनोरथनन्दी; प्रमाणवार्तिकवृत्ति; नहि बुध्याकारस्य······तस्मात् वस्तुतः अवस्तु-प्रतिभासिनाः शाब्दाः प्रत्ययाः । प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 152.

established in Dharmakīrti's philosophy with a view to tracing lines of interconnection in his various thoughts and the different issues and problems he discusses. Merely this much, however, is not enough. It is necessary to examine some of the important implications of them to see what contours they open using which conceptual framework and unity of his philosophic thought, as we propose to lay it bare in the next chapter, happens to be surfaced. An enquiry of this sort is hoped to bring before us such implications of them as would be helpful to and instrumental in our search for conceptual framework of his philosophic thought. It is to this consideration that we now turn.

Contrastive Aspects of Svalakṣaṇa and Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa and their Bearing on interconnection between perceptual and inferential cognitions:

We observed in the second and third chapters respectively that *Svalakṣaṇas* and *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇas* are objects of perceptual and inferential cognitions. We also noted that the necessary and sufficient cogditions that need to be satisfied for the occurrence of perceptual and inferential cognitions are differential. But this differentiality of them does not stem from arbitrary stipulation and contingent choice. It is the contrastive features of the objects or features that happen to be cognized respectively through perceptual and inferential cognitions that are determinative of difference between them. We noted that it is particularity which is object of perceptual cognition, while that of inferential cognition it is generality which is the object. We also saw that it is not necessary that everything that we cognize needs to have both these kinds of features for their being what they are, although some things having both these kinds of features should not be permanently precluded. But what are these contrastive aspects of the features which happen to be cognized as *Svalakṣaṇa* and *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* respectively ? We are told that *Svalakṣaṇa* is (a) always incommunicable through words indicative of generality (*Anubhidheya*), because by its very nature *Svalakṣaṇas* are such features which mark a thing off in every respect from similar and different things,[53] (b) capable of being

53. मनोरथनन्दी; प्रमाणवार्तिकवृति; तस्मात् तस्मात् तस्य स्वलक्षणस्य रुपं सर्वत : सजातीय विजातीय भिन्नम् ।
प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 288.

captured as obtainable or not, (c) never an object of deceitful cognition, (d) unique, (e) incapable of being indicated by words loaded with conventionality or memory generated by them, (f) dissimilar with anything else, and (g) capable atways of inducing action on our part that culminates in obtaining or rejecting a thing of which such are the features.[54] By contrast, *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* differs from *Svalakṣaṇa* in each of the above-mentioned respects and accordingly cannot be said to be never failing instrument of obtainability of a thing whose general features it enables us to cognize.[55] Thus, while *Svalakṣaṇas* are those features which through agreement or difference (*Anvaya-Vyatireka*) never-failingly enable us to capture a thing which obtains directly and hence has a bearing on paradigmaticity of empirical world or the sort of world we normally live in, *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* can have such a bearing only accidentally and contingently.[56] It is not an accident, therefore, that *Svalakṣaṇa* is always considered to be *Nirvikalpaka* to mark it off from *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* which is always *Savikalpaka*,[57] as the latter can never be indicated by words loaded with *Vācya-Vācaka* relationship.[58]

In spite of such contrastive aspects of features cognized through perceptual and inferential cognitions, as pointed out earlier, as there could be things which have by nature both differentiating, specific, distinguishing, unique as well as general, shareable, similar features they alone can be objects of both perceptual and inferential cognitions. It is these which are sought to be captured through *Svabhāvānumāna* and *Kāryānumāna*. Just because there is a thing it cannot be held to be capable of being cognized both through perceptual and inferential cognitions, either simultaneously or in succession,

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54. तत्रैव; अनभिधेय, तत्त्वान्यत्त्वाभ्यां वाच्यं, असदर्थप्रत्ययाविश्लिष्टप्रतिभास विषयत्वं, असाधारणत्वं,संकेतस्मरणानपेक्षप्रतिपत्तिकत्वं, अन्यरूपविविक्तं स्वरूपप्रतिभासत्वं, अर्थक्रियाक्षमत्वं च ।
प्रत्यक्ष परि० 116.

55. तत्रैव; एतत् विपर्यस्य, अवस्तुसाधनस्य सामान्यलक्षणम् । पृ० 116.

56. तत्रैव; अर्थसामर्थ्यात् जायमाना बुध्दि······साक्षात् तस्यग्रहणम् ।
पृ० 116.

57. तत्रैव; निर्विकल्पकं हि स्वलक्षणविषयम् । पृ० 140.

58. तत्रैव; स्वलक्षणे संकेताभावान् निरस्ताः । पृ० 144.

jointly or alternatively. For, what is enough to make thing a thing is not generality but rather its uniqueness, everything being governed by its natural disposition which need not be general and shareable.[59] That is, general and shareable features need not be taken necessarily to be thing-determinative and accordingly to hold that everything must have particularity as well as generality is to lay down too stringent a criterion of thinghood. To say, on the contrary, that uniqueness, differentiality is enough for thinghood is to stipulate necessary and sufficient conditions of discreteness and plurality—fundamental mark of the empirical world. The interconnection of perceptual and inferential cognitions which so emerges is not so much because of contrastive aspects of the features that we cognize through these respective cognitions but rather in spite of them. Thus, the contrastive aspects of *Svalakṣaṇa* and *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* do not preclude interconnection between perceptual and inferential cognitions, although they do not also necessitate this kind of interconnection in every case, as this sort of interconnection between them is determined more by the accidental and contingent fact that *Svalakṣaṇas* or their *Sanghātas* figure in arguments only in so far as things have shareable features, although having such shareable features does not determine primarily their being things, though it does determine the kind of things they are. It is such things related with each other through a tie of *Tādātmya* or *Tadutpatti* can be the context of the interconnection between perceptual and inferential cognitions and this is in spite of the contrastive aspects of *Svalakṣaṇa* and *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*. We shall have an occasion to see in the next chapter that this mode of interconnection between perceptual and inferential cognitions has an important bearing on paradigmaticity of empirical world, for it is in such a world that things related with each other through *Tādātmya* and *Tadutpatti* can be hoped to be given to us as instances and it is with reference to them alone that interconnection between perceptual and inferential cognitions has an important significance and import, knowables which we cognize through perception alone—exhibitive of non-

59. प्रज्ञाकरगुप्त; वार्तिकालंकार; तस्मात् न साधारणं नाम किंचित्। सर्वस्य स्वात्मानि व्यवस्थितत्वात्, विशेषता एव……। प्रमाण सिद्धि परि॰ पृ॰ 20.

shareable features only—or through inference alone—exhibitive of shareable features only—, being those which preclude possibility of interconnection between these two kinds of cognition. Thus understood, perceptual or inferential, direct or indirect cognitions in themselves do not invariably necessitate interconnection between them. It happens rather to be governed by the fact whether both *Svalakṣaṇa* and *Sāmāny-lakṣaṇa* kind of features which we cognize are of the same thing and also by whether we cognize them to be features of the same thing. Since this kind of possibility does not emerge with regard to every cognition that we have, possibility of interconnection between perceptual and inferential cognitions does not automatically result into a fact.

There are certain important implications of the above-stated mode of under standing interrelationship between perceptual and inferential cognitions in spite os contrastive aspects of *Svalakṣaṇa* and *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* which happen to be cognized respectively through them. Since these implications have an important role to play in Dharmakīrti's philosophy and since they have a significant bearing on the conceptual framework and unity of his philosophic thought we proceed to take them into account in the next section.

Implications of Interconnection Between Perceptual and Inferential Cognitions in spite of Contrastive Aspects of Them :

We saw that according to Dharmakīrti anything that is real need not have both shareable as well as non-shareable features to be real, although there being such things that have both these kinds of features is a possibility that need not be precluded. For, according to him to hold that a thing must have both shareable and non-shareable features is too stringent a condition that can be laid down for there being a thing at all. On understanding anything to be a cluster of features or properties and nothing else than that, three alternatives stand before us : (i) It may be held that any object or thing which is a cluster of properties involves only general or shareable properties and accordingly any object is nothing else but cluster of shareable properties only. Since any generality or sharesbility is communicable and since what we know is always generality there is a correspondence between what is, what we know and what

we talk or communicate through shareability. Thus, on this view there is an intimate relationship between language, knowledge and the world such that whether we analyse our knowledge or language through which we communicate we should be able to have the same world and same features of it available to us. On this view generality must be considered to be the only thing-determining feature. This view obviously is not upheld by Dharmakīrti for the simple reason that on this view generality is the sole thing-determinative feature. For Dharmakīrti, on the contrary, things may have generality but it is not this that makes them things. (ii) It may be held, on the contrary, that an object which is a cluster of properties involves only non-shareable properties. Hence, on this view, nothing that is real can ever involve generality – necessarily or accidentally. But if this is the case then although there would be discrete particulars none of them would be communicable and the very differentia of human beings viz. language and communication, loses all its significance and importance. Secondly, no viable relationship between knowledge and language or between language and world is possible on this alternative. Accordingly both these alternatives remain unacceptable to Dharmakīrti.

Since the two above-mentioned alternatives have their respective disadvantages, Dharmakīrti seems to opt for the third regarding the nature of an object of perceptual and/or inferential cognition. If the cluster of properties out of which object is made, involves merely non-shareable features alone then it can be object of perceptual cognition alone. Likewise, if a cluster involves shareable features only then it can be cognized inferentially alone. If there were only these two kinds of clusters then the possibility of convergence between perceptual and inferential cognitions would have been nipped in the bud. Our knowledge would be compartmentalized and the very possibility of cognising differential features of the perceptually known object would also stand automatically annulled. Further, since in our communication of both object and knowledge only general features figure any object or knowledge lacking them would simply remain incommunicable. On Dharmakīrti's view those clusters that lack shareable features would certainly remain incommunicable, though perceptible they would certainly be. But there can

be and indeed are such clusters called objects in which both shareable as well as non-shareable features would figure, although former of them would be known inferentially while latter only perceptually. But both these kinds of features would be held by the said cluster naturally and non-teleologically. That is, such a cluster having both these kinds of features is a contingent matter and it is not this that makes it a cluster. Any cluster that is perceptible has to have at least one non-shareable feature and it is this that determines its perceptibility. Likewise, any cluster that is inferentially cognizable has to have at least one shareable feature, and it being shareable remains imperceptible as well. We perceive no generality, nor do we infer any particularity, although some objects may have both these features.[60] But in so far as they have them, the same

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60. (1) धर्मोत्तर; न्यायबिन्दुटीका; स्वम् असाधारणं लक्षणं तत्त्वं स्वलक्षणम् ।
वस्तुनो असाधारणं च तत्त्वमस्ति सामान्यं च प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 15.

(2) धर्मकीर्ति; प्रमाणवार्त्तिक; अर्थक्रियासमर्थं यत् तदत्र परमार्थसत् ।
अन्यत् संवृत्तिसत् प्रोक्तम्; ते स्वसामान्यलक्षणे ॥3॥ प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ०

(3) तत्रैव; सामान्यमात्रग्रहणात् सामान्यं चेतसार्द्धयोः ।
तस्यापिकेवलस्य प्राग ग्रहणं विनिवारितम् ॥40॥
प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 113.

परस्पर विशिष्टानामविशिष्टं कथं भवेत् ।
तथा द्विरूपतायां वा तद् वप्त्वेकं कथं भवेत् ॥41॥
प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 113.

तस्मात् समानतैवास्मिन् सामान्ये वस्तुलक्षणम् ।
कार्यं चेत् तदनेकं स्यान्नश्वरं च न तन्मतम् ॥43॥
प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 113.

(4) मनोरथनन्दी; प्रमाणवार्त्तिकवृत्ति; ······अवश्यं हि व्यक्तिनां भेदः कथञ्चिदङ्गीकर्तव्यः, सत्त्वरजस्तमसामिव, प्रकृतिचैतन्ययोरिव वा, अन्यथा सामान्यमेव न स्यात्; भिन्नानामभिन्नस्य रूपस्य तत्त्वात् । ये च भिन्न-स्वभावास्ते नाभिन्ना भवितुमर्हन्ति, विरुद्धत्वात् । अथैकस्यापि समानममानं च द्वे रूपे···भेदेऽभेदे च वस्तुत्वायोगात्, प्रकारन्तरस्य चाभावात् ।
प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 113.

contd.

object being known both perceptually and inferentially remains open, although we do not know the same features both perceptually and inferentially. The features so cognized are not things, since clusters having at least one non-shareable features alone could be things. Features; particularity and generality cognized by perception and inference are in themselves neither clusters nor things. Thus understood, possibility of convergence between perceptual and inferential cognitions on the same cluster remains open, but that of *Pramāṇa-saṁplava* is annulled. In spite of contrastive features of perceptual and inferential cognitions brought out above and in spite of Dharmakīrti's subscription to *Pramāṇa-Viplava*, convergence between perceptual and inferential cognitions is not made impossible, and yet this convergence in itself does not guarantee or preclude the same thing perceptually and inferentially being cognized. For, while perceptually cognized features alone are thinghood determinative, inferentially cognized feature of generality is impotent to determine thinghood.[61] What generality guarantees is communicability and communicabilty is not necessarily thing-determinative. What verbal and linguistic communication could guarantee at the most is conceivability and what is conceivable may be something that is bogus and non-existent.[62] Generality is not a thing, nor is it thing-determinative,[63] no matter whether it is

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(5) धर्मकीर्ति; (1) प्रमाणवार्त्तिक; तस्मादर्थक्रियासिद्धेः सदसत्ता-विचारणात्। तस्य स्वपररूपाभ्यां गतेमेयद्वयं मतम ॥54॥
प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 117.
(2) तत्रैव : ज्ञानाद्यर्थक्रियां तास्तां दृष्टवा भेदेऽपि कुर्वतः अर्थास्तदन्य-विश्लेषविषयैर्ध्वनिभिः सहः ॥98॥ स्वार्था परि० पृ० 289.
संयोज्य प्रत्यभिज्ञानं कुर्यादप्यन्यदर्शने परस्यापि न सा बुद्धिः सामान्यादेव केवलात् ॥99॥ स्वार्था० परि० पृ. 290.

61. मनोरथनन्दी; प्रमाणवार्तिकवृत्ति; साधारणं अर्थत्वेन सामान्यं उच्यते, तत् सामान्यम् न वस्तुरूपादि स्वभावम्। सामान्यं शब्दज्ञानगोचरम्। न च शब्द-विषयः वस्तु। प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 104.

62. तत्रैव; सामान्यविषयं विकल्पज्ञानं अनर्थप्रापकम्। पृ० 107.

63. (1) तत्रैव; न वस्तु सामान्यम्। पृ० 115.
सवार्थक्रियायां अशक्तम्। पृ० 116.
(2) धर्मकीर्ति; प्रमाणवार्त्तिक; न तत् वस्तु, अभिधेयत्वात् ॥11॥
प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ०

positive, negative or both.[64] Dharmakīrti repudiates *Sāmānya*[65] not so much because it is not knowable, but rather because it is neither a thing nor can it be said to be thing-determinative.[66] It has no parts either.[67] We might perceive cluster of things[68] or might cognize similarity between members of a cluster.[69] But any cluster or collection is just that, nothing beyond that of which it is a cluster or collection, and can under no circumstance be mistaken for or equated with *Sāmānya*.[70] *Sāmānya* understood as generality could thus be an empty construction. But generality need not always be unrelated with things. That is things can have generality as their feature, and although they may have it quite naturally, it is not this that makes a thing a thing.

But, when clusters or things have generality as their feature it does not open the possibility of our being able to catch hold of or capture a particular directly with the help of it. Generality bearing on things has to be distinguished from the one that is empty of this feature[71] on the one hand, and the particular which we intend to capture needs to be segregated from other particulars that figure in the cluster of which generality is a constituent.[72] The instrument

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64. मनोरथनन्दी; प्रमाणवार्त्तिकवृत्ति; सामान्यम् त्रिविधम्, भावाश्रयम्, अभावाश्रयम्, भावाभावोउभयाश्रयम् । प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 116.

65. धर्मकीर्ति; प्रमाणवार्त्तिक; सामान्य निराकरणम् ॥145-146॥ प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 116.

66. मनोरथनन्दी; प्रमाणवार्त्तिकवृत्ति; न च तत् सामान्यम् किंचन वस्तु । प्रत्यक्ष परि० 231.
    न सामान्यं वस्तु । प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 201.

67. तत्रैव; न हि सामान्यम् सावयवम् । स्वार्था परि० पृ० 304.

68. तत्रैव; अर्थसंचयविषयत्वात् सामान्यविषयत्वम् । प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 162.

69. तत्रैव : अवयवसमानता हि सामान्यमुच्यते । प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 275.

70. तत्रैव : न च समुदायो नाम समुदायिभ्यो भिन्नः । प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 231.

71. प्रज्ञाकर गुप्त : वार्तिकालंकार : शब्दार्थशब्दस्यैव अन्यापोहत्वात् । प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 262.

72. तत्रैव : सर्वत्र बुद्धिरूपबाह्ययेर्थेनारोपमध्यारोपते प्रतीयते । प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 263.

through which this double kind of segregation could be methodologically accomplished is known as *Apoha* or better still *Anyāpoha*, Generality in itself opens possibility of capturing many particulars. especially when it is non-empty, but does not guarantee capturing of particulars. We are required to weed our way in such a way that within the range of the convergence of perceptual and inferential cognitions we should succeed in capturing particularity within the jurisdiction of the possibility of capturing many particulars that a non-empty generality opens. For, this kind of non-empty generality needs to be demarcated from an empty one and the given particualr feature from other similar features that fall within its range. This is what *Apoha* or *Anyāpoha* is supposed to enable us to accomplish. For fear of undue length of our argument we refrain from exploring further implications of *Apoha*. Suffice it for the present to note that *Apoha* or *Anyāpoha* is an important implication of the possibility of convergence of perceptual and inferential cognitions in spite of their contrastive features.

That in Dharmakīrti's philosophy, in this way, there could be convergence between perceptual and inferential cognitions remains an open possibility. Knowledge thus ceases to be schizophremic in the sense that the features cognized perceptually and inferentially respectively could be those of the same cluster of features of which non-shareable and shareable features are members. Every cluster of features that is cognized need not have both these kinds of features as its members. This assures contrastive cognitions made available perceptually and inferentially. But it is further assured by the fact that we never cognize the same features both perceptually and inferentially. The generality that is comprehended inferentially opens the possibility of communicability, though it does not guarantee thinghood. The features, thus, cognisable are particulars and/or general, non-instaintiable and/or instaintiable, and their clusters could in all be of three kinds:

(1) Object which is a cluster of features involves only instantiable features.

(2) Object which is a cluster of features involves only non-instaintiable features.

(3) Object involves those features which are both instantiable and non-instantiable.

Of them, non-instantiable features as non-instantiable are not instantiated. Instantiable features as instantiable can be instaintiated. Features which are instantiated are sub-set of instaintiable features. Of course, it is not always the case that very instaintiable feature conceived to be so must necessarily be instaintiated. The features which are instaintiated are not further instaintiated. There is no instance of an instance. In this sense, instaintiated feature is unique, non-shareable. Thus, we can say that features which are instaintiated are both shareable, as they are instaintiable and non-shareable in the sense that the instaintiated feature is never further instaintiated. For instance, red is an instaintiable feature and a red curtain, a red table etc. Which are instances of red are not further instaintiated. In this sense, every instaintiated feature is unique. This uniqueness of an instance needs to be distinguished from uniqueness of a non-instaintial feature. While the non-instaintiability in the former is determined by the fact that instance is not itself required to be further instaintiated, in the latter it is determined by inconceivability of instance. For instance, *Ākāśa* is unique in the latter sense, while each of us is unique in the former sense. Thus, in the former case that which is unique is an instance, while in the latter it is unique in spite of its not being an instance.

In Dharmakīrti's philosophy through possibility of convergence of perceptual and inferential cognitions on the same cluster of features connection between ontology, epistemology and language does not stand severed as it may appear *prima facie* to be, through contrastive features of perceptual and inferential cognitions. Thus, contrastive features of perceptual and inferential cognitions is no bar to their interconnection and through such interconnection there opens a way of formulating conceptual framework of Dharmakīrti's philosophy, as we hope to point out in the next chapter. The convergence of this kind, which is intuitively clear, is further regulated by the regulative features of both perceptual and inferential cognitions, viz. *Avisaṁvādakatva* and *Ajñātārthaprakāśakatva*. Through these regulative criteria, as we observed earlier, co-tenability of perceptual and inferential cognitions is assured, though not in a guaranteeing way, at least in an authorising a way. This would give methodological assurance of their cotenability. But is this assurance both necessary and sufficient, or is there any additional consideration as well, which, though not explicitly articulated by

Dharmakīrti, seems, however, to give a strong indication of its being acknowledged by him? It is to the consideration of this issue that we turn in the next section.

Additional Consideration Regarding Co-tenability of Perceptual and Inferential Cognitions

There are two theories on the basis of which it is possible for us to argue about the co-tenability of perceptual and inferential cognitions.

(1) According to the first, there are certain basic beliefs whose truth is determined by its relation with facts. Other beliefs are justified on the basis of these basic beliefs i.e. these beliefs are derivative from basic beliefs. This view is known as foundationalism. The foundationalists accept pyramidical structure of knowledge,[73] and through it seek to establish tenability of our knowledge claims.

(2) There is another view which holds that on the basis of consistency or coherence between perceptual and inferential cognitions their co-tenability could be established. They accept that there is a set of consistent knowledge-claims and on the basis of coherence between members of this set, knowledge claim could be shown to be justifiable.[74] The former of these theories is reductionistic, while the latter need not necessarily be so.

Foundationalists believe in correspondence between fact and our khowledge-claim and hold that any of our knowledge claim is either basic and non-reducible and is guaranteed by its correspondence with fact or is non-basic or derivative and hence is indirectly supported by facts. In a foundationalist framework our knowledge has a structure which is pyramid-like and is in turn a reflection of a similar structure of the world. For a coherentist, on the contrary, totality of knowledge-claims is like a net in which various threads support one another without any of them being basic and others being derivative. A coherentist need not reject correspondence altogether. But it is neither correspondence nor reduction that are decisive features of knowledge in his view.

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73. Lehrer, K.; *Knowledge* ; p. 76.

74. *Ibid*, p. 76.

Although we might expect our knowledge to be pyramidical in structure and although we might further desire all our knowledge-claims to be either basic or derivative from them, yet there might arise trouble's especially on the count of stipulating criterion of basic beliefs. Further, all knowledge-claims other than basic ones may not be capable of being shown to be reducible to them. This is not to say that we just do not treat any knowledge-claims to be primary. Reduction of all our knowledge-claims to those derived from our experience or at least to those that are derivative from them too may not be said smoothly. A coherentist, on the contrary may just not care for correspondence between our knowledge and the world at all and may instead come to be guided solely by the consideration that our knowledge-claims should be considered to be respectable just because and in so far as their co-tenability or simultaneous satisfiability has not given rise to any contradiction. For a coherentist, in this way, a proposition is true not so much because it corresponds with fact, but rather because it coheres with other propositions or whatever basis they might have come to be formulated. While for foundationalist among truth and justification, truth is primary and on the contrary for coherentist, it is justification which is primary. While a foundationalist might seek to tailor justification to truth, coherentist might seek to tailor truth to justification. For a foundationalist what we certify must be known to be true in advance, for a coherentist this may not be considered to be necessary. Each of these two approaches try to establish simultaneous satisfiability of perceptual and inferential cognitions. Each is beset with its own respective difficulties and whichever alternative of them we accept, some or the other kind of difficulty looms large before us.

Dharmakīrti seems to suggest an alternative model with the help of which knowledge claims could be hoped to be justified without embracing the sort of difficulties to which foundationalism or coherentism gives rise. The model which he suggests is not purely coherentist or foundationalist. Rather, it is in between them. According to him, knowledge claims available to us by perception and inference stand justified on the basis of consistency.[75]

75. (1) धर्मकीर्ति; प्रमाणवार्त्तिक; प्रमाणमविसंवादि ज्ञानम् ।
प्रमाण सिद्धि पृ० 3.
(2) मनोरथनन्दी; प्रमाणवार्तिकवृत्ति; प्रमाणं तदनुमानम् अविसंवादात् ।
प्रत्यक्षमपि हि संवादकत्वात् प्रमाणम्, तच्चानुमानस्यापि समानम् ।

Consistency is a criterion which operates on three levels: (1) Perceptual cognition, (2) Inferential cognition (3) Convergence between perceptual and inferential cognitions.

When Dharmakīrti talks about perception, he talks only about veridical perception. Veridical perception of the same object at two moments cannot be inconsistent. In the case of inference, object is inferred on the basis of *Avinābhāva Niyama.* Hence, two knowledge claims inferentially derived through the same rule cannot be inconsistent. But over and above *Avisaṁvādakatva* and *Ajñātārthaprakāśakatva*, Dharmakīrti also brings in the following additional consideration to uphold cotenability of perceptual and inferential cognitions. First, the same goal is sought to be realised through both of them. With the help of tenable knowledge (*saṁyak jñāna*) *Puruṣārtha Siddhi* is the uniform goal that is sought to be realised through both perceptual and inferential cognitions. Hence, any knowledge claim, no matter whether it is perceptually and/or inferentially available to us, or their totality would be considered to be tenable only on the ground that it enables us to realise the same goal, i.e. it leads to the same kind of *Puruṣārthasiddhi.*[76]

Secondly, as pointed out earlier, although Dharmakīrti subscribes to *Pramāṇa-Viplava*, in spite of the fact that perceptual and inferential cognitions have their respective contrastive features, the possibility of their convergence without encroaching upon each other's field through the same cluster of features having particularity and generality as its constituent features is not ruled out. That is, knowledge gained perceptually is not only not denied but it is also not considered to be so basic that it is to it and to it only that all non-basic knowledge is sought to be reduced. Within the frame of perceptual cognition, as we shall point out in the next chapter,

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76 (1) धर्मोत्तर; न्यायबिन्दुटीका; अविसंवादकं ज्ञानं सम्यग्ज्ञानम् ।···तदवज्ञानमपि स्वयं प्रदर्शितमर्थं प्रापयत् संवादकमुच्यते । प्रदर्शिते चार्थे प्रवर्तकत्वमेव प्रापकत्वम् नान्यत् । तथा हि··· न ज्ञानं जनयदर्थं प्रापयति, अपि त्वर्थे पुरुषं प्रवर्तयत् प्रापयत्यर्थम् । प्रवर्तकत्वपि प्रवृत्ति विषयप्रदर्शकत्वमेव । न हि पुरुषं हठात् प्रवर्तयितुं शक्नोति विज्ञानम् । प्रत्यक्षपरि० पृ० 4.

(2) धर्मकीर्ति; न्यायबिन्दु; सम्यग्ज्ञानपूर्विका पुरुषार्थसिद्धिरिति तद् व्युत्पाद्यते । प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 1.

(3) दुर्वेक मिश्र; धर्मोत्तरप्रदीप; प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 7-34.

reduction is not ruled out in so far as minimally momentary perceptual cognition is held by Dharmakīrti to be viable alternative for tenability of perceptual cognition. In spite of acknowledging distinctive and differentiating features of perceptual and inferential cognitions respectively neither their convergence nor their simultaneous satisfiability are sought to be done away with. But the possibility of convergence between perceptual and inferenitial cognitions or their cotenability or simultaneous retainment should neither turn out to be accidental nor at the cost of doing away with the contrastive features of the respective cognitions under consideration. Here merely saying that there are clusters of features such that particular as well as general features are their members too would not be of much help. For, through this route possibility of convergence between perceptual and inferential cognitions happens to be acknowledged. Through contrastive features of the respective cognitions under consideration, their mutual irreducibility to each other too happens to be accepted. But without doing away with any of these features cotenability of perceptual and inferential cognitions should be realizable in an appropriate way. It is for this purpose that the theory and doctrine of *Apoha* or *Anyāpoha*, as observed earlier, happens to be invoked. *Nyāya* logicians subscribing to *Pramāṇa-saṁplava* see no need of it, in spite of the fact that it goes against the minimalistic or economy consideration, of which we shall have lot to say in the last chapter, where we propose to examine determiners the conceptual framework and unity of Dharmakīrti's philosophy. Turning to one extremely important implication of the doctrine of *Apoha* or *Anyāpoha* and its bearing upon cotenability of perceptual and inferential cognitions without losing sight of their respective contrastive features. In the case of knowledge claims available to us either through perception or inference alone this problem just does not arise. In that case there is no question of convergence between these two cognitions nor is there a question of demarcation between them within the framework of convergence. This problem arises in case of possibility of convergence between them. This point could be formulated in this way. We have pointed out earlier that with the help of perception non-shareable features are comprehended, while with the help of inference shareable features are comprehended. Through inference and perception we can comprehend those features which are share-

able as well as non-shareable and those which are members of the same cluster of features. Here the problem arises, because we not only do not wish to sacrifice the contrastive features of perceptual and inferential cognitions, nor their convergence, nor also their simultaneous satisfaction within our epistemic enterprise without losing sight of the possibility of the same goal being realized through both of them without sacrificing coherence between them or even the possibility of our being able to discover hitherto undiscovered knowledge-claims. In the case of convergence between perceptual and inferential cognitions particularity comprehended perceptually must remain unadulterated both with generality comprehended inferentially as also with other particularities comprehended through other instances of perceptual cognition. Likewise, generality comprehended as instantiated in one instance of inferential cognition should remain unadulterated with other generalities comprehended through other instances of inferential cognition, as also with particularity comprehended perceptually. When we want to specify a particular knowledge claim within such a chunk of knowledge claims, we have to eliminate or exclude other knowledge claims from that particular knowledge claim. This process of elimination or exclusion is called as *Apoha*. *Apoha* involves three aspects: *Anyavyāvṛtti*, *Anyonyāvṛtti* and *Anyonyāśraya*. *Anyavyāvṛtti* means exclusion of those which are similar to it. *Anyonyāvṛtti* means exclusion of those which are other than it. Suppose, we have a chunk of knowledge-claims which involves perceptually and inferentially available knowledge-claims. Through their mutually contrastive features their merging with each other is avoided. This is *Anyāpoha*. But it is not sufficient. For we want to exclude other knowledge claims available to us by inference. Such knowledge claims are excluded by *Anyonyāpoha*.

Thus, with the help of *Anyavyāvṛtti*, particular knowledge claim is sliced out from those which are similar to it while with the help of *Anyonyavyāvṛtti* particular knowledge claim is sliced out from those which are dissimilar to it. *Anyavyāṛtti*, can be explained in terms of *Sajātiya Vyāvṛtti*. It means exclusion from those which are other than but similar to a particular knowledge claim. *Anyonyāvyāvṛtti* can be explained in terms of *Vijātiya Vyāvṛtti*. It means exclusion from those which are other than and dissimilar to

that particular knowledge claim.[77] By the process of ***Apoha*** we exclude not only convergent but divergent knowledge-claims as well.

But here a problem may arise : how is it possible that both particular and non- particular features are cognized simultaneously ? Dharmakīrti answers that both these are differential features of the same thing or members of the same cluster of features,[78] and through perceptual and inferential cognitions we come to cognize both of them. Both these kinds of cognitions remain simultaneously satisfiable, even though they are neither derived through perception alone nor through inference alone.

Thus, within the jurisdiction of *Avisaṁvādakatva* and *Ajñātārthatva* we are in a position to authorise cotenability of perceptual and inferential cognitions without allowing them to merge with each other. But this does not give us the guarantee of either truth or applicability of our knowledge. For, it is quite possible that two different knowledge-claims available to us are distinct, false and yet consistent with each other. Likewise, it may be the case that two knowledge claims are consistent or coherent with each other and yet lack applicability. Thus, consistency need not necessarily determine the applicability of knowledge. Secondly, if we talk about simultaneous retainability of perception and inference, then mere consistency between them would not suffice. For, through consistency, we may have unitary picture of our knowledge via its being considered to be conceivable and mere conceivability would not play any role in determining the truth especially or our perceptual knowledge. Thirdly, if we are talking about this world

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77. धर्मकीर्ति; प्रमाणवार्त्तिक; सजातीय व्यावृत्याश्रयेण व्यतिरेकबुद्धी ।
विजातीय व्यावृत्याश्रयेण अन्वयबुद्धी ॥ 137 ॥
प्रत्यक्ष परि०

78. तत्रैव : (1) वस्तुभेदाश्रयाच्चार्थे न दिसंवादिका मता ।
ततोऽन्यापोहविषया तत्कर्त्राश्रितभावत: ॥ 113 ॥
स्वार्थपरि० पृ० 293.

(2) अवृक्षव्यतिरेकेण वृक्षार्थग्रहणे द्वयम् ।
अन्योन्याश्रयमित्येक ग्रहाभावे द्वयाग्रहा: ॥ 114 ॥
स्वार्थ० परि० पृ० 293.

(empirical world) consistency alone does not suffice. For due to consistency we have unitary picture of the world but such a consistent world may not essentially be a factual world but instead could just be a conceivable world. In the next chapter we will argue that Dharmakīrti accepts empirical world as a paradigmatic world. There it will be pointed out that Dharmakīrti is not merely interested in elaborating any kind of conceivable world. He is rather interested in elaborating that kind of world where Buddha's teaching would remain significant. This kind of world is actual world, empirical world. Hence, mere consistency consideration of our knowledge or of the world would not suffice, as it can at the most give us general nature of knowledge. Dharmakīrti accepts paradigmaticity of empiiical world and refuses to sacrifice truth that is perceptually made available. Naturally some priority is going to be accorded to perception. Hence, apart from co-tenability of perceptual and inferential cognitions there remains an important question of truth and applicability of our knowledge. Let us deal with this problem and assess the role of perceptual cognition centrally and inferential cognition peripherally as having bearing upon truth and applicability of our knowledge.

Truth and Applicability of Knowledge :

We observed above that in Dharmakīrti's philosophy the problem of truth figures basically with regard to those clusters in which particular features figure as members, no matter whether such a cluster of features is such that in it particular features alone figure or whether it is such in which particular as well as general features figure, although the latter kind of features would not be cognisable perceptually. Inferential knowledge, according to Dharmakīrti, does not primarily have bearing on truth, as erceptual cognition has, although both of them have a bearing on applicability to behaviour patterns—overt or covert that we naturally undertake—which we adopt, as we shall see later and which are supposed to culminate in our being able to accept or reject anything. Inferential cognition can have bearing on truth, although secondarily only in so far as those features which we cognize inferentially figure as members of that cluster of features, some of which are perceptually cognized. It is through some features of such a cluster being percep-

tually available that inferentially available features too come to have a bearing on truth. In the case of perceptual cognition Dharmakīrti is talking about empirical world and the propositions framed on its basis remain necessarily to be factual propositions, But such propositions do not become true merely on account of calling them to be factual propositions. Rather their being considered to be factual and true propositions depends upon fulfilment of criteria. They are factual because their basis is veridical perception and since they are about something that is real in its own right and is nothing else but peculiar and particular.[79] But the truth of such propositions, according to Dharmakīrti, we discover on the basis of correspondence. A proposition is true if it corresponds with fact, if there is a correspondence between object of veridical perceptual knowledge and our knowledge of that object.[80] Such a kind of correspondence between object and our perceptual knowledge of it gives us a guarantee of its truth. This kind of cognition of truth through correspondence is important beacaue through it the possibility of our being able to discover such an object happens to be opened, and it is on the basis of such a discovery that we can think of accepting or rejecting the object under consideration. Truth, thus, opens the possibility of the discovery of the object of veridical perception.[81] But merely opening of this kind of possibility is not enough. It needs squarely to be realized. How is it hoped to be realized ? Real thing has a natural disposition to provoke us to undertake a response with regard to it and being induced in this way by it we are in a position to reach out to it and discover it.[82] It

79. प्रज्ञाकरगुप्त; वार्तिकालकार; स्वलक्षणमेव परमार्थत: प्रत्यक्षेण प्रमेयम् ।
प्रत्यक्षपरि० पृ० 212.

80. धर्मकीर्ति : न्यायबिन्दु : अर्थसारुपप्यमस्य प्रमाणम् । प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 18.

81. (1) तत्रैव : तदवशाद् अर्थप्रतीतिसिद्धेरिति । प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 19.
(2) धर्मोत्तर न्यायबिन्दुटीका : तस्माद् अर्थाद् उत्पत्तावप्यस्य ज्ञानस्यास्ति कश्चिद् अवश्यकर्तव्य: प्रापकव्यापारो येन कृतेनार्थ: प्रापितो भवति । प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 18.

82. मनोरथनन्दी : प्रमाणवार्तिकवृत्ति : अर्थक्रियायां ज्ञानादिकाभ्यां स्वरुपोपश्धानेन समर्थं यत्, तदत्र वस्तुविचारे परमार्थं सत् । प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 101.

is only consequent to such a discovery that the question of accepting or rejecting the discovered object as conducive or non-conducive to *Puruṣārthasiddhi* can arise and may come to be resolved appropriately.[83] The kind of knowledge on the basis of which certification of knowledge-claim which may be attempted must, in the last analysis, be our own knowledge, no matter whether knowledge claim that is advanced is put forth on the basis of perceptual or inferential cognition.[84] With regard to certification of our knowledge-claims the knowledge on the basis of which we are in a position to certify it remains of the same kind, i.e. our own knowledge[85] no matter whether one is a follower of *Vijñānavāda* or of *Sautrāntika* or *Vaibhāṣika* school. Certificatorily therefore, we find convergence between *Vijñānavāda* and *Sarvāstivāda*, in Dharmakīrti's philosophy.

With regard to both perceptual and inferential cognitions Dharmakīrti raises yet another point which has bearing on *Arthakriyākāritva*. In the case of both these kinds of cognitions the knowledge that arises exhibits features of the kind of object that is cognized, i.e. knowledge in both cases is of the same shape as that of the object cognized through it. In spite of this, however, there is a fundamental difference between them. What veridical perceptual cognition leads us invariably to cognize is the object that is real, peculiar. In the case of inferential cognition, on the contrary, it does not guarantee this. In fact it often leads us to cognize a

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83. (1) धर्मोत्तर : न्यायबिन्दुटीका : अर्थक्रियार्थिभि: अर्थक्रियासमर्थ अर्थप्राप्तिनिमित्तं ज्ञानं मृग्यते ।...ततः अर्थक्रिया समर्थप्रदर्शकं सम्यक् ज्ञानम् । प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 5.

(2) प्रज्ञाकर गुप्त : वार्त्तिकालंकार : अर्थक्रियाकारिणो हि पदार्थस्य सत्त्वासत्त्वाभ्यां अर्थिनो प्रेक्षावतां । तदवबोधाय च प्रमाणमन्विष्यते । प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 213.

84. धर्मकीर्ति : न्यायबिन्दु : प्रमाणफलव्यवस्थाऽत्रापि प्रत्यक्षवत् । स्वार्था परि० पृ 21.

85. (1) मनोरथनन्दी; प्रमाणवार्त्तिकवृत्ति; ज्ञानानां द्वैरुप्य साधनेऽपि प्राय: बाहुल्येन स्वसंवेदनं ज्ञानं सिद्धम् । प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 224.

(2) तत्रैव; तत्त्वत: स्वसंवेदनमात्रं प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिकम् । प्रमाणसिद्धि परि० पृ० 7.

projected, imputed object.[86] In spite of this difference knowledge as such, of whatever kind it is, has a built in disposition of assuming the form of a feature cognized through it. This kind of disposition of *Tadākārtva* of knowledge, irrespective of whatever kind it is, is a point of convergence between perceptual and inferential cognitions on the level of knowledge and this kind of convergence is due to built in feature of knowledge itself as it originates. This built in feature of knowledge is neither determined by differential features cognized through perceptual and inferential cognitions, nor do contrastive features of these respective cognitions make any difference to it. The tendency or disposition of knowledge to assume the form and shape of the feature cognized through it, is like a disposition on the part of a mirror to reflect whatever that thing is presented before it and it is neutral to the kind of thing so presented. Similarly disposition of knowledge to assume the form of a feature or object cognized through it makes no difference to what sort of feature or object that is cognized through it. Nor is this disposition of knowledge determined by the sort of feature that comes to be cognized through it. Were it so, according as differential feature is cognized through differential knowledge—perceptual or inferential—we should have noticed differential *Tadākāratva* of knowledge. This does not, however, happen. Accordingly there is no basis to hold that the disposition of knowledge to assume the form of the sort of feature that is cognized through it is differential with regard to perceptual and inferential cognitions.

In spite of this uniform disposition or built in feature of knowledge, contrastive features which happen to be cognized through perceptual and inferential cognitions do not vanish. Thus, *Tadākārtva* of both perceptual and inferential cognitions remains to be an inalienable disposition in spite of the fact that particularity alone is cognized perceptually and generality inferentially. Very often this kind of convergence of perceptual and inferential cognitions via *Tadākāratva* on the epistemic plane is made caricature of. We shall return to this point a little later. Prior to it, let us inquire what role differential features cognized through perceptual and inferential cognitions have to play and what are they precisely determined by.

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86. धर्मोत्तर; न्यायबिन्दुटीका; यदाकारं यत्प्रतिभासं ज्ञानं उत्पद्यते तद्विदिष्टम्परमार्थारोपितश्च । परार्थ परि० पृ० 71.

From the foregoing it is clear that *Tadākāratva* as the disposition of knowledge cannot be said to be determinative of particularity or generality that we cognize respectively through perceptual and inferential cognitions. Were it so, their contrastive aspects should have vanished. We also saw that *Tadākāratva* of knowledge is neutral to particularity or generality that happens to be cognized through it. That we cognize contrastive features through differential modes of cognition, according to Dharmakīrti, is a fact. But then what are these differential and contrastive features determined by ? The determiner, again, under consideration, must never determine both the sort of contrastive features.[87] Were it so, such a determiner would turn out to be as neutral as the disposition of knowledge, viz. *Tadākāratva*. Particularity cognized perceptually is determined solely by the particular, unique, non-general *Svalakṣaṇa* that is cognized through it.[88] *Svalakṣaṇa,* a unique thing, always has a disposition to manifest its nature and unique and particular as it is, it alone is determinative of particularity cognized perceptually. And perceptual knowledge manifests only particularity through assuming form of it. Generality, comprehended inferentially, is determined by *Vikalpabuddhi* anchored in *Vācya-Vācaka* relation of significant expressions and what they signify.[89] Generality is not determined by things, but by words primarily, although there may be cluster of features of which generality or general features are members, or there may be things having general or shareable features. Generality, thus, is determined not because of and by things but arises in spite of them, basically through communicative language and the impressions of significations it generates through convention.

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87. मनोरथनन्दी; प्रमाणवार्त्तिकवृत्ति; नापिसामान्यविशेषलक्षणात्मक: एक: विषय:। प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 98.

88. (1) दुर्वेकमिश्र; धर्मोत्तर प्रदीप: स्वं असाधारणं च तत्स्वलक्षणं स्वरूपं तत् स्वलक्षणम् । प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 70.

(2) धर्मोत्तर; न्यायबिन्दुटीका; यत् असाधारण तत् प्रत्यक्षमेव ग्राह्यम् । परि० पृ० 70.

89. मनोरथनन्दी; प्रमाणवार्त्तिकवृत्ति; विकल्पबुद्धिस्तु कल्पिका, सा च संकेतसंकेत संस्कार प्रबोधमात्रभाविनी, न अर्थाधीना। प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 102.

Thus, independent of the uniform disposition of *Tadākārtva* of *Jñāna* that is tenable, particularity cognized through it is exclusively determined by the sort of object or thing viz. *Svalakṣaṇa* that is cognized through perceptual cognition. Here too knowledge is *Tadākāra*. But, as pointed out earlier, perceptual cognition could be determined to be true on the basis of its correspondence with facts and it is through such correspondence that we succeed in discovering the object of perceptual cognition.[90] In the case of inferential cognition, on the contrary, the generality that we comprehend through it is determined by convention-loaded significant expressions. Such generality is not invariably determined by things. So, it is not *Tadākāratva* of knowledge, a uniform and convergent disposition of both perceptual and inferential cognitions, which is determinative of contrastive features which we come to cognize through them. In the case of perceptual cognition particularity cognized through it is determined by the particular and unique thing or *Svalakṣaṇa* and by nothing else, with which perceptual knowledge—or better still particularity cognized through it—corresponds. In the case of inferential cognition, on the contrary, generality cognized through it and through it alone is determined by language and there is no question of correspondence of generality inferentially cognized and something in the external world. For, generality could be cognized through convention-loaded significant expressions independently of whether there are things that have general or shareable features. This is often lost sight of and as a result certain unwelcome consequences follow out of this kind of failure.

Concentrating perhaps more on *Tadākāratva* disposition of knowledge and paying exclusive attention to generality which is determined by language it comes perhaps to be held by some *Vijñānvādins* that we can cognize any feature independently of there being anything in the external world at all. In this way they come to illegitimately reduce correspondence to be the hallmark of

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90. (1) धर्मोत्तर : न्यायबिन्दुटीका : अर्थसारूप्यं प्रत्यक्षस्य प्रमाणं, तद्वशात् अर्थप्रतीतिसिद्धा । प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 19.

(2) मनोरथनन्दी : प्रमाणवार्तिकवृत्तिः प्रत्यक्षं हि वस्तुसामर्थ्योत्पन्नं तदाकारं अनुकुर्यति, न विकल्पिनाम् । प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 171.

perceptual cognition to linguistically determined feature and accordingly particularity also to be determined by language. This kind of caricature of our knowledge is likely to lapse into a kind of solipsism, if not into idealism—subjective or otherwise. At the hands of *Sarvāstivādins*, on the contrary, both particularity as well as generality should be considered to be determined by features of things or better still by things themselves. At their hands, in this way, generality too is determined in a correspondence way as much as particularity is. But here the decisive feature of language, viz. that it can make us cognize features which things lack, happens to be neglected. Dharmakīrti, on the contrary, in saying that it is not *Tadākāratva* of knowledge that is determinative of the contrastive features of perceptual and inferential cognitions, and in holding that whereas particularity is thing-centred, while generality is language-centred points a way of avoiding the pitfalls into which *Vijñānavāda* and *Sarvāstivāda* are prone to make us lapse. Through, *Tadākāratva* of any knowledge, further, he is in a position to bring to our notice that sort of convergence between perceptual and inferential cognitions which is neither thing-determined nor is it language-determined. This disposition of knowledge he highlights without sacrificing contrastive features of perceptual and inferential cognitions. As we hope to point out in the next chapter, his avoiding pitfalls of *Vijñānvāda* and those of *Sarvāstivāda* is indicative of his coming to adopt *Madhyamā-Pratipad*, while his insistance on contrastive features of perceptual and inferential cognitions is indicative of two sorts of truths (*dve satye*) to which the Buddha wanted to draw our attention.

The convergent and divergent aspects of perceptual and inferential cognitions come to the focus in yet another way also in Dharmakīrti's philosophy. How are we to establish acceptibility of our knowledge-perceptual or inferential ? On Dharmakīrti's view *Prāmāṇya* of knowledge, via its applicability, could be sought to be established through *Vyavahāra*. Knowledge must be capable of being related with our life, it should be applicable, it should be

७१. धर्मकीर्ति; प्रमाणवार्त्तिक; प्रामाण्यं व्यवहारेण ।। I ।।
प्रमाणसिद्धि परि० पृ०

capable of being used—in past, present and future.[92] Knowledge, thus, whether inferential or perceptual, must be capable of being used, applied and should in this way have bearing on our life.[93] Thus, primacy of practice is a feature that is convergent with reference to perceptual and inferential cognitions. Yet, there is a fundamental difference with regard to the consequence of the respective kind of practice they prompt. Through perceptual cognition we succeed in discovering what is and what is not the case.[94] In the case of inferential cognition, on the contrary, the kind of practice that remains significant with regard to it is of communication and comprehension of significance of significant expressions. Through the former we are able to discover the sort of world there is, while through the latter we are able to comprehend and communicate, but may not be able to discover anything that is real.[95] In spite of applicability, serviceability and usability of both perceptual and inferential cognitions as their convergent feature their contrastive features do not vanish. In the case of perceptual cognition it is discovery of that which is real, in the case of inferential cognition, on the contrary, it is comprehension and communication, independently of whether there is anything real or not. These divergent features of perceptual and inferential cognitions, in spite of their convergence on applicability and usability, has a bearing, as we hope to point

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92. मनोरथनन्दी; प्रमाणवार्त्तिकवृत्ति; सांव्यावहारिकस्येदं प्रामाण्यस्य लक्षणम्, संव्यवहारश्च भावीभूतरूपादि क्षणानामेकत्वेन संवादविषयो ऽ नविगीतः सर्वस्य । प्रमाणसिद्धि परि० पृ० 7.

93. प्रज्ञाकरगुप्त;वार्त्तिकालंकार;···प्रमाणत्वसिद्धिः किमर्थमितिमुच्यते व्यहारेणेति । तस्मात् व्यवहारमात्र प्रसिद्धानुमानप्रत्यक्षाश्रयेण प्रसिद्धं सम्बन्ध आश्रित्व तदेतदर्थंक्रियासाधनमिति······। प्रमाणसिद्धि परि० पृ० 25.

94. (1) तत्रैव; अर्थक्रियाकारिणों हि पदार्थस्य सत्वासत्त्वाभ्यां अर्थिता प्रेक्षावतां। तदेवबोधाय च प्रमाणातन्विष्यते । प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 213.

(2) धर्मकीर्ति; प्रमाणमार्त्तिक; व्यवहारः सचासत्सु नेति प्राप्तात्र मूकना ॥ 225 ॥ परार्थानुमान परि० पृ० 439.

95. धर्मोत्तरः न्यायबिन्दुटीका; कुतः विकल्पः शब्दः अर्थात नोत्पद्यते ? अर्थसन्निधि निरपेक्षत्वात् ।

प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 11.

out, on the two sort of truths to which the Buddha laboured to draw our attention.[96]

From the foregoing it should be amply clear that Dharmakīrti does not repudiate the external, empirical world and the real things belonging to it. He also holds that we cognize particular, discrete, unique things perceptually. This means he subscribes to empiricism. But what kind of empiricism is it – social, indivídual or momentary? Further, two features of the world that we empirically cognize demand philosophical scrutiny, viz. change and continuity. What has Dharmakīrti to say about them and through it what aspects of perceptual cognition does he seek to highlight ? It is to the consideration of these issues that we turn in the next section.

Two Prominent Features of the World:

When we consider the nature of the world given to us two prominent features of it, viz. change and continuity stand out and demand a close scrutiny of them for their satisfactory analysis. With reference to them different issues arise. Are the continuity and change to be regarded as structural or constitutive features of the world? And if so, on what ground? What minimum conditions need to be satisfied in order that we comprehend change and continuity? How do we interpret change and continuity? Further does change necessiate continuity and does continuity presuppose staticity? Are change and continuity discordant features of the world?

To begin with, according to Dharmakīrti, nothing in the world whatever that is red, is eternal, as anything that is eternal and permanent cannot be endowed with *Arthakriyāsāmarthya*,[97] for it being eternal and real it would continuously keep on provoking us to act one way or the other. Likewise, anything that is eternal

96. धर्मकीर्ति : प्रमाणवार्त्तिक : अर्थक्रियासमर्थं यत् तदत्र परमार्थसत् । अन्यत् संवृत्तिसत प्रोक्तम्; ते स्वसामान्यलक्षणे ॥ 3 ॥

प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 100.

97. मनोरथनन्दी; प्रमाणवार्त्तिकवृत्ति; नित्यानां क्रमाक्रमाभ्यां अर्थक्रियायां असामर्थ्यात् । प्रमाणसिद्धि परि० पृ० 64.

cannot be persented successively.[98] It would rather continue to be presented continuously and uninterpretedly. Further, nothing belonging to world is immunized from being destroyed or changed.[99] Since everything in this way is liable to be destroyed sometime or the other, nothing could be saved from being destroyed.[100] As no thing is immune from being destroyed so also no state could ever be said to be eternal and free from being changed or destroyed.[101] The reason why Dharmakīrti is so much against eternality seems to be that neither change nor continuity which we experience necessitate eternality. Eternality can also not be said to be subsumble under any of them in such a way that in accepting any of them we cannot help accepting etrnality as well. It cannot either be said to be determinative of tenability, truth or acceptability of our knowledge. Similar kind of consideration holds, according to Dharmakīrti in particular and Buddhists in general, regarding staticity as well. Staticity cannot be said to be determiner of continuity. Nothing requires a stable and static base, without which it cannot be held to be existing or real at all.[102] The continuity of anything cannot be separated from it and its basis cannot be said to be its staticity either.[103] Staticity like eternality cannot be said to be determina-

98. तत्रैव:; नित्यस्य क्रमयौगपद्याभ्यां विरहात् । प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 210.

99. (1) धर्मकीर्ति; प्रमाणवार्त्तिक; वस्तुमात्रानुबांधित्वात नाशस्य न नित्यता ॥ 44 ॥ प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 114.

(2) मनोरथनन्दी; प्रमाणवार्त्तिकवृत्ति; सत्तामात्रानुबांधित्वात नाशस्य । परार्थ परि० पृ० 342.

(3) तत्रैव; वस्तुमात्रानुबांधित्वात् नाशस्य वस्तुन: न नित्यता स्यात् । प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 114.

100. तत्रैव; नश्वरस्वभावस्य अवश्यं नाशात् । प्रमाणसिद्धि परि० पृ० 32. वस्तुधर्मता नाशस्य । प्रमाणसिद्धि परि० पृ० 31.

101. तत्रैव; भावानां क्षणिकत्वात् । प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 157. क्षणिकेषु भावेषु । प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 133.

सर्वेषां भावानां क्षणभंगता । स्वार्थ० परि० 341.

102 धर्मकीर्त्ति: प्रमाणवार्तिक : अनाश्रयात् सदसतो: नाश्रय: स्थितिकारणम् ॥ 65 प्रमाणसिद्धि परि० पृ० 30.

103. मनोरथनन्दी : प्रमाणवार्त्तिकवृत्ति : न हि स्थितिर्नाम स्थातुपदर्थात् भिन्ना, यां कुर्वंत आश्रयम् । प्रमाणसिद्धि परि० पृ० 30.

tive of change of a thing or its destruction. In fact staticity is so much opposed to change. It cannot be held to be determinative of tenability, truth or applicability of our knowledge either. Nor can our perceptual cognition of particularity or inferential cognition of generality be said to be determined by things being static. On these and similar other grounds eternality and staticity of things or of their states happen to be repudiated in Dharmakīrti's philosophy. This does not, however, mean that he does not pay attention to change and continuity. Nor does he fail to analyse and explain their nature and implications.

As on Dharmakīrti's view nothing is immune from being destroyed, so too nothing is free from change, no matter whether it is a thing or a state. But, whether change or destruction, it does not occur because something outside the thing causes it to be changed or destroyed. No state, likewise, arises or happens to be destroyed because of any motive or as instrumental to anybody's expectation. Being liable to change and destruction is the very disposition of anything that is real.[104] Since anything happens to be born, changed or destroyed due to disposition of such a thing itself, destruction or change is considered by Dharmakīrti to be unmotivated, non-teleological and due solely to the natural disposition of thing concerned.[105] Origination, change or destruction of anything occurs simply because it is nature of the concerned thing and nothing else. Thus, change and destruction, on Dharmakīrti's view, are natural, constitutive, non-teleological and unmotivated disposition of things belonging to the world. Since things are liable to be changed and destroyed in this way on their own everything is considered to be short-lived and nothing is eternal and static. Staticity and eternality or permanence are repudiated, in this way, not by way of luxury of speculation but because and in so far as they are opposed to the structural and constitutiue feature of things

104. तत्रैव : सत्वमात्रानुबंधिनी नश्वरता । स्वार्था० पार० पृ० 317-318.

105. (1) मनोरथनन्दी : प्रमाणवार्त्तिकवृत्ति : अहेतुत्वेऽपि नाशस्य । स्वार्था० परि० पृ० 344.

(2) प्रज्ञाकरगुप्त : वार्तिकालंकार ; अहेतुकः विनाशः प्रसक्तः इति वस्तुधर्मता नाशस्य । प्रमाणसिद्धि परि० पृ० 71.

or of states, viz. change and destruction. Their repudiation is necessitated not only on epistemic plane but also on ontological plane, they not being in any way connected with nature of things as they are, as also with the way we experience them, where it is determined by the way in which the nature of things manifest to us.

But what about continuity? That we experience continuity is a fact and therefore continuity cannot be brushed aside or repudiated the way eternality and staticity are repudiated. For repudiation of continuity would go against intuitive constraint on our account of it, however it may be capable of being sustained methodologically in the sense it fits into, coheres with or is consistent with the methodological framework one has adopted, arbitrary though it may be. But does this mean that a satisfactory account of change and continuity must be given analogously? That is, must we consider continuity to be the structural and constitutive feature of the world and things belonging to it or their states in the same way in which change happens to be considered to be a structural and constitutive feature? Or can continuity be considered to be a non-structural feature of things, although change is held to be their structural feature? In other words, would it be possible for us to account for continuity without considering it to be constitutive and structural feature of things? It is to this issue that we now turn.

In all four alternatives stand out of our being able to account for change and continuity which we experience and consider to be the features of the world : (i) both change and continuity are the structural features of the world—if this alternative is accepted then we shall have to show that unless we consider continuity to be the structural feature of the world, there is no way of our coming to experience it. That is, unless continuity is determined through inalienable disposition of things we just cannot come to experience continuity. On closer examination and analysis, as it will be shown below, it seems fairly clear and tenable as well that although continuity is not a structural feature of the world and of things, we can, nonetheless, experience continuity, i.e. continuity need not necessarily be thing-determined as change is required to be. (ii) While change is a structural feature of the world, continuity is not—we

shall soon see that Dharmakīrti accepts this alternative and is backed by minimalistic consideration we need to have at our disposal for our satisfactorily being able to account for change and continuity. (iii) While continuity is the structural feature of the world, change is not—. This altenative is untenable as there is no way accounting for change on the basis of continuity, although continuity can be accounted for on the basis of change. (iv) Neither change nor continuity are structural features of the world – on this alternative change and continuity will have to be considered to be determined by something other than thing and that would go against *Nirhetukatva.* Since each of the alternative except the second is beset with one or the other kind of unsurmountable difficulty Dharmakīrti accepts the second. It remains to be seen how he exploits it to his being able to satisfactorily account for change and continuity.

We have seen that on Dharmakīrti's view our experience of change of a thing is determined by thing or undergoing change is its disposition. That is, things change since they cannot help changing, not because someone else changes them, as things happen to be destroyed as it is built into their very nature. When things are destroyed there is no question of our coming to experience their continuity in spite of their being destroyed. But such is not the case with change. Change and continuity are not discordent features of the world such that if the world or thing changes it cannot have continuity. Continuity need not be thing-determined in order that we may come to experience it. Given that a thing is a cluster of features, through change or destruction some of the members of the cluster may come to be changed or destroyed and the destroyed ones may or may not be replaced by some other features. Under such a circumstance we can experience continuity, however accidental feature of the thing or cluster it might be. Continuity here comes to be determined by convergence between the previous and the later cluster of properties. Or even if discrete items happen to be presented to us in quick succession, we can have an experience of continuity. This is precisely what happens in the case of cinemaphotographic film projected before us, or in the case of our experince of *Alātacakra.* Thus, experience of continuity may be determined by convergence —however partial, incomplete and accidental – between previous and later cluster

of properties, or due to quick succession. But in none of these ways is it determined by the disposition of the thing under consideration. Neither can convergence be held to be disposition of clusters nor quick succession that of discrete things. Yet experience of continuity occurs.

Change and continuity, in this way, turn out to be non-discordant features of the world or things although both of them are not structural or constitutive features of them. Further, this sort of account of them turns out to besatis factory although least numbers of features are held to constitutive or structural with regard to the world or things. Nextly, it does not repudiate continuity and thus does not go contrary to the intuitive constraint that we must not come to deny, do away with or repudiate continuity in favour of change. For, change need not rule out continuity ; nor are change and continuity so opposed to each other that if we accept change to be the feature of the world we cannot help doing away with continuity. And yet change and continuity could be shown to be non-discordant features of the world without considering both of them to be structural and constitutive features of the world or of things.

This insight into and analysis of change and continuity has both ontological and epistemic implications. It is neither counter-intuitive nor is it counter-methodological. Ontologically it tells us that change cannot be held, within the framework of *Nirhetukatva*, to be determined by anything other than disposition or nature of things, while epistemically it assures us that although we may have experience of continuity, our experience of this kind need not be necessarily determined by the nature of things as they are. For, our cognition of continuity may remain merely to be an epistemic feature of our knowledge without its being determined by the structural features of objects of which our said knowledge is a knowledge. This has an important bearing on *Nairātmyadarśana*, paradigmatic issue in Dharmakīrti's philosophy, as we intend to point out in the next chapter. Just because continuity remains to be an epistemic feature of our knowledge of objects or things it does not, however, follow that continuity must be as *Nirhetuka* as much as change is. Very often continuity as a feature of the world that we comprehend continues to be a purposive and teleological trait, although change

may not be such a kind of trait of the world. This contrastive feature of our comprehension of change and continuity, too, has implications in the conceptual framework and unity of Dharmakīrti's philosophy, which we hope to study in the next chapter.

We saw earlier that with regard to the world given to us Dharmakīrti adopts an empiricist attitude. But empiricisms that one may adopt may be of three principal kinds and it remains to be seen which of them Dharmakīrti accepts and on what basis. Three principal forms of empiricism are :

(i) *Momentary mepiricism*—this is the view according to which all the knowledge we have—rather an individual has—is and must in principle be capable of being made sence of in terms of momentary sensations and hence such momentary sensations are the building blocks of our knowledge, no matter whether such a knowledge is gained through acquaintance or through description, i.e. whether it is gained experientially or linguistically, as the latter is analysable in terms of the former and the former is analysable in terms of momentary sensations. With regard to our knowledge of the empirical world Dharmakīrti adopts momentary empiricism in so far as according to him our knowledge of such a world is gained through momentary perceptual cognitions and also in so far as, according to him, in order that we succeed in gaining such a kind of cognition the things need to be presented to us at least for a moment, although it need not mean, as it is often held, that they need to last no more than a moment.[106] We shall have an occasion to inquire into this distortion in the last chapter. Momentary empiricism is a methodologically sufficient philosophical position for our being able to analyse and explain our knowledge of the empirical world. It is in this

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106. (1) मनोरथनन्दी; प्रमाणवार्त्तिकवृत्ति; न अर्थः अनुभवं अन्तरेण कचित दृष्टः, वेदनं च अर्थाकारं विना न दृष्टं संवेद्यमानम् । प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० .15.

(2) तत्रैव; परनिरपेक्षाश्च भावा: स्वनाशः इति क्षणिका: सर्वं संस्कार: इति अकप: सोगतसिहनाद: ।
परार्थां परि० पृ० 457.

(3) तत्रैव; क्षणक्षयिस्वभावा : भावा: स्वहेतो एव जायन्ते । परार्थां० परि० पृ० 456.

limited sense Dharmakīrti adopts it, not in the sense that inferential cognition too must be analysable in terms of momentary sensation. With regard to paradigmaticity of empirical world that he accepts, as we wish to explain in the next chapter momentary empiricism accepted by Dharmakīrti with regard to perceptual cognition has enormous implications, especially the minimalistic condition that needs to be satisfied in order that we have perceptual cognition at all.

(ii) *Individual empiricism*—All knowledge which human beings have should be capable of being satisfactorily analysed in terms of knowledge that a given individual has or can have in principle, no matter whether such a knowledge is available by acquaintance or by description. This variety of empiricism transgresses the minimum requirement that empiricism as a philosophic position needs to satisfy in order that it remains methodologically viable. This is especially because knowledge by description that an individual might have is capable of satisfactorily being analysed in terms of his own knowledge by acquaintance and the latter is analysable in knowledge gained through momentary sensation.

(iii) *Social empiricism*—On this variety knowledge should ultimately be analysable in terms of interpersonal knowledge, no matter whether empirically gained or gained through description. That is, on this view knowledge has to fulfil the condition of communicability for its being considered to be viable. This is rather a stringent demand that knowledge is expected to satisfy since it holds that knowledge of whatever kind must be social both in its origination as well as certification. Dharmakīrti going by minimalist consideration which methodologically needs to be satisfied in order that our knowledge—individual or social—comes to be considered to be viable opts for the first kind of empiricism with regard to our knowledge about empirical world gained perceptually. We shall have an occasion to examine Dharmakīrti's brand of empiricism with regard to paradigmaticity of empirical world in the next chapter, where we propose to discuss minimalistic consideration as a measure in terms of economy to be considered in detail in the last chapter with a view to analysing determinative factors of the conceptual framework and unity of his philosophy.

Resume and the Argument to Follow :

In this chapter we studied various contours of interconnection-convergently and divergently—between perceptual and inferential cognitions according to Dharmakīrti with a view to make a little fiber-tracing of the routes going along with which we may hope to spell out the sort of conceptual framework of and unity in Dharmakīrti's philosophy which stands out on a closer scrutiny. While undertaking examination along with this route we wish to bring out the sort of world and the sort of problem Dharmakīrti treats and considers to be paradigmatic, the way he spells out decisive aspects of the sort of philosophy the Buddha intended to put before us, the sort of truths he sought to bring to our notice along with interconnection between them, and the way he utilizes and exploits the insights made available by Dharmakīrti's predecessors within the Buddhist camp. Taking such aspects of Dharmakīrti's philosophy is expected to enable us to comprehend the conceptual framework and unity of his philosophy. This, however, being the task of the next chapter we propose to discuss them there and it is with this intention that we proceed to it. The interconnections studied in this chapter are expected to be helpful in accomplishing the task of the next chapter on the background of Dharmakīrti's analysis of perceptual and inferential cognitions studied respectively in the second and third chapters. Being armed with the material that has surfaced in the last three chapters we proceed to study conceptual framework and unity of Dharmakīrti's philosophy in the next chapter.

5

The Conceptual Framework of Dharmakīrti's Philosophy

In the previous chapter we have made an attempt to bring out the interconnection between analysis of perception and object of perceptual cognition on the one hand and that of inference and object of inferential cognition on the other as presented by Dharmakīrti. This is done to make it possible for us to comprehend some of the important lines of interconnection between various concepts, Dharmakīrti has invoked and different issues he has discussed in the contexts of his epistemological and methodological investigation. Through an inquiry of this kind certain lines of interconnection in his thought have doubtlessly surfaced. But merely concentrating upon these aspects of his thought in itself is not enough for our being able to comprehend unity of Dharmakīrti's thought and philosophy. Nor just adding those aspects of his thought which have remained uninvestigated in our inquiry so far can enable us to grasp the requisite unity of his thought. The unity of his thought will have to be brought out through investigation into conceptual framework of his philosophy. In such an investigation the contours of interconnection brought out, so far it would certainly have to find a legitimate place. But much more importantly, the goal of his philo-

sophic investigation would have to be shown to be not only bearing its stamp and seal on the sort of world he considers to be paradigmatic, the paradigmatic problem of philosophical investigation in his view, together with the sort of epistemological and methodological inquiry he embarks upon and endeavours to accomplish to the best of his ability. It will not merely suffice to point out that in Dharmakīrti's view philosophical investigation is in order in so far as it is through it alone that we can discover and comprehend that knowledge properly so called or knowledge in the true sense of the term which is instrumental to the realisation of the totality of *Puruṣārthas* ; the legitimate goals of human life.[1] Nor will it suffice to point out that the way, according to him, in which genuine philosophic comprehension would dawn on us is through our discovering and enabling others to discover that there is nothing like permanent self.[2] It will also not do to point out that Dharmakīrti does not repudiate the reality of external empirical world either.[3] It will also not do to hold that what gives unity to Dharmakīrti's thought and philosophy is the fact that the kind of philosophy he puts before us through his numerous writings is not something that is his own independent creation but is rather an elaboration and thoroughgoing systematic presentation of the philosophic vision of the Buddha himself,[4] the trait in which he could be said to be following in the footsteps of no less an able predecessor than Nāgārjuna who declares in *Vigrahavyāvartanī* that "there is no philosophic position that I call mine and which I wish

1. धर्मकीर्ति; न्यायबिन्दु; सम्यकज्ञानपूर्विका पुरुषार्थसिद्धिरिति तद् व्युत्पाद्यते। प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 1.

2. प्रज्ञाकरगुप्त; वार्तिकालंकार; नैरात्म्यदर्शनं फलं, निवर्तकं आत्मदर्शनस्य। पृ० 116.

3. मनोरथनन्दी; प्रमाणवार्त्तिकवृत्ति; तस्मात् बाह्य: सन्निहित: अपि अर्थ: तां स्वग्राहकजनने शक्तां धियं विबन्धन् प्रतिहातुं न प्रभु: अपि: शक्त: अन्यथा यदि एवं न अभ्युपगम्यते, तदार्थस्य सन्निधौ तज्ज्ञानस्यैवोत्पादनात् ज्ञानज्ञनस्यानुत्पादाद्धियं कश्चिन्नानुभवेत् । प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 247

4. प्रज्ञाकरगुप्त; वार्तिकालंकार; नैरात्म्यदर्शन अवसाना भगवता देशना । प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 158.

to defend in the work under consideration."[5] Such aspects of Dharmakīrti's philosophic enterprise and investigation are certainly important. But the unity of his thought and philosophy cannot be hoped to be spelt out through just one of these threads in isolation from others. To do something of this kind would amount to missing many of the important philosophic insights he presents in his various treatises and which have been elaborated and commented upon by his commentators. Instead of going about in this way we wish to investigate into Dharmakīrti's conceptual framework and bring out unity of his thought in such a manner that not only the lines of interconnections pointed out in earlier chapters would find a profounder significance but the various aspects of his thought would also come to bear upon one another in such a way that unity of his thought and philosophy would stand out in a bolder relief. An inquiry or this kind, it is hoped, would enable us to comprehend the sort of unity under consideration within the conceptual framework of his philosophy. This would also enable us to unify at least the principal threads of our argument. With this end in view we turn in this chapter to study the conceptual framework of Dharmakīrti's philosophy and hope to comprehend the uniting threads of his thought and philosophy.

Possibility of Exploring Unity Through Puruṣārthas

Out of the different treatises Dharmakīrti has ritten the most comprehensive of them is obviously *Pramāṇavārtika*. But his other treatises no matter whether, considered in the *Nyāya* terminology, they are *Vādagranthas* or *Prakaraṇagranthas*, are not to be discounted and neglected totally. At their neglect of this kind one cannot hope to claim to have explored and investigated into the conceptual framework and unity of his thought and philosophy. Due significance and importance has also to be attached to his philosophical exploration and investigation in them. Moreover, in so far as it comes to be held that his *Nyāyabindu* is meant to explicate some of the principal points of *Pramāṇavārtika* in such a way that they would be comprehensible to persons of limited interest in technical

5. नागार्जुन; विग्रहव्यावर्तनी; यदि काचन प्रतिज्ञा तत्र स्यात्देषमे भवेद्दोष : । नास्ति च मम प्रतिज्ञा तस्मान्नैवास्ति मे दोषः ॥ 29 ॥

considerations and those of limited intellectual calibre,[6] the way in which certain points are made there must have been considered to be comprehensible even to laymen and not necessarily to *Paṇdits*. To satiate their inquisitiveness there are tougher nuts for them to crack like those of *Pramāṇavārtika* and *Hetubindu,* to mention just two of the extant works of Dharmakīrti in *Sanskrit,* no matter whether through restoration from Tibetan or otherwise. The way and the points which are made in such works of Dharmakīrti like *Nyāyabindu* should have remained comprehensible even to laymen, it is possible to surmise, especially because they would have been floating around in the then prevalent intellectual atmosphere and milieu and hence even a mere mention of them, without any elaborate and additional explication of them, they should have remained easily comprehensible by laymen and non-*Paṇdits* also. In addition it is not unlikely, as is the case with reference to Dharmakīrti's *Nyāyabindu* as we hope to point out shortly, that certain points which could be taken to be obvious and fairly clear to *Paṇdits* need to be mentioned, however passingly, in a treatise meant for common people, to make the discussion of the unfamiliar points easily accessibly to them by putting it in the scheme already known to and familiar with them. As we shall point out below something of this kind happens in the case of *Nyāyabindu* of Dharmakīrti and that is why we have been making the point under consideration.

In the *Nyāyabindu* as in *Pramāṇavārtika* Dharmakīrti accepts only two avenues through which any kuowledge worth the name could be said to be available with us. This seems intuitively to be obvious in so far as whatever knowledge we have flows to us either through our own experience, whereby we come to discover things, or through significant expressions which we use while we communicate with one another. Using Russellian terminology it could be said that knowledge we have come to be gained either through acquaintancc or through description. This parallel needs, however, to be understood with a pinch of salt. It is this that, while according to Russell objects of both knowledge by acquaintance

6. दुर्वेक मिश्र; धर्मोत्तरप्रदीप; ननु वार्तिकादिनाएव सम्यक् ज्ञानस्य व्युत्पादनात् कथमस्य (न्यायबिन्दोः) न वैयर्थ्यमितिचेत्, संक्षिप्तरूचीत् प्राज्ञान् अधिकृत्य इदं प्रणतिभिति अदोषः । पृ० 35.

and by description have both particularity and generality as their constitutive features, at the hands of Dharmakīrti particularity is the only decisive feature of objects of knowledge by acquaintance and if and when they have shareable features it should be understood to be a matter of accident rather than that of a rule and unexceptionality, generality, shareability or communicability not being their constitutive and inalienably decisive feature. We need not labour longer on this comparison. The point we made is meant to free the concerned ones from the possible confusion into which one is likely to plunge in an unguarded moment of deliberation, being carried away by superficial comparison, which very often is unfortunately the fate of studies in our country carried out under the banner of comparative philosophy.

Leaving the digression and returning to the point of decisive significance that we wish to make. Although both in *Nyāyabindu* and *Pramāṇavārtika* Dharmakīrti accepts only two avenues of knowledge, as pointed out earlier, viz. perception and inference or knowing the object of knowledge directly or indirectly, yet in *Nyāyabindu* alone, however passingly, he attempts to answer the question: why should one probe and investigate into these kinds of knowledge? He answers the question by saying that an inquiry into both these kinds of knowledge properly so-called is intended to be undertaken in the treatise under consideration, viz. *Nyāyabindu* (and elsewhere in such treatises as *Pramāṇavārtika* as well in so far as this contention in not repudiated by him or by his commentators), because and in so far as such a kind of knowledge is instrumental to the realization of *Puruṣārthas*—considered to be the legitimate and proper goals of human life in its individual and social life in the context of Indian intellectual and cultural milieu and hence easily accessible even to laymen merely by mention of the term *Puruṣārthas* without in any way further elaborating it or in any way enumerating them explicitly, as also without further pointing out that in all four *Puruṣārthas* need to be considered to be genuine and legitimate goals of human life, viz. *Dharma*, *Artha*, *Kāma*, and *Mokṣa*. A bare mention of the term *Sarvapuruṣārtha* is enough to serve the intended purpose.[7]

7. धर्मकीर्ति; न्यायबिन्दु; सम्यकज्ञानपूर्विका सर्वपुरुषार्थसिद्धिरिति तत् व्युत्पाद्यते । प्रत्यक्ष परि॰ पृ॰ 1.

From this consideration one important point stands out. It is this that knowledge properly so-called is not to be prized, praised and gained as an end in itself. In fact no Indian philosopher or philosophical school has ever come to consider and uphold the view in which knowledge itself is taken to be intrinsic end or goal. Given further that *Puruṣārthas* were held to be legitimate goals or ends of human life, in the sense that to which one realises or at least the possibility of their being realised in one's life open, that one could be said to have lived in a characteristic human way, it was a legitimate way of understanding that the only way one can hope to realise the *Puruṣārthas* as genuine ends of human life in so far as one has gained the requisite kind of knowledge properly so-called. There might have been difference of opinion whether *Puruṣārthas* need to be considered to be just two or four— adherents of *Cārvāka* school are generally held to have subscribed to only two *Puruṣārthas*, viz. *Artha* and *Kāma* in such a way that the former is said to have been held to be instrumental to the latter-or although some philosophers might have held one of them to be the most important—for instance a case can be made out with regard to *Mokṣa*—yet at least on two counts there seems to be fair general agreement: (a) that *Puruṣārthas* are the legitimate goals of human life, and (b) that knowledge properly so-called is decisively instrumental to our being able to realize *Puruṣārthas* in our life. Again, the difference of opinion as to what sort of knowledge properly so-called is held to be determinative of the realisation of *Puruṣārthas* in our life is a point which need not detain us here. What is important at this juncture of our investigation is to understand that knowledge properly so-called was held in India generally to be instrumental to our being able to realise *Puruṣārthas* in our life—individual or social.

It may, however, be asked as to how does knowledge properly so-called enable us to realise *Puruṣārthas* in our life? It is pointed out that such a knowledge enables us to realise *Puruṣārthas* in our life in so far as it enables us to select that which is conducive to the realisation of *Puruṣārthas* and reject or give up that which is not so conducive.[8] Thus, acceptance or rejection of anything in

8. (a) दुर्वेक मिश्र; धर्मोत्तरप्रदीप; पुरुषार्थो हेयोपादेय हानोपादानलक्षण [illegible] [illegible]: । स्त्रोऽस्यास्तीति[illegible] । पृ० 10.
(b) धर्मोत्तर; न्यायबिन्दुटीका; पुरुषार्थोपयोगि सम्यक् ज्ञानम् । पृ० 10.

an anthropocentric or cosmocentric world is said to be governed decisively by the consideration whether it is instrumental to or not to our being able to realise *Puruṣārthas* in our life. This kind of acceptance or rejection may be extended to things, the manifestation or disclosure of which may induce a response on our part of searching and finding them out through perceiving them or that of an action— overt or covert— no matter induced by perception of a thing or not.[9] While veridical perceptual cognition invariably discloses a particular thing to be there, inferential cognition invariably indicates an object that is connected with *Liṅga* or *Hetu.*[10] In both the cases the respective knowledge under consideration is instrumental to our being able to realize *Puruṣārthas* in our life through enabling us to chose things or actions conducive to being adopted or rejected depending upon whether they are or they are not beneficial to it.

Given this it may be asked: if the key significance of knowledge properly so-called in Dharmakīrti's view is sought to be understood along the path whether or to what extent it is conducive to enabling us to realise the legitimate goals of our life, viz. *Puruṣārthas*, would it not be proper to investigate the conceptual framework of his philosophy and the unity of his thought along this route, especially in so far as this could be held to be the unitary and unifying thread of his philosophic investigation in his various treatises ? This *prima facie* luring and attractive line of considering unity and conceptual framework of Dharmakīrti's philosophy is ridden, however, with some of the unsurmountable difficulties: (i) It will have to be accepted that Dharmakīrti's entire philosophical enterprise would have to be said to be directed at spelling out such a conceptual framework within the jurisdiction of which our realisation of *Puruṣārthas* in our life could be said to be the only solitary goal towards which it could be said to be exclusively geared. (ii) Given further that number of philosophical enterprises in our country were directed, directly or indirectly, centrally or

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9. धर्मोत्तर; न्यायबिन्दुटीका; द्विविधं च सम्यक् ज्ञानम्, अर्थक्रियानिर्भासनम्, अर्थक्रियासमर्थे च प्रवर्तनम्। प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 28.

10. तत्रैव; तथा च प्रत्यक्षं प्रतिभासनं नियतं अर्थं दर्शयति, अनुमानं च लिङ्ग सम्बद्धं नियतमर्थं दर्शयति। पृ० 21.

peripherally, at accomplishment of such an end, Dharmakīrti's philosophy in particular and Buddhist philosophical tradition in general would lose much of its crucial and significant peculiarity and differentia. (iii) If Dharmakīrti and his predecessors as well as successors are to be said to be striving towards the realisation of the goal of their being able to spell out such a conceptual philosophic framework within which, in their view, the realisation of our *Puruṣārthas* in our life would be considered to be plausible then there should have been much more agreement and concurrence among them than normally noticeable. (iv) As we hope to point out in what follows the fundamental point in Dharmakīrti's philosophic enterprise in his various treaties is to spell out such a conceptual framework within the jurisdiction of which the philosophy of the Buddha could be shown to be significant and important on the one hand and his being able to combat and show the weakness in the philosophic positions and conceptual framework adopted by his adversaries on the other. As a corollary of this he also wishes to defend, to the extent to which it is possible, feasible and warrantable, the points of crucial importance made by *Dinnāga* in his philosophic enterprise, not only because they are decisive in spelling out important tenets and implications of the philosophy of the Buddha but also because, not realising their significance, they were made caricature of by his such adversaries as Udyotakara. If we adopt the above-mentioned line of spelling out conceptual framework and unity of Dharmakīrti's philosophy then the point that what he seriously strives for is to spell out the conceptual framework and unity of the philosophy of the Buddha would be lost sight of and instead we would come to attach disproportionate significance to a point which should be reckened to be less significant.. This is not to say that consideration of *Puruṣārthas* as also of the instrumentality of knowledge properly so called in our being able to realise them in our life—individual and social—meant nothing to him and hence was worthy of being confined to a dust-bin. But they were sought to be understood and comprehended within the framework of the philosophy of the Buddha and neither never outside it nor even independently of it. Understanding this way, it is Buddha's philosophy, its conceptual framework and its unity which should gather decisive importance in Dharmakīrti's philoso-

phic enterprise rather than consideration of *Puruṣārths*, context free instrumentality of knowledge properly so-called in our being able to realise them in our life, as also the conceptual framework and unity around which *Puruṣārthas* and above mentioned kind of instrumentality of knowledge properly so-called are said to revolve. (v) Lastly, as we shall spell out and explain in the sequel, Dharmakīrti does not wish to explore and investigate into the philosophy of the Bhddha, articulate its conceptual framework and indicate the thread of unity that runs through various thoughts of the Buddha independently of the consideration as what kind of world, problem, path and perspective needs to be considered to be paradigmatic minimally with a view to our being able to grasp and comprehend the nerve and heart of it. As we shall show below, although Dharmakīrti is in agreement with quite a large number of his predecessors in so far as everybody of them considered spelling crucial aspects of the philosophy of the Buddha to be the central task of their philosophic enterprise. But we will endeavour to point out that in spite of this agreement there are marked differences between Dharmakīrti on the one hand and his predecessors on the other. The sort of differences under consideration, it will be pointed out later, stem basically from the consideration as to what kind of world needs minimally to be considered to be paradigmatic etc. with a view to our not failing to spell out the conceptual framework and unity of the philosophy of the Buddha. It is, the aspects of this kind of the philosophic enterprise of Dharmakīrti which need to be paid a little closer and profounder attention to in order to be able to spell out the conceptual framework and unity of his philosophy, rather than allowing the roling moss of *Puruṣārths* and instrumentality of knowledge properly so-called in our being able to realise *Puruṣārthas* in our life gather the entire dust of Dharmakīrti's philosophy, its conceptual framework and its unity. It is significant to look elsewhere, allow them to spin around those considerations to spell which out, to the best of his ability, Dharmakīrti spared no effort and to combat adversaries against which he shirked no responsibility.

Given this, the *prima fcie* luring and attractive line of exploring and investigating the conceptual framework and unity of Dharmakīrti's philosophy along the route of the consideration of *Puruṣārthas* and instrumentality of knowledge properly so-called in

enabling us to realise them in our life—individual and social—cannot be endeavoured at the cost of losing much of the warmth and heat in Dharmakīrti's philosophy and also at the cost of blunting much of its curical sharpness and decisive peculiarity. For our being able to spell out conceptual framework of Dharmakīrti's philosophic enterprise and articulating its unity we shall have rather to look elsewhere. It is the task of the remainder of this chapter to undertake investigation into them along the differential route and bring out some of the important implications of it. It is to this that we turn in the sequel.

Preliminary Considerations about Investigations into the Conceptual Framework and Unity of Dharmakīrti's Philosophy

We had an occasion earlier to examine Dharmakīrti's analysis of percept ion and that of objects of perceptual cognition. Similarly, we also investigated into his analysis of inferential cognition and that of objects of such cognition. Inquiring into the modes and some of the important patterns of interconnection between them we argued that such threads of interconnection aie pointers to the investigation into the conceptual framework and unity of his philosophy. But investigation into them is not merely a matter of tossing together number of such modes and patterns of interconnection between Dharmakīrti's analysis of perception and inference as also of their respective objects. In the same vein, we saw in the preceding section that the conceptual framework of his philosophy and the unity of his philosophic enterprise cannot fruitfully be attempted to be captured through the point that in his view knowledge properly so-called, no matter whether perceptual or inferential, is held to be instrumental to our being able to realise, in our individual and social life, the legitimate goals of human life, viz. *Puruṣārthas*. The kind of modes and patterns of interconnection between his analysis of perceptual and inferential cognitions and their respective objects, or the point that in his view knowledge properly so-called being held to be instrumental to our being able to realise our legitimate *Puruṣārthas* in our life are doubtlessly important. But none of them can exclusively be claimed to be commanding the prerogative of enabling us to be able to spell out the conceptual framework and unity of his philosophic enterprise. His analysis of perceptual and inferential cognitions is not directed

merely at pointing out the nature and significance of the kinds of cognitions human beings are capable of. The analysis of the objects of the cognitions under consideration, again, is not directed merely at bringing to our notice the nature and importance of the kinds of objects human beings can cognise through the two fundamental, mutually irreducible to each other, kinds of cognitions they can have. The methodological considerations that he brings in, in explicating modes and patterns of intereonnection between perceptual and inferential cognitions as also between objects of these respective cognitions are not exclusively directed at pointing out modes and patterns of interconnection between the two principal kinds of cognitions normal human beings are capable of. These considerations of general significance are no doubt there. But the crucial significance of Dharmakīrti's philosophy, cannot, without violence to its principal tenets, be attempted to be brought out in this general way only. While exploring into the conceptual framework of it and while bringing out the unity of it, it cannot conveniently be forgotten or ignored that he is one of the most important Buddhist philosophers. This being the case it is but natural to expect that some crucial features of his philosophy with other Buddhist philosophers, notably his predecessors. At the same time he is neither a parasite nor an eclectic, expert like a bee in serving a recipe that is ninety percent predigested and hence the easiest to digest even by a child. It is not invain and merely a matter of eulogy that such a staunch adversary of his like Jayantabhatta, an erudite *Pandita* from *Nyāya* camp, said about him that he is '*jagat abhibhava dhiro dhīmān*.'[11] The way, therefore, of explicating the conceptual framework of his philosophy and unity of his philosophic enterprise needs to be carefully prepared and laid in such a way that some of the decisively and crucially significant aspects of his philosophy and philosophic enterprise are neither relegated arbitrary into a background nor are they violently brushed aside. The sort of methodological considerations that he raises have to be given their legitimate due. But the problems and issues of primary significance around which the conceptual framework of his philosophy and the unity of his philosophic enterprise revolve

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11. जयन्तभट्ट; न्यायमञ्जरी; जगदभिभवधीरं धीमतो धर्मकीर्तेः। प्रथमभाग पृ० 93.

and spin have also to be kept in the centre of the focus of attention. At the same time, those general tenets of our epistemological enterprise that he highlights should not come to be made a mockery of. Thus, although the conceptual framework of Dharmakīrti's philosophy should not come to be explored solely through the points of general significance about our knowledge—perceptual or inferential—that he brings forth, or the unity of his philosophic thought should not come to be explicated solely through the view that he upholds that our knowledge properly so-called—no matter perceptual or inferential—should be considered to be instrumental to our being able to realise legitimate goals of our individual or social life, yet these cannot be held to be the aspects of his philosophy which could conveniently be allowed to be glossed over and neglected. The point we are labouring hard to make is that exploration into and explication of the conceptual framework of his philosophy and unity of his philosophic investigation cannot be fruitfully undertaken, without doing serious kind of violence of his philosophy—as many of those who have tried to interpret his philosophy and label it through one or the other way have done at the cost of overlooking or neglecting to take note of those aspects and facets of it which decisively set it apart not only from the philosophy of other Buddhist philosophers but also from that of non-Buddhist philosophers. In order to be able to lay our hand upon those crucially significant aspects of his philosophy with a view to exploring into and explication of the conceptual framework of his philosophy and the unity of his philosophic enterprise we begin with a cursory glance at the scene of Buddhist philosophy in the pre-Dharmakīrti period. This is sought to be done for a twin purpose: (i) On the one hand to assure ourselves that although Dharmakīrti markedly differs from his predecessors in the Buddhist camp, his difference with them is not so radical as to deprive him the very title of his being a Buddhist philosopher at all. (ii) On the other hand, we also wish to lay our finger precisely at those problems and issues the extensive discussion of which at the hands of Dharmakīrti sets him apart from his predecessors and which is important in the task of exploration into and explication of the conceptual framework of his philosophy and unity of his philosophic enterprise in the various treatises he wrote. Such a line of investigating into the conceptual framework and unity of Dharmakīrti's

philosophy, it is hoped, would enable us to avoid those sort of pitfalls, errors, confusions and shortcomings into which the neglect of it is prone to make us fall. Likewise, it would enable us hopefully to understand his philosophy and its implications in a way different from the way it is attempted to be understood and pigeon-holed previously.

Thus, the task of formulating and explicating the conceptual framework of Dharmakīrti's philosophy is extremely intricate and complicated. Yet trying to accomplish it over-simplificationally or neglectfully and carelessly is more likely to throw us into greater confusion and error, misunderstanding and misinterpretation of it that it would be a herculean task to extricate ourselves from the clutches of it. In order not to come to repeat the same kind of mistakes that have been committed at the hands of those who have previously attempted to understand and interpret Dharmakīrti's philosophy we wish to traverse our path differently. As a milestone on this route we begin with a glance at the scene of pre-Dharmakīrti Buddhist Philosophy.

Pre-Dharmakīrti Buddhist Philosophical Position:

During the life-time of the Buddha when he was asked about the problems regarding metaphysical issues he kept silence.[12] It might be the case that he gave primordiality and priority to the problems pertaining to society though sometimes he discussed certain issues regarding truth etc.[13] After couple of hundred years of Buddha's *Nirvāṇa* the successive Councils were held in order to formulate and explicate what the Buddha has said. *Sutta Pittaka*, *Vinaya Pittaka* and *Abhidhamma Pittaka* are products of the proceedings of these Councils. But at the hands of these Councils the systematic inquiry into philosophical aspect and significance of Buddha's teaching remained by far neglecled and teaching and silence came to be interpreted in a religious way. We had to wait upto the commencement of the systematic period of Buddhism in order to

12. Dutta ; N. ; *The Spread of Buddhism and the Buddhist Schools*, p. 11.

13. भिक्षुधर्मरत्न; (Trans.) सुत्तनिपात; चूलवियूह-सुत्त; पृ० 109-193.

understand the philosophical significance of Buddha's teaching. Nāgārjuna is perhaps the pioneer of this period. He made an attempt to interpret Buddha's teaching in a systematic way. Before Nāgārjuna, it could be easily surmised, *Sarvāstivādins* and literal *Sūnyavādins* made an attempt to interpret Buddha's philosophy and tried to formulate his philosophic teaching.

According to *Sarvāstivādins*, the Buddha kept silence because he wanted to accept reality of everything. Everything that we cognise and talk about is real and every real thing is cognisable and explanable in language. Thus, according to them, everything, internal and external, is real.[14] But so far as the issue as to how do we perceive an object, there are two divergent views in the *Sarvāstivādins*' school. According to some, every object is changing at every moment and it is not possible to cognise it immediately. Hence, they accept that an object is indirectly perceived. Upholders of this view are known as *Sautrāntikas*.[15] On the contrary, other *Sarvāstivādins* hold that an object is directly perceived. They do not believe in the literal sense of *Kṣaṇikatā*. Upholders of this view are known as *Vaibhāṣikas*.[16] *Sarvāstivādins*, however, seem to accept one to one correspondence not only between knowledge and the world but also between cognitive and justificatory epistemology. But at their hands the crucial distinction between the real and the unreal seems to remain to be vulnerable.

According to literal *Śūnyavādins* the Buddha kept silence because he wanted to deny reality of everything. Nothing is real.[17] For them, neither external nor internal object is real. Naturally, if nothing is cognized then the very problem of its justification need not be raised. Thus, at the hands of literal *Śūnyavādins*, problems of epistemology, either cognitive or justificatory, are not raised for the very simple reason that they cannot be raised, as nothing being real, nothing could be cognized.

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14. उपाध्याय,बलदेव; बौद्ध-दर्शन मीमांसा, पृ० 165.

15. तत्रैव; पृ० 214.

16. तत्रैव; पृ० 213.

17. पाण्डे, गोविन्दचन्द्र; बौद्ध धर्मका इतिहास; पृ० 365.

Thus, *Sarvāstivādins* and literal *Śūnyavādins* seem to hold two extreme positions through accepting everything to be real and denying everything respectively.

If we carefully examine these views we find that there are certain defects in them:

1. Both these views are indefensible because although both are intreseted in interpreting Buddha's teaching yet they commit themselves to extreme positions and it is in itself inconsistent with the Buddha's teaching because the Buddha is held to have advocated *Madhyamā Pratipād*.

2. Problems of epistemology do not seem to have been discussed in a proper way in their philosophy. With respect to literal *Śūnyavādins* such problems do not arise likewise it is not necessary to accept the sort of one to one correspondence between knowledge and the world or that between cognitive and justificatory epistemology which is accepted by *Sarvāstivādins*. Such an acceptance at the hands of *Sarvāstivādins* might have been due to the impact of *Nyāya* tradition or lack of appropriate methodology.[18]

3. Although it could perhaps to be accepted that both literal *Śūnyavādins* and *Sarvāstivādins* wish to make Buddha's philosophy significant yet they are unable to explicate its principal tenets with reference to that sort of paradigmatic world and problem as the Buddha might have thought it to be appropriate to do so, as they do not make it clear as to what sort of world could it be in which Buddha's philosophic teaching could be explained and to which it could be made applicable in a significant way.

As pointed out earlier, Nāgārjuna has made an attempt to interpret Buddha's philosophy in a systematic way. According to him, what he says is not what he wants to say, it is rather what the Buddha wants to say.[19] He believes *Madhyamā Pratipād* to

18. Chinchore, M.; *Vādanyāya : A Glimpse of Nyāya-Buddhist Controversy*. A Ph. D. Thesis (unpublished), Poona University, pp. 19-20.

19. चन्द्रकीर्ति; प्रसन्नपदा; ···एवं यः निरोधादिविशिष्टः प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादः देशितः भगवता···स एवं इदं मध्यमकशास्त्रं प्रणीतमाचार्येण नेयनीतार्थ सूत्रान्त-विभाग उपदर्शनार्थम् । पृ० 13

be the philosophic position of the Buddha.[20] Though, he does not directly explain what is the nature and structure of the paradigmatic world according to the Buddha, yet through his analysis of *Pratītya Samutpād* it seems that he accepts reality of discrete, unique particulars. So far as epistemological issues are concerned he seems to give more importance to justificatory epistemology in his *Vigraha Vyavartanī*, though cognitive epistemological issues are not altogether rejected or denied. Though Nāgārjuna avoids extreme positions of eternalism or nihilism, *Sarvāstivāda* or literal *Śūnyavāda* in his philosophy, it is nonetheless not possible to intersubjectively cognize and communicate about reality because it is accepted that discrete and unique particulars alone are real, and as to cognize intersubjectively and to communicate some general, shareable features are required to be possessed by entities taken to be real. It is true that he believes *Madhyamā Pratipad* to be the philosophic position of the Buddha, but it seems to be accepted to be the goal or end of philosophical enterprise, *Madhyamā Pratipad* in his view does not seem to be instrumental to the realisation of *Puruṣārthas* in our life. His sole concern seems to be systematic explication of the philosophy of the Buddha.

Accepting perhaps a clue from Nāgārjuna's position regarding epistemology Asaṅga and earlier Vasubandhu seem to concentrate on certain issue/s without inquiring whether and to what extent such an issue needs to be considered to be not only to be paradigmatic but decisively significant as well in Buddha's philosophy. While according to later Vasubandhu our understanding of the nature of *dharmas* seems to gather immense importance, in the philosophy of both earlier Vasubandhu and Asaṅga the field of justificatory epistemology seems to be held to be crucially important. But they seem unable to answer the question what sort of objects are given in our cognition and what sort of world or problem needs to be considered to be paradigmatic with a view to our being able to capture the very nerve and heart of the philosophy of the Buddha.

20. नागार्जुन; मध्यमकशास्त्र; यः प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादः शून्यता तां प्रचक्ष्महे। सा प्रज्ञप्तिरुपादाय प्रतिपद् सैव मध्यमा । ॥ 24.'18.॥

At the hands of Diṅnāga it seems to have come to be emphasised unambiguously and unhesitatingly that not only cognitive and certificatory epistemological issues need to be paid attention to but also that a proper analysis of perceptual and inferential cognitions is necessary for our being able to grasp the central tenets of the philosophy of the Buddha. In spite of his having made a distinction between *Sva-lakṣaṇa* and *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* as the legitimate objects respectively of perceptual and inferential cognitions his methodological tool does not seem to have been sharpened enough to be able to immunise his explication of the philosophy of the Buddha against those kinds of vulnerabilities to which Dharmakīrti draws our attention later on and accordingly differed from Diṅnāga, not allowing his reverence for him to be confused with or allowed to be substituted for truth and its methodological defensibility. At the hands of Diṅnāga, further, we seem to remain in the dark as to what sort of nature of things needs minimally to be understood in order to be able to make sense of the philosophy of the Buddha. Or, for that matter, what sort of world and what sort of problem need to be understood to be paradigmatic for the accomplishment of the task under consideration in a methodologically defensible way.

At the hands of Diṅnāga, it does not seem to be clear whether *Sva-lakṣaṇa* and *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* are knowables or things. Hence, as it seems, Diṅnāga, while elucidating a world view, conducive to our being able to explicate Buddha's philosophy, accepts a sort of dualism. Likewise, it is not clear whether he talks about veridical and non-veridical perceptions in an alike way or differently. Though he wants to make the distinction between cognitive and justificatory epistemological issues, yet he seems to be unsuccessful in clearly bringing to our notice whether there is or there is not correspondence between the way we cognize our knowledge-claims and the way we defensibly would be able to certify them, without giving way to confusion and error.

If we look at the systematic period of Buddhism from Nāgārjuna to Diṅnāga, it appears that there are certain difficulties with which the philosophical discussion in this period were unfortunately ridden. First, it is quite legitimate to hold that given that Buddhist

philosophers during this period wanted to discuss some of the important tenets of Buddha's philosophic teaching, his philosophic doctrines and principles were sought to be explicated and their significance and relevance brought out at their hands in a systematic way. But does accomplishment of systematization of these doctrines, concepts etc. alone suffice ? Or is it sufficient to emphasise problems falling within the jurisdiction of justificatory epistemology alone ? One might succeed in showing that knowledge or information available at one's disposal is systematizable. But does this also enable one to spell out the nature of the world about which this kind of information is relevant and significant ? Again, the world about which such systematized information may be relevant, may just be a conceivable world. But then did Buddha's philosophy concern itself merely with conceivable world ? In this case, the problem of reliability and genuine relevance of such knowledge-claims on the one hand and relevance of Buddha's teaching on the other may remain problematic, as in such a situation Buddha's teaching would have relevance only in a conceivable world and not necessarily in this world. Hence, mere systematic presentation of Buddha's philosophy is not sufficient. In addition, it is also necessary to discuss as to what kind of world-view did the Buddha endeavour to put forth and what sort of world-needs to be considered to be paradigmatic with regard to our being able to comprehend relevance and significance of Buddha's philosophy.

Secondly, among the sort of epistemological issues which should concern us exclusively emphasis on justificatory epistemological issues would not suffice. For, as is already pointed out earlier, in a legitimate philosophical inquiry into our epistemological enterprise problems pertaining to both cognitive and justificatory epistemology have to be given due consideration and importance that they legitimately deserve. For, our coming to advance worthwhile knowledge-claims needs to be backed by cognitive enterprise on our part, and the question of certification of knowledeg-claims advanced by us is futile to be raised independently of the consideration of cognitively available information at our disposal. Again, about the sort of information at our disposal it cannot be held conveniently that it must all be certifiable since every piece of information we have is

about some or the other real and that there is a correspondence between cognitively available and certifiable information as *Sarvāstivādins* are prone to hold. Nor can it be held, on the other hand, that no information at our disposal could be held to be about anything real, there being nothing that is real, and hence certifiable, as literal *Śūnyavādins* are prone to hold.

Though Diṅnāga tries to present significance and relevance of Buddha's philosophy avoiding the above mentioned kinds of shortcomings through giving due importance to cognitive and justificatory epistemological issues yet there are certain loopholes in his philosophic enterprise as well with the result that from his account of Buddha's philosophy one finds it extremely difficult to make out what sort of world and problem/s might have been held to be paradigmatic by the Buddha.

In the philosophic enterprise of Dharmakīrti and in the various treatises he wrote, the sort of conceptual framework that he adopts and the way he explicates unity in the philosophy of the Buddha revolves and spins around the consideration of certain decisively important issues and it is to highlight their nature and significance that we turn in the sequel. Meanwhile, we attempted to bring out that although Dharmakīrti belongs to the systematic period of Buddhist philosophy, he markedly differs from his predecessors. This does not, however, mean that he is totally negligent of those points being made at the hands of his predecessors from the systematic period of Buddhist philosophy which are beneficial and helpful in spelling out important tenets of the philosophy of the Buddha. We shall have an occasion to return to this point in the next chapter where we hope to inquire into the impact of the predecessors of Dharmakīrti on him with reference to the important consideration of the contribution of his predecessors that he upholds. Turning presently to those points and problems around which the entire net-work of the conceptual framework of his philosophic enterprise and the unity of his thought revolve we intend to bring out their significance and implications below.

The Doctrine of two truths

We had earlier an occasion to point out that Dharmakīrti accepts two *Pramāṇas* corresponding to the fact that there are two

principal kinds of knowables. But the two principal kinds of knowables are not held to be discernible arbitrarily. They are rather held to be so in so far as their knowledge on our part brings forth two different sorts of cognitions and two distinct sort of truths, the comprehension of which becomes possible with the help of two distinct *Pramāṇas* through which they remain knowable. The two sorts of comprehensions under consideration are held respectively to be those of *Parmārtha Sat* and *Samvṛtti Sat.* The respective objects of perceptual and inferential cognitions, viz. *Svalakṣaṇa* and *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* make the two different sorts of cognitions available and through them bring before us two distinct sort of truths.[21] Of them, veridical perceptual cognition discloses the nature of things as they are, while any cognition arising through language and communication enables us to adopt certain patterns or modes of action and behaviour—including verbal and intellectual—which we are ordinarily prone to subscribe to. It is this latter kind of cognition which arises through our coming to cognize. *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇas* and our being able to comprehend nature and constitution of things as they are is never a built-in or constitutively determinative feature of it.[22] In holding this view Dharmakīrti seems to be indebted to Nāgārjuna according to whom the entire gamut of the epistemological and philosophic enterprise of the Buddha is directed at delineation of the sorts of two kinds of truths we are prone to discover.[23] This does not mean that there are two sorts of entities belonging to the world and that duality of truths we discover is determined by such a kind of duality entities. On the contrary, the same entities, *Svalakṣaṇas*, happen to be comprehended differentially in such a way that two distinct kinds of features of them become manifest to us in the two differential kinds of comprehensions stemming from perceptual and inferential cognitions.

21. धर्मकीर्ति; प्रमाणवार्तिक; अर्थक्रियासमर्थं यत् तदत्र परमार्थ सत् । अन्यत् संवृत्तिसत् प्रोक्तं, ते स्वसामान्यलक्षणे ॥3॥
प्रत्यक्षपरि० पृ० 100.

22. मनोरथनन्दी; प्रमाणवार्तिकवृत्ति; ते परमार्थसंवृती स्वसामान्यलक्षणे स्वसामान्यलक्षणे इष्टे । पृ० 100.

2 . नागार्जुन; मध्यमकशास्त्र; द्वे सत्ये समुपाश्रित्य बुद्धानां धर्मदेशनां लोकसंवृत्ति सत्यं च सत्यं च परमार्थता: । ॥24.7॥

The fundamental difference between them is this that veridical perceptual cognition as it arises independently of language and communication loaded with convention, enables us to cognise those and only those non-shareable features of things, which the genuinely existent things cannot lack and yet be the kind of things they are, while through inferential cognition we cognise such shareable features of things or *Svalakṣaṇas* irrespective of the fact whether they are actually possessed by them or not. What the latter makes possible, at the most, is our being able to enter into communication, using language as a fabric of entering into various relationships, connect ourselves with various expectations, wishes, desires, inclinations etc. in such a way that it is they which, as it were, constitute the very nexus of our genuine being. But since the latter can arise independently of our discovery of real things and their genuine nature, through them it is hardly legitimate to expect that sooner or later we may be in a position to discover real nature of existents. This is not, of course, to deny outright that nothing existent can ever have shareable and communicable features of any kind. But it is important, at the same time, to realise that this sort of feature of them is not determinative of their being existents; rather it is an accidental feature that they have. It is this sort of accidentality that makes convergence of perceptual and inferential cognitions possible and feasible, as was pointed out in the previous chapter. But what Dharmakīrti seems to impress upon us is that such an accidentality cannot be held to be a built-in-feature of things such that things just cannot be unless the condition of this kind of feature being possessed by them is fulfilled unexceptionally. In the philosophic enterprise of the Buddha, too, it was this that was sought earnestly to be brought to our notice so that we do not go about in our epistemological enterprise muddle-headedly. The doctrine of two truths is not meant to usher in any kind of schism in our epistemological accomplishment and is not an attempt to bring about an unbridgeable chasm between two aspects of it. It is rather a tacit and genuine acknowledgement of the fact that originating as they do from two directions these two aspects require differential minimum conditions to be satisfied for their feasibility and viability. A failure to realise this would not only not enable us to comprehend the principal tenets of the philosophy of the Buddha but would also make us end with such confusion and error

from which it would be very difficult to free ourselves. The systematic Buddhist philosophers like Nāgārjuna and Dharmakīrti seem to strive hard to bring this to our notice. The discussion of the doctrine of two truths in Dharmakīrti seems to be directed at bringing to our attention an important aspect of the philosophy of the Buddha.

Madhyamā Pratipad

While explaining some of the key and central concepts and bringing the interrelationship between them Systematically viz. *Pratītyasamutpāda*, *Śūnyata* and *Nirvāṇa*—Nāgārjuna attempted to describe what he considers to be the central or focul approach that the Buddha exhorted us to adopt, decisive philosophic under standing that is determinative of the emergence of right sort of vision and comprehension. viz. *Nirvāṇa*. He called the philosophical position of the Buddha to be *Madhyamā Pratipad* and wrote a full treatise called *Madhyamakaśāstra* to explain it.[24] There, it seems what Nāgārjuna strives to point out is what sort of philosophic approach would it be appropriate to cultivate on our part, according to the Buddha, so that other things remaining the same emergence of *Nirvāṇa* right sort of vision and comprehension, does not remain removed from us—a vision or comprehension is which *Pratītyasamutpāda*, *Śūnyata*, and *Nirvāṇa* so stand interrelated with each other that none of them could be severed from or understood independently of one another. What he called *Madhyamā Pratipad*, perhaps for the first time, or the Middle path continued to be held to be the philosophic position of the Buddha, and it has never come to be denied or repudiated at the hands of any Buddhist philosopher belonging to the systematic period, Dharmakīrti being no exception to it. Although he does not devote any section of any of his treatises available in Sanskrit to the discussion of the philosophic position of the Buddha it seems fairly clear, as it would be pointed out later. that its explication remained an uppermost task in his thought and writings. Without anticipating our argument to be outlined later let us, for

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24. For details see Padhye, A.M. ; *The Conceptual Framework of Nāgārjuna's Philosophy*, A Ph. D. Thesis (unpublished), Poona University.

the present, concentrate upon *Madhyamā Pratipad* to be the philosophic position of the Buddha as Nāgārjuna calls it and which has not been denied or repudiated by any successive Buddhist writer worth the name.

What *Madhyamā Pratipad* minimally means is the sort of path, approach we should adopt if we expect that right sort of vision or comprehension should dawn upon us sometime in order that we may to live right sort of life and may come to be cured of those sort of diseases and modes of suffering from which it seems almost otherwise impossible to free ourselves. The path or approach that the Buddha exhorts us to adopt in his medical model of philosophy[25] is directed at curing, of those otherwise incurable diseases we generally come to suffer from and from the clutches of which we are normally unable to see way of our delieverance, consists of our being able to avoid those sort of extremes we are normally prone subscribe to and stand committed to. Such extremes are available every sphere and every situation, every context and circumstance ordinary ; individual, social, epistemological, metaphysical methodological, ordinarily philosophical and it is this that generally makes us diseased, come to suffer and be unhappy. The extremes under consideration range over a fairly wide expanse of contexts and situations that one way or the other have a bearing upon human life—whether those of over eating and of totally fasting or those of holding everything to be real and of holding nothing at all to be real. Such a curative path should be middle, equidistant from both the extremes of poles in a given context or situation is quite obviously clear and hardly needs any prolonged argument for the establishment of it. This has been clarified by Nāgārjuna in no uncertain terms and we should be grateful to him for bringing this aspect of it to our notice.

But on what basis are we in a position to decide whether the path we have adopted in fact is middle or otherwise ? If we use our being cured of the disease we were suffering from to be the criterion then two unpallatable consequences follow :

25. दुर्वेक मिश्र; धर्मोत्तरप्रदीप; ईदृशं वस्तुतः रूपं, इदं च अनुष्ठेयम् इत्यादि रूपेण धर्मदर्शनेन हि भगवता जगद्धितावगमन लक्षणपरार्थसम्पादनोपायसंपद् वैद्यवरस्येव यथावस्थितरूपप्रतीतिशक्ति भैषज्योपदेशो रोगोपसंपादनोपायसम्पत् । पृ० 3.

(a) we should have to wait for this kind of judgement till we become actually cured and in that case that the path we adopted is the middle path becomes a matter of post-martem judgement.

(b) But more importantly, suppose the path we adopt not being middle one worsens our diseases incurably, what would be the use of our judgement that the path we adopted was not in fact the middle one ? Much water by that time would have flown under the bridge and we already could have come to land ourselves in a situation of no return. Can we not avoid these consequences and yet be in a position to adjudge whether the path we have adopted is a middle one or not ? We cannot argue that since we have adopted it therefore it must be the middle one either. For this line of the defence of its being the middle path would be arbitrary and hence indefensible. It is, therfore, necessary to stipulate a criterion on the basis of which it could be held reasonably to be the middle one. Dharmakīrti and his followers seem to have addressed themselves to this consideration and we propose to take a brief note of it with a view to high-lighting its bearing on the conceptual framework of his philosophy and unity of his thought.

It will not merely do to say that the Buddha exhorted us to adopt middle path or *Madhyama Mārga*. Adoption of it is not matter of arbitrary choice. Nor is it a matter of post-martem judgement. It must be a matter of at least fulfilment of an authorising criterion, if not of a guarantering criterion. For, there can be nothing to guarantee that if we have adopted a Middle Path we shall never come to deviate from it. But whenever and to the extent to which we have adopted a Middle Path there must be at least fulfilment of an authorising criterion for our claim that we have adopted a Middle Path. The condition under consideration is that of non-partiality, neutrality or that of non-commitment.[26] Such

26. दुर्वेकमिश्र; धर्मोत्तरप्रदीप;···मननान्मननागवर्जनं माध्यस्थ्यं वा···पुरुषयोः। चित्तप्रसाद स्थैर्यमनः प्रसादोपजननाभ्यां पुण्यातिशयो जायते। माध्यस्थ्ये तु भगवद्विद्वेषोपचयोपनेयनरकेष्वनतिपतनं .विद्वेषोपशमाद् जायते। पृ० 2.

a non-partiality, neutrality or non-partisanship is not a matter of clever decision, policy consideration, idealogical move or a matter of sitting on fence with a view to waiting to chance upon more opportune moment, It is rather an attitude that one comes to cultivate ardously and assiduously on the conviction that partiality and partisanship of any kind is more than likely to detract us from the fulfilment of the task of our being able to live in a way in which we do not fall pray to petty. partisan and narrow considerations. The *Madhyamā Pratipad* that the Buddha extorts us to adopt is a matter of cultivation of an attitude of impartiality and neutrality so non-deviatingly and so constantly that in so far as one has come to adopt it in this way can, other thing being equal authorise us to hold that he is a follower of Middle Path, cultivator of *Madhyamā Pratipad* a *Mādhyasthya* a person characterised by the attitude of *Mādhyasthya.* It is this that authorises us to hold that he would be in a position to equidistant from, non-committed to or non-partisan to any of the warring or tempting alternatives. Not only explanation of the doctrine of the truths but also explication and exhortion of *Madhyamā Pratipad* that links Dharmakīrti's philosophic enterprise and his numerous treatises with the vision of the Buddha and thereby paves a way of spelling out the conceptual framework of his philosophic endeavour. This has some additional implication and we hope to explore them in the context of the next section.

Explication Of Buddha's Philosophy:

The Central Task:

Right from Aśvaghoṣa and Nāgārjuna, to mention the two most prominent Buddhist philosophers of the period of the dawn of the systematic Buddhist philosophy, one trend has been seen to be extremely dominant in the camp of systematic Buddhist philosophers. It is this that everyone of them has considered it to be the central task of his philosophical enterprise to explicate some or the other tenets of the philosophy of the Buddha. Every philosopher of the period worth the name exerted whatever erudition and acumen he had towards this end. One may or may not have said so in the works he wrote. But to any discerning reader of them, this becomes fairly obvious, no one of them has endeavoured to put forth and elaborate what may be called to be philosophic position

of the Buddhist philosopher concerned. This is not to say that they were parasites or sycophants. But in the phase of the changing intellectual circumstance and challanges they took it upon themselves to explain, explicate and elaborate those aspects of the philosophy of the Buddha which had remained hitherto unexplored and unexplicated. As any prominent Buddhist philosopher of the period is not an exception to this so too Dharmakīrti. Since, the task he took upon himself was that of explaining some of the important and hitherto unexplored aspects of the philosophy of the Buddha, it is a matter of small wonder tnat in his numerous treatises one or the other facet of the philosophy of the Buddha has come to be investigated into and its implications elaborately explained. This is so no matter whether a treatise under consideration written by him was written for enlightening *Pandits* or laymen, whether the facet of the philosophy of the Buddha that he undertook to invistigate into is central or peripheral to it. All arguments and counter-arguments, all analysis and investigation available in his various treatises are directed at a single and yet double-edged motive: on the one hand to explain the conceptual framework and unity of the philosophy of the Buddha and on the other hand to competently counter the attacks on it from the side of its detactors and adversaries. This aim, whether explicitly mentioned or not, finds repeated occurance, directly or indirectly and he has never striven in any of his treatises to be kept it hidden or guarded. Accordingly, the conceptual framework and unity of the philosophic enterprise and thought of Dharmakīrti or of any prominent systematic Buddhist philosopher turns out to be conceptual framework and unity of the philosophic thought of the Buddha. He shines more as an humble explorer in this domain of investigation rather than as an aggrandiser of his own view, however unreasonable and untenable it might be. Given this it is a small wonder that the doctrine of two truths or the theory of *Madhyamā-Pratipad* or of the attitude of *Mādhyastha* do not happen to be glossed over or ignored and considered to be relatively less important, important place as they occupy in the philosophy of the Buddha. Various facets and aspects discernible in the philosophical investigation undertaken by Dharmakīrti in his various treatises are the varied facets and aspects of the seminal thought of the Buddha. It is this feature of his philosphy that gives unity to the various

contoure, corvatures and points which become available in the philosophical investigation he has so honestly and industriously undertaken in his varied treatises. Thus, the philosophy of the Buddha and the centrally important doctrines and principles enunciated and explicated in it, however briefly they might have been explained, in the unifying and uniting tie that gives unity to the philosphic investgation undertaken by Dharmakīrti and it would be totally futile and meaningless to try to make sense of it and derive implications from it at the neglect and disregard of the former and in ways which are at variance with it. There can be no greater violence and damage done to it than a move of this kind which he seeks so ardously and strenuously to abhor. But likewise he also seeks to detaste those moves on the part of his predecessors, as we shall see in the next chapter, in their philosophic enterprise which go contrary to the contention of the Buddha or which seek to supplant or substitute it by something that is at variance with it. For, in his view any move of this kind would not only weaken and jeopardise the unity and strength of the philosophy of the Buddha but make it vulnerable as well to the attacks from its adversaires. Any Buddhist philosopher worth the name should resolutely guard himself from being overpowered by such a kind of temptation of seeking to reform the thought of the Buddha and thereby render it to be weakened and vulgarised. As we shall see in the next chapter, in spite of Dharmakīrti's disliking for it and warning against it, it is precisely succumbing to a temptation of this kind on the part of his successors that made Buddhist philosophy being weakened and prone to the kind of onslaughts on it— methodological or otherwise— from which it did not ever recover in this country.

But to say that explication of the philosophy of the Buddha and central doctrines and principles of it furnish unifying and uniting tie in Dharmakīrti's philosophic enterprise is not enough, although important it is, with a view to comprehending the complicated conceptual framework of it. It is also necessary to inquire with reference to which paradigmatic problem or issue and with reference to which kind of paradigmatic world does he seek to explain the central tenets of the philosophy of the Buddha. For, an answer to these questions would also pave

a way of our being able to understand what sort of problem and what sort of world remained uppermost in the thought of the Buddha. Again, the reasons of something of this kind being done would remain uniform and non-discordant from one another in both the contexts. With a view to our being able to comprehend the conceptual framework of Dharmakīrti's philosophy and understand the thread of the underlying unity that runs through the various thoughts and interconnections between them that he entertains in his philosophic enterprise, we pay a little closer attention to these two issues in the succeeding two sections. First of them, we turn to the paradigmatic issue or problem.

The Paradigmatic Problem : Nairātmya Or Antāmadrsana :

In Dharmakīrti's various treatises in general and in *Pramāṇavartika* in particular there occur such expressions as *Nairātmya,*[27] *Nairātmya Darśana,*[28] *Nairātmyadṛṣti* or *Anātmadṛṣti*[29] etc. quite often. Similarly in the commentaries on it also there occur such kindred expressions as *Nairātmyapakṣa,*[30] *Nairātmya Tattva,*[31] *Kṣaṇika Nairātmya*,or even equation of *Śūnyatādṛṣti* with *Nairātmyadṛṣti* [32] or equation of *Samyak dṛṣti* with *Nairātmyadṛṣti.*[33] Given

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27. धर्मकीर्ति; प्रमाणवार्त्तिक; नैरात्म्यादपि तेनास्य सदिग्धं विनिवर्तनम्। अस्तु नाम तथाप्यात्मा नानैरात्म्यात् प्रसिध्यति ॥242॥
परार्थपरि० पृ० 443-444.

28. तत्रैव : हेतुविरोधि नैरात्म्यदर्शनं तस्य बाधकम्। बहुशो बहुधोपाय कालेन बहुनास्य च ॥138॥ प्रमाणसिद्धि परि० पृ० 51.

29. तत्रैव; दुःखस्य शस्त नैरात्म्यदृष्टेश्च युक्तितोऽपि वा।
पुनरावृत्तिरित्युक्तौ जन्मदोषसमुद्भवौ ॥142॥
प्रमाणसिद्धि परि० पृ० 52.

30. मनोरथनन्दी; प्रमाणवार्तिकवृत्ति; नन्वनैरात्म्यपक्षे ऽपि···।
प्रमाणसिद्धि परि० पृ० 81.

31. तत्रैव; नैरात्म्यतत्त्वे ऽप्यारोपादात्मस्नेहात्···।
प्रमाणसिद्धि परि० पृ० 81.

32. तत्रैव; शून्यतादृष्टेर्नैरात्म्यदृष्टेः···। प्रमाणसिद्धि परि० पृ० 75.

33. प्रज्ञाकरगुप्त; वार्तिकालंकार; प्रमाणसिद्धि परि० पृ० 162-64.

this there naturally arises a question as to what is the role and significance of such expressions and in which way do they enable us to have any clue about the conceptual framework and unity of Dharmakīrti's philosophic enterprise and thought and in which way do they enable us to grasp an important thread in the philosophy of the Buddha ? We shall argue that they jointly or severally bear upon the paradigmatic problem of *Anattā* or *Anātmadarśana* in such a way that through it a wide gate happens to be opened in the philosophy of the Buddha of the resolution of a family of problems which otherwise seem to elude resolution. It is to this consideration that we now turn.

Sarvaṁ Duḥkham, Sarvaṁ Kṣaṇikaṁ and *Sarvaṁ Anātmam* are said to be the three important doctrines of Buddhism. Of them, the first is an unmistakable statement of fact in the sense that it seeks to bring to our notice that there is absolutely nothing in human life ..individual or social...which even in principal cannot, sometime or the other, in some or the other context and situation, become a source of pain and suffering. The other two doctrines, on the contrary, seem to be brought in for the resolution of the problem of pain and suffering that in this way comes to human lot. Due to the acceptance and the permanence of *Ātmā duḥkha* is said to be coming forth, and everything being impermanent change is said to be taking place incessantly, while there not being anything like permanent *Ātmā* all our clingings, desires and expectations are attempted to be shown to be without any locus or basis with the support of which they could be held to be sustainable or of the unchanging nature of which they could be regarded as changing aspects or properties. Thus understood, the paradigmatic problem in the philosophy of the Buddha could be said to be having a twin aspect about it : one, through *Anattā* seeking resolutlon of *duḥkha*, while another through *kṣanikatā* seeking resolution of it. Both these aspects are directed, thus, in the medical model of the philosophic enterprise of the Buddha towards the resolution of the same otherwise intractable, unsurmountable and irresoluble problem of occurrence of pain and suffering in human life. Since the very philosophic enterprise of the Buddha originates from the consideration of pain and suffering in human life and seeks resolution of this problem, the Buddha is rightly called to be a *Mahākāruṇika*. We shall have

an occassion in the next section to inquire into paradigmaticity of empirical world of which *Kṣaṇikatā* is a built-in-feature according to the Buddha. For the present let us confine ourselves to that mode of resolution of *duḥkha* what Dharmakīrti calls *Nairātmyas*, *Nairatmyadarśaga* or *Nairātmyadṛṣti*. Hence, the problem of *Anattā* has an important place.

It has importance in another respect also. Buddhists in general and Dharmakīrti in particular hold that there are two principal ways in which any thing that is real may be comprehended : as it fs or differently from it. *Parmārtha Sattya* and *Samvṛtti Sattya* or what may be called cosmocentric and anthropocentric (including anthropomorphic) comprehensions respectively give rise to two sort of truths. As Nāgārjuna has pointed out the distinction between *Pāramārthika Sattya* and *Saṁvṛtti Sattya* is not a matter of mere speculation, it is accepted by the Buddha himself.[34] *Saṁvṛtti Sattya* brings forth such an aspect of a thing that is inessential to its existence while *Pāramārtha Sattya* is that aspect of a thing which it has got to have it in itself in order to be or which is *Svabhāva* of it and happens to be manifested on its own.[35] In order to communicate our thoughts, feelings, emotions etc. We use language, and expressions in language remain simultaneously applicable to more than one object of a given kind and hence are general words. The generality that so happens to be brought forth is considered to be indicative of something common between or among objects of a given kind. According to Dharmakīrti although while using language for communication we use general words, but so that it is not necessary to accept that the features of things they indicate are structural and constitutive features of them.

In the previous chapter it is pointed out that generality is not a necessary condition of *Vastutva*, thought an object may have shareable features however accidentally. What is necessary for its being is that it does not lack those features which are determinative

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34. नागार्जुन; मध्यमकशास्त्र; द्वे सत्ये समुपाश्रित्य बुद्धानां धर्मदेशना ।
लोकसंवृत्तसत्यं च सन्यं च परमार्थत: ।।24.8.।।

35. धर्मकीर्ति; प्रमाणवार्तिक; अर्थक्रियासमर्थं यत् तदत्र परमार्थसत् ।
अन्यत् संवृत्तिसत प्रोक्तम; ते स्वसामान्यलक्षणे ।।:।।
प्रत्यक्ष प्ररि० पृ० 100.

of its nature. Here someone may raise an issue that it is contradictory that on the level of *Saṁvṛtti Sat* Dharmakīrti accepts generality but with respect to *Pārmārtha Sat* he does not. Why is it so ? According to Dharmakīrti this is so because reliability (*Prāmāṇya*) of any kind of knowledge ..perceptual of inferential...is to be measured taking into account whether it enables us to adopt those patterns...of behaviour or communication ..it is meant to. Since language and communication is not primarily meant for enabling us to discover the nature of things as they are but to enable us to communicate thoughts, feelings ets. we have come to entertain and comprehend meanings of expressions so used in communication. But since meanings of words used in communication are determined by convention and since we can and do entertain thoughts, feelings not necessarily on the basis of having discovered nature of things as they are, neither the thoughts, feelings, emotions expectations that we entertain nor the language through which we communicate them can be said to be indicative of the nature of things as they are.

Dharmakīrti's consideration about language and communication needs hardly to detain us any longer at this juncture of our inpuiry. Returning to the discussion of *Anattā*, therefore, it is important to understand that its consideration arises in the context of resolution of the problem regarding the phenomenon of pain and suffering in human life on the one hand and in the context of marking off anthropocentric (including anthropomorphic) world from the cosmocentric world, or the world imagined to be from the world as it is on the other. It is in the latter context, as we shall show below, that the equation of *Nairātmyadṛṣti* with *Śūnyatādṛṣti* needs to be understood.[36]

In the case of the cosmocentric world view what is important is the nature of things as they are and on the basis of such a kind of nature of them being available through their manifestation succeed in discovering the nature of them as it is. As we shall argue below, if the built-in-feature of things as they are is to be continuously and incessantly changing then it is not necessary to accept permanence

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36. मनोरथनन्दी; प्रमाणवार्तिकवृत्ति; यतश्चैवमात्मदर्शनप्रभूताः सर्वक्लेशाः, तथा सत्त्वदृष्टया विरोधच्च शून्यतादृष्टेर्नैरात्म्यदृष्टेः तत्मयैः सत्त्वदृष्टिहेतुकैः सर्वदोषैर्विरोधः सिद्धयति...। प्रमाणसिद्धि परि० पृ० 74.

or staticity of them in such a world view. But, likewise, if *Ātmā* happens to be posited as a basis of various inclinations, desires, impulses, expectations, greed *Tṛṣnā* ect. In an anthropocentric world to make emergence of them intelligible then such a worldview being different from and not necessarily related with the cosmocentric world-view, it would appear to be mere imputation to or emposition on the former. It is one thing to say that without positing such an *Ātmā* and that too which is permanent and unchanging in the anthropocentric world perspective it would not be possible to explain occurrence and continuation of desires inclinations etc., and quite another to hold that such an *Ātmā* must be held to be part and parcel of the cosmocentric world and an inalienable feature of the cosmocentric world-view. Since the necessary and sufficient conditions that need to be satisfied in order that we might come to entertain cosmocentric and anthropocentric world-views being differential it is a folly to hold that the same necessary and sufficient conditions need to be satisfied in order that we might come to entertain any of these world-views, or that on the fulfilment of the same necessary and sufficient conditions we can entertain any of these alternative world-views without in any way seriously damaging the objective of our philosophic or epistemological enterprise. It is this folly and confusion that is sought to be protested against when it is said that it is doubtlessly clear that acceptance or non-acceptance of *Ātmā* to be belonging to the real world are the world-views which are diametrically opposed to each other.[37] The choice between them is not to be made arbitrarily but rather on the basis of *Anātma Darśana* or *Nairātmya Dṛṣti* as we shall soon point out, of which *Nairātmyadṛṣti* is a methodological tool on the basis of which redundant considerations from the cosmocentric world-view are sought to be eliminated.

We observed above that acceptance or non-acceptance of *Ātmā* is determined by what kind of world-view do we subscribe to within which we philosophise...what have been called *Parmārtha Sat* and *Saṁvṛtti Sat*...do not become available in the same world view and through the same *Pramāṇa*. Nor do they become available through the fulfilment of the same minimum necessary and sufficient

37. प्रज्ञाकरगुप्त; वार्तिकालकार; नैरात्म्यदर्शनन्तु आत्मदर्शनविरुद्धमित्य विप्रतिपत्तिरेव। प्रमाणसिद्धि परि० पृ० 118.

conditions. Very of ten this is lost sight of and as a result we come to embrace such intriguing confusions in our philosophic and epistemological enterprise that it becomes well-nigh possible to free ourselves from. Being aware of this Dharmakīrti seeks to outline a way of *Nairātmya darśana* as envisaged by the Buddha,[38] resorting to which we can guard ourselves from falling into the trap of such bewitching confusion. It is to the consideration of it that we now turn.

The word *Darśuna* indicates two things, namely, to see and to shaw. Thus understood, the expression *Anātma Darśana* needs to be understood in its two important aspects : (1) one, one's seeing for oneself that there is nothing like permanent *Ātmā* and (2) secondly, bringing to the notice of those, who have not seen or comprehended this, the fact that there is no permanent *Ātmā*. Since *Nairātmya Darśana* in this way is diametrically opposed to *Ātmadarśana* it is held that the former is repudiative of the latter-[39] It is held that there is no (permanent) *Ātmā* because as a matter of fact and in the strict sense of the term there is nothing like (permanent) *Ātmā* that can be said to be real.[40]

It may, however, be contended that *Ātmā* needs to be posited as a real entity at least on three grounds : First, there is such a thing as rebirth, passage from one life to another and if there is no permanent *Ātmā* what can pass from one life to another ? Therefore, for the satisfactory explanation of the phenomenon of organisms being repeatedly reborn *Ātmā* needs to be posited. Secondly if there is no *Ātmā* it is futile and meaningless to talk in **terms of** *Mokṣa*, for in the absence of a permanent and lasting *Ātmā* what can be liberated or emancipated ? For, everything else pertaining to an organism except *Ātmā* is impermanent and anything that is impermanent could only be destroyed. No one sensibly talks of its

38 मनोरथनन्दी; प्रमाणवार्तिकवृत्ति; मार्गः नैरात्म्यदर्शनलक्षणः उक्तः। प्रमाण-सिद्धि परि० पृ० 71.

39 (1) प्रज्ञाकरगुप्त; वार्तिकालंकार; नैरात्म्यदर्शनं फलं निवर्तकं आत्मदर्शनस्य। प्रमाणसिद्धि परि० पृ० 116.

(2) तत्रैव; नैरात्म्यदर्शनं आत्मदर्शनविरुद्धम्। पृ० 118.

40 तत्रैव; आत्माभावात्, परमार्थतः अभूतत्वादात्मनः। पृ० 117.

being emancipated or liberated. Thirdly, there are such phenomenon as feelings of pleasure and pain, desires, expectations, emotions, as also actions and their results and consequences. In the absence of a lasting *Ātmā* whose feelings can one speak of, whose desires, expectations, emotions etc. could there be and who would be held to be the doer of actions and therefore responsible for the resultp and consequences of them ? Since in face of such problems no straight-forward answer seems to be forthcoming there is no alternative to positing lasting *Ātmā* and holding it to be a real entity.

Dharmakīrta and his commentators try to rebuilt the above-mentioned argument in defence of lasting or permanent *Atmā* and endeavour to defend what they call *Nairātmya* or *Anātmadrśana* in the following way—In the face of the first argument it is held that to begin with there is nothing like the one that migrates from one life to another.[41] This is so because the very notion of migrator from one life to another is available in an anthropocentric world-view and on account of ['an experience of an incessant flow of impermanent and yet discrete thing. Moreover, there is no rule that to everything discernible in an anthropocentric world-view there must be something corresponding to it in the cosmocentric world-view and hence real.[42] Further since in case of the one who has understood that there is nothing like permanent *Ātmā* the question of his being rebor a does not arise;[43] and since seeing for oneself does not involve concepts, language and communication there also is no question of *Ātmā* being posited and held to be real, for whatever reason it might be.[44] Secondly, the contention that independently of their being permanent *Ātmā* it would be impossible to make sense of *Mokṣa* liberation or emancipation

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41. मनोरथनन्दी; प्रमाणवार्तिकवृत्ति; न हि संसारी कश्चिदस्ति । पृ० 63.
न तु संसारी नाम कश्चिन् । प्रमाण परि० पृ० 91.

42. प्रज्ञाकरगुप्त; वार्तिकालङ्कार; न च संसारी परमार्थत: कश्चिदस्ति क्षणानां असंसरणात् । सन्तानस्य परमार्थत: अभावात् तत: संसारित्वात् इति असिद्धो हेतु: । प्रमाण परि० पृ० 137.

43. मनोरथनन्दी; प्रमाणवार्तिकवृत्ति; नैरात्म्यदर्शी न जायते ।
प्रमाण परि० पृ० 89.

44. तत्रैव; दर्शनम् अविकल्पम् । पृ० 141.

too is baseless and indefensible for it is through *Nairātmya Darśana* alone that *Mokṣa* is possible.[45] On the part of discriminative persons too there is no way except comprehension of *Nairātmy* and hence it follows that *Ātmadarśana* cannot be held to be instrumental to *Mokṣa*.[46] Moreover, since all the important teachings of the Buddha converge upon *Nairātmya*.[47] This should be considered to be a reinforcing argument in support of it. Thirdly, if it is held that *Ātmā* needs to be taken to be real as the basis or locus of feelings of pleasure and pain, then it needs first of all to be realised that there is nothing like *Ātmā* that is locus.[48] Further, it is positing *Ātmā* to be there is the indisputable source of the experience of pain and suffering and it can be got rid of only through resolute negation of *Ātmā*.[49] Additionally *Ātmā* whose pleasure depends upon various kind of enjoyment according through actions undertaken by it must be held indeed to be non-independent and such a feature of *Ātmā* by would be diametrically opposed to the generally held conception of *Ātmā* by *Ātmavādins* that it is independent.[50] Such an *Ātmā* must really be held to be non-existent and unreal. In fact, it has been held that, knowledge' should really be a pointer to *Nairātmya* while it is ignorance and nescience that is the basis of *Ātmya*.[51] the genuine non-attachment can only be said to be a legitimate consequence of giving

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45. प्रज्ञाकरगुप्त; वार्तिकालंकार; नैरात्म्यदर्शना देव मोक्षः न्यान्तगतिः। प्रमाण परि० पृ० 157.

46. तत्रैव; नैरात्म्य अवबोधो ऽपि विवेकतां अनिवार्यः एव इति न आत्मदर्शनात् मोक्षः। 150.

47. तत्रैव; नैरात्म्यदर्शन अवसाना भागवता देशना। पृ० 158.

48. मनोरथनन्दी; प्रमाणवार्तिकवृत्ति, अधिष्ठातुः आत्मनः अभावात्। प्रमाण परि० पृ० 63.

49. प्रज्ञाकरगुप्त; आत्मा आत्मीयग्रहे हि निःसंदिग्धं दुःखअस्ति। तदेव प्रहाणं। कुतः 1 नैरात्म्यदर्शनादेव। प्रमाणसिद्धि परि० पृ० 116.

50. धर्मकीर्ति; प्रमाणवार्तिकस्वोपरावृत्ति; क्रियाभोगाधिष्ठान अस्वतंत्र हि आत्माहि निरात्मा। तत् स्वातंत्र्य लक्षणत्वात् आत्यनः। पृ० 103.

51. मनोरथनन्दी; प्रमाणवार्तिकवृत्ति; विद्यायाः नैरात्म्यदृष्टेः विपक्षो अविद्या। प्रमाण परि० पृ० 85.

up of *Ātmabuddhi*.[52] Since death is understood in the buddhist view to be cessation of *Vijñāna Indriya* and *life* it is fruitless to posit *Āmtā* to be real and take it to a lasting or permanent entity,[53] whereas in the absence of any *Avayavin* being there body should be held to be nothing else but a collection of *Paramāṇus*.[54]

From the foregoing discussion of *Nairātmya* or *Nairātmya-darśana* some of the important implications of it remain discernible and we proceed to study them briefly.

On the level of *Paramārthika Sat* or the cosmocentric world-view alone is the legitimate world-view that stands on its feet. The world of things should be taken to be basic because it is unadulterated with human coneeption and imposition. In *Pāramarthika Sat*. *Svalakṣaṇas* alone figure as legitimate reals, while *Samvṛtti Sat* arises on account of *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇas*. There is no rule or necessity by which correspondence between them could be attempted to be established. Accordingly, *Nairātmyadṛsti* turns out to be a tool of slicing of those entities which baselessly and indefensibly happen to be imputed to the world as it is or are made to figure in the cosmocentric world-view. This reminds one of the view of Nāgārjuna at whose hands *Śūnyatā* remains a methodological tool of getting rid of dispensable appendages. That is why *Nairātmya-dṛṣti* has perhaps been considered to be *Śūnyatādṛṣti*. Thus with the help of *Anātma Darṣana* it is perhaps sought to be emphasised that there is no one to one correspondence between ontology, epistemology and language.

Secondly, it has been pointed out already that *Avisaṁvādakatva* and *Ajñātartha Prakāśakatva* are the two authorising and regulative criteria of reliability of knowledge. *Nairātmyadarṣaṇa* as a paradigmatic problem in Dharmakīrti's philosophy enables us to knit such a unifying conceptual framework of it which remains non-discordant with both cosmocentric and anthropocentric world-views and thereby fulfils both criteria of knowledge.

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52. प्रज्ञाकरगुप्त; वार्तिकलंकार; आत्मबुद्धि परित्यागेवैराग्यम् । प्रमाण परि० पृ० 159.

53. मनोरथनन्दी; प्रमाणवार्तिकवृत्ति; विज्ञानेन्द्रियायुर्निरोधलक्षण मरणमिष्टं बौध्दसिद्धान्ते ।
प्रमाणसिद्धि परि० पृ० 15,

54. तत्रैव; अवयविन: अभावात् परमाणुपुंजं शरीरादि···। पृ० 37.

Thirdly, the problem of *Anattā* also indicates that in our investigation into the nature of the world, minimally speaking, acceptance of cosmocentric world is sufficient, although for purposes of language and communication importance of anthropocentric world is not denied.

Thus, accepting *Anātma Darśana* as a paradigmatic problem Dharmakīrti deviates from *Sarvāstivādins, Śūnyavādins* on the one hand and Nāgārjuna, Asaṅga, Vasubandhu and Diṅnāga on the other, in so far as he avoids the extremes advocated by the former while in spotting a paradigmatic problem in the philosophy of the Buddha deviating from the latter he shows us a way of articulating conceptual framework and unity of the philosophy of the Buddha in a non-discordant way. This he further accomplishes through subscription to what may be called economy or minimalistic consideration, into the detailed implications of which we shall have an occasion to probe in the next, that is the last, chapter.

Now, it is accepted that cosmocentric world has to be accepted as a world in the true sense of the term. But what is the nature of this world ? What sort of world could be considered to be paradigmatic with reference to the philosophy of the Buddha ? Or can we hold any conceivable world to be the one intended by him with reference to which his philosophic insight could be shown to be intelligible ? As we shall show below it is in showing that the empirical world is paradigmatic with reference to the philosophy of the Buddha that the acumen and skill of Dharmakīrti lies and here also minimalistic consideration holds and remains applicable with equal force. In addition, in this context he also attempts to answer the questien whether change and continuity could both be said to be constitutive features of such a paradigmatic world or whether change alone is a built-in-feature of it. It is to the task of the consideration of the nature and constitution of the paradigmatic world in relation to the philosophy of the Buddha that the following section is addressed.

Natue of Cosmoc.ntric World :

When one begins to consider nature and structure of the cosmocentric world one may be tempted to hold that the least that can be said about it is that it must be conceivable. But if this view is accepted then some difficluties may arise :

(1) Any conceivable world not necessarily an experienceable public world, and in that case perceptual knowledge of such a world would become impossible. Such a world could be an abstract world of ideas.

(2) Secondly, every individual may conceive his own conceivable world, in which case there would only be a cluster of conceivable worlds without perhaps any relation between or among them.

(3) Lastly, if conceivable world is accepted to be the basis of the very possibility of making Buddha's philosophy significant, then this gives rise to unsurmountable difficulties. For, the Buddha is not interested in any kind of conceivable world. Likewise, there will be no possibility of achieving the goal of *Puruśārtha Siddhi* in any of such conceivable world.

Hence, any conceivable world cannot be held to be acceptable as the one meant by the Buddha, because first in such a world various aspects of our epistemological and philosophic enterprise may not be capable of being shown to be significant and number of issues would remain unresolved. Secondly, it is not possible to explicate relevance and significance of Buddha's teaching with reference to it. Hence there arises a problem as to what kind of world could it minimally be with regard to which it would be inescapable to show the philosophy of the Buddha to be at least significant. According to Dharmakīrti, that kind of world should be accepted in this context in which we could have experience. He accepts *Parmārtha Sat* which is made up of *Svalakṣaṇas*. *Svalakṣaṇas* are objects of perception and naturally *Parmārtha Sat* too is cognised perceptually. In his view empirical world must at least be the world with regard to which the philosophy of the Buddha has to be shown to be significant, no matter whe ther over and above this we succeed in showing it to be significant with regard to any other kind of conceivable world or not. Thus, Dharmakīrti accepts empirical world to be the context of the philosophy of the Buddha. But what kind of world is considered to be empiiical and paradigmatic by him ? What are its salient features ? It is this question into which we intend to probe now.

It is quite possible that different thinkers accept different con-

ceptions of the empirical world in the light of which differential nature and structure of it could be spelt out.

(1) According to some not only perceptible and concrete entities belong to the empirical world but abstract entities as well. They further seem to hold that we not only cognise entities belonging to it but we can also communicate about it in so far as each of such entity belonging to it has general features as constitutive of it. In short, they accept, as *Sarvāstivādins* seem to do, that kind of world to be real and empirical world with regard to which there is one to one correspondence between ontology, epistemology and language. But with respect to this world some difficulties arise.

(i) problems pertaining to cognitive and justificatory epistemology turn out to be reciprocally connected and hence there remains no considerations with regard to the latter which are only peculiar to it. But such is not the case. For, everything that we cognize is not necessarily justifiable, and for everything that we seek to justify there is no empirical cognitive support.

(ii) Abstract entities and perceptible entities are treated on par with eath other. Hence, the distinction between anthropocentric and cosmocentric collapses.

(iii) With reference to making the philosophy of the Buddha intelligible correspondence between world, knowledge and language is neither methodologically justified nor intuitively demanded. In this context it is sufficient to accept that kind of world in which possibility of experiencing empirical entities is not only not ruled out but remains restricted only to them. Accepting extreme realistic world to be meant by the Buddha is also against minimal consideration.

(2) According to some that kind of world should be accepted which is made up of discrete unique particulars such that they cannot even in principle have shareable features. Nāgārjuna seems to be the chief spokesman of this view. But if this view is accepted then the possibility of knowing even accidentally those objects indirectly or inferentially which are perceptible otherwise happens to be ruled out and accordingly possibility of convergence between perceptual and inferential cognitions happens to be nipped in the bud. This kind of world cannot be held to be paradigmatic with regard to the philosophy of the Buddha.

(3) According to the third view no doubt what we perceptually cognise are unique features of things belonging to the empirical world. But features cognisable in all are of two main kinds : non-shareable and shareable which are cognisable through *Pratyakṣa* and *Anumāna* respectively. But there can be no thing belonging to the world meant by the Buddha which can be cognized both perceptually as well as inferentially, however accidentally it might be. The two sort of features, that things have absolutely unconnected and the cognition through which they happen to be cognized too are unconnected. This view seems to be upheld by Diṅnaga. But this view is also not acceptable because though particulars and universals are not treated on par with each other yet they are supposed to be two distinct sort of features and naturally this position commits dualism of cognizable features and also epistemological schism. In the case of dualism of this sort we are not in a position to reconcile perception and inference on the one hand and *Svalakṣaṇa* and *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* on the other. Again, we are not in a position to explicate relevance and significance of Buddha's philosophy. Hence, such kind of position is not acceptable.

Acceptance of the world of any of these kinds is unable to solve either epistemological, ontological issues or offer explication of Buddha's teaching. But here a problem arises: what kind of world does Dharmakīrti want to accept so that he is able to discuss epistemological and ontological issues. When Dharmakīrti solves these issues he differs from Diṅnāga's position so that the sort of difficulties Diṅnāga's position gives rise to can be resolved. As Diṅnāga, he too accepts that these problems can be solved with reference to empirical world. Like Diṅnāga, he accepts the distinction between *Sva-lakṣaṇa* and *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* and that they are cognized by perception and inference,[55] respectively. But,t hough Dharmakīrti accepts the general framework of Diṅnāga, he accepts it with modifications. Unlike perhaps Diṅnāga, he accepts that *Sva-lakṣaṇa* and *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* are two features of the same object.[56] Yet he also holds further that it is quite possible that the object has both shareable

55. धर्मकीर्ति; न्यायबिन्दु; प्रत्यक्षमनुमानञ्च । तस्य विषयः स्वलक्षणम् । अन्यत्सामान्यलक्षणम् सोऽनुमास्य विषयः। प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 2 से 3.

56. धर्मोत्तर; न्यायबिन्दुटीका; ···स्वसाधारणं लक्षणं तत्त्वं स्वलक्षम्। वस्तुनो असाधारणं च तत्त्वमस्ति सामान्यं च। प्रत्यक्षपरि० पृ० 16.

and non-shareable features. According to him, veridical perception captures only non-shareable features and that is why he adds the term *Abhrānta* in the definition of perception to make it restrictive only to veridical perception. Hence, he restricts theory of perception only to veridical perception. But how do we cognize those shareable features which an object could have in itself. According to Dharmakīrti, inference is capable of capturing those shareable features. With the help of *Tadātmya* and *Tadutpatti* we are in a position to comprehend those shareable features which object has in itself.[57] there are two features of the world, namely, *Svabhāva* and *Kārya* which things belonging to the world might have, though they are never perceptually cognizable. Yet it is not having shareable features that is determinative of perceptibility of things in any way. The things or properties should be so related to each other that if one of the properties is absent another property will also be absent. For instance, *Śimśapātva* cannot exist independently of *Vrikṣatva*. Such a kind of feature is called *Svrbhāva*. There are also some properties which are related to each other in such a way that the relation between the two is *Kārya-Kāraṇa*. For instance *Dhūma* is *Kārya* of *Agani*. But here a problem arises : How *Svabhāva* or *Kārya* are determined ? For, merely if we are given two things we cannot say that one of them is *Svabhāva* of another nor can we say that one of them is *Kārya* of another. The conditions, according to Dharmakīrti, determinative of *Svabhāva* and *Kārya* are *Tādātmya* and *Tadutpatti* relations respectively.[58] *Tādātmya* and *Tadutpatti* relations between things inform us, not only that they are related but rather that they are so related in a particular way. It is on the basis of this, that we can say that where one obtains, the other cannot fail to obtain. We have already dealt with this issue in the third chapter. Thus, not only perception but inference has also a role to play in the field of cognitive epistemology. But when the problem of fashioning and formulation of an argument arises, inference alone has a role to play.

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57 धर्मकीर्ति : न्यायबिन्दु : वस्तुतस्तादात्म्यात् तदुत्पत्तेश्च । स्वार्थानुमान परि० पृ० 30.

58 तत्रैव; ते च तादात्म्यतदुत्पत्ती स्वभावकार्ययोरेवेति ताभ्याम् एव वस्तु सिद्धिः स्वार्थानुमान परि० पृ० 31.

Among *Svalakṣaṇa* and *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa, Svalakṣaṇa* alone is real because it alone has *Arthakriyāsāmarthya.*[59] *Sva-lakṣaṇa* alone creates the vague and vivid image according to its distance.[60] It means *Svalakṣaṇa* is external or is in the external world. It is already pointed out in the previous chapter that what is determinative of the reality of a real object is its own nature or *Svabhāva,* though possibility of its having shareable features is not ruled out. *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* is linguistic and communicable in character, and may not be real.

Thus, with the help of perception and inference it is possible for us to cognise the same object. Here someone may raise an objection that holding such a position is not quite distinct from that of Naiyāyikas, or one could say that though Dharmakīrti accepts *Pramāṇa-Viplava,* however, he also holds *Pramāṇa-Samplava.* But such is not the case. It is indeed true that Dharmakīrti accepts that perception and inference give us the information about the same object. However he also accepts that the knowledge available through these avenues is quite distinct in nature. *Svalakṣaṇa* and *Sāmānya-lākṣana* are two features of the same object. Perception captures only *Svalakṣaṇātmaka* features while inference captures only *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇātamka* features. Thus, perception and inference comprehend two different sorts of features of the same object. And upholding such a position does not in any way make him commit to *Pramāṇa-Saṁplava.* For, by *Pramāṇa-Saṁplava* one means that the same object can be comprehended with different *Pramāṇās.* On the contrary by *Pramāṇa-Viplava* we mean particular feature is comprehended by particular *Pramāṇa* only. Hence it could be said that though Dharmakīrti holds the view that perception and inference comprehend two different features of the same object he does in no way commit himself to *Pramāṇa-Saṁplava.*

Relation between *Sva-lakṣaṇa* and *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* on the one hand and that between perception and inference on the other leads us to comprehend the nature of cognizable object. Informa-

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59. तत्रैव; तदेव परमार्थसत; अर्थक्रियासामर्थ्यलक्षणत्वाद् वस्तुनः। प्रत्यक्षपरि० पृ० 17.

60. तत्रैव; यस्य अर्थस्य सन्निधान असन्निधानाभ्यां ज्ञानप्रतिभासभेदस्तत्। स्वलक्षणम् प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 16.

tions available to us through these two means of cognition is not necessarily inconsistent with each other. Rather they are related to each other. Such a relation between them must be within the framework of *Saṁyag jñāna*. In the last chapter it was pointed out that, *Avisaṁvadakatva* and *Ajñātārtha Prakāśakatva* are criteria of reliability of knowledge. There we discussed *Avisaṁvādakatva* and *Ajñātārtha Prakāśakatva* with respect to perceptual or inferential cognitions alone or with reference to the possibility of convergence between them. It is this *Saṁyaga jñāna* that opens the possibility of *Puruṣārtha Siddhi*. Likewise, elaborating the same criteria of reliability, applicable to *Partyakṣā* and *Anumāna*, Dharmakīrti insists that an object having shareable and non-shareable features concurrently is neither intuitively nor methodologically an untenable proposition. Accordingly, through perception and inference we can have knowledge of two different sort of features an object can have in so far as it has them, although having both these kinds of features simultaneously is not determinative of the being of objects as they are.

It is, thus accepted by Dharmakīrti that knowledge can in all bring to our notice two sorts of features, namely, particularity and generality. Both of them are cognitively as well as justificatorily significant, however contextually it might be. There must be a way open for their possible convergence, otherwise these two features would stand segregated and accordingly perceptual and inferential cognitions would remain unrelated and thereby would create either ontological or epistemological schism through unconnected hemispheres according as it might come to be held that either there are two distinct kinds of objects making up the world or that two kinds of cognitions stand totally unrelated from each other—the consequence which seems to emerge in the philosophic position advocated by Diṅnāga—and such a view, according to Dharmakīrti becomes inadequate. It cannot even be called knowledge of the object in the true sense of the term. Of course, independent importance of perceptual and inferential cognitions remains unquestionable, but certainly not at the cost of their mutual severence from each other. Now, the issue is, how could they be related to each other ? In the previous chapter it was pointed out that conditions of knowable are that knowable has either shareable properties or non-shareable properties alone or both. Among these properties some

properties may be *Svābhāvika* or *Asvābhāvika*. On the other hand, condition which determines 'being' of a thing is that the object has its own *Svabhāva*. And *Svābhāvika* properties of the object can be related among themselves, and to that extent convergence of 'being' and 'knowable' becomes possible. Due to this convergence particularity and generality aspects of knowledge could be said to be related with each other.

Thus, perception and inference are equally valuable and important, there is no inferiority or superiority with respect to them, for both of them are means of cognition.[61]

Thus, against *Sarvāstivādins* and *Śūnyavādins* he accepts reality of only *Svalakṣaṇas* and accepts middle path between two extremes. Likewise, against Nāgārjuna, he does not accept reality of discrete, incommunicable particulars alone. He accepts that a thing or object could be a cluster of both shareable and non-shareable features. Again, he does not emphasise only justificatory epistemological issues, he treats both cognitive and justificatory epistemologies on equal level as he understands that both these issues are equally important. As Diṅnāga he accepts empirical world though his empirical world is quite distinct from Diṅnāga's. The world that Dharmakīrti accepts is empirical world and it is quite evident from his analysis of perception.

When Dharmakīrti is talking about perception, according to him in order to experience the object it is sufficient that atleast non-shareable features which are determinative of the very being of a thing at least minimally are not missed to be captured. Further, for an occurrence of experience of an object, it is not necessary that it should be communicable. Nor for that matter is it necessary that such an object should possess shareable features. That is why he accepts *Nirvikalpa Pratyakṣa* to be paradigmatic in true sense of the term and it is held rightly to be prior to *Savikalpa Pratyakṣa*.[62]

61. धर्मोत्तर; न्यायबिन्दुटीका; चकार: प्रत्यक्षानुमानयोस्तुल्यबलत्वं समुच्चिनोति। यथा अर्थाविनाभावित्वाद् अर्थं प्रापयत् प्रत्यक्षं प्रमाणम् तद्वद् अर्थाविनाभावित्वाद् अनुमानमपि परिच्छिन्नमर्थं प्रापयत् प्रमाणम् इति। प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 8.
62. (a) धर्मकीर्ति; न्यातबिन्दु; तत्र कल्पनापोढं अभ्रान्तं प्रत्यक्षम्। प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ०
(b) प्रज्ञाकरगुप्त; वार्तिकालंकार; साधारणता विरेहेणतु निर्विकल्पं एव। प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 269.

The world that Dharmakīrti accepts to be paradigmatic is empirical world and this explains why so much importance is attached to perception in his philosophy,[63] although perceptual cognition is by no means taken to be a pre-requisite of inferential cognition. He is discussing that kind of world, where there is a possibility of our living and is that with reference to which the philosophic insight of the Buddha needs to be made sense of and understood.[64] Hence, it is not necessary to accept extra-ordinary or some other kind of world for our being able to make a satisfactory sense of the philosophy of the Buddha,[65] although such a world is known to us, in the last resort, through our own experience only. That is why Dharmakīrti neither accepts extra-ordinary perception nor does he subscribe to any world other than the empirical. For, in his view both these moves are unnecessary and dispensable to be able to make sense of the philosophic insight of the Buddha.

Again when the problem of justifying knowledge-claim arises, my knowledge alone should be reckoned to be the basis of justificatory enterprise, because when we are going to justify our knowledge-claims on what other basis shall we be in a position to justify them? Hence our knowledge and experience must be assigned due importance to. But this is never sought to be done in his philosophy at the cost of denying or relegating to secondary importance either the empirical world and objects legitimately belonging to it or even at the cost of neglecting importance of cognitive epistemology as seems to have been done at the hands of some of his predecessors. His acceptance, therefore, of *Vijñaptimātratā Siddhi* is quite distinct from the acceptance of *Vijñaptimātratā Siddhi* of Asaṅga and earlier Vasubandhu.

Thus the world that Dharmakīrti accepts is quite different from that of his predecessors'. But why is it necessary to accept such kind

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63. तत्रैव; प्रत्यक्षं विद्यमानविषयत्वात् । पृ० 271., प्रत्यक्षं स्वरूपसाक्षात्करण इति प्रतिपादितम् । पृ० 439,
निर्विकल्पकं किलं बहिरर्थरूपमेव । पृ० 382.
प्रत्यक्षेण वस्तुग्रहणात् । पृ० 316.

64. तत्रैव; नहि बाह्यार्थं विधानार्थं भगवतो बाह्यदेशना. अपि तु अनुवादार्थम् आत्मनिषेधस्य तदनुवादेन विवक्षितत्वात् । पृ० 289.

65. तत्रैव; यद्यपि विज्ञानादेव विज्ञानं तथापि न परलोकः सिध्यति । प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 128.

of world and what could be considered to be the salient constitutive feature/s of it ? Let us deal with these issues.

Necessity of Empirical World

Any philosophical position does not originate in a vacuum ; rather it is a reflection of our experience, thought, action and modes of fellowship. Hence, any philosophical position remains valuable provided it has reference to them. Further, if it does not have any bearing upon our life and the sort of world we are living in, it would lapse into an utopia, a sheer idealogy and would cease to be worthwhile. The Buddha when talks about world. should be talking about the sort of world we live in normally. Likewise, he should be talking about the sorts of experiences he had about this world and which any normal human being is prone to have. Hence, the world that he talks about is this world. In other words, in his view knowledge will be worthwhile when it is about the empirical world Our knowledge-claims must have anchorage in empirical world if they are not to figure badly on the count of applicability. Hence, Buddha's world is empirical world. This is the insight of Diṅnāga. Dharmakīrti accepts this and yet goes a couple of steps beyond him in so far as he considers it to be paradigmatic, minimally expected kind of world with reference to which the central tenets of the philosophic and epistemological enterprise of the Buddha could be satisfactorily made sense of.

Secondly, the kind of world-empirical world-that Dharmakīrti accepts to be paradigmatic should not only enable us to make sense of the teaching of the Buddha but also must not be at variance from the sort of world we actually live in. This would ensure three things: (i) we shall not come to overlook importance and significance of empirical world and our experience of things belonging to it in our life, nor would we be denied the privilege of having experiential knowledge of it. (ii) It would ensure Dharmakīrti's falling in line with Diṅnāga in so far not only as cognitive and justificatory epistemological aspects of epistemological enterprise with both come to be given their due, but also in acknowledging importance of empirical world in our life, although in treating it to be paradigmatic it would not, at the same time, block the prospects of his coming to differ from Diṅnāga. (iii) Thirdly, unless the world that is taken to be paradigmatic happens to be shown to be related with our life and our

life with it, the question of exploration into continued relevance of the philosophy of the Buddha would be futile and in vain to be raised. We shall have an occssion to inquire into this sort of interest, that Dharmakīrti shows in his philosophic enterprise, in the next chapter. There we shall argue that if the philosophy of the Buddha is attempted to be shown relevant merely with reference to a sort of conceivable world then on the count of our being able to show it to be having continued relevance there would arise lot of difficulties. Let us not, however, anticipate here our argument in the next chapter.

Thirdly, any philosophical position is acceptable provided it has a reference to our thoughts, actions and modes of fellowship that we normally are prone to adopt. Further, in Dharmakīrti's view given knowledge properly so-called that we can claim to have at our disposal should be instrumental to *Puruṣārtha Siddhi* the sort of world that needs to be considered to be paradigmatic gathers renewed and significant importance. For, other things being equal, our *Puruṣārtha Siddhi* is not expected to emerge in a world other than the one we are actually living in. And if our discoveries of the nature of things, our actions instrumental to such discoveries, the modes of fellowships that we are exhorted to adopt are said in any way to be determinative of the *Puruṣārtha Siddhi* then they must have to have an anchorage in the sort of world we actually live in. Otherwise the world we actually live in and the world conducive to our *Puruṣārtha Siddhi* would remain segregated from each other. In such a situation even if we succeed in tracing relevance of the teaching of the Buddha to the sort of world we are living in, yet the world conducive to our *Puruṣārtha Siddhi* being taken to be different, Buddha's teaching would continue to remain irrelevant to our *Puruṣārtha Siddhi*. Unless, in this way, the world in which the teaching of the Buddha could be shown to be significant, the world that we normally know, and the world in which we actually live as also the one in which we are exhorted to achieve *Puruṣārtha Siddhi* are convergent and mutually reciprocal inquiry into the significance of the teaching of the Buddha and the world with reference to which this can be shown to be the case, that world which we know and we live in as also that in which we are to accomplish our *Puruṣārtha Siddhi* would remain segregated from one another. In order not to allow something of this kind to happen Dharmakīrti holds that the world in which Buddha's teaching

could be shown to be significant and the world in which through the instrumentality of *Saṁyag jñāna* it is possible for us to achieve the *Puruṣārtha Siddhi*[66] is essentially the same paradigmatic empirical world. But what is meant by *Puruṣārtha Siddhi* ? *Artha* means an object. It is of two kinds : *Heya* and *Upādheya*. *Upādheya* objects are always expected to be had and hence their direct and positive serviceability to *Puruṣārtha Siddhi* On the contrary, *Heya* objects being detrimental to it are expected to be got rid of from the path of *Puruṣārtha Siddhi*. It is the normal tendency of human beings to accept *Upādeya* objects and reject *Heya* objects. Man's every effort is generally directed in this direction. He always strives to achieve this goal and this is how he is able to achieve his *Puruṣārtha Siddhi*.[67] But this acceptance or rejection is not arbitrary. It is goal directed and it is made possible through proper knowledge of things that we have at our disposal on the basis of our discovery of their nature through *Svabhāva* or disposition of things to disclose themselves in our experience and thereby provoke us to discover their nature. Our discovery of the nature of objects on the basis of which we are in a position to accomplish our *Puruṣārtha Siddhi* is, in this way, rooted in the *Arthakriyāsāmarthya of* things. This kind of *Arthakriyāsāmarthya* of them remains discernible in a way conducive to our *Puruṣārtha Siddhi* in the empirical world that Dharmakīrti considers to be paradigmatic. Thus, the sort of world Dharmakīrti considers to be paradigmatic is determined not by arbitrary consideration but through a serious consideration of number of profoundly significant problems which need to be taken into account while resolving the issue one way or the other non-arbitrarily.

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66. धर्मकीर्ति; न्यायबिन्दु; सम्यग्ज्ञानपूर्विका पुरुषार्थसिद्धि तद् व्युत्पाद्यते। प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 1.

67. धर्मोत्तर; न्यायबिन्दुटीका; पुरुषस्यार्थः पुरुषार्थः अर्थ्यतः इत्यर्थ काम्यत् इति यावत्। हेयोऽर्थः, उपादेयो वा। हेयो अर्थो हातुमिष्यते, उपादेयोऽपि उपादातुम्। न च हेयोपादेयाभ्यामन्या राशिरस्ति। उपेक्षणीयो अनुपादेयत्वात् हेय एव। तस्य सिद्धिः···हानम् उपादान च। हेतुनिबन्धना हि सिद्धिरुत्पत्ति-रुच्यते। ज्ञाननिबन्धना तु सिद्धिरनुष्ठानम। हेयस्य च हानमनुष्ठानम्, उपादेयस्य चापादानम्। ततो हेयोपादेययोर्हानोपादानलक्षणानुष्ठानतः सिद्धि-रित्युच्यते।
प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 6.

Haveing looked into the sort of world Dharmakīrti considers to be paradigmatic with reference to the task of making sense of the philosophy of the Buddha which he takes upon himself, it remains to be seen as to what sort of structural or constitutive features of such a world does he consider to be important with regard to our being able to understand and satisfactorily interpret the important tenets of Buddha's thought. We intend to inquire into this aspect of his philosophy with special reference to two features which generally are held to be characteristic of empirical world viz. change and continuity.

We observed earlier that the most central issue that occupied the attention of the Buddha was that of pain and suffering in human life. We also saw that the doctrine of *Anattā* or *Nairātmya* was designed in his thought to enable us to circumvent the phenomenon of pain and suffering that comes to human lot. It could at least be said to be directed at immunising human life with regard to them. This much, however, is not enough. The pain and suffering that comes to human lot all of it is not of our own making. Some of it also could be held to be originating from the circumstance and situation we happen to be placed in. Added to this is the phenomenon of our conception of the world and the sort of structural and constitutive features we consider the world to be having. Among the features of the world that have engaged human attention, the most impartant are thoses of change and continuity and the view, the Buddha takes about them is another avenue, through which he seeks to resolve the problem of pain and suffering in human life. We remarked earlier that *Sarvaṁ Santānam* is another doctrine of the Budda, one being that of *Anattā* or *Nairātmya*, that is directed at resolution of the problem of pain and suffering coming to human lot. This doctrine is very intimately connected with the sort of features the Buddha takes to be the structural and constitutive features of the world and it is into the treatment of this aspect of Buddha's thought at the hands of Dharmakīrti that we now intend to probe.

We considered earlier that the sort of things which belong to the world according to Dharmakīrti are particulars such that particularity is the minimum structural and being-determinative feature. Nothing in the world, in his view, is free from or immunised to its being destroyed.[68] Accordingly nothing could be said to be everlasting perma-

68. धर्मकीर्ति; प्रमाणवार्तिक; वस्तुमात्रानुबन्धित्वात् विनाशस्य न नित्यता ॥44॥ प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 114.

nent and eternal, for nothing that is so could ever be connected with succession, simultaneity or even *Arthakriyākāritva.*[69] Such a thing being either atemporal or omnitemporal cannot intelligibly be connectd with change. The *Svalakṣaṇa* kind of things which are said to belong to the world legitimately need to be given to us just for a moment for their being perceptible,[70] and this in no way means that anything that belongs to the world can at the most last for a moment. As things are liable to be destroyed so too states of things too are liable to be destroyed. If we believe that everything is either figment of imagination or else is eternal, on each of which counts there is an unsurmountable difficulty, we would not be in a position to account for our experience of the world. Hence, we are constrained to hold that everything that is real is liable to be changed, destroyed and unless it is taken to be so amenable to change a satisfactory explanation of succession, simultaneity and *Arthakriyākāritva* of things would not be forthcoming from any quarter.[71] It may, however, be asked : on what basis are we to comprehend that impermanence of this kind is the very inalienable nature of anything ? It is held that such an impermanence or change is the very built-in-structural feature of things which are real. Accordingly changes which occur in the world are unmotivated or could not be said to be instrumental to the realization of any end. They occur because given the structural and constitutive nature of things they cannot help occurring.[72] Since

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69. मनोरथनन्दी; प्रमाणवार्तिकवृत्ति; नित्यं वा द्रव्यं कारणं कथम्, तस्य क्रमयोगपद्याभ्याम मर्थक्रियाविरहात । प्रमाण परि० पृ० 63.

70. प्रज्ञाकरगुप्त; वार्तिकालंकार; क्षणिकत्वे ऽपि प्रत्यक्षग्राह्यता स्यात । प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 218.

71. धर्मकीर्ति; वादन्याय; यदि न सर्वं सत् कृतकं वा प्रतिक्षणविनाशि स्याद् अक्षणिकस्य क्रमयोगपद्याभ्यामर्थक्रियाऽयोगाद्, अर्थक्रियासामर्थ्यलक्षणमतो व्यावृत्तम् इत्यसदेव स्यात् ।पृ० 9.

72. (1) धर्मकीर्ति; प्रमाणवार्तिक; सर्वेषां नाशहेतूनां हेतुमन्नाशवादिनाम् ।
असामर्थ्याच्च तध्देतोर्भवत्येव स्वभावतः ॥196॥
स्वार्थ परि० पृ० 317.

contd.

anything that is permanent and unchanging cannot be destroyed or come to be changed, change and destruction must be understood to be the features of only those things which are impermanent and short-lived. And nothing whatever in the world is free from change and destruction. Add to this the fact that there is a plurality of discrete, separate things each of which is impermanent and liable to be destroyed. Given this we can satisfactorily make sense of succession or chain, simultaneity as also *Arthakriyāsāmarthya* of things. The plurality of discrete things is capable of being understood in terms of differential dispositions they have and capability to manifest themselves on their own. If an allowance for this kind of differential dispositions to change and give rise to differential results is not made, the whole world would unfortunately collapse into a unity,[73] which is counter-intuitive. Even if a thing is understood to be a cluster of feaures the memebers of the cluster are not immune to change and destruction. Or even if a thing is understood to be a chain of successive states, state is immuse to change and liable to be destroyed sooner or later. Impermanence, change, liability to being destroyed are the built-in-features of things which are real and hence inalienable from them. Such a change may be rapid or slow, successive or simultaneous and things being impermanent and short-lived is neither counter intuitive nor against the sort of experience we normally have in the world. It is this feature of things to be permanently and in principle in a state of impermanence, change and liability to be destroyed as

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(2) तत्रैव; अनित्यश्चे यथाकार्यमकार्यं वाऽविनाशिनि ।
अहेतुत्वाद् विनाशस्य स्वभावादनुबन्धिता ॥193॥
स्वार्था० परि० पृ० 317.

(3) मनोरथनन्दी; प्रमाणवार्तिकवृत्ति; कथं पुनर्गम्यते सत्त्वमात्रानुन्धिनी नश्वरता ? इत्याह-अहेतुत्वात् अहेतुकृतत्वाद् विनाशस्य स्वभावात् वस्तुसत्ता-मात्रेणानुबान्धिता । पृ० 317.

73. (1) धर्मकीर्ति; प्रमाणवार्तिक; सामग्रीशक्तिभेदाद्धि वस्तुनां विश्वरूपता । साचेन्न भेदिका प्राप्तमेकरूपमिदं जगत् ।-249॥ परार्था० परि० पृ० 445-446.

(2) मनोरथनन्दी; प्रमाणवार्तिकवृत्ति; सामग्रीणां शक्तिभेदाद्धि वस्तुनां कार्याणां विश्वरूपता नानात्मता । सामग्री चेद् स्वभेदेन कार्याणां न भेदिका, जगदिदं एकरूपं प्राप्तम् । पृ० 445-446.

their built-in-feature and any change occurring non-teleologically and inevitably might have made the Buddha to consider it to be the constitutive and structural feature of the world.

But what about *staticity, unity,* continuity as features of the world? According to Dharmakīrti unity of a thing is not inconsistent with impermanence and changeability of it. Even an impermanent thing can be unitary. Accordingly, staticity cannot be said to be determinative of unity of a thing. But continuity, too, cannot be said to be determinative of unity of a thing either. For, to say that things are impermanent is not to deny continuity to them or withdraw its possibility summarily from them. Continuity of things is not inconsistent with impermanence or changeability of them, although it is not determined by staticity of things. For, static things alone do not have continuity as their exclusive prerogative, as permanent, unchanging things alone are not unitary. In fact permanent, unchanging, static things are counter intuitive and one would not be able to subscribe to them unless one turns one's blind eye to the sort of experiences we have in the world. Our analysis of the features of the world and our cansideration as to which of them could be held to be constitutive of it cannot be decided merely by methodologically expedient and conceivability conducive determinents. Methodologically expediency and conducivity to conceivability need to be geared to their enabling us to make sense of and interpret the kinds of experiences we have, rather than twisting or ignoring them to suit the requirements of methodology and dictates of conceivability. Through spiral overlap between or among various states through which a thing or an organism happens to pass during its life-time is sufficient enough to enable us to make satisfactory sense both of continuity and unity, and neither permanence nor staticity of things are required to be summoned in service of it.

Thus, out of two features generally ascribed to the world, viz. change and continuity, at the hands of Dharmakīrti change alone happens to be held to be its structural and constitutive feature, although he accepts both change and continuity to be non-discordant features of the world. At the same time, however, he is careful to observe that continuity should neither be necessarily taken to be a built-in-feature of the world or of things belonging to it,

nor should it be taken to be determined by either unity, or staticity or impermanence of things. An impermanent thing, too, has its unity, though it might lack continuity, and although a continuing thing has to have unity, it need not be taken to be determined by staticity or permanence. In this way continuity ceases to be a built-in, structural, constitutive feature of the world or of things belonging to it, as neither reality nor experienceability of things hinges upon their continuity. Further, in so far as things are impermanent by their very nature wherever they continue to be over a prolonged period of time, it should more be treated to be a matter of an accident, and neither experience-determinative nor inevitable feature of them.

Dharmakīrti further seems to imply, in consistency with the contention of the Buddha, that our coming to consider things to be permanent, unchanging, liable to continue to be for a prolonged period of time is the source of pain and suffering that comes to human lot. In addition when and in so far as we hold it to be a built-in-feature of things our experience of their having changed or their being destroyed makes us all the more restless, panicky, dissatisfied and unhappy. It is our clinging to their untenable permanence, unchangeability, continued continuity over a prolonged period of time in an unchanged state, and our understanding their structural and constitutive features in a counter intuitive way that is the source of the trouble. Instead, if we clearly comprehend impermanence to be the only structural feature of things and of the world at large, much of pain and suffering from our life would automatically be taken care of. It is in this way that *Sarvaṁ Kṣaṇikam* as the way of resolving the problem of pain and suffering coming to human lot can be understood and made sense of.

Resume

Thus, the complicated network of the conceptual framework of the philosophic enterprise of Dharmakīrti is required to be comprehended via weeding one's way through intricate connection and interconnections between various problems he discusses in his several treatises, each of which has a bearing on the thought of the Buddha. Likewise, the unity of his philosophic thought is required to be understood through the unity in the thought of the Buddha. It is this which would enable us to comprehend its conceptual framework and unity properly. Otherwise our discussion of his philosophy is likely to remain confined to the consideration of this or that

problem that figures in his philosophy. Or it can at the most rise to the level of explicating some of the important interconnections between his analysis of different concepts and problems. It is through understanding the complex conceptual framework of it and comprehending its true unity which would enable one to grasp heart of the matter in a characteristically philosophic and comprehensive way. The attempts at the hands of predecessors to make sense of and interpret his philosophy seem to fail precisely in this and in consequence under the name of characterising his philosophy one or the other way end up only with giving rise to a distorted understanding of it. Whether his philosophy is attempted to be understood through the pigeon-hole of subjective idealism, critical realism, *Vijñānvāda* or that of his being a *Sautrāntika* instead, each of these attempts is methodologically inadequate and unsatisfactory. But more than this each of them makes his philosophic enterprise spin and revolve around the discussion of one or two problems in isolation from others that figure in it and as a result mistaking part for the whole end up with confusion and error. That is why we decided to go differently and investigated into the conceptual framework of his philosophy and its unity independently of any of such pigeon-holes of looking at and characterising his philosophy. We shall have something more to say on the count of predecessors' attempt to interpret and comprehend Dharmakīrti's philosophy in the next, that is the last, chapter in the context of winding up the principal threads of our argument.

The Argument To Follow:

Having investigated into the conceptual framework and unity of Dharmakīrti's philosophy, although important as far as it goes, is however, not enough. It is further necessary to consider the determinents of the sort of conceptual framework and unity of his philosophy that we have briefly outlined above. Likewise, it is also necessary to wind up systematically the principal threads of our argument right from the first chapter so that our attempt to undertake a fresh study into the philosophy of Dharmakīrti could be appropriately marked off from other attempts on the part of predecessors. It is to the investigation into this twin task that the last chapter is addressed.

6

Determinants of Unity

In the previous chapter an attempt has been made to discover and articulate the conceptual framework of Dharmakīrti's philosophy and bring out the unity of his thoughts. There it is pointed out that the aim of Dharmakīrti is not so much to put forth his own novel and attractive philosophy as much as to explicate Buddha's philosophy in such a way that it will be methodologically viable and its important facets and aspects will not come to be missed and ignored. But such facets and aspects of it are not aimed to be brought out and explicated at the cost of either neglecting the task of giving a sketch of its conceptual framework or overlooking the importance of the unity of the thought of the Buddha. Thus, it was argued in the preceding chapter that the importance of Dharmakīrti's philosophical enterprise lies principally in the fact that the intuitive and methodological constraints, within the framework of which he seeks to outline the conceptual framework of the philosophical thought of the Buddha and articulate its unity remain directed not so much at putting forth a new and hitherto unexplored philosophical position as much as at investigating into such an avenue and channel through which the philosophy of the Buddha, its conceptual framework and unity could be explicated within the framework of intuitive and methodological constraints so that no

major and important tenet of it would be lost. Accordingly, the paradigmaticity of either the empirical world or that of the problem of *Anattā* or *Anātmadarśana* as Dharmakīrti prefers to call it, were shown to be geared and directed at highlighting some of the chief currents of the philosophy of the Buddha. Likewise, the insistence of Dharmakīrti on the middle path to be the view "of the preacher *par excellence* of the 'Middle Path' " is directed at bringing to our notice, it was argued there, that even it has "largely been interpreted in extreme terms"[1] which is contrary to the central tenet of the philosophy of the Buddha.

Thus, it was argued in the previous chapter that the conceptual framework and unity of the philosophic thought of Dharmakīrti as it is found explicated in his various treatises—major or minor—are, as a matter of fact, those of the philosophy of the Buddha and not those of that kind of novel philosophic position which he wanted to put forth before us or attract our attention to. Hence, the concepts he invokes and the interconnections between or among them which he explicates are not acrobatics in the intellectual circus but rather devices and tools which he exploits to the fullest to articulate those facets of the philosophic acumen of the Buddha which would not be otherwise uncovered. Thus, the conceptual framework and unity of the philosophic thought that Dharmakīrti articulates are those of the philosophy of the Buddha and secondarily, if at all, those of his philosophy. It would perhaps be better to say that his scholarship, acumen and philosophic insight lies in uncovering them without violence to any of them in such a way that none of the major tenets of it should come to be ignored or disregarded.

This much exploration, however, in Dharmakīrti's philosophy is not enough, although it is by no means mean and negligible. The sort of conceptual farmework and unity of the philosophy and the philosophic thought of the Buddha which Dharmakīrti explores into and articulates must not have come to stand before him accidentally and on their own. They must have come to be determined by their appropriate determinants, although Dharmakīrti might not

1. Pratap Chandra; "A Middle Path Social Philosoyhy: Norms Reflected in Early Pāli Literature" in *Social Transformation And Creative Imagination,* (ed.) Sudhir Chandra, p. 35.

have explicitly told us anything about them in his treatises so obviously. Hence, it becomes incumbent upon us to inquire as to what could be said to be determinants of them. It is one of the tasks to which the present chapter is addressed. But. secondly, and equally importantly, if what Dharmakīrti is putting forth in his different treatises is not so much his own philosophic position but that of the Buddha, then there arises another formidable question : would it be proper and appropriate to characterise Dharmakīrti's philosophic position the way some of the prominent predecessors have done ? For, if it is considered to be proper then that would have to be held to be characterisation of the philosophic position of the Buddha rather than that of Dharmakīrti. Accordingly, we shall also have to inquire, however briefly, whether the way in which Dharmakīrti's philosophic position has come to be characterised and interpreted is legitimate and defensible, taking into account some of the chief tenets of it. This is the second problem, to inquire into which this chapter is addressed. Through inquiry into these two issues we hope to outline determinants of Dharmakīrti's philosophic enterprise on the one hand and investigate whether the way his philosophic position has come to be characterised and labelled are appropriate and whether these sort of characterisations are defensible. An investigation of this sort, it is hoped, would enable us to explain those aspects of his philosophy which have remained unexplored so far. But it would also help us. it is expected, to wind up the thread of principal arguments we have been putting forth in the foregoing in a fruitful way. It is to the accomplishment of this twin task the present chapter is addressed. Having investigated into these issues it would enable us to capture, it is hoped, the key aspects of Dharmakīrti's philosophical enterprise. This kind of comprehension would also enable to understand and make sense of, by contrast, some of the vulnerabilities which emerged in the Buddhist philosophy of the post-Dharmakīrti period, no matter whether one is thinking of his immediate or remote successors. Through this sort of inquiry we would be able to hint at those points—intuitive or methodological—which created a problematic situation in Buddhist philosophy at the hands of his successors, especially so far as not only defensibility and warrantability of it but also its viability is concerned. This would be the third problem we wish to inquire into in this chapter. We hope to study these

problems in the same order in which we have posed them here. First, therefore, turning to the determinants of the direction and focus of Dharmakīrti's philosophic enterprise.

Determinants of Dharmakīrti's Philosophic Enterprise and Unit of his Thought:

(A) *Simplicity and Minimalism*: We saw earlier the sort of conceptual framework within which Dharmakīrti endeavours to articulate the philosophy of the Buddha and lay bare the outlines of its unity. But this sort of investigation could be hoped to be carried out in either of the two following ways: on the one hand, the philosophy of the Buddha, its conceptual framework and its unity may be sought to be investigated in the most inclusive and complex way in the sense that maximum amount of presuppositions may be sought to be requisitioned the services of, enormously complicated world/s may be sought to be brought in with refcrence to which the philosophy of the Buddha could be attempted to be made sense of and applicability of it could be sought to be extended to any world for the very simple reason that it is considered to be conceivable. As contrasted with this, on the other hand, the philosophy of the Buddha, its conceptual framework and its unity may be sought to be investigated along the route of least or minimal presuppositions about it, with reference to the least complex world and in the context of the most simplistic framework and along the minimalistic channel. On the first alternative profundity of thought comes to be held to be determined by complexity of considerations, while on the second alternative depth and profundity are not only held to be non-discordant with but even governed by considerations of simplicity and minimalism. In this section we hope to argue that one of the principal determinants of Dharmakīrti's philosophy and philosophic enterprise is his insight that the philosophy of the Buddha needs to be made sense of simplistically and not via complexity consideration of it. This has bearing not only upon the Middle Path as an instrument of avoidance of onesidedness, dogmatism, and extremism of any kind but also upon paradigmaticity of empirical world and importance of *Anātmadarśana* as well, as it will be pointed out below. The category and determinant of simplicity functions in his philosophy multi-sidedly and wields influence upon his philosophic enterprise in more than one way.

To explore into some of these aspects of it is the task of the present sub-section.

The simplicity or economy consideration in Dharmakīrti's philosophy works along the consideration of not multiplying any entity as belonging to the ontological or real world unless it is absolutely and minimally necessary to do so with a view to making sense of the philosophy of the Buddha. Epistemologically it amounts to subscribing to the view of not taking any knowledge or information to be worthwhile unless it brings to our notice some or the other aspect of the minimalistic or paradigmatic world. On the plane of language, on the contrary, it amounts to holding only those expressions to be significant which have a bearing upon the paradigmatic or the empirical world. Thus, ontologically it is opposed to considering anything and everything to be real just because we are inclined to do so, on whatever ground it might be, no matter whether it is relevant to the philosophy of the Buddha. Likewise, whatever sort of information we might be prone to consider to be worthwhile on whatever ground is not sought to be held to be so, especially because it in no way may be held to be significant with regard to our being able to satisfactorily interpret and make sense of the philosophy of the Buddha. In the same vein no knowledge by description or through linguistic communication could, on his view, be held to be important unless it, in someway or the other, has any bearing upon the philosophy of the Buddha on the one hand and upon the sort of the world with reference to which minimally it could and should be shown to be significant on the other. This simplicity and economy consideration as a determinative category of Dharmakīrti's philosophical enterprise enables him to cast relationship between ontology, epistemology and communication in a garb different from those adopted by *Nyāya* philosophers, who seem to operate along maximalistic avenue so that no world or item held to be belonging to it could bc excluded, no piece of information could be sought to be eliminated or no so-called significant expression could be denied the privilege of describing anythlng in the world or some of the other information we have about it at our disposal.

Thus, whether ontologically, epistemologically or communicationally it is proliferative tendency that is sought affectively to be curbed. This kind of curbing of extremes and one-sidedness is

sought to enable him steer his way of interpreting the philosophy of the Buddha along the Middle Path. But it is also sought to consider unwaveringly the paradigmaticity of the empirical world—the world which is enough to make sense of the philosophy of the Buddha and the world with reference to which the Buddha philosophised. It is, again, treating every expression to be not necessarily significant with reference to the empirical world that enables him to mark off such a kind of world from any conceivable world that may be held to be having bearing on the philosophy of the Buddha, or vice versa.

Thus, at the hands of Dharmakīrti empirical world is considered to be paradigmatic not only because it is enough to show Buddha's philosophy to be significant with reference to it, but also because it is simplest and the most easily available world we can have at our disposal with regard to which at least the philosophy of the Buddha needs to be shown to be significant. Adherence to the principle of simplicity in this way does bring in nominalistic trends in his philosophy and philosophic enterprise. But this is not because he intends to put forth a nominalistic philosophy—no matter whether it is consistent with the philosophy of the Buddha or not—but rather because such a subscription to economy, simplicity or minimalistic approach is conducive to and determinative of interpreting Buddha's philosophy in an appropriate way. His taking *Anātmadarśana* to be the principal aspect of Buddha's philosophy is likewise another side of his subscription to simplicity in the sense that it is an effective non-proliferative device and since the Buddha is all the while busy in bringing to our notice some of the unsurmountable consequences we are likely to be confronted with if we do not check and curb the proliferative tendency to which we unwittingly fall prey. It is, thus, not an attactiveness of the alternative that weighs with Dharmakīrti as much as its serviceability to bring in that sort of insight into and illumination about Buddha's philosophy which otherwise would not be available. Simplicity consideration is important in his view both intuitively as well as methodologically. Intuitively because it enables us to make sense of the philosophy of the Buddha with reference to sparcely populated world as contrasted with thickly populated world, as also because it would enable us to understand it without bringing in those considerations which are alien and

foreign to it. And methodologically because even when empirical world is taken to be paradigmatic, within the framework of momentary empiricism—as individual and social empiricisms are satisfactorily explainable in terms of it—, as the minimal world given to us experientially the philosophy of the Buddha could be interpreted in all its principal tenets, no matter whether with regard to its consideration of the thesis of impermanence and non-staticity or that of *Anattā* or even that of possibility of end of pain and suffering in human life—individual or social.

Subscription to simplicity principle has also another important aspect connected with it at the hands of Dharmakīrti. Instead of presuming the empirical world to be composed of heterogeneous entities and instead of holding of heterogeneity to be its structural feature he seems more prone to hold that the paradigmatic empirical world is composed of homogeneous entities called *Svalakṣaṇas* each of which, in principle, could be given to us in terms of momentary perception. Such an empirical world which is composed of homogeneous entities would lack considerable amount of richness of content in the form of heterogeneity and complexity. But this is because heterogeneity and complexity are inessential demands and are contrary to the satisfaction of the conditions of adequacy and clarity so strikingly demanded by viable interpretation of the philosophy of the Buddha. Yet simplicity and homogeneity at the hands of Dharmakīrti do not become so simplistic as to assume nothing else but discrete, unique particulars alone to be there, as Nāgārjuna does, so that the very possibility of similarity between or even possibility of communication about them is ruled out even in principle. For, as pointed out earlier, Dharmakīrti would allow communication and rational knowledge about such momentary entities in so far as they have similarity or shared features, although having such similarity or shared features is not their existentially and inevitably a structural feature.

Where, on the contrary, similarity or shareable features indicated by words and conventionality bring forth features which are not actually possessed by things belonging to the world, such features are judiciously sought to be segregated from those which as a matter of fact are possessed by things, however accidentally they might be so possesed.

Contrasted with Nāgārjuna, Dharmakīrti shows Middle Path to be the position of the Buddha both methodologically as well as intuitively. But through subscription of the principle of economy and simplicity he is also in a position to strengthen and reinforce that to be the central contention of the Buddha with special reference to paradigmaticity of empirical world. His weeding through the jungle of extremes of literal *Śūnyavāda* or that of *Sarvāstivāda* on the one hand or those of there being no shareable feature at all or all features being nothing else but shareable on the other is helped through his subscription to the principle of economy and simplicity.

Apart form such general implications of Dharmakīrti's subscription to simplicity as a determining category of the conceptual framework and unity of his philosophy let us briefly glance at some of the illustrative examples of the way it brings about certain important consequences contextually. According to Dharmakīrti there are two sort of knowable, namely, *Svalakṣaṇa* and *Sāmānya-lakṣaṣa*.[2] Among these two, *Svalakṣaṇa* alone is necessarily real.[3] Hence, if one wants to comprehend the nature of that which cannot fail to be real in Dharmakīrti's philosophy, it is sufficient for him to comprehend the nature of *Svalakṣaṇa*. Independently of *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa, Sva-lakṣaṇa* can be comprehended, as *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* can be comprehended, independently of *Svalakṣaṇa*. Again, he accepts that there are two distinct features of the world and to comprehened the world it is sufficient to accept that there are only two sorts of knowables, namely, *Svalakṣaṇa* and *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* and over and above them there is none.[4] These knowables are comprehended by perception and inference respectively, and it is sufficient to accept

2. धर्मकीर्ति; प्रमाणवार्तिक; अर्थक्रियासमर्थं यत् तदत्र परमार्थसत् .
अन्यत् संवृत्तिसत् प्रोक्तम्; ते स्वसामान्यलक्षणे ॥3॥
प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 100.

3. धर्मकीर्ति; न्यायबिन्दु; ···तदेव परमार्थं सत् । प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 3.

4. (1) धर्मकीर्ति; प्रमाणवार्तिक; न प्रत्यक्षपरोक्षाभ्यां मेयस्यान्यस्य सम्भवः। तस्मात् प्रमेयद्वित्वेन प्रमाणद्वित्वमिष्यते ॥63॥ प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 120.
(2) मनोरथनन्दी; प्रमाणवार्तिकवृत्ति; तच्च द्विविधमिति··· तृतीयादिकं न प्रमाणम्; तृतीयादिप्रमेयाभावात् । नाप्येकम् : द्वितीयस्य प्रमेयस्य तेनानधिगते···प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 120.

two *Pramāṇas* because other than these two knowables there is none and hence it is not necessary to accept any additional *Pramāṇa*[5] either. This shows, as pointed out earlier, either that in all only two sort of features, viz. non-shareable and shareable, are knowables and that all our knowledge comes to us through experience or description. His simplicity consideration is also reflected in his views regarding perception, inference and their interrelation. It is pointed out previously that since according to Dharmakīrti *Pratyakṣa* is *Kalpanāpodha*. *Nirvikalpa Pratyakṣa* alone is *Pratyakṣa* in the true sense of the term.[6] this is also because in order that we may come to perceive anything at all it is not necessary that it has shareable featuers, as also because shareable features are never preceptible. This is further because communicability and shareability are not conditions which needs to be fulfilled by the very occurrence of experience itself. Lastly, whatever feature of perceptible object which could be given to us could be given to us only via *Laukika Pratyakṣa* and over and above it there is just no need to assume *Alaukika Pratyakṣa* as an independent variety of *Pratyakṣa*. For, it not only goes against subscription to the principle of economy but also against paradigmaticity of empirical world.

Such a minimalistic consideration is also reflected in his analysis of inference. While elaborating the nature of *Hetu*, as pointed out in the third chapter, he holds that there are three important characteristics of *Hetu*, namely, *Pakṣa Sattva*, *Sapakṣa Sattva* and *Apakṣa Asattva*. Likewise, these three characteristics of *Hetu* are sufficient to determine validity of an argument. When the problem of fashioning and formulating an argument arises it is not necessary to consider either our being able to communicate it or our being able to use it in the context of debate and controversy. Dharmakīrti, further, accepts that there are three kinds of *Anumāna*, namely, *Svabhāvānumāna*, *Kāryānumāna* and *Anupalabdhi Anumana*. Among these three kinds of *Anumāna* the first two indicate *Vidhi* (obtainable) objects, while the third indicates *Anupala-*

5. धर्मकीर्ति; प्रमाणवार्तिक; श्र्येकसंख्यानिरासो वा प्रमेयद्वयदर्शनात् ॥64॥.
प्रत्यक्ष परि० पृ० 120.

6. धर्मोत्तर; न्यायबिन्दुटीका; ननु निर्विकल्पकत्वात्प्रत्य क्षमेव···प्रत्यक्ष परि०
पृ० 19.

bdhi (non-obtainable) objects.[7] Other than *Vidhi* objects and *Anupalabdhi* objects there is none other. Likewise, over and above the three *Hetvābhāsas* acknowledged by Buddhists in general and Dharmakīrti in particular, no other is required to be acknowledged as *Naiyāyikas do.*

Thus, whether it is the context of discussing some of the important tenets of the philosophy of the Buddha, or that of discussing any particular issue with reference to our perceptual or inferential cognition with reference to which Buddha's philosophy could be sought to be interpreted and understood it is the consideration of the principle of economy and simplicity that weights with Dharmakīrti and therefore, the sort of conceptual framework which he seeks to put forth or the kind of unity of his philosophic enterprise which he seeks to outline are decisively determined and influenced by it. Independently of the consideration of its impact and influence our understanding of his philosophy, its conceptual framework and the unity of his philosophic enterprise are likely to be seriously inadequate.

(b) *Continued Relevance of Buddha's Philosophy*: After the demise of the Buddha his followers did not wish to study his philosophy merely as a matter of museum piece and out of sheer historical interest. Even though since the time of the demise of the Buddha the circumstances and situation changed the message of the Buddha was not sought to be kept buried permanently in the historical past, never to be resurrected—only to be respected from a distance but never to be approached and imbibed. Nor was Buddha's philosophy merely utopian and idealistic such that it could not be brought in practice and linked with human life—individual or social. Were it so, it would have been extremely hard to understand how it would have enabled countless people to seek their deliverness from pain and suffering in their life. At the same time in every epoch, century, time, circumstance it might not have been intuitively and obviously clear to everybody as to how one would be able to link one's life with his teaching and vice versa. Likewise, in the heads of doubting devils number of cobwebs of muddled headed

7. धर्मकीर्ति; न्यायबिन्दु; अत्र द्वौ वस्तुसाधनौ। एकः प्रतिषेधहेतुः। स्वार्थानुमान परि० पृ० 29

understanding of his teaching due to distortion of it at the hands of both his enthusiastic adherents as well as sworn detractors might have come to be given rise to, as a result of which they might have been unable to see clearly their way out of such difficulties. In such circumstance someone is required to take voluntarily upon himself the task of explaining and explicating the continued relevance of the teaching of the Buddha. This is required to be done for more than one reasons. Some important of them are:

(i) To show that Buddha's teaching has not become obsolete and therefore worthless, (ii) to dispel doubts in the heads of laymen, half-informed and ill-informed persons, and (iii) to counter the indefensible and untenable charges levelled against it and to put it in the right and proper sort of perspective. Such a kind of need must have arisen in the time of Dharmakīrti as well,[8] as it had arisen in the time of Diṅnāga.[9] Given this the problem of bringing out such an interpretation of the philosophy of the Buddha which on the one hand is non-discordant with its central tenets and yet, on the other hand, brings forth such novel and hitherto unknown aspects of it in the light of which relevance and significance of the teaching of the Buddha could be seen in proper way comes to surface. One can surmise that in the face of such a problem Dharmakīrti must have been induced to embark upon his philosophic career and enterprise. He must have indeed come to be confronted with a cluster of problems on this count, some of which originated from within the camp of the adherents of Buddhism itself while others were progenies of the brains of the adversaries of Buddhism. The net result of both of them must have been intellectual confusion and lack of rational and methodological sophistication. Faced with such problems he must have taken upon himself not only the task of outlining such principal

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8. धर्मकीर्ति; प्रमाणवार्तिक; तेनायं न परोपकार इति नश्चिन्तापि चेतश्चिरम्
सूक्ताभ्यासविवर्धितव्यसनमित्यत्राबुबद्धस्पृहम् ।।2।।
प्रमाण सिद्धि परि० पृ० 3.

9. दिन्नाग; प्रमाणसमुच्चय; प्रमाणभूताय जगद्धितैषिणे प्रणम्यशास्त्रे युगताय तायिन्जे।
कुतर्कसाभ्रान्तजनानुकम्मया प्रमाणसिद्धिर्विधिवद्विधीयते ।।1।। प्रमाण परि०
पृ० quoted in प्रमाणवार्तिक पृ० 3.
संपा स्वामी द्वारिकादासशास्त्री.

aspects of the philosophy of the Buddha as they continue to have relevance and give a sketch of those methodological considerations in the light of and within the framework of which they could be immunised systematically from their otherwise vulnerability. The task that he took upon himself was indeed a complicated one and for a person of his acumen, intellectual competence, dedication and zeal that he accomplished it in his numerous treatises is not a matter of surprise. But the fact remains, however, that one of the factors which must have wielded considerable influence upon him and his philosophical enterprise is to bring out as clearly and unambiguously as possible the continued relevance of the philosophy and the teaching of the Buddha. This, therefore, seems to be the second determinant of the conceptual framework and unity of the philosophy of Dharmakīrti.

(c) *Impact of his Predecessors*: Dharmakīrti, however, does not intend to go about his business all alone and totally unaided by or unmindful of his predecessors, no matter whether Buddhists or non-Buddhists. It is again not true to say that his falling upon predecessors in more for support, endorsement and reinforcement of what he wants to uphold and defend, while his making reference to the views of his adversaries is more for attack and criticism. He never mixes between reverence and truth and accordingly he would always hold—especially about a Buddhist predecessor—that his predecessor is great, but wherever he would consider truth to be greater still he would have no compunction not only to differ from but even criticise such predecessor. He, for instance, is critical of Diṅnāga on the count of his views on *Pratyakṣa* as well as *Anumāna* in his *Nyāyabindu*. From his commentators we learn about the numerous references he makes to his predecessors, although often without explicitly mentioning their names, either in support of his view or with view to criticising the view put forth by them.

It goes without saying that Dharmakīrti is in a position to see wider horizon in so far as he stands on the shoulders of his predecessors. This is not, however, to say that he was a parasite and that he could not stand independently on his intellectual feet. He utilizes and exploits those insights of his predecessors which are helpful in spelling out some or the other aspect of the philosophy

of the Buddha. One of the considerations, thus, which seems to have remained uppermost with him is not to miss or ignore those insights at the hands of his Buddhist predecessors which are helpful in bringing out some or the other aspect of Buddha's philosophy on the one hand and not to leave any stone unturned on the count of criticising those views—whether put forth by Buddhists or non-Buddhists—which go contrary to or are unhelpful in explaining important tenets of the teaching of the Buddha on the other.

Thus, three determinants mentioned above seem to have jointly and severally shaped and determined the philosophic enterprise of Dharmakīrti. This is not to say that the entire illumination in his philosophy flows only via or from these channels and sources. But it is equally true that at the neglect of their being taken adequately into account it would be very difficult to make sense of his philosophic enterprise. It is not in vacuum that he seeks to explain the central tenets of the philosophy of the Buddha. It is on some canvas and background; but it is within its appropriate conceptual framework and without loss of its unity.

Having looked into some of the important determinants of Dharmakīrti's philosophy we need to take a fresh look at the ways in which his philosophy has come to be characterised and lebelled with a view to capturing important feature/s of it. It is to this consideration that the next section is addressed.

Possibility of the Characterisation of Dharmakīrti's Philosophic Position

In the first chapter it was pointed out that at the hands of modern scholars Dharmakīrti's philosophical position has been interpreted and characterised variously. There we saw that none of these interpretations either jointly or severally explicate Dharmakīrti's philosophical position appropriately because, first, the conceptual framework that these scholars have articulated is not determined by the proper determining consideration of it. None of the points which have weighed with those who have characterised his philosophical position one way or the other seem to gather any decisive importance with Dharmakīrti. The only consequence of this is that different interpretations of his philosophy have been

attempted without pausing to inquire whether any of them is appropriate in the light of what he has written. Secondly, if we accept any of these characterisations seriously then we not only continue to miss chief tenets of Dharmakīrti's philosophic enterprise but also continue to fail in the task of capturing principal points in the philosophy of the Buddha. Nor are we in a position to bring out continued relevance of it in the context of changing circumstances and situations. Thirdly, if, as pointed out earlier, the main task before Dharmakīrti is to explicate the philosophy of the Buddha in its principal tenets with reference to paradigmatic empirical world and the paradigmatic problem of *Anattā* and not so much to put forth his own philosophical position, then various characterisations of Dharmakīrti's philosophy could be held to characterise Buddha's philosophy itself variously. But we are told repeatedly by the tradition of Buddhist philosophy which came to prevail in this country after the demise of the Buddha that he refused to characterise his philosophy to be capable of being pigeon-holed appropriately into the sorting socket of any characterisation. This is not, however, tantamount to saying that the Buddha had no philosophy worth the name or that it had no crucial tenet af any kind to exhibit. On the contrary, any extant mode of characterisation of it was found to be inadequate to capture it in its entire richness and warmth. It would be preposterous to hold that the philosophy of the Buddha appealed to people during the life-time of the Buddha, and even later on it kept on attracting people from various countries and walks of life towards it because and in so far as it was idealistic or realistic monistic or pluralistisc, this worldly or other worldly. Likewise, it would be equally questionable and indefensible to hold that Dharmakīrti succeeded in explicating the principal tenets of the philosophy of the Buddha because and in so far as he gave to it an idealistic or realistic, epistemological rather than ontological, empirical and this worldly rather than non-empirical and otherworldly bias or turn. Were Dharmakīrti's success to lie along any of these paths he would have at the most been in a position to give rise to yet another interpretation of Buddha's philosophy.

But as we saw it is not in this that the characteristic importance and significance of his philosophic enterprise lie.

Had it been so he would have been yet another interpreter of Buddha's philosophy. Nor was he an eclectic, wishing to collect honey alone from the bechives of various interpretations of Buddha's philosophy. In such a case he should have come out with a treatise of the nature of anthology of good points in the extant interpretations of the philosophy of the Buddha, right from the time of the first such attempts at interpreting his philosophy since his demise. None of his treatises could, however, be accused of this. Nor can his paying close attention to intuitive as well as methodological considerations be said to be geared at anything of this kind.

This is not to say that at the hands of adherents of Buddhism in successive centuries and generations some or the other aspect of Buddha's philosophy did not at all come to be highlighted and emphasised, sometimes so onesidedly that it seemed as if that were the only aspect of it worthy of paying concerted and close attention to. Likewise, it cannot be said that at the hands of his followers the philosophy of the Buddha did not come to be distorted and misinterpreted either, although it could not be said to be the principal aim of those attempts. For, in that case deliberate and calculated distortion of Buddha's philosophy must, unfortunately, come to be considered to be the principal task these attempts wanted to accomplish. Even a sworn adversary of Buddhism cannot sensibly advance such a claim and defend it reasonably. This does not mean that Buddha's followers and interpreters of his philosophy could be absolved to tally and completely of distorting and misinterpreting it. But in the light of such distartions and misinterpretations of it in this way that people must have come to be puzzled as to what is the principal teaching of the Buddha, what are its important tenets, and what sort of continued relevance does it come to have. For, in the absence of clear information on any of these counts there seems to be no reason as to why people should have falt attracted towards the philosophy of the Buddha and would have been able to counter any attack on it—commonsensical or otherwise. But to do anything of these Dharmakīrti no longer felt it to be necessary to pigeon hole or characterise Buddha's philosophy one or the other way. For, he must have been convinced as no one else that any move of this kind would bring

in an additional distortion into Buddha's philosophy, however unwittingly it might be. He is. of course, critical of such attempts on the part of his predecessors and adversaries. But his criticism of them does not spring from his intention to supplant them by yet another novel way of characterising the philosophy of the Buddha. For he seems to be convinced that any such attempt would be as frustrating and unrewarding as earlier attempts had been, jointly or severally. That is why characterisation of Buddha's philosophy one or the other way—even in the most appropriate way—does not and cannot remain an uppermost task on his mind and in no treatise of his does he ever reck up any problem of this kind.

Given this, it is a small wonder, therefore, that Dharmakīrti does not take upon himself the task of characterising Buddha,s philosophy one or the othei way. Since, further, he does not intend to put forth his own philosophy—whatever it might mean—the question of his characterising it appropriately, too, does not arise in any of his treatises. Nor does he wish to exclusively highlight any particular approach or perspective with reference to Buddha's philosophy. Absence of any characterisation of his philosophy one or the other way at the hands of Dharmakīrti is not, thus, a matter of accident. He does not take up such a route firstly because Buddha's philosophy cannot be characterised with the help of any of the extant labels and secondly because understanding and interpreting Buddha's philosophy appropriately through this or that sort of characterisation of it is a move which is bound to be frustrating. Instead of this, he prefers to concentrate his attention upon such problems as to what sort of world could it be with reference to which at least Buddha's philosophy could be shown to be significant, what problem could it be which seems to have engaged his attention maximally and due to which reason, and which insights of the Buddhist predecessors could be said to be decisively significant in our attempt at capturing central tenets of Buddha's philosophy etc. Going about his business in this way he prefers to stick to the line of least resistance, subscribes to the minimalistic principle which insists upon satisfaction of sufficient conditions for our being able to make sense of Buddha's philosophy and its central tenets. Thus, for example, according to Dharmakīrti, upholding momentariness of percetible things is sufficient to comprehend the nature and structure of

the world given perceptually and again it is enough to explicate Buddha's philosophy with reference to empirical world to be paradigmatic.

In trying to make sense of and interpret Buddha's philosophy in this way he is found to be upholding and defending some of those doctrines and principles which have found eloquence with *Vijñānvādins, Sautrāntikas Vaibhāṣikas* or even with non-literal *Śūnyavādins*. But this should be considered more to be a matter of accidental feature of his philosophic enterprise and not a shrewd and clever mode of reconciliation between *Sautrāntika* and *Vaibhāṣika* schools of *Sarvāstivāda*. For, if *Sarvāstivāda* in its crude and naive form is said to bring in one kind of distortion into the philosophy of the Buddha through striking such a compromise would not Dharmakīrti be said to be arriving at or attributing such a position to the Buddha as is foreign to, discordant with and destructive of at least some of the principal tenets of Buddha's philosophy ? The task before Dharmakīrti was not of striking a balance between warring positions. Nor was it eclestic in character of gathering good points from varions interpretations from the extant of them. It was rather of explicating some of those tenets of the philosophy of the Buddha which cannot be allowed to be missed at the cost of distorting or misinterpreting it, however attractive such a line may seen to be. After all, *Sautrāntikas, Vaibhāṣikas* or *Vijñānvādins* etc. also wanted to capture and highlight some tenets of Buddha's philosophy. Their fault was not so much of supplanting Buddha's philosophy by something else or their own philosophy for that matter. They rather seem to have gone about their business carelessly distortively, and one-sidedly. It is this, which seems to have given rise to distortions of Buddha's philosophy at their hands. But this does not mean that everything that they said was non-sense and untenable or even unacceptable with regard to the philosophy of the Buddha. In our intention of articulating conceptual framework of Buddha's philosophy, sketching its unity or highlighting its principal tenets we need not come to suffer from phobia of what has been said about them and seek to reject it without scrutiny and investigations in a advance. If after an examination of this kind if some of those tenets of Buddha's philosophy which are brought to our notice by *Vijñanvādins, Vaibhāṣikas, Sautrāntikas* etc. are capable of being shown to be non-discordant with principal tenets of the philosophy of the Buddha then it would

be a mistake of a very grave kind, Dharmakīrti would hold, to reject them just because we have been made aware of them by *Vijñānvādins* etc.

Dharmakīrti in this way refuses to characterise Buddha's philosophy directly and his own philosophy indirectly not because of the sheer hate of it but rather because no characterisation can capture Buddha's philosophy in its principal tenets and without bringing in a distortion of it which would be discordant with it. It is this consideration which must have weighed with him, not a matter of substituting one characterisation of Buddha's philosophy by another or preferring one over the other. For, in his view, any move of this kind is fraught with the same kind of result of giving us a distorted picture of the Buddha's philosophy.

Increased level of sophistication and improved methodological framework would also be of no avail on this count according to Dharmakīrti for, that which is distortive and defective cannot improve the prospect of making us understand anything clearly just because it comes to be backed by a methodological framework and increased level of sophistication. Whether it is by way of characterising Buddha's philosophy or through any other way our responsibility with regard to a knowledge-claim can never be said to be over just with our coming to put it forth. The troubles begin to surface right from this stage and they begin to take our wicket especially on the level of our coming to defend them satisfactorily. And if we proceed here unguardedly and unwittingly the entire project is bound to end up in confusion and bewitchment rather than any clarity and illumination arising from it. The methodological sophistication cannot be used as a guarb of hiding our confusion and unclarity.

The fundamental mistake which characterisation of Dharmakīrti's philosophcal position at the hands of scholars...modern or contemporary...gives rise to is to treat some or the other thread, thought, doctrine, principle available in his philosophy to be the most important and decisively significant. It is given such a status and importance that the entire philosophic enterprise is said to almost revolve around it as its principal shaft. Thus, for expample, in the context of justifying our knowledge-claims if and in so for as Dharmakīrti, in agreement with at least some *Vijñānvādins*, holds

that our own *Vijñāpti* could be said to be the legitimate basis of such a warrant and certification, he is held to be *Vijñānvādin*. This view of Dharmakīrti needs to be carefully distinguished from what may be called a solipsistic stance, which does not necessarily make one an idealist as observed in the first chapter. Or in so far as he accepts reality of external world he cannot just on that ground be taken to be a *Sautrāntika*. He cannot be accused of attempting a hybrid or synthesis of this or that kind either. Such modes of characterisations of his philosophy are not only alien to the spirit of his philosophic enterprise but are also distortive of its thrust and focus. It is this which very often happens to be lost sight of, in spite of the fact that it engenders confusion and error.

There is also one more tendency at work in trying to capture the important aspects of Dharmakīrti's philosophic enterprise through its characterisation in one or the other way. It is this that we somehow do not feel satisfied unless the philosophic position of any philosopher of Indian origin comes to be pigeon-holed through one or the other way of its being characterised with the help of a label borrowed from western philosophic milieu. We are often unmindful of the distortions. Such characterisations bring in and makes us miss some of the chief tenets of the philosophy which we so characterise. In the case of Dharmakīrti's philosophy similar kind of situation his, unfortunately come to prevail and in consequence has made our vision about it so myopic and distortive that in the process we have come to miss some of its crucial aspects. The loss is indeed very great and the situation would not come to be repaired unless we begin with the reversal and rejection of this trend. It is something along this line that is attempted to be done in the foregoing pages with a view to not making our vision and insight into Dharmakīrti's philosophy short-sighted and non-transperent. It seeks to avoid the danger of our getting a distortive and untenable characterisation of it as well.

Thus, our reservation about and dissatisfaction with Dharmakīrti's philosophic position being characterised one or the other way should be held to be threefold : First, since the task before Dharmakīrti is to explicate and articulate the philosophy of the Buddha in its chief tenets so that we do not miss any significant and important aspect of it since Buddha's philosophy cannot be pigen-holed

into one or the other characterisation of it and since Dharmakīrti does not wish to put forth his own philosophy in preference to that of the Buddha through characterising it one or the other way we are not likely to throw any light on it which would enlighten us in a hitherto unknown and unfamiliar way through characterising it in one of the other fashion. Secondly, since any characterisation of Dharmakīrti's philosophy in one or the other way is characterisation of the Buddha's philosophy itself and since any such characterisation of it is bound to bring in an element of distortion and misinterpretation of it earlier we free ourselves from the temptation of pigen-holing it in the socket of one characterisation of it or the other the better. Thirdly, western philosophic modes of characterising somebody's philosophy one or the other way are foreign and alien to the very spirit and essence of our philosophic traditions and unless we give them up we are not likely to gain any better and clearer insight into our philosophical heritage and past. This being the case, whatever way, Dharmakīrti's philosophy in particular and any philosophy of Indian origin in general that is sought to be characterised in one or the other western modes of characterisation of it is bound to be unsatisfactory and distortive of it. It is the wholesale, unreserved protest against characterisation of Dharmakīrti's philosophy one or the other way which makes us voice our protest against them and not preference for one characterisation of it over the other.

From the foregoing discussion it should be amply clear as to why any of the characterisations of Dharmakīrti's philosophy or that of the Buddha should be treated not only with the element of suspicion and doubt but that of its utter rejection as well. It is this approach which prompted us to undertake exploration into his philosophy afresh and investigate what could be said to be the principal contribution of the philosophic enterprise on the part of Dharmakīrti. Although this sort of inquiry does not readily enable us to characterise his philosophic enterprise one or the other way through characteri sation of it in one or the other fashion, it does enable us to gain a deeper insight into and illumination about it is hoped, which otherwise would have been unavailable to us. This gain is not small but the loss is not regretable either. It is in this light that the various *treatises which* Dharmakīrti wrote...principal

or subordinate...need to be looked into and brought to bear upon one another.

In the preceding two sections of this chapter we looked into two important points with regard to Dharmakīrti's philosophy: (i) the determinants of his philosophic enterprise, and (ii) the possibility of characterising his philosophic enterprise in one or the other way with a view to capturing every prominent insight of it and not missing any tenet of the philosophic enterprise on the part of the Buddha. An inquiry into these two aspects of his philosophic enterprise would not suffice, however. It needs to be inquired as to why and what sort of vulnerability might have come to be given rise to in the Buddhist philosophy in general and Dharmakīrti's philosophy in particular as a result of which death knell of the decline and fall of Buddhist philosophy in this subcontinent might have come to be sounded without any intrinsic proportion to the urgency of it. Of course, other factors might have also contributed to it, jointly or severally. But unless some internal vulnerability might have been given rise to at the hands of adherents of Buddhist philosophy it is hard to imagine the almost utter extinction of its unbroken traditions spread over a fairly long duration. There are philosophic traditions as that of Jainism which withstood the onslaught of external aggressions and attacks on it from the alien traditions. The tenacity and perseverence they exhibited was not something totally foreign to Buddhist philosophy, being reared and nurtured in the same cultural tradition. But in spite of this, it is a historical fact that the tradition Buddhist philosophy in this country almost disappeared till it came to be rejuvinated and resuscitated quite lately and recently. There must, therefore, have been a factor responsible for the decline and downfall of the tradition of Buddhist philosophy in this country from within its own fold. It remains to be seen and inquired into as to what such a factor, creative of internal vulnerability in the Buddhist philosophic tradition, might have been which might have taken its toll, though it was not planned, manveuoered and engineered that way consciously and in all fairness. It is into this aspect of Buddhist philosophy that we wish to inquire into in the following section.

Internal Vulnerability in Buddhism After Dharmakīrti :

It is pointed out earlier that Dharmakīrti accepts minimalistic principle. His entire exercise is determined by subscription to

this principle. Every important consideration is raised, every problem is discussed and each concept is interpreted in a minimalistic way. That is way at the hands of Dharmakīrti the principle of *Kṣaṇikatā* or *Anityatā* is interpreted in a very flexible way. According to him accepting literal sense of *Kṣaṇikatā* is not essential to our being able to make sense of so ne of the important tenets of the philosophy of the Buddha. It is not at all necessary to hold that nothing lasts for more than one moment. He holds that to have an empiricl experience of the object it is sufficient that is exists and is given to us at least for one moment. Actually by accepting *Kṣaṇikatā* and *Anityatā* what he wants to deny is staticity, permanence or eternality. According to him, to interpret the nature of the world, to comprehend diversity, continuity and change as also to be able to make satisfactory sense of the teaching of the Buddha it is not necessary that things should be static or permanent.

Instead of considering staticity and permanence to be the structural features of the world and things belonging to it, to bring out the consistency with the teaching of the Buddha he holds change and dynamism to be their built-in-feature. It is permanent possibility of liability to change and non-immunisation of anything from it that, according to him is the essence and heart of it. Likewise, perspective from which he considers the nature of the empirical world and things belonging to it is that of cosmocentricity rather than that of anthropocentricity. In his view such a kind of perspective is enough to be adopted if we are to succeed in understanding the neture of the world as the Buddha wants us to understand it. This is principally because the anthropocentric perspective is more likely to bring in such faetures of the world and of things belonging to it which by no stretch of imagination be side to be essential to determine their nature or existence.

Thirdly, Dharmakīrti seems to impress upon us that "the Budha rejected only a particular notion of self which had been current in his day."[10] Yet one can surmise that it was a dominant one and yet unacceptable to him. This means the Buddha did not perhaps seek to repudiate any and every notion of self but only that which

10. Pratap Chandra ; "A 'Middle Path' Social Philosophy : Norms Reflected in Early Pāli Literature" in *Social Transformation And Creative Imagination* (ed.) Sudhir Chandra, 1984, p. 40.

sought to bring in vogue and subscribed to some kind of premanent and eternal self, especially the one that is said to outlast the duration of the present and non-permanent life. This kind of notion of self was sought to be repudiated both by the Buddha and also by Dharmakīrti because in their view in particular and that of Buddhists in general the notion of death which is accepted is that of cessation of *Vijñāna*, capability of sense-organs and that of life,[11] as also because there is nothing that transmigrates or passes from one life to another.[12]

Fourthly, Dharmakīrti sought to emphasise that "the Buddha prehced religion and philosophy whose commitment to realism and empiricism was total and uncompromissing." [13] This being the case, paradigmaticity of empirical world was a feature in his philosophy which was non-accidental and indispensable.

Fifthly, *Apoha*, as pointed out earlier, was sought to be utilized and exploited in Dharmakīrti's philosophy as a powerful tool using which we can hope hope to differentiate and distinguish one *Svalakṣaṇa* kind of things from another without falling prey to confusion and error.

But in the post-Dharmakīrti period Buddhist philosophy, did these insights of his come to be preserved and perpetuated in their purity and unadulterated condition? Unfortunately at the hands of his successors number of distortions and aberrations come to be introduced as a result of whtch vulnerability in Buddhist philosophy come to be created and given rise to from within and as the domain of this kind of vulnerability went on increasing and proliferating the seeds of its decling and downfall came to be sown widely and deeply. It is into this aspect of Buddhist philosophy of the post-Dharmakīrti period that we wish to induire briefly in what follows.

First, as we saw earlier Dharmakīrti's approach to *Kṣaṇikatā* and *Anityatā* was minimalistic in the sense he spelt out those minimum conditions of duration which need to be satisfied in order

11. मनोरथनन्दी : प्रमाणवार्तिकवृत्ति : तथा विज्ञानेन्द्रियायुर्निरोधलक्षणं मरणमिष्टं बौद्धसिद्धान्ते प्रमाणसिद्धि परि० पृ० 15.
12. तत्रैव : नहि संसारी कश्चिदस्ति प० 67.
13. Pratap Chandra; A 'Middle Path' Social Philosophy ; Reflected in Early Pali Literature in *Social Transformation And Creative Imagination* (ed.) Sudhir Chandra 1984, p. 41.

that we may experience things or in order that they may exist. He also wanted to explain change and impermanence in their light so that Buddha's analysis of impermanence and its important implications, including *Anattā*, could be satisfactorily explicated. For, according to the Buddha "material and non-material spheres of life and existence have nothing in common except impermanence"[14] with which they are permanently infected. To be able to satisfactorily explain impermanence and its implications as well as its bearing upon cessation of pain and suffering in human life with due respect to experience situation around us and our being able to live without succumbing to their pressure it is not necessary to hold that everything—material or non-material—needs to last not more than a moment and that nothing can last more than a moment, at the most one moment being the longest stretch of the duration or life of anything. But this, unfortunately is how *Kṣaṇikatā* or *Kṣaṇbhaṅga* came later on to be understood at the hands of Post-Dharmakīrti Buddhist philosophers.[15] Instead of *Kṣaṇikatā* or *Kṣaṇbhaṅga* being understood as a minimum condition of impermanence it came rather to be taken as the sole and only necessary and sufficient condition of it. That is, *Kṣaṇbhaṅga* came to be interpreted maximalistically, a move contraty to Dharmakīrti's intention and exploration. It may also be understood as a move to understand *Kṣaṇbhaṅga* and its implications when it is carried to its logical extreme. We need not explore here into the reasons which might have prompted philosophers like the author of *Kṣaṇbhaṅgasiddhi* to write the sort of treatises they wrote. But the fact remains that at their hands it was perhaps thought that unless *Kṣaṇbhaṅga* was understood literally and maximalistically there was no way of making satisfactory sense of impermanence and its important implications to teach us which the Buddha spent his life time.

Secondly, for Dharmakīrti it was minimally enough to understand empirically given world to be paradigmatic and comprehend Buddha's teaching with reference to it in order to come to live in accordance with and within the framework of his teaching. There is no need to posit any other world although Buddha's teaching may perhaps be extended to a world other than the empirically

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14. *Ibid*, p. 49.

15. रत्नकीर्ति; क्षणभंगसिद्धि.

given. But this minimalistic insight of Dharmakīrti was forgotten in the Post-Dharmakīrti period of Buddhist philosophy. Otherwise it is very difficult to understand the phenomenon of such treatises as *Paraloksiddni* being written.[16] Perhaps the motive that might have prompted such treatises being written was to consider to what sort of world other than the empirical world could, applicability of Buddha's teaching, be extended, provided such a world could be shown to be non-discordant with the empirical world. Such a move tried to understand Buddha's teaching and its implications maximalistically and even literally. This is certainly contrary to what Dharmakīrti wanted to accomplish. But more seriously, while at the hands of Dharmakīrii *Attā* remains impermanent although non-eternal and non-migratory from this to any other world, at the hands of such authors as those of *Parloksiddhi* not only worlds come to be multiplied but *Atta* perhaps happens to be taken to be permanent and migratory from one to another life or world as well. It needs hardly to be pointed out that such a move is not only contrary to Dharmakīrti's contention but to the teaching of the Buddha as well. For, under this approach we are required to give up at least partly the thesis of impermanence. But once this move is made the difference between the philosophy of the Buddha and that of others can hardly be made out and defended.

Thirdly, Dharmakīrti, as pointed out above, wanted to impress upon us that everything—material as well as non-material—is impermanent and not necessarily that it lasts only at the most for a moment. But at the hands of post-Dharmakīrti Buddhist writers, two consequences seem to have been given rise to, each of which goes contrary not only to the minimalistic contention of Dharmakīrti but also to the teaching of the Buddha. On the one hand, in so far as *Kṣaṇikatā* or *Kṣaṇbhanga* came to be understood literally and maximally it came to be contended that nothing lasts more than a moment and that there is nothing like *Attā* or self at all. On the other hand, those who posited world other than the empirical one had perhaps no compunction to accept more than one world and also at least permanent self, if not permanent things as well. But on each of these alternatives there must have arisen unsurmountable difficulties, the chief of them being a very gravs kind of inconsis-

16. घर्मोत्तर; परलोकसिद्धि.

tency in the Buddhist camp, on the background of which the Buddhist philosophers must have found it to be extremely difficult not only to explain salient features of Buddha's teaching but also to counter criticisms which came to be hurled at it from adherents of non-Buddhist trends of Indian philosophic tradition.

Fourthly, the paradigmaticity of the empirically given world began, in the post-Dharmakīrti period of Buddhist philosophy, perhaps to be taken less and less seriously. As a result, it was perhaps thought that it is not with reference to this world and our experience in it that the Buddha came to formulate and put forth his philosophic teaching and that he also thought that it is perfectly possible to put an end to pain and suffering in this life itself and attain *Nirvāṇa*. But contrary to this it came to be held that *Nirvāṇa* is a state which is attainable in some world other than the one in which we normally live and that it is with reference to such a world that Buddha's philosophy is primarily formulated. This kind of shift from this worldliness to other worldiness might have created a serious kind of vulnerability in Buddhist philosophy.

Fifthly, as pointed out above *Apoha* was meant to be understood as a methodological tool and was also expected to be used as such. As a result nobody bothered to prove it or prove its being there, as if it is an ontological entity of some or the other kind. But at the hands of the author of *Apohasiddhi*[17] something of this kind perhaps comes unfortunately to be done. What perhaps he wanted to do was to explicate the nature of the methodological tool called *Apoha*. But in that case the title of the work should have been *Apohvivaraṇa* rather than *Apohasiddhi*. Dharmakīrti, for example, wrote fairly extensively on *Hetu* in his *Hetubindu* directed at explicating its nature and implications. But he never proceeded to prove that there is such a thing as *Hetu*. Through the sort of moves like the one on the part of the author of *Apohasiddhi* paradigmaticity of empirical world and Dharmakīrti's bias for empiricality came progressively to be eroded and in consequence his minimalistic principle came also to be progressively either abridged or totally given up altogether.

17. रत्नकीर्ति; अपोहसिद्ध.

In face of the above-mentioned kind of aberrations and distortions it is but natural to expect that a considerable amount of internal vulnerability must have come to be given rise to from within the Buddhist philosophical tradition itself. As a result of this quite a large number of weaknesses might have come to be given rise to. In face of such weaknesses it might have become progressively difficult, if not impossible altogether to defend and explicate fundamental line of approach of the Buddha to some of the important issues he himself paid close attention to on the one hand and counter satisfactorily the lines of attack summoned and counter-arguments marshalled by the adherents of non-Buddhist philosophic tradition of Indian origin on the other. Any philosophic position which figures poorly and vulnerably on each of these counts, for whatever reason it might be—conscious or unconscious, calculated and inevitable or unwitting and accidental—might be forced to succumb to its internal weakness. Such factors seem to have contributed quite considerably if not solely and exclusively, to the decline and downfall of the tradition of Buddhist philosophy in this country. A prolonged and concerted investigation is required to be undertaken to understand and asses the nature and significance of such factors which seemed to have emerged in the Post-Dharmakīrti period of Buddhist philosophy. This not being the point of our present engagement, we leave this stone unturned at the present juncture of our inquiry.

We do not wish to give an impression that such factors alone and in isolation from others might have been necessary and sufficient to bring about decline and downfall of the Buddhist philosophic tradition in our country. Our only modest and minimal plea is that such factors might have commenced a tendency in that direction and helped prepare the appropriate sort of circumstances in which their being aided and reinforced by such other factors—fore seen or unforeseen—as external aggression, condition of deteriorating social and political stability, rise in the strength of non-Buddhist philosophic traditions etc. brought in not only decline and downfall but also almost utter extinction of the Buddhist philosophical tradition in this country. Under such circumstances this kind of consequence might have become unavoidable and inevitable. It is this point which we intend to bring to the kind

notice of the interested scholars in order that its significance and importance as also its impact within and outside the camp of Buddhist philosophy does not come altogether to be ignored and disregarded.

Concluding Remarks

In the foregoing investigation we attempted to inquire into some of the important issues and problems in the philosophy of Dharmakīrti, the crowning philosopher in the tradition of Buddhist systematic philosophy with a view to assessing their significance in a way different from any hitherto undertaken and known. This differential sort of inquiry is undertaken in his philosophy in order to outline such conceptual framework and unity of his philosophic enterprise which does not ignore any important issue and yet also does not elevate its importance disproportionately as to make him merely to be a logician or methodologician or an epistemologist or a metaphysician. An attempt has been made to bring to bear important iseues in his philosophy upon one another in such a way that the central task of his philosophic enterprise, of explicating the principal tenets of the teaching of the Buddha with reference to the paradigmatic empirical world and paradigmatic problem of *Anātmadarśana* within the framework of minimalistic interpretation and understanding of impermanence in such a way that any important insight into the philosophy of the Buddha made available by any worthy predecessor in the camp of Buddhist philosophy does not come to be summarily rejected or dismissed in advance without its appropriate examination and in spite of the fact that it has been found to be non-discordant with the teaching of the Buddha. This is, further, sought to be done without suffocating and throtling his philosophic enterprise in any characterisation of it in one or the other way for the very simple reason that Dharmakīrti disfavours it and the Buddha abhors it. Investigation along this route has turned out to be a fairly complicated exercise and we are aware that it could be further refined and improved. Whatever shortcomings knowledgeable people will find in the present investigation are to be understood as originating from our side and Dharmakīrti cannot be held in any way responsible for them. The matter of proper and impartial assessment of the worth of the present exercise lies squarely within the jurisdiction of experts and scholars and without in any way tresspassing on it we frankly and gladly leave this in the competent hands, it being their exclusive prerogative.

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ABOUT THE BOOK

The book 'Bhuddhist Logic', i.e., Dharmakirti's philosophy : A Fresh Study is an attempt to reconstruct a better understanding of Dharmakirti's philosophy in a novel way. It is a new and fresh perspective of looking at Dharmakirti's philosophy.

The present work is completely relied upon Dharmakirti's principal works as *Pramāna-Vārttika, Nyāyabindu, Hetubindu*, and subordinate works like *Vādanyāya, Sambandhaparīksā* and *Santānāntarasiddhi*. The author has gone into great details of Dharmakirti's treatment of perception, inference and the inter- relationship between the two and has made a clear distinction between the cognitive and the certificatory aspects of Dharmakirti's epistemology.

It is hoped that this book will be a good contribution to the field of Indian Philosophy in general and Buddhist Philosophy in particular.

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Dr.(Miss) Lata Bapat did her M.A. (1979) and Ph.D.(1985) in Philosophy and also M.A. (1987) in Anthropology from the University of Poona. Presently, she is Research Associate in Buddhist Philosophy, University of Poona. She has a couple of research articles, published in the renouned journals, to her credit.

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